Continental Philosophy

– ‘Continental Philosophy’ is a branch of philosophy and a tradition of empiricism. This page seeks to address a range of concepts that forms this branch of philosophy.

INTRODUCTION

The phrase “continental philosophy” was first used in the 19th century by British philosophers who wished to distinguish what they saw to be their own tradition of empiricism from the more speculative form of philosophy practised on mainland Europe. The label stuck, however, and provides a useful distinction between two broad approaches to philosophy, especially in the 20th century.

The rift between the two schools widened with the establishment of analytic philosophy, which was inspired by the work of Bertrand Russell. At the same time, philosophers on mainland Europe were coming to terms with the legacy of a century of German idealism. The continental tradition did not have the empirical roots that British philosophy had, and since the 17th century had been steeped in rationalism and idealism. Where British philosophers developed the pragmatic ideas of utilitarianism and liberalism, a more speculative undercurrent flowed on the continent, rising from the revolutionary ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Marx, through the German idealists Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, and culminating in the iconoclastic Nietzsche.

In the 20th century, continental philosophers placed even more emphasis on subjective experience. This produced a human-centred approach to philosophy that first appeared in the work of Edmund Husserl, whose “phenomenology” was the basis of a lot of future continental philosophy. Husserl argued that philosophers should not speculate about things that are beyond our apprehension, but instead focus on the things that we can and that we do experience. Husserl’s ideas were taken up by Martin Heidegger, who proposed that philosophers should study the nature of experience itself. This idea of analysing subjective experience appealed particularly to French philosophers, including Jean-Paul Sartre, the leading figure of the “existentialist” school of thought. Philosophy was very much a part of the French literary as well as academic tradition, and as such had anticipated the subjective perspective of modern continental philosophy. Sartre, and his partner Simone de Beauvoir, also developed Heidegger’s idea that we should all aim to live “authentically”. They argued that we have no essential nature, and that we should each live according to our own principles.

Other strands of philosophy also emerged from the continental tradition. A combination of the critical approach advocated by Kant and a reinterpretation of Marx’s ideas gave rise to a school of critical theory that tried to counter the rising tide of totalitarianism before World War II. This process of analysis of social and political issues flourished after the war. Michel Foucault, for example, identified ways in which society at large exercises power over individuals. His ideas greatly influenced subsequent structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, who revealed the extent to which ideas and power are interconnected.

OBJECTS IN THE MIND

The German philosopher Franz Brentano argued that all mental acts, such as thoughts, emotions, and perceptions, are about something – namely, an object towards which the mind is directed.

Intentionality

The term “intentionality” was originally used by scholastic philosophers, who argued that God exists in reality as well as in our minds. Brentano (1838–1917) reintroduced the term as part of his theory of consciousness from a first-person perspective and attempted to lay the foundations of a scientific psychology.

In his book, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano argued that every thought or mental state we have is about something. When we sense, remember, imagine, or desire something, we direct our minds towards that thing. For example, we might picture that thing in our mind, we might have an opinion on it, or it might provoke an emotion in us. Brentano named this directing of the mind towards something “intentionality”, and called the things towards which we direct our minds “intentional objects”. For Brentano, mental states are about intentional objects, and intentional objects exist inside our minds whether or not they exist outside our minds (as real objects in the physical world). Brentano argued that there can be no unconscious mental acts. This is because we are always aware of the objects towards which our mental acts are directed, and so are always aware of the mental acts themselves. He called the most basic kind of mental phenomena “presentations”, which we have when we picture an object in our minds. Other kinds of mental acts, such as judgements (which involve an affirmation or denial of the existence of objects), desires, and emotions are based on, and require, presentations.

Mental (intentional) objects

Intentional objects include objects of perception, recollection, or imagination, and objects of desire or those towards which we have feelings. These intentional objects exist within our mind whether or not these things exist outside our mind. We can be directed towards one and the same intentional object in various ways: for example, by directly sensing it, remembering it, or having a feeling towards or an opinion about it.

The real: physical objects exist outside the mind, independently of us. When we sense real objects, they become objects in our minds.

Mental objects: objects that are inside the mind (or “immanent”) can be representations of real objects or non-existent objects. Brentano called these representations in the mind “presentations”.  

Experienced objects: objects that have been sensed or remembered become objects inside our minds: they become mental representations of the real.  

Emotions: emotions and desires are also about things, since they are directed towards an object.

Non-existent things: Not all mental acts are about real objects. We can have a “presentation” of something that has no counterpart in the real world.

🔎 DIFFICULTIES WITH BRENTANO’S INTENTIONALITY

A major problem with Brentano’s ideas is that he never clearly defined the terms he used to describe consciousness. This means that there has been confusion about the concepts he used to describe mental objects, such as “presentation” and “immanent object”. It is also unclear whether his use of the term “intentional object” refers to the real object or its mental representation.

PHENOMENOLOGY

Founded by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is concerned with phenomena, or things that appear to us. It involves laying aside our assumptions about whether or not external, physical objects exist.

