– ‘Philosophy: Ethics and Morality’ seeks to address a range of concepts that are established as a branch of philosophy.
Many people think of morality as a set of rules that requires us to perform certain actions and refrain from others. However, what happens when two rules contradict each other? Knowing the right thing to do is not always as simple as following a rule – raising a question over the nature of moral authority. The nature of this authority is one of the central questions of ethics.
RIGHT AND WRONG
(1) Rules and principles
ARISTOTLE believed that ethics only starts with rules. He argued that conflicts between rules force us to think for ourselves, and it is just this exercise of “right reason” that constitutes morality. However, by denying moral rules, he was not claiming that we cannot have “rules of thumb”, or guidelines on how to behave. His point was simply that rules can never be absolute, or eternally binding.
Many philosophers disagree with Aristotle. Some believe that morality is a collection of rules that is embedded in human nature. Immanuel Kant, for example, believed that morality is governed by categorical imperatives, or universally binding rules that are arrived at by rational thought. For Kant, the moral value of an action should thus be judged in terms of its motive, or whether it flows from the moral law. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham also believed in rules, even arguing that only one is required: that we act in a way that maximises the happiness of the greatest number of people. And so, for utilitarians, the morality of an action is not a question of its motive, but rather its consequences in the world.
Other philosophers follow David Hume, who argued that reason is the “slave of passions”. By this he meant that a moral act is simply one that brings about a desired state of affairs. According to this tradition, to say “lying is wrong” is another way of saying “I don’t like lying”, for morality is simply an expression of personal preference, which cannot therefore be rationally justified. Philosophers who hold this view regard emotion, rather than reason, as the basis for moral decisions and actions.
One thing that most philosophers agree on is that morals are a matter of choice. Unlike the laws of physics, moral rules can be broken, but they can only be broken freely. Someone who steals, for example, is only acting immorally if they freely choose to steal: if they feel compelled to steal, then we tend to judge them differently – perhaps as needing help. For this reason, determinism – the idea that our behaviour is fixed by the laws of nature – renders morality void. As Jean-Paul Sartre argued, it is our ability to act freely that makes us moral agents.
Contemporary moral philosophy falls into two broad categories: first- and second-order ethics. First-order ethics involves thinking about specific moral problems. These include whether human cloning is morally acceptable, whether animals have rights, and whether the law should permit assisted suicide. Second-order ethics is more general, and involves thinking about the nature of morality: whether it is a system of rules, whether or not we have free will, and whether we can justifiably claim to know right from wrong – or even that right and wrong really exist.
Rules and principles
Some philosophers believe that we need to follow rules to make moral decisions. Others argue that there are no moral rules, and we can only make moral decisions by assessing our particular situation.
To follow or not to follow rules?
Most people are brought up to see rules as central to deciding what is right or wrong. The moral rules that children are taught give them a framework for how they should always behave. Young children need this framework because they cannot yet reason for themselves. However, as children grow older, experience tells them that it is difficult to apply inflexible rules to specific situations. They will encounter situations in which one moral rule conflicts with another, or where following a moral rule could have dire consequences. There must, therefore, be more to morality than the rules we are taught as children.
Philosophers disagree about whether morality can consist of rules. Aristotle said that making a moral decision is not always a matter of applying a rule, and that often we instead must exercise reason and judgement. Rules are only helpful up to a point because most moral judgements are affected by the situation in which they are made.
🔎 THE GOLDEN RULE
The “golden rule” is the principle of treating other people the way we would like to be treated, or the idea that we should “do as we would be done by”. This rule cannot give us specific instructions for making a moral decision. To follow it, we need to decide how we would like to be treated in a particular situation, and what course of action would involve treating other people the way we would like to be treated. It is not a rule that can be taught to children because they are not yet able to reason for themselves. But it is a rule that can help moral generalists in the case of a moral dilemma.
Moral particularism and moral generalism
One theory, moral particularism, goes further. It states that there are no moral principles because every moral judgement depends on the context in which it is made. No two contexts are the same, so every moral decision must be made on its own merits. The philosopher Jonathan Dancy is the best-known advocate of particularism. Dancy argues that morality cannot be governed by rules because all reasons for performing an action or not performing an action depend on the context in which we might perform an action.
“Morality can get along perfectly well without principles.” – Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (2004)
Philosophers who reject moral particularism are referred to as moral generalists. They believe that morality is a matter of following rules, but not necessarily the inflexible rules that children were brought up on. They offer more general rules that can more easily be adapted to specific situations. The utilitarian view that we should do whatever produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number is an example of a rule that a moral generalist would accept. Another example is the golden rule, or the idea that we should treat other people the way that we would like to be treated. Moral generalists might apply rules such as these when faced with a moral dilemma.
Moral dilemmas
In everyday life, we often encounter moral dilemmas: specific situations that bring the general moral rules that we have been taught as children into conflict with each other. For example, we might have been taught that we should always be loyal and should always tell the truth, but there are many situations in which telling the truth would mean being disloyal to someone. When faced with a moral dilemma, a moral particularist would make a moral decision based only on the context of the situation. A moral generalist would still follow the rules, but these rules are more flexible than the rules that children are taught.
RIGHT AND WRONG
(2) Ethics and the law
The laws that apply in a particular country or region, the “laws of the land”, are rules that everyone knows they must follow. Such rules govern our behaviour and must not be broken.
Law of the land
Ignorance of the law of the land is not permitted as a defence against breaking these laws. This means that laws must be publicised in such a way that it is reasonable to expect everyone to know what they are. But what relation do the fundamental rules of morality, if they exist, have to the rules that make up the law of the land?
