YEMEN

THE RAGING WAR in Yemen is a paradigmatic dispute in a faraway country between people of whom the world knows very little. But sometimes, however, its internal power struggles become entangled in wider geopolitical issues of the day. In the 1960s, for instance, the rivalry between monarchists and Arab nationalists split the Arab world. Then, Egypt intervened on the side of the nationalist republicans against the loyalists of the Zaydi imamate, backed by Saudi Arabia. Today, the great line of demarcation is the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which feeds the ravage sectarianism between Sunnis and Shias respectively. Now Saudi Arabia and Egypt are allies, often intervening to support Sunnis against the Houthis (a northern Zaydi militia, that is backed and supported by Tehran).

The conflict in Yemen is escalating. Three weeks into the air campaign, and with civilian casualties growing, there is little sign that the Saudi-led coalition has much of a political or military strategy. The difference in strengths couldn’t be starker: the poorest country in the Arab world is being bombed by one of the richest.

For the United States, which is backing the Saudi operation with logistical support and intelligence, Yemen presents two dangers. First, it is a fertile breeding ground for transnational jihadists (AQAP: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the most dangerous of the group’s branches), and secondly, it offers Iran an opportunity to extend its influence and nurture a Shia ally (which some fear might become akin to Hezbollah in Lebanon). Both risks are being piqued by the chaos.

The Houthis fought repeated conflicts with the Yemeni government led by the former strongman, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following a popular uprising and coup, the president stepped down in 2011 and power passed to a transitional government led by Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But the Houthis, now allied to the hip with Mr Saleh, took the capital, Sana’ a, last September and then marched on Aden, to which Mr Hadi had fled.

Sectarianism is not particularly strong in Yemen, and there is uncertainty about how much support Iran provides the Houthis. But, in a rhetorical sense, Iran’s backing has become strident. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, said Saudi attacks in Yemen amount to genocide. Using the social networking site Twitter, he has mocked the recently enthroned King Salman, particularly his son and defence minister, Prince Muhammad, who is in his thirties: ‘inexperienced #youngsters have come to power & replaced composure w barbarism.’ (sic)

Amid the chaos, AQAP has taken over Mukalla, a Yemeni port – although it has suffered a setback when a US drone killed one of its leaders on April 15th.

Certainly, Saudi action might have prevented the Houthis from taking all of Aden, but they are still making steady gains. Air strikes alone will not defeat them, but the ground option is receding after Pakistan rebuffed a Saudi request to send troops. Egypt is in no rush to send soldiers to Yemen, either.

The question does loom as to whether the time has come for a political deal. There are increasing calls for a ceasefire and negotiations. On April 14th the UN Security Council passed a resolution placing an arms embargo on the Houthis and Mr Saleh’s family. It also recognised the Saudi call for UN-mediated talks in Riyadh, a condition that the Houthis cannot agree to. The Saudis are pushing for the restoration of Mr Hadi, but he is an unpopular ally, not least because he fled the country. Mr Hadi has appointed Khaled al-Bahah as his deputy. A former prime minister, Mr Bahah is seen as just about the only unifying figure in Yemen. Still, Saudi Arabia has set out no clear political objectives. Whether that leads to the annihilation of the Houthis, or by allowing Iran to act as peacemaker, is yet to become clear.

Appendage:

Graphical and geographic depiction of who controls Yemen.