The phenomena of consciousness

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) believed that a scientific approach to the study of consciousness and experience from a first-person point of view would give us definite answers to questions about subjective experience that philosophers had been debating for centuries. He called this approach phenomenology.

Husserl defined phenomenology as the science of the phenomena of consciousness. The standard definition of a phenomenon is something that appears to us – that is, what we experience, mean, or intend. Husserl makes a distinction between phenomena and objects, however. He argues that objects exist outside our consciousness and beyond the limits of our perception, whereas phenomena are how these objects appear to us within our consciousness.

Changing attitude

In what Husserl calls our “natural attitude” towards things, we assume that objects and a world beyond our own consciousness exist. We perceive, remember, imagine, and desire what we assume are the objects themselves, but we do not investigate these mental acts of perception, remembering, imagining, and desiring. That is to say that because we assume that the objects themselves exist, we do not examine how these objects appear as phenomena within our consciousness. Husserl argues that we can change our attitude and pass from the natural attitude to what he calls the phenomenological attitude. This change in attitude is called phenomenological “reduction” or epoché.

If we carry out the epoché, we lay aside (or “bracket out”, as Husserl calls it) our assumption that objects beyond our consciousness exist. Instead, we focus on our consciousness and how these objects appear as phenomena in our consciousness. For Husserl, this enables us to make a pure description of the contents of our consciousness, free from any assumptions. Our consciousness is not at all empty, but full of the intentional objects towards which we direct our minds.

“Experience by itself is not itself.” – Edmund Husserl

Epoché

Science aims to give us certain answers to questions about the world, but scientific findings depend on experience, and experience is subject to assumptions and biases. Phenomenology “brackets out” our assumptions and puts them to one side in an epoché. Epoché involves a change of attitude from the “natural attitude” to the “phenomenological attitude”.

In the natural attitude, we assume the existence of external objects. In the phenomenological attitude, we suspend our judgement about the existence of external objects and instead focus on, and describe our inner experience of these objects. This enables us to grasp the essence of our experience of objects and what makes it possible for us to make sense of them.

[1] Setting aside assumptions

The phenomenological method requires us to put aside, or “bracket out”, our assumptions and beliefs about external objects. We no longer assume that these objects exist. Instead, we suspend our judgement about their existence.

[2] Objects and phenomena

This enables us to distinguish between an object (the chair, say) and a phenomenon (the chair as we perceive it). We might destroy the chair, but we can still remember or imagine it. The phenomenon can survive the object.

[3] Focusing on consciousness

If we reflect on our own perception or memory of a chair, this means we can focus on our inner experience of objects and examine how they appear to us within our consciousness.

🔎 PHENOMENOLOGY VERSUS LOGICAL POSITIVISM

According to logical positivism, the only meaningful statements are logical propositions and statements about the physical world that can be verified by observation. Statements that express a subjective opinion or judgement are meaningless. This means that a logical positivist would argue that subjective answers to philosophical questions are meaningless.

For Husserl, logical positivism is flawed because it assumes that fundamental questions and issues about human existence are meaningless, and so unanswerable. Husserl argues that phenomenology can help us answer philosophical problems with the same degree of certainty with which we can answer scientific and mathematical questions. By laying aside all of our assumptions, we can build a foundation for knowledge of subjective experience that will enable us to make meaningful philosophical statements about our experience of life.

TIME CONSCIOUSNESS

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) argued that time consciousness, or our awareness of time, is the most basic form of human consciousness.

Present, past, and future

To explore how humans experience time, Husserl analysed an actual moment of consciousness. He used the example of hearing a melody. For Husserl, when we hear a note of a melody at a precise moment, the sound of this note creates a “primal impression”, or a new “now-moment”. This new sound pushes away the most recent moment. As that most recent moment moves into the past, our consciousness holds onto it, so that what is retained takes on the character of being just past and no longer immediately present. Husserl calls this process of holding onto the recent past “retention”.

Husserl argued that the past of something is made up of a continuity of retentions. This continuity of retentions makes it possible for us to perceive an object as one particular thing rather than as a multiplicity of things or just a messy chaos. Every retention brings with it a further retention. When a present moment of time slips into the past, it becomes connected to a retention of the past moment that immediately preceded it. A chain of retentions, connected with the present moment reaches into the past like a comet’s tail. When we hear a melody, we are not only retaining past sounds but also expecting or even anticipating – by drawing on past retentions – the new sounds that are about to come. Husserl calls this forward-looking aspect of time consciousness “protention”.

For Husserl, the three basic elements of time consciousness – primal impression (present), retention (past), and protention (future) – allow the immediate present to be connected to the past and the future as humans experience, and are aware of, the passing of time.

The flow of time

Husserl argues that the experience of hearing a melody brings together the primal impression of the immediate now, the retention of the immediate past, and protention, or anticipation of, the future.

Immediate moment: at any given immediate moment, a new note is sounding – say from a pianist playing a piano.

[1] Primal impression: the new note that is just sounding creates a primal impression, or a new now-moment.