It is obvious that the rules of morality and the law of the land are different. We know this because laws are not always fair, and those that are unjust may be rejected. For example, many countries are currently questioning whether to allow assisted suicide. To do so would be to challenge existing laws that prohibit the taking of life. If some laws should not be passed, and other laws should be passed, then morality somehow determines the law of the land. But if morality determines these laws, what determines morality?
Some philosophers believe that the moral rules we should follow are those we were taught in childhood; others believe in different moral rules; while others believe there are no moral rules at all. But who is right?
Moral knowledge
Working out which moral rules to follow, if any, and how to do so, is a question of moral epistemology (the study of moral knowledge). Whether we have to use reason every time we make a moral judgement, or if we have to apply a rule, how do we ensure that our judgement is correct? We cannot observe that an action is wrong, or conduct an experiment to tell us whether or not it is wrong, so science will not help. Some philosophers say we have a special intuition that allows us to “see” moral truth. Others argue that we acquire moral knowledge through our actions over time, building a moral sense from our experience.
Moral compass
The philosopher John Locke believed that the moral law has priority (in terms of time and importance) over the law of the land and argued that it is the duty of a government to introduce the laws that will uphold the “moral law”, but never those that go further than the moral law (by, for example, introducing restrictions not justified by the moral law). He thought that if the laws passed by a government strayed too far from the moral law, this would justify rebellion against that government.
“The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.” – John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690)
🔎 FIGHTING INJUSTICE
People tend to rebel when faced with a law they believe to be unjust. In the UK in the 1980s there were riots when the government tried to introduce a system of local taxation that many people felt was unfair. In the US in the 2000s, rebellion was threatened when people began to believe that black people were less protected by the law than white people. It seems many people believe rebellion is justified if the law of the land strays too far from the moral law. The Black Lives Matter campaign group, for example, is a movement that emerged from rebellion against the unequal treatment of black people.
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(3) Free will?
Most people believe that acting morally involves exercising free will: the ability to freely choose both our actions and the reasons for our actions. However, others argue that free will does not exist.
Rationality and morality
Free will is usually considered a necessary condition of being a moral agent – that is to say, being capable of acting rightly or wrongly. This is because free will involves freely choosing to carry out an action for a specific reason. An action can be considered morally justifiable if an agent has made a rational choice to act according to a moral principle. This suggests that rationality and free will are essential aspects of morality. Although most normal adult human beings are rational, many human behaviours, such as emotional or instinctive reactions, or compulsive behaviours, are non-rational – they are not performed for reasons, whether good or bad. And since moral agency requires rationality, non-rational actions are therefore not moral actions. This explains why young children are not full moral agents: even if they have free will, they have not yet developed the sort of rationality (and understanding of right and wrong) that equips them to choose to behave in a certain way for moral reasons.
However, some philosophers question whether even normal adult human beings are moral agents. Psychologists believe that the human mind is made up of “two systems”, only one of which involves rational thought. It has even been suggested that most moral decisions made by adults could be said to be non-rational. An argument for this is that the reasons people give for their moral decisions are mostly “post hoc rationalisations”. In other words, people often apply rational explanations for non-rational actions in retrospect.
🔎 THE FREE WILL DEBATE
Determinism – Determinists argue that the world is governed by laws of nature regardless of what people do or think. This means that people’s actions and behaviours are also governed by laws of nature, and therefore that there is no such thing as free will.
Free will – Others believe the libertarian idea that people choose their actions for their own reasons, which have nothing to do with the laws of nature. Since people can freely choose to act in a certain way for a certain reason, free will must exist.
☑ Does choice exist?
The traditional view of morality is that we can only act morally when we freely choose our actions. If we do not believe in free will, we could re-think this traditional view, arguing that morality depends on something other than the ability to freely choose our actions. Or we could accept this traditional view but argue that since free will does not exist, none of our actions are moral actions and therefore morality does not exist either.
Hard Determinism – A person’s sense of freedom is an illusion. People do not have free will. Instead, their actions are governed by the laws of nature and the conditions at the time.
Soft Determinism – The conditions that determine people’s actions include people’s beliefs and desires. This means that determinism is not incompatible with free will.
Free Will – There are many reasons why people might decide or not to perform an action. They have the free will to choose which of these reasons to act on.
RIGHT AND WRONG
(4) Do we have moral knowledge?
Most people assume that humans are capable of knowing what is right and wrong. However, some argue that when we think we are acting morally, this is not a matter of knowledge, but of emotion or biology.
Knowledge-how and knowledge-that
Moral knowledge is knowledge about what is right and what is wrong. To understand the nature of moral knowledge, it is essential to define what knowledge is. Knowledge generally falls into two categories: knowledge-how and knowledge-that.
Knowledge-how is knowledge of actions and skills that we have learned and that have become instinctive, such as riding a bike. We would find it difficult to explain this knowledge to other people. Knowledge-that is knowledge based on facts, feelings, or perceptions that we “know” are real. It can be put into words and explained to other people.
Does moral knowledge exist?
Moral knowledge is an example of knowledge-that. All kinds of knowledge-that are factive, they express propositions that we cannot know unless those propositions are true. If moral knowledge exists, then our moral beliefs must be supported by moral facts, or at least by rational justification.
In everyday life, we assume we know what is right and wrong. However, some people argue that our moral beliefs are not grounded in facts or rationality, but in emotion, psychology, or evolution, and that moral knowledge is an illusion. Other people would say that we do have moral knowledge because we can think rationally about morality.
