Category Archives: Iran

Government, Iran, Middle East, Politics, United Nations, United States

US-Iran rapprochement requires time…

US-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Where a diplomatic stalemate that has lasted, off and on, for several decades, it would be foolhardy in being anything but wary before dealing again. No more so when the country in question is Iran who has made peaceful overtures towards the United States. The opportunity for misrepresentations and misunderstandings – on both sides – is more pronounced than most others.  Greater still, given the unpredictability of a domestic political scene in Tehran in which the remit of the President and the Supreme Leader are not always clear.

However, Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, has made encouraging noises. He has released political prisoners, exchanged letters with the U.S. President and even used social media to offer New Year greetings to Iran’s Jews earlier this month. And, most significantly of all, he has shifted responsibility for the nuclear programme to a moderate former diplomat who has long established ties to the United States. Mr Rouhani says this has the express support of the Ayatollah.

With Washington responding in good faith, the world’s media expected a meeting to be held between the US and Iranian presidents following Mr Rouhani’s speech at the United Nations earlier this week. Not since the toppling of the Shah in 1979 have both presidents met.

In the end, though, no meeting took place. After more than 30 years without diplomatic relations, some commentators later argued that the absence of a meeting may have been for the best. Undoubtedly, there remains great hurt and pain on both sides. The US has had no official representation in Tehran for almost two generations, with a gulf of understanding left widely prized open. Compared with Iran, the US is an open book. The risk of misunderstandings, especially on the American side, would have been great. It would have been little short of tragic if the early signals from Tehran had been misread which might have squandered any chance of forging better relations.

It was apparent, from their respective speeches at the UN General Assembly that both leaders treaded carefully. They did, after all, have their own public opinion to consider, as well as the expectations that were running so high elsewhere in the world. Mr Rouhani’s stated readiness, though, to engage in ‘results-orientated’ talks on his country’s nuclear programme, and his disclosure that he has negotiating authority, delegated from the Supreme Leader, does raise hope. President Obama would be derelict if he did not now try to test them out in some way.

The rewards from improved US-Iranian relations could be far reaching, particularly if agreement can be made on the nuclear issue. Iran would be brought in from the cold at a crucial time, and the regional map – which looks increasingly hostile to the West – would seem a little friendlier. With the stakes so high rapprochement must be given time rather than scuppering any deal by rushing it through.

Mr Obama, of course, risks charges of capitulation. The concern of Israel, which has Iranian nuclear facilities on its radar, and is ready and willing to bomb them, is again raising its head. But the prize of a safer and less divided Middle East must be pursued with as much vigour as the West can muster. Syria’s bloody civil war, and the threat of regional meltdown, only makes the need for a deal with Iran more urgent.

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Iran, Syria, United States

Will Iran’s new president alter its policy on Syria?

Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, is faced with a plethora of national and international challenges.

Rouhani’s presidential term starts at a particularly challenging time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing an unprecedented level of regional and international isolation, largely due to the US/EU sanctions because of Iranian aspirations in building a nuclear bomb.

One of the most crucial foreign policy objectives in Rouhani’s agenda will be the Syrian conflict, which has now entered its third year.

Iran’s election result raises vital questions as to whether its foreign policy towards the Assad regime will be altered or whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance will evolve into a new phase. The presidency of the centrist Rouhani could change the diplomatic ties with Damascus, with a change possible in Iran’s support for Assad. Tehran has provided the Syrian state with political, military, intelligence and advisory support to its army and security services. That support has, until now, been unconditional.

While there are high expectations among Western political leaders that the election of the centrist Rouhani might influence a change in Iran’s support of Assad, that enthusiasm must be balanced against a number of factors including the realism of Iran’s centrist ideology, the power of the presidential office, Iran’s political structure, and Tehran’s foreign policy objectives.

The political spectrum of the centrists in Iran analyses Syria more from a religious and geopolitical angle and how the realms of the balance-of-power lies. It is least interested in any deterioration in human rights.