[2] Retention: The sound from the immediate past is no longer present, but it is retained in our consciousness.

[3] Protention: we expect to hear new sounds that will occur in the immediate future.

WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE HUMAN?

In his form of existentialist philosophy, Martin Heidegger explored what it means to be human, and most importantly, what it is like to exist as a human being living in the world.

Existentialist phenomenology

Heidegger (1889–1976) was influenced by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, but he transformed the phenomenological method to address what he believed were more fundamental questions about meaning and being. While Husserl argued that we find meaning by understanding the structure of consciousness, Heidegger argued that we can only find meaning by analysing what it is like to be human in our day-to-day existence.

Heidegger maintained that various attempts to define the human being as consciousness, subject, or self, are inadequate because they look at human life from the outside. He argued that in order to understand what it means to be human, we should not ask abstract questions about human existence, but should think about it through lived experience. Instead of asking “What is a human being?”, we should ask “What does it mean to exist as a human being in this world?”.

Human existence

In Heidegger’s view, if we are to understand what it means to say that something is, we need to understand what it means to be a human being. This is because humans are the only beings for whom the meaning of existence and being is a question. Animals, plants, and inanimate objects, for example, do not ask questions about their being and reality, but humans do ask such questions. Heidegger argued that “Dasein”, or the state of “being there” in the world, is what defines us as humans. We are not isolated subjects cut off from the world that we want to know about, but rather are beings who are “always ready” in the world. For Heidegger, to be in the world means to dwell in a familiar environment, and being-in-the-world is both simpler and broader than mere knowledge or perception. It refers to how things we engage with affect our existence and how they make us feel.

What to ask

For Heidegger, we can only understand our existence in this world by asking questions about our own experience, such as “What is it like to be human?”. Scientific questions, such as “What is human?”, will not help us reach this understanding.

BEING-IN-THE WORLD

In his book Being and Time (1927), Heidegger describes the nature of being-in-the-world (Dasein) by exploring the attitudes of humans who exist in this world towards the various things that they encounter in this world. If humans encounter an object and their attitude towards that object is that it is potentially available for them to use in order to achieve something, then that object is what Heidegger calls “ready-at-hand”. If humans merely look at or observe an object without engaging with and using it, then that object is “present-at-hand”. In this way, Heidegger takes human being as a starting point for asking philosophical questions about being in general.

“Dasein is in each case mine and in the world.” – Martin Heidegger

LIFE BEFORE DEATH

Martin Heidegger argued that it is only possible for us to understand and engage with the things that matter most to us when we live an “authentic” existence and acknowledge our own mortality.

Being-towards-death

In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that a fundamental human anxiety is our awareness that we are not the source of ourselves, and so do not have absolute power over our destinies. Indeed, he claimed that this sense of “groundlessness”, or lack of foundation, lies at the heart of our being and that it is connected to our awareness of our mortality. Heidegger called this attitude of living in the face of death “being-towards-death”.

Being-towards-death is not an attitude that occurs occasionally but is, from the outset, part of who we are, whether we acknowledge it or choose to ignore it. Heidegger argued that we must genuinely understand our own mortality if we are to live as our authentic selves. By acknowledging death, we acknowledge the outermost limits of our own experience. If we ignore our own mortality, we miss this fundamental dimension of our existence and become preoccupied with banal aspects of our day-to-day lives that are ultimately meaningless. In this way, our existence becomes inauthentic. If we become aware of death, we reach a deeper understanding of ourselves, and what it means to exist and have a meaningful existence.

The call of conscience

For Heidegger, having a genuine understanding of our own mortality brings us back from our lostness in the world to our own true selves. Achieving it seems to occur spontaneously, but Heidegger claimed that it is prompted by the “call of conscience”, which is being’s profoundest communication with itself: conscience cuts through the surface “chatter” of our lives and summons us into the presence of ourselves. It is a call away from the distractions that shield us from the truth – that we are temporary creatures, whose fear of death is relieved by facing it directly.

✔ THE NATURE OF ANXIETY

Heidegger argued that one of the ways in which the authentic-self manifests itself is through anxiety, or angst. He contrasted anxiety with fear, which he claimed was always fear of something in particular, such as a snake or a spider: when the snake or spider is removed, the fear disappears. Anxiety, on the other hand, is not a fear of anything in particular; it is a feeling of alienation from the world. The feeling of “groundlessness” is, for Heidegger, the birth of the authentic self – or, as he puts it, of Dasein, becoming individualised and self-aware. It is the moment in which, distanced from the world and other people, we are free to become ourselves.

Authentic existence

For Heidegger, existence is finite, ending with our deaths, and belongs not just in the present, but also in the past and future, which are interconnected. To understand what it means to exist authentically is to constantly project our lives on to the horizon of our death: to exist as “being-towards-death”. To be is to be in time, and our being is, ultimately, a being-towards-death. But this is not a pessimistic view; instead, it enables us to make sense of the things that matter to us, and to prioritise them over less important things.