“I believe the moral feelings are not innate but acquired…” – John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863)
🔎 “BOO/HOORAH” THEORY
Non-cognitivists argue that moral beliefs are not a matter of knowledge and reason, but a matter of emotion. For non-cognitivists, when we say that a course of action is morally right or morally wrong, we are not expressing a belief about truth or falsehood, but something more like an emotion. They argue that there are no objective moral facts, and therefore moral statements can only express the speaker’s approval or disapproval of a course of action.
A popular version of non-cognitivism is the “Boo/Hoorah” theory of morality. This is the theory that to say, for example, “Murder is wrong” is, in effect to say, “Boo murder!” To say, “It is right to keep promises”, on the other hand, is to say “Hoorah to keeping promises”. According to the “Boo/Hoorah” theory, these statements do not express truth or falsehood, but emotional reactions.
Moral nihilism vs moral knowledge
Moral nihilism is the view that nothing is right or wrong, and nihilists believe that there are no moral facts. If there are no moral facts, then there are no moral truths. And if there are no moral truths, then there can be no moral knowledge because there is nothing to know. Psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology offer some arguments in support of this nihilistic view, claiming that science will one day show that moral beliefs are a product of human evolution and psychology.
The opposing argument points out that these scientific arguments are just theories about what science might prove in the future, and that science is actually a very long way from showing that morality is merely biological. Until it does, we should consider the evidence we have for thinking that we do rationally justify our moral beliefs, that we do have free will, and that at least some of our behaviour is not determined by our genetic inheritance or evolutionary impulses to adapt to our environment. This evidence suggests that we do have moral knowledge.
There follow now three arguments – Justification, Free Will, and Evolution – and explanations for them for both moral nihilism and moral knowledge.
Argument: Justification
Moral Nihilism
Post-Hoc Justification
Some psychologists believe that what we see as explanations for our moral actions are nothing more than post-hoc rationalisations. In other words, when we must decide between right and wrong, we often react emotionally rather than rationally, and then attempt to explain our actions in retrospect.
Moral Knowledge
Rational Justification of Moral Beliefs
Science will never be able to successfully demonstrate that no one ever reasons about what is right and wrong. Many philosophers have spent much of their time thinking rationally about morality.
Argument: Free Will
Moral Nihilism
Hard Determinism
Hard determinists (see above) believe that there is no such thing as free will and our actions are governed by the laws of nature and the conditions at the time. Some neuroscientific experiments support the view that free will is an illusion. If we cannot freely choose our actions, then we cannot offer rational explanations for them based on moral knowledge either.
Moral Knowledge
Soft Determinism
Soft determinists believe that free will is compatible with determinism because the conditions that govern our actions include our beliefs and desires. If these beliefs include moral beliefs, then we can choose to act for moral reasons.
Argument: Evolution
Moral Nihilism
Evolutionary Adaptation
Some evolutionary biologists believe that when humans think they are acting morally, they are merely adapting to their social environment. Humans are social animals, so it is advantageous for them to acquire a reputation for honesty, kindness, cooperation, and loyalty. Genes that are not conducive to acquiring this reputation are more likely to die out.
Moral Knowledge
Altruism
Many human beings engage in altruistic behaviour that is not easy to explain in evolutionary terms. Some altruistic acts are done in secret, so will not help a person acquire a reputation for generosity. Sometimes people perform altruistic acts for the benefit of someone they will never meet. In this case, altruistic behaviour will not help a person flourish in his or her social environment.
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(5) Does moral truth exist?
Conventional ways of discussing morality imply that moral beliefs (beliefs about what is right and wrong) are either true or false. But what exactly is moral truth? Might it not even exist?
Moral facts
If moral beliefs can be true or false, there is such a thing as moral truth. But if beliefs are made true by facts, then moral truth must depend on moral facts. Moral nihilists argue that there are no moral facts, and therefore that there can be no such thing as moral truth. It would certainly be very difficult to establish the existence of moral facts by observation or experimentation. But over the years, philosophers have come up with theories that offer an account of the sort of facts that make moral beliefs true and help people make moral decisions.
Moral theories
Aristotle argued that an action is right if a virtuous person would perform it. For Aristotle, a virtuous person is someone who knows what is right, does what is right, and does what is right for the right reasons.
Deontologists believe that morality is based on unbreakable laws. Unbreakable moral laws, or the facts about what is right that are known by a virtuous person, could be the kind of moral facts on which moral truth can be based.
Non-cognitivists argue that moral beliefs are a matter of emotion rather than a matter of reason, and that moral statements therefore cannot be true or false. However, non-cognitivists would also argue that we can arrive at the sort of moral facts that can help us make moral decisions by adopting a “stable and general perspective”. This means finding out as much as possible about the things we approve or disapprove of and considering the opinions of people who disagree with us.
Non-moral facts?
According to utilitarians, an action is right if it produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN). Utilitarians would argue that this is a moral fact, and that we can understand the problematic concepts of right and wrong in terms of something we can already understand: human happiness. This means that no action is inherently right or wrong because the likelihood of it producing the GHGN depends on the context in which it is carried out. Utilitarians will not necessarily agree with each other about whether a particular action will produce the GHGN in a particular situation. And some people would say that seeing morality in terms of human happiness is an attempt to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts.
The naturalistic fallacy
According to the philosopher G.E. Moore, utilitarians are guilty of the “naturalistic fallacy” of assuming that what makes us happy is the same as what is good. Moore argued that goodness cannot be reduced to notions of pleasure or happiness. For Moore, the fact that some actions are wrong is a “brute” fact that cannot be analysed in terms of any other sort of fact. We can only determine the truth of a moral claim by looking to facts about inherent rightness and wrongness, and these facts can be detected by our special moral sense, or intuition. We may not observe the fact that a particular action is wrong. But we do “intuit” this fact through our moral sense.