Meaning through action and choice

By engaging with plans and tasks that project us towards the future, we make sense of ourselves and the world. Awareness of death as the outermost limit of our possibilities makes us project ourselves towards a future that matters to us. Pastimes and future projects give our life sense and meaning; the authentic self is mindful of the limit that is death, while the inauthentic self would try to ignore it.

FREEDOM AND IDENTITY

Jean-Paul Sartre argued that freedom is one of the fundamental things that makes us human, but that we attempt to deny the existence of this freedom by deceiving ourselves and assuming fixed identities.

Being-in-itself and being-for-itself

One of the most important contributors to existentialism (the analysis of human existence in the world), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) was influenced by and critically engaged with the works of leading phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

In his seminal work Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943), Sartre distinguished between different ways of existing. “Being-in-itself” characterises the being of inanimate objects or animals, which are as they are made to be and lack consciousness and freedom to make choices. By contrast, “being-for-itself” is a mode of existence that has consciousness and freedom to choose and act. Sartre claimed that humans are distinctive for having both kinds of nature. We have freedom, but, at the same time, our existence is defined by situations and identities that we simply accept, like personal history, age, gender, race, class, or professional status. Sartre believed that freedom is, however, inescapable. We may seek to flee the choices and decisions that come with freedom because we do not want to take responsibility for our actions, but we are “condemned to be free”: to be constantly faced with these choices and decisions.

Bad faith

Sartre identified a fundamental kind of self-denial of consciousness and freedom, which he called bad faith. Bad faith is a kind of self-deceit about our freedom to transcend the identities we impose on ourselves.

Bad faith is not, however, lying. In the case of lying, the deceiver and the deceived are two parties. The liar is aware of his intention to lie and does not seek to hide it from himself. In contrast, with bad faith, the deceiver and the deceived are the same person. The deceiver knows the truth, which he conceals from himself, choosing instead to imprison himself in his role. Sartre thought that bad faith is a deep paradox of consciousness: we deny our freedom, but if we were not free, we would not be able to carry out this denial.

🔎 EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE

For Sartre, existence is the fact of being, while essence is its purpose, function, and definition. For everything in the world created by human beings, essence precedes existence, but for humanity itself, the reverse is true.

Sartre illustrates the distinction between existence and essence with a paper knife. The knife would not have been created if no need for it existed. Therefore, the knife’s essence must have preceded the knife itself. 

As an atheist, Sartre did not believe that a creator god had given humanity an essence. He argued instead that there is no human nature beyond that which we actively define for ourselves.

Playing a role

Sartre illustrates the distinction between existence and essence with the example of a café waiter, who excels in his professional role. Being a waiter seems to be part of his essence, the purpose and identity that are imposed on him, and he seeks to perform the ideal role of a café waiter. Sartre says that the waiter is trying to imprison himself in this role, but this is in principle impossible. This is because humans cannot escape their freedom. The waiter is not just a waiter. His existence – a state of being in which he is free to act as he chooses – is characterised by possibility. For Sartre, a person’s identity cannot be reduced to the roles that (that) person plays in everyday life. Our existence as conscious, free beings is more important than the roles that we perform, or our essence.

Illustration –

Customers: Ah, Jacques! He really is the perfect waiter – so polite and efficient.

Waiter: I am the perfect waiter, but I am free to leave my job.

Freedom The waiter is free to reject his identity. No more bad faith!

THE “OTHER”

According to John-Paul Sartre, we cannot view ourselves as separate from other people, or other minds, because we can only become self-aware when we are aware that someone else is watching us.

The problem of other minds

Many philosophers have viewed our relation to other people in terms of the “problem of other minds”: how can we know that other people have minds, and think and feel like we do? These philosophers seek to prove that other minds exist, and thus solve the problem of solipsism (the view that I am the only mind that I can know to exist). From Sartre’s perspective, arguments that attempt to prove or disprove the existence of other minds fail for a number of reasons, the main reason being that they share a view of the “self” as separate from others, and a view of other people as objects of knowledge for us.

Sartre challenges these assumptions, arguing that the self is inseparable from others, and that our main relation to other people is a lived (immediate, first-personal) experience of them as subjects in concrete life situations, rather than as objects of knowledge. He says that once we realise that other people view us as an object – and label us in any way they choose – we become aware of ourselves and see ourselves as objects of the other’s gaze.

In Sartre’s view, the existence of others cannot be proven, but we can and do resist solipsism because we rely on our lived experience of others (how we experience them) to make us aware of ourselves, and of how other people view and label us. As we become aware of the labels that other people attach to us, we might apply these labels to ourselves and lose awareness of our freedom. But if we reassert our selves and our freedom, we gain greater self-awareness.

“Through the revelation of my being-as-object for the ‘Other’ . . .  I apprehend his being-as-subject.” – Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943) 

🔎 OUR UNEASY RELATIONS TO OTHERS

According to Sartre, we cannot control the way in which we are seen by someone else. How people characterise us – as, for example, “nice” or “funny” – is unpredictable, as they can see us as they want to. The other person’s freedom is, as Satre says, “the limit of [our] freedom”. Other people can attach, in their mind, certain labels to us and our “outside” objective appearance.

By objectifying us in this way, other people rob us of our inherent freedom (our existence as a being-for-itself) and instead turn us into a being-in-itself. We see ourselves as vulnerable. This alienates us from ourselves and our possibilities in the world because we lose awareness of our freedom and become restricted by the labels that other people attach to us. We regain our freedom by opposing objectification by others.

The other’s look

In Sartre’s view, when we are aware that another person (“the other”) might see us, we do not just notice two eyes directed at us. An open window or the movement of a curtain or door can be manifestations of the other’s look. When we are looked at, we become aware of ourselves as vulnerable. This awareness is not some sort of knowledge; it is a lived experience of another person – the experience of feeling vulnerable or ashamed that arises from being seen by that person. We become aware of our own self, as an object, only in relation to the other person. The self therefore has its foundation in the other’s look. Being seen by another is “an irreducible fact” of our being. Sartre concludes that our relation to other people (and their “mind”) is an internal relation between two separated entities: it is a direct, lived relationship, rather than a mediated form of objective knowledge.

Objectifying others

For Sartre, we become aware of conscious states such as shame when we are confronted with the gaze of another. To illustrate this, he imagined himself peeping through a keyhole. In this similar example, a man is spying on his partner, who is having an affair with another man. As he watches, he is totally absorbed in what he is doing – he is not explicitly aware of himself. But his look objectifies his partner and the other man (such as cheater, liar, traitor).

Being objectified

Suddenly, the man realises that another person is watching him. He becomes aware of himself as an object for someone else, and of their objectifying gaze. As he has negatively labelled his partner and the other man, so, in turn, the person who has caught him spying labels him (such as spy, voyeur, creep).

Finding freedom

Under the gaze of the other person, the man’s self eventually reasserts itself and opposes the other person’s objectification; it seeks to regain and affirm freedom. As the self becomes aware of its freedom, the other becomes an object for the self. The self no longer feels ashamed (busybody, meddler, troublemaker).

GENDER IDENTITY

The activist and intellectual Simone de Beauvoir (1908–86) had a huge influence on contemporary philosophy and feminist theory. Her ideas on the framing of woman as man’s “Other” were groundbreaking.

The ”Other”

In The Second Sex (1949) Simone de Beauvoir examined human consciousness from a first-person, phenomenological perspective, using existential ideas about freedom to address the question of the difference between women and men. She draws a distinction between sex, which is biologically determined, and gender, which is a social construct. Gender has been used by men to make women their “Other” and to justify traditional views of women as inferior. Men and masculine features are seen as the absolute ideal of the human, whereas women have been characterised as deviant, imperfect, the inessential “Other”. At worst, the female body has been regarded as weaker than, or inferior to, a man’s – Freud, for example, described a woman as “mutilated man”. At best, women have been regarded as a “mystery” in order to justify their secondary, alienated status as a “second sex”.

The lived body

De Beauvoir argued that historically men have used sexual difference as a way of oppressing women, in particular, by requiring them to be passive, caring, and concerned with their appearance. Her argument was not that women should be like men, or that sexual differences should be eliminated, but that differences, whatever they are, should not be used to subordinate women.

De Beauvoir saw sex and gender as essential aspects of human life. She argued that our existence is characterised by “being-in-the-world” and shaped by our physical forms: women and men exist as embodied individuals engaged with the world. Her major idea was that embodied existence, and in particular, the “lived body”, is essentially gendered and sexed.

✔ WHO IS TO BLAME?

Although women cannot be said to be to blame for their domination by men, de Beauvoir claimed that women are sometimes complicit in compromising their freedom. She identified three kinds of women who show what Sartre called “bad faith” – that is, who turn their back on their own essential freedom. The Narcissist denies her freedom by seeing herself as an object of beauty; the Woman in Love does so by submerging herself in the love of a man; and the Mystic does so by devoting herself to an absolute idea, such as God.

A Woman must assert her own identity to avoid compromising her freedom.

Becoming a woman

De Beauvoir rejected the traditional view that biology determines what we are, and that it is a woman’s destiny, for example, to become a mother. She argued that such ideas were invented by men, chiefly for the purpose of subjugating women. Instead, she restated the existential claim that “existence precedes essence”, arguing that we are not born with any particular gender identities, and that women are not born women but only become women through social conditioning.

In other words, women’s nature is not fixed, but is constantly changing and developing. Furthermore, since women have freedom, they have the ability to liberate themselves from the demands that men have traditionally made of them. Her point was not that there are no gender differences, but rather that whatever differences there are should not be used as excuses for treating women as inferior.

“One is not born but becomes woman.” – Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949)   

Infancy: De Beauvoir observed that baby girls do not behave differently from baby boys, and that they are not expected to do so.

Early socialisation: However, as female infants get older, they are socialised in ways that make them behave like “girls”, doing the things that “girls” stereotypically do.