“Moral laws are merely statements that certain actions will have good effects.” – G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903)
🔎 TRUTH WITHOUT OBSERVABLE FACTS?
Moral beliefs are not the only kind of belief that cannot be established to be true by observable facts:
. New theories cannot be established by observation or experiment, but only by argument from existing theories, rules, and axioms (accepted statements). These existing theories, rules, and axioms are not concrete facts, but abstract facts. That is to say that just like new theories, they cannot be established by observation either.
. General claims cannot be established by observation or experience because they are claims about states of affairs in the past, present, and future, and we cannot observe the future. Such general claims and beliefs are made true by modal facts (facts about possibility and necessity), not concrete facts.
. Analytic truths (for example, “frozen water is ice”) are truths that depend on the meaning of the terms that constitute the statement. They are true by definition and they cannot be made true or false by observable facts in the outside world. In other words, they are not made true by concrete facts, but by conceptual facts.
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(6) The fact-value distinction
David Hume argued that we cannot arrive at a value (a statement about how things should be) from a fact (a statement about how things are) because values depend on what matters to us.
What are values?
Some philosophers believe that the key characteristic of value judgements is that we cannot construct arguments for or against them. Value judgements express deeply held convictions about what matters to us, or what we value. If we do not value something, it is very difficult to persuade us to value it. We could persuade someone to say that they value something, but if we do this by threatening them, their position will not be genuine. We might try to persuade someone to value something by saying it is a means to something they already value. But this might simply make them stop valuing the thing that they already value. Judgements about values seem to be quite different from judgements about facts.
FACTS
“Is” statements
Descriptive statements (“is” statements) refer to facts. They simply say how things are. A descriptive statement straightforwardly expresses truth or falsehood.
VALUES
“Ought” statements
Prescriptive statements (“ought” statements) express values, or judgements about the potential “value” of a fact. These judgements are true or false only in so far as things do or do not matter to us.
Can we bridge the gap?
Hume made a distinction between “is” statements (statements that express “facts”) and “ought” statements (statements that express “values”, or what matters to us as individuals). He argued that people sometimes fall into the trap of using an “ought” argument in place of an “is” argument, that is, they confuse the roles of values and facts. According to Hume, any attempt to bridge the gap between facts and values will always involve assumptions about what matters. Judgements of value cannot be arrived at in the same way as judgements about facts.
“The rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason.” – David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1738)
🔎 UTILITARIANISM
The GHGN
Utilitarians (see above) might argue that a particular course of action does not create the greatest happiness for the greatest number (GHGN). This is a descriptive statement, which expresses a fact. They would then argue that we ought not to follow that course of action. This is a prescriptive statement, which expresses a value. But by arriving at a value from a fact, utilitarians have assumed that the GHGN matters to us.
☑ RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE MORAL TRUTH?
Statements that are absolutely true are true under any circumstances. Statements that are relatively true rely on facts that only exist relative to something. So are moral statements true absolutely, or only relatively? If they are relatively true, what are they true relative to? Many believe that moral truth is not absolute because moral judgements and laws vary according to their context. This context might be a community, a culture, a situation, or even a person. Utilitarians could claim that the statement “we should do whatever produces the GHGN” is absolutely true, but argue that moral statements about whether a course of action is right or wrong are only true relative to whether that course of action would produce the GHGN in a given situation.
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(7) Aristotle’s virtue ethics
Aristotle’s theory of morality has more recently become known as “virtue ethics”. Virtue ethics defines morally right actions as those that would be performed by a virtuous person.
Knowing what is right
According to Aristotle, a virtuous person is one who knows what is right, does what is right, and does what is right for the right reasons. Reason is at the heart of virtue ethics – Aristotle believed that our capacity for reason separates us from other living things. Only humans can distinguish between where and what they are, and where and what they ought to be. This means that only humans can, by being virtuous – by doing what they ought to do – get themselves from where and what they are to where and what they ought to be. Aristotle argued that the true function and purpose of humankind is to exercise reason in action. To exercise reason in action is to exercise the virtues (do what we know we ought to do) each time we act.
Acting virtuously
Only if we exercise the virtues in all of our actions will we achieve life’s purpose – eudaimonia, which means “happiness”, or “flourishing”. To experience pleasure is not to experience eudaimonia. In Aristotle’s view the only way we can achieve eudaimonia is by acting, throughout our lives, in accordance with the virtues. We act virtuously only if we act for the right reason. Acting with the intention of achieving eudaimonia is not acting virtuously. We act virtuously only if we do what virtue requires of us because virtue requires it. If, by accident, we do what virtue requires of us, but not because virtue requires it, our act may be virtuous, but we are not.
🔎 GATHERING VIRTUES
Becoming virtuous takes time. Each time who choose an action we are choosing our future character. If we consistently make the right choices for the right reasons, we will acquire a good character. Aristotelian virtues fall into two categories: moral and intellectual.
. Intellectual virtues – Theoretical and practical wisdom, the intellectual virtues, can be taught by parents and teachers.
. Moral virtues – The moral virtues cannot be taught; instead, they must be acquired. Even if we are born with a tendency to be honest, we are not born with the virtue of honesty. To have this virtue is to understand what it means to be honest, to be consistently honest, and always to be honest for the right reasons.