Feminisation: As the years pass, girls are feminised further in accordance with social expectations. Typically, they are expected to be passive.

Potential for liberation: By the time they are adults, women have been taught to be mothers, and effectively the inferiors of men. De Beauvoir argued that women should see through this conditioning and embrace their own destinies instead.

THE LIVED BODY

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, influenced by Martin Heidegger’s account of ‘Being-in-the-world’, argued that the way we perceive the world is not purely intellectual but is also shaped by our bodies.

Phenomenology of the lived body

Merleau-Ponty criticised traditional understandings of the human body, namely the “intellectualist” approach and the “empiricist” approach. Intellectualism views the body in terms of our mental representations of it, and neglects its material existence, ignoring the fact that the body is made up of matter. This fact becomes obvious when, for example, people encounter physical obstacles, or become ill, or are injured. Empiricism, meanwhile, sees the body as a thing of the natural world, but neglects its distinctive intentionality – that is, its conscious engagement with the world.

Merleau-Ponty argued that a person’s body is not just an object that responds to external stimuli. Instead, he said, it should be thought about in terms of that person’s engagement with the world and their ability to act with purpose. The “lived body” (a term first used by Husserl to describe the body as we experience it from a first-personal point of view) is not accessible to us like an object that we can see and touch from all sides but is always present for us and enables us to access the world. The lived body is not a mere object but is involved in all aspects of our existence.

The phantom limb

To illustrate this view, Merleau-Ponty used the phenomenon of the phantom limb (where someone who has lost a limb still feels the limb as part of their body). Merleau-Ponty argued that this phenomenon is neither merely the result of neural connections nor of purely mental processes. The empiricist explanation of the body is insufficient here, for given that the limb is no longer present, it cannot receive stimuli. Also, different patients tend to have different experiences of the condition. The intellectualist explanation also fails because the limb is vividly felt as present – far too vividly for it to have been generated by a mental representation such as memory. Rather, Merleau-Ponty argued, the phantom limb has its source in the person’s habitual ways of being and acting in the world. For this reason, the intention is still present, even though the limb is not.

Perception as background

Merleau-Ponty took Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world – the idea that to understand existence, we must first consider our own existence within the world we live in – and added to it a new idea about the human body and perception.

In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty challenges traditional beliefs about perception, arguing that it cannot be properly explained in terms of how sensory data is received and processed (as empiricists claim), nor in terms of thinking about objects and their sensory properties (as intellectualists propose). In his view, perception is a fundamental openness, a background that enables us to discern specific sensory features, and which is “pre-reflective”. For example, we can identify the ringing sound of a phone and reach for it only because we already have a (background) perception of the thing that is a phone; we do not need to reflect on it in order to reach for it, but instead act automatically.

In everyday life, we are neither mere spectators to the world’s “show” nor armchair thinkers; we are actively engaged in specific environments. Perception is connected to action and movement. It is not simply produced – by either the physical body or the mind – but instead stems from an entanglement of the lived body and consciousness. For example, a swimmer perceives the water and interacts with it without thinking about it; her body has a consciousness that enables her to swim without reflecting on her movements and how they interact with the water.

“The body is our general medium for having a world”. – Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945)

Perceiving without thinking: Our perception of things involves an awareness of objects as a whole, including parts we cannot see, such as the interior of a house. This precedes our focusing on particular details.

Bodily intention: Reaching out with a phantom limb emerges from a habitual way of being involved in the world through one’s body.

Perceiving a phantom limb: In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the phantom limb phenomenon arises when a habitual way of being in the world conflicts with a change in a person’s circumstances. The phantom limb keeps alive an area of the person’s embodied life and openness to the world. Merleau-Ponty did not say that physiological conditions or psychic factors (memories, emotions, and so on) are irrelevant to the experience of the phantom limb. Instead, he said such facts should not be conceived in isolation from each other, they “gear into each other” within the framework of Being-in-the-world.

CRITICAL THEORY

Developed as a response to 20th-century capitalism, critical theory aimed to free individuals from ideological, cultural, and political forms of domination.

Emancipation

Led by a group of scholars in Frankfurt, Germany, in the 1930s, critical theorists examined modern capitalist society, seeking to identify and expose its limitations – in particular, the norms and institutions that define society and that can exert power over individuals. Critical theory attempted to uncover not only sources of domination but also possibilities for social change, with the eventual practical aim of human emancipation. A “real democracy”, according to Max Horkheimer (1875–1973), leader of the Frankfurt school, is one in which “all conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings depend on real consensus”.

Instrumental rationality

Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1903–69) were critical of liberalism and the “instrumental rationality” that seeks to identify efficient means for specific ends, and thus control and manipulate relevant factors in order to reach set goals. They argued that the liberal, capitalist ideologies that are used to promote social, economic, or political progress – resulting, for example, in mass production and rampant consumerism – have led to the decline of the individual. The rationality of liberalism, therefore, needs to be reconsidered for the genuine pursuit of social freedom.