“Virtue lies in our power, and so does vice; because where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act.” – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (4th century BCE)
Asking for help
One problem with virtue ethics is that it gives us no clear rules for deciding how to act. Aristotle said we should look to the example of a virtuous person. When we ask a wise friend how we should act, we are following Aristotle’s advice.
Virtuous act or agent?
Aristotle made a distinction between a virtuous act and a virtuous agent. He argued that when we face a moral dilemma, each of us must exercise moral reasoning in deciding how to act. When we do act, our act will be virtuous only if, in the context of that dilemma, it is the right thing to do. But we will be a virtuous agent only if we do the right thing for the right reason.
☑ THE GOLDEN MEAN
Aristotle said that to be virtuous, we must understand the nature of virtue. There is no instruction manual that tells us how to behave morally. The only way for us to determine what we should or shouldn’t do is to identify, in each situation, the action that accords with the “golden mean”. This will be the action that avoids both an excess and a deficiency of certain characteristics. A courageous action, for example, avoids rashness (an excess of courage) and cowardice (a deficiency of courage). Not only might such an action be different in each situation, but it might also be different for each person. To be virtuous, we must therefore also understand ourselves.
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(8) Humean ethics
According to philosopher David Hume, the right action is the action that a “true judge” would approve of. The wrong action is the action that a true judge would disapprove of.
Acts of passion, not reason
At a glance, Hume’s theory looks rather like Aristotle’s virtue ethics (see above). But Hume’s “feeling approbation” (approving of) is different from Aristotle’s “knowing what is right”, and “true judges” are not the same as “virtuous persons”. Hume was an advocate of “non-cognitivism” – the view that morality is not a matter of reason, and that, therefore, moral statements cannot be true or false.
Hume’s ethics were built on his philosophy of mind – in particular, on his account of mental, or cognitive, states. He argues that cognitive states such as beliefs and knowledge cannot motivate actions. Actions can only be motivated by “passions”, such as desires, values, and emotions. For example, knowing how to make a cup of coffee (a cognitive state will not, in the absence of a desire for coffee (a passion), motivate a person to make one.
According to Hume, reason informs us of matters of fact, and of relations between ideas. Only passion motivates us. Moral judgements, he says, are essentially linked to action; they cannot, therefore, express cognitive states such as beliefs, and must instead express passions. This means that when we act on a moral judgement, it is passion that prompts us to act, not reason.
Moral judgements
Hume argues that if beliefs cannot motivate us, then moral judgements, which do motivate us, cannot express beliefs. Therefore, they must express passions. Unlike beliefs, passions cannot be true or false. It is undoubtedly true that moral judgements motivate us. To believe that lying is wrong, is to believe that we should not lie. The move from “is” to “should” shows that the belief itself is motivating. Hume says that as this move takes us from beliefs (about what is the case) to values (what matters to us), moral judgements are expressions not of belief, but of passion.
This argument that moral judgements express passion rather than reason was revolutionary in its time. For example, the statement “lying is wrong” may seem to express a belief about a type of action (“lying”, in this case) that is either true or false. But Hume would say this statement does not express a belief about the world, but rather a feeling – that the speaker does not like lying. This would be a highly subjectivist view – it suggests that there is no more to morality than our own likes and dislikes. Hume gives moral judgements a sort of objectivity by insisting that before an expression of approval or disapproval can be deemed moral, it must be made by one who adopts a “stable and general perspective” and thus becomes a “true judge”.
The need for a true judge
Hume argues that to become true judges we must move from the “pre-moral deliverances of sympathy” of childhood to truly moral attitudes. These pre-moral deliverances of sympathy are those we experience when we empathise with others. If a child cries because her friend is crying, for example, she is experiencing such a state. To become a true judge, we must therefore have a great deal more than the natural ability to empathise.
“Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” – David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1738)
🔎 EXPERIENCE
Acquiring the knowledge required to become a true judge is a natural process. As we grow up, our parents and teachers, and our experiences teach us that if, for example, we hurt our friends, we will lose them. Before our expressions of approval and disapproval can be counted as truly moral, we must, through our life experience, learn to consider every action from the perspective of those who will be affected by it, and then use this ability before deciding whether to act.
☑ A stable and general perspective
To become a true judge, we must acquire a great deal of knowledge about the nature of the things we approve or disapprove of, and how facts about the world relate to one another. If we allow bias to skew our perspective or fail to consider someone who will be affected by our actions, our attitudes of approval and disapproval will not qualify as “moral attitudes”. When we do succeed in adopting a stable and general perspective, modern Humeans, such as Simon Blackburn, say that we “earn the right” to think of our moral judgements as true or false. Though these judgements are still expressions of passion, not reason, the passions they express are so informed by reason that they almost attain the status of beliefs.
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(9) Deontology
The theory of deontology (from the Greek word for “obligation”) states that morality is based on unbreakable rules. The right action is the one that is performed according to the “moral law”.
Inclination or obligation?
The most famous deontologist is Immanuel Kant. Kant believed that all our actions are performed either to achieve a desired result, or out of a sense of moral duty – our need to follow the moral law. Acts of the first kind are motivated by inclination (a form of passion). Kant thought that actions motivated by passion cannot be moral. They may be forbidden by the moral law, or they may conform to the moral law, but be performed by an agent motivated by his or her own end rather than by the moral law. Kant believed, like Aristotle (see above), that an act can be virtuous without the agent being virtuous. An act can only be a moral action, he argued, if the agent puts his or her inclinations aside and performs it out of duty (because it is required by the moral law). Our actions, therefore, are moral, if our intentions are good, and we act “out of reverence for the law”.
Deontologists like Kant think that acting morally depends on our acting because it is required by the moral law, not because it will achieve a desired result. But what is this “moral law”? Kant’s version of it is the “categorical imperative”.
🔎 MORAL HIGH GROUND
Imagine a situation in which two hikers, Hiker A and Hiker B, come across a man who has fallen and is in desperate need of help. Each of them gives the man a rope. Their actions are identical, but their motives differ. Kant would say that Hiker B’s motive ensures she has acted morally. But Hiker A’s motive means that he has not acted morally (even if his action was required by the moral law).
Inclination
Hiker A offers the man his rope because he wants Hiker B to think he is courageous and kind. In doing so he is acting out of inclination, rather than moral duty.
Moral duty
Hiker B throws the man her rope because she believes that is the right thing to do. She is acting out of duty and is therefore obeying the moral law.
Imperatives
Imperatives tell us what to do – they are instructions. Kant made a distinction between two types of imperative. A hypothetical imperative tells us how to act in order to achieve a desired goal. It applies only to people who want to achieve that particular goal. In seeking approval for an action, a person is acting on a hypothetical imperative. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, applies to everyone, regardless of individual desires or circumstances. To recognise that an action is morally right is to believe it should be performed. In acting out of moral duty, a person is acting on a categorical imperative.
Formulas
Kant offered two main formulations of the categorical imperative. The Formula of Universal Law tells us that we should always act in such a way that we would be happy for everyone else to act in the same way in the same situation. In other words, moral rules must apply to everyone, in all circumstances. According to the Formula of the End in Itself, no “end in itself” (Kant’s term for a rational being) should be treated only to the ends of others. In other words, we must not neglect the needs of others or dehumanise them to achieve our goals as individuals.
“Morality is not the doctrine of how we make ourselves happy. It is the doctrine of how we make ourselves worthy of happiness.” – Immanuel Kant
. More on Kant: The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
RIGHT AND WRONG
(10) Utilitarianism
Utilitarian philosophy is based on the idea that the right action is the one that results in the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN).
Consequences count
Utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of actions – the right action being the one with the most desirable consequences. According to John Stuart Mill, the only thing each of us desires is happiness, and so our ultimate goal is for everyone to be happy. He defined happiness as “intended pleasure, and the absence of pain”, and unhappiness as “pain, and the privation (absence) of pleasure”.
The moral rules we learn as children, Mill argued, are unhelpful because we do not see them as rules that cannot be broken. Instead, we need a rule that can be applied in any situation – a rule to which there are no exceptions. The Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP) is such a rule. According to the GHP, an action is right only if it results in the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN). Whether or not we intend to produce the GHGN when we act in a certain way is unimportant to utilitarians – they judge an action solely by its consequences.
Interpreting utilitarianism
The Greatest Happiness Principle, or GHP, can be interpreted in many ways – for example, whether it is the quantity or quality of happiness that is most important, or whether the actions the GHP refers to are individual “token acts” (Act Utilitarianism) or general “action types” (Rule Utilitarianism).
. The Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP)
The GHP tells us that the right action is the one that results in the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN). To utilitarians, a truly moral agent is one whose actions, over time, successfully produce the GHGN.
. Act Utilitarianism
To say, “that lie is wrong”, is to say that a particular lie is wrong. An act utilitarian (AU) checks every action against the GHP and chooses the action that will result in the GHGN. When lying would promote the GHGN, an AU will break the moral rule-of-thumb that lying is wrong. For an AU, therefore, there are no absolute moral rules.
. Quantity or quality, or both?
Jeremy Bentham, another famous utilitarian, believed that we only need to look to the quantity of happiness produced, and that the enjoyment of “pushpin” (a board game) and poetry were of equal value in the “hedonic calculus”. Mill, however, thought that both the quantity and quality of happiness were important, and said that the enjoyment of poetry (what he called a “higher pleasure”) should count for more.
. Observation and experience
Utilitarians (AUs, at least) will not accept that any of our everyday moral rules are absolutely true or false. They believe that the GHP is everywhere, always and for everyone true. They also believe that we acquire knowledge of morality by inductive means. We observe or otherwise learn about the consequences of various actions and, assuming the future will be like the past, we think of those that are likely to produce the GHGN as (likely to be) right and the others as (likely to be) wrong. Moral knowledge is not, therefore, as Kant would have it, discerned by intuition, but by observation and experience.
. Rule Utilitarianism
To say “lying is wrong” is to commit to the belief that all lies are wrong. Rather than looking at the consequences of every action, a rule utilitarian (RU) refers to a set of moral rules based on general “action-types” that promote the GHGN, checking individual actions against these rules. RUs who won’t break the rules even when an action would violate the GHP are often dismissed as “rule-worshippers”.
In Utilitarianism (1863), John Stuart Mill suggests that ‘actions in the right proportion tend to promote happiness.’
RIGHT AND WRONG
(11) Existentialism
Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism denies the existence both of God and human nature (a set of shared characteristics that determines what we think and do). We alone can choose how we lead our lives.
Free to choose
Humans, Sartre argued, were not conceived in the mind of some deity to have a particular purpose, or “essence” – the characteristics that make us what we are. There is no divine purpose that determines how we should think and act, and no set of divine commandments that tell us how we should live. But nor is there any non-divine purpose or set of rules that do so. To think that human nature exists, Sartre says, is to fail to carry to its logical conclusion the belief that God doesn’t exist. It is to leave intact the idea that something determines how we think and act – even if that something is not God.