Discursive rationality

More recently, Jurgen Habermas (1929–) argued for a more discursive, collaborative approach to rationality, framing it as a social enterprise to be carried out within the public sphere. He believed that assessing ethical and political norms cannot be the result of detached “armchair” thinking, but can only occur through public discussion, which should be open to all of those affected by an issue. This approach emphasises social diversity and complexity and enables people to be seen as individuals existing independently in their own socio-historical circumstances.

Liberation from liberalism

Critical theorists argued that liberal rationality no longer sets us free but has instead turned into a new form of enslavement. They seek to overturn various forms of social, economic, and political control over individuals.

“The limited freedom of the bourgeois individual puts on the illusory form of perfect freedom.” – Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (1972)

Freedom: Critical theory aims to expose the institutions and norms that dominate society, with the aim of freeing individuals from their capitalist chains.

✔ THE RISE OF CRITICAL THEORY

The first critical theorists were influenced by Karl Marx’s critique of society and the economy. The critical theory movement centres on the Frankfurt School, whose members include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Jurgen Habermas, and Herbert Marcuse.

Technological advances in the early 20th century allowed ideas to be quickly reproduced and circulated to huge numbers of people. This, critical theorists argue, enabled certain ideologies and cultural forces to dominate, and suppressed individual’s desires to seek answers for themselves.

Critical theory has, since its foundation, extended in numerous directions, including feminism, post-colonial and race theories, and gender theory.

POWER PLAYS

Michel Foucault (1926–84) was a prominent social theorist, historian of ideas, and philosopher associated with postmodernism. His work challenged traditional ideas about power.

Disciplinary power

Foucault’s philosophy challenged both traditional philosophers and important thinkers of his own time, such as Jean-Paul Sartre. He was influenced to some extent by existentialism and phenomenology, as well as the work of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Foucault regarded power and knowledge as being intimately interconnected and being used to control and to dominate individuals. In Discipline and Punish (1975), he considered new forms of control and punishment at work in the modern prison. He identified what he calls “disciplinary power”, which is exerted not only in prison but also in other institutions such as schools, hospitals, and industry. This is a mode of control that pervades all levels of society.

The tactics and techniques of modern disciplinary power are designed to sustain power structures throughout society by imposing self-regulation on the populace. Foucault thought that this modern “disciplinary power” replaces the “sovereign power” (of, for example, kings or judges) found in feudal social structures.

Conforming individuals

Disciplinary power achieves control over individuals by making them conform voluntarily to the norms and standards of society. It brings about the “normalisation” of individuals (especially “deviant” persons) by requiring them to fit into existing systems such as education. This process is also intended to produce efficient workers.

At the same time, the infrastructure for monitoring and observation of individuals – such as the surveillance camera – effectively controls individuals by identifying deviant behaviour for punishment. Foucault also applies his theories on the relationship between power and identity to sexuality, a theme developed by Judith Butler in her work on gender, sex, and sexuality.

Normalisation

Foucault calls the crucial technique for exerting disciplinary power over individuals’ “normalisation”. Individuals who are observed, examined, and judged as having failed to comply with required norms and regulations (such as those in industry), or to meet certain standards (of good, “normal” behaviour, for example), are considered “deviant” or “abnormal”. The behaviour of such individuals is deemed to require correction – potentially through coercive tactics and procedures. Techniques of disciplinary control thereby turn individuals into the objects of scientific (or pseudo-scientific) knowledge and domination.

Punishment: Close surveillance is a more efficient and less severe form of control than previous systems based on physical punishment.

Normalisation in prisons: Observation and strict surveillance achieves normalisation: inmates behave as though they are constantly being observed.

Diverse workforce: The capitalist economy requires vast numbers of individuals from a variety of backgrounds to work in industry.

Normalisation in industry: Monitoring and surveillance turns individuals into efficient and useful workers, who are judged by their contribution to the economy.

Entering education: Education appears to open up new opportunities for students with a wide range of potential skills and abilities.

Normalisation in education: Education aligned with norms and standards controls students, rendering them employable and therefore useful to society.

“Disciplinary power […] is exercised through its invisibility.” – Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975)

🔎 THE PANOPTICON

Foucault used the example of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon prison, which Bentham designed in the late 18th century, to illustrate his idea of modern disciplinary power. The architectural model of the prison includes individual cells encircling a central observation tower, from which of the inmates could be watched. The idea was that because the inmates could be observed at any time, they would behave as though they were constantly under inspection. Foucault considered this technique to be a prototypical example of using disciplinary power to exert control over the individual.

The Panopticon was never built, but Crest Hill prison, Illinois, built in 1928, followed Bentham’s original design.

– Crest Hill Prison, Illinois

DECONSTRUCTION

Jacques Derrida was an influential postmodern thinker whose thesis of “deconstruction” laid down a detailed linguistic challenge to both the prevailing views of the day and accepted philosophical tradition.