According to existentialism, there is no set of objective rules that tells us how we should live our lives. Recognition of this fact means that human beings are “radically free”. They are not defined by their natures, and their choices are not determined by their natures. Nor are they required to do, or value, anything dictated by a divine being. Instead, they must choose their values, beliefs, and actions for themselves. Every individual is the person they are only because of the choices they have made in the past. Individuals will become the people they become because – and only because – of the choices they will make in the future.
Bad faith
Sartre goes on to say that we are in bad faith if we attempt to persuade ourselves or others that we are not responsible for what we do with our freedom. For example, a person who says he was “carried away by passion” demonstrates bad faith, as does a person blaming her choices on her poverty.
Recognising that we alone can choose how to live our lives underlines our subjectivity. Humans, Sartre argues, are the only beings that “propel themselves towards their future and are aware of doing so”. Only we can “surpass” ourselves, to transcend what we are, and to become what we choose to become.
From abandonment to despair
The need to make responsible choices weighs heavily on us as human beings. This is partly because we feel “abandoned”, bearing the responsibility for the choices we make alone. This causes us anguish as we recognise that the burden of decision-making falls on us alone, and that nothing or no one can help us. Even if we seek guidance from someone we believe to be virtuous, we are making a choice – by choosing who to ask. If we are to live in good faith, therefore, there is nothing for it but to accept responsibility for our decisions. Even if it causes us despair, we must accept the freedom that we cannot escape, and resolve to do our best with it. To refuse to act is to choose to refuse. By such acts, and failures to act, we create ourselves, and so each of us is nothing more than the sum of our actions.
☑ FREEDOM
We are free to choose for ourselves, and so we must recognise that we are exercising free choice whatever decision we make, in whichever situation we find ourselves. Sartre admits that certain universal facts – for example that we all die – place limitations on us. But each of us faces a unique combination of circumstances as well as these universal ones. It is to each of these unique situations that we must individually respond. We cannot escape our freedom – we are “condemned to be free”. Even to decide not to decide is to decide.
☑ RESPONSIBILITY
With responsibility comes not only to choose for ourselves, but to choose for everyone. This is because to make a choice is to believe that choice is good – and that is good for everyone. To choose is, in effect, to decide that this is how everyone else should live. Existentialists are thus able to claim that some choices are right (those that are responsible), and others are wrong (those that are not responsible or are taken in bad faith). The alternative would be to insist that our choices are arbitrary, and therefore there is no such thing as right or wrong.
☑ SEEKING GUIDANCE
Sartre offers an example of a young man who comes to him with a moral dilemma. Should the man, Sartre is asked, stay with the elderly mother who adores him and who has no one else to care for her? Or should he leave her and join the French Resistance against the Nazis? Sartre points out that conventional morality could justify either decision. But in asking the advice of an existentialist philosopher the young man knew he would be told that he must make his own choice. He had, therefore, in a sense, already accepted his need to do so and was only postponing the decision.
“It is only in our decisions that we are important.” – Jean-Paul Sartre, existentialist
RIGHT AND WRONG
(12) Animal rights
In the past, humans rarely questioned the morality of using animals for all kinds of purposes. However, many people now argue that humans have duties towards animals, or even that animals have rights.
Rationality and sentience
The deontologist Immanuel Kant (see above) claimed a being has rights if and only if it is an end in itself. Kant believed that to be an end in itself, a being must be both rational and autonomous. He argued that animals are neither rational nor autonomous, and therefore have no rights. However, other deontologists argue that some animals choose how to act and therefore act for reasons even if their “reasoning” differs from ours. According to these deontologists, animals are both rational and autonomous and therefore have rights, but not necessarily the same rights as humans.
Other philosophers believe that even if animals are not rational, they still have rights because they are sentient and so they, like humans, can feel both pleasure and pain. Utilitarians (see above), who believe that actions are right insofar as they produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN), would argue that a being with the capacity to feel pleasure and pain has rights even if it cannot demonstrate rational thought. Descartes did not believe that animals feel pleasure and pain. To him animals are simply “automata”.
Rights or duties?
The philosopher Roger Scruton believes that animals are rational but that they do not have rights because they are incapable of understanding duties. A human’s right to life brings with it the duty not to kill others. A lion cannot understand the duty not to kill, and so it cannot have the right to life.
However, Scruton argues that even if animals have no rights, we have duties towards them. For Scruton, our duties to animals’ matter because of the effect our actions have on them. Kant also believed that we have duties to animals, but only because humans who are cruel to animals are more likely to be cruel to other humans. According to Kant, our duties to animals are indirectly duties to other humans, whereas for Scruton, our duties to animals are direct.
The views of other people
Non-cognitivists (see above) believe that a stable and general perspective is necessary if we want our decisions about how animals are treated to be morally justifiable. To gain such a perspective, we must learn as much as possible about the subject and consult the views of other people, especially those whose views differ from our own. However, there is no consensus among philosophers about animal rights, despite efforts to achieve a stable and general perspective.
Virtue theorists argue that something is right if a virtuous person believes that it is right. Although it is very difficult to know whether a virtuous person would say that animals have rights, a government might set up a committee of “the great and the good” to advise on issues such as medical research on animals.
Animal rights and the GHGN
Utilitarians who believe that animals are sentient also argue that animals should be considered when deciding which action will produce the GHGN. However, not all utilitarians believe that the happiness of animals is as important as human happiness. Even utilitarians who think that animals have as much right to be happy as humans face difficult questions about which actions will create the greatest happiness for animals and humans.