Dismantling philosophies

The idea of “Deconstruction” proposed by Derrida (1930–2004) owed much to Martin Heidegger’s earlier notion of “Destruktion”, which itself challenged the Western metaphysical tradition – the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of reality and our perception of it. Derrida continued Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and, in particular, its “logocentrism” – the idea that truth exists as a separate entity to the language (“logos”) used to describe it. Derrida famously declared: “There is no outside-text”, meaning we cannot grasp what is beyond the language used to discuss philosophical concepts.  

Derrida argued that the meaning of a word is not a representation of some “truth” that exists “out there”. Instead, words draw their meaning from their links and oppositions to other terms. In traditional metaphysical thinking, binary oppositions such as essence/appearance, speech/writing, mind/body, being/nothingness, and male/female have gained acceptance. Derrida points out that these oppositions involve a biased prioritisation of one term over the other in a hierarchal relationship decided arbitrarily. Not only is this theoretically inadequate, but it can be ethically or politically dangerous, potentially resulting in violence or injustice against the things represented by the “inferior” item in each pair.

As a philosophical approach, deconstruction investigates these binary oppositions and exposes the biases that underlie them. It does not seek to reconcile the terms of opposition, but aims to destabilise and rethink the differences between traditional opposites.

Différance

Derrida further explored the meaning of words with his idea of “différence”, a play on words that implies both difference and a deferral of meaning. He argued that meaning comes from differences between words, but that arriving at meaning is deferred because of the way we use language – terms are qualified, explained, and contextualised by the other words surrounding them. For Derrida, différance means that when we examine “truths”, theories, and ideas, we must deconstruct the words used to refer to them, remaining alert to the fact that meaning is never as straightforward or explicit as it may seem.

🔎 POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernists argue that the world as we know it is “discursively constructed” – that there is no fixed or stable relationship between individuals and the world, and that difference is at the heart of all things. Postmodernists endorse multiple viewpoints and emphasise the “contingency” – reliance on other factors – of scientific and other rational attempts to make sense of things. They challenge the authority of reason and objectivity and argue that choosing one theory over another is a result of individual decisions rather than of rational, objective justification.

Questioning meaning

Meaning is created by the “play” of differences between words, which can be limitless and indefinite. Rather than perceiving concepts as existing in paired opposites, Derrida encourages us to question the basis of our understanding, actively deconstructing the meaning of a text by challenging implicit hierarchies, breaking traditional binary pairings, and looking for gaps – which Derrida termed “aporias” (Ancient Greek for “puzzles” or “contradictions”) – in meaning.

FEMINIST POSTMODERNISM

Third-wave feminists, influenced by postmodernism, question the idea that sex and gender are biologically determined. They aim to overturn dominant “feminine” and “masculine” ideals.

Gender as a performance

In Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler argues that gender is a sort of performance. Acted out repeatedly, gendered performances have solidified in time and created the illusion that gender has an essential nature, which is either male or female.

Such performances, Butler claims, reinforce dominant norms and ideals relating to the traditional gender binary (feminine and masculine) and (hetero)sexuality, and so marginalise and oppress those who do not conform, such as gay or transgender people.

Butler argues that these norms are socially constructed and rooted in language as “regulative discourses”. Such discourses shape which forms of sex, gender, and sexuality are “socially acceptable”, and so enable dominant groups to exercise power over others. Butler argues that we must contest these norms in order to destabilise the view of a gender binary and compulsory heterosexuality.

Against essentialism

Essentialism, simply defined, is the view that all women across cultures and time share essential features or experiences. An essentialist might, for example, say that sex is defined by essential biological attributes we are born with (a view called “biological foundationalism”).

Butler argues that essentialism is a political fiction that serves existing oppressive patriarchal regimes. In her critique of the category “woman”, she rejects the view that the word refers to a unified gender identity and proposes a new understanding of the complexities of gender identity that intersects with other aspects of a woman’s identity, such as race.

🔎 THE THREE WAVES OF FEMINISM

The traditional (pre-1960) view of gender and sex was that they are both the product of biology; that is, that sex determined gendered behaviour and roles. Second-wave feminists (1960s–early 1980s) believed that sex is biological, but that gender is a social and cultural creation. Third-wave feminists (1990s–) argue that “sex” and “the body” are not simply biological categories: differences between male and female bodies are, in part at least, socially constructed. Third-wave feminists question the idea of essential female characteristics.

Redefining gender

Many contemporary feminists believe that universal claims about women, gender, and sex are wrong. Such claims, they say, obscure the diversity of women’s situations and strengthen male-female power hierarchies. Butler argues that not only gender but also sex is socially constructed and reinforced.

Sex and gender are both socially constructed

Third-wave feminists, including Butler, argue not only that gender is socially constructed, but that sex (having a “male” or “female” body) is too, through language. They question the biological foundations of gender.

One size does not fit all

Butler argues that an idealised view of women is a dangerous illusion, which has an oppressive power and damaging effects.

Gender roles

Butler seems to liken us to actors in a puppet show, performing gendered scripts, and asks how we can disrupt these norms to promote justice for both women and men.

“Gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original.” – Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (1990)

This concludes the narrative for the page ‘Continental Philosophy’. Amendments to the above entries may be made in the future.