. Keeping pets – It could be argued that keeping pets is cruel, and that animals would be happier in the wild, where they would be free to fulfil their natural potential. But would animals really be happier in the wild? Many people would argue that pets enjoy human company and living in a safe, comfortable home. For some people, even if animals would be happier in the wild, the enormous pleasure that keeping pets generates for humans justifies any suffering caused to the animals.
. Vegetarianism and veganism – Some vegetarians and vegans believe that it is wrong to kill animals or cause animals to suffer. Others think that a vegetarian or vegan diet will minimise human suffering: for example, because they think such a diet is healthier or better for the environment than eating meat or dairy. Those who do eat meat and dairy products might justify it in terms of human happiness, arguing that it is better for their health, it gives humans a lot of pleasure, and it helps farmers to make a living.
. Research on animals – There are some animal rights activists who believe that any kind of animal testing, whether it is for cosmetic or medical reasons, is wrong, and that the suffering caused to animals can never be justified. Many people, however, would argue that carrying out research on animals is morally right because of the benefits that it brings to humans, particularly in the case of medical research that might lead to cures for diseases.
. Zoos – Those who believe it is morally wrong to keep animals in zoos might argue that human beings would not like to be kept in captivity. But it could be argued that some animal species would become extinct if there were no zoos. And some people think that the pleasure and educational benefits that humans get from zoos are enough to justify keeping animals in captivity.
🔎 SPECIESISM
Many people might argue that the suffering of animals matters less than human suffering because animals do not have hopes, fears, or life plans, for example. The utilitarian Peter Singer thinks that such an attitude is “speciesist”. For Singer, speciesism is as morally unacceptable as racism or sexism, and we must always consider the impact our actions have on the pleasure or pain of animals.
“To be for animals is not to be against humanity.” – Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983)
RIGHT AND WRONG
(13) Cloning
It is now possible in principle to clone human beings for both medical and reproductive purposes. However, human cloning is controversial and poses many ethical questions.
The purpose of cloning
Human cloning has two potential purposes: therapeutic cloning (cloning human embryos for medical research) and reproductive cloning (use cloning to produce new human babies). Both these uses pose moral problems. Most countries have passed legislation banning reproductive human cloning, but therapeutic cloning is permitted in some countries under certain conditions.
The ethics of therapeutic cloning
Therapeutic cloning involves cloning a human being to conduct research on the resulting embryo. This might enable us to develop more effective diagnostic techniques and therapies for congenital conditions.
But is it morally acceptable to conduct research on a human embryo? A deontologist (see above) who believes that human life is sacred would think not. So, arguably, would any deontologist who believes that we should not ever use others for our own ends. The only way a deontologist could accept therapeutic cloning is if the embryo were deemed not (yet) to be a human being.
A utilitarian would not oppose therapeutic cloning so long as it produced the greatest happiness of the greatest number (GHGN), which it almost certainly would if it generated new diagnostic techniques and therapies.
Aristotle’s virtue ethics (see above) might suggest that we convene a committee of people who we think are virtuous, who can help us decide whether therapeutic cloning is morally acceptable. Hume, on the other hand, would recommend that we find out as much as we can about cloning, and reflect on as many different views as we can (including views that we do not agree with), to arrive at a “stable and general perspective”.
🔎 DOLLY THE SHEEP
Dolly the sheep was the world’s first mammal to be cloned from an adult cell. She was born in July 1996 and her birth was announced in February 1997. She was produced by a technique known as SCNT: somatic cell nuclear transfer. The birth of Dolly proved that, in principle at least, human beings could be cloned. Within a few months of her birth, nearly every country in the world had banned reproductive cloning, because the technology was not yet advanced enough for reproductive cloning to be viable without posing great risks to human health. But this technology is improving all the time.
The taxidermised remains of Dolly the sheep are on display at the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh.
Is cloning morally wrong?
Both therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning are highly controversial. Since therapeutic cloning involves carrying out research on, and eventually killing, human embryos, the controversy around it is largely focused on the debate as to when human life begins.
Reproductive cloning is even more controversial. It is banned in most countries, primarily for reasons of safety. Technology is improving all the time and reproductive cloning has the potential to become a method of treating infertility, but there are many arguments against it.
. Therapeutic cloning
[1] Wrong – because it involves killing human embryos.
Justified – An early embryo is just a bundle of cells and therefore has no right to life.
[2] Wrong – An adult human is also a bundle of cells, but no-one says adults have no right to life.
Justified – We do not know how many human lives a very early embryo represents.
[3] Wrong – An embryo has the potential to become a human being.
Justified – The potential to become something does not necessarily guarantee rights.
[4] Wrong – We do not fully know the medical risks of treatments involving therapeutic cloning.
Justified – These treatments have the potential to greatly reduce human suffering.
. Reproductive cloning
[1] Wrong – Reproductive cloning is morally wrong because it is not natural.
Justified – Many medical and life-extending technologies are also unnatural.
[2] Wrong – A clone is genetically identical to its donor, so cloning could create odd relationships.
Justified – Environment is as important as genetics for producing the traits of any organism.
[3] Wrong – Cloning might be used, for example, to produce a copy of a child who has died.
Justified – We can regulate cloning to stop people using it for morally dubious reasons.
[4] Wrong – Cloning could have a negative impact on biodiversity.
Justified – People are unlikely to resort to cloning unless it is the only way they can have a child.
“Clones are simply identical twins.” – Richard Dawkins, biologist
This concludes the narrative for the page ‘Philosophy: Morality and Ethics’ on the various categories outlined. Euthanasia has been excluded and will not form part of this page. Amendments to the above entries may be made in the future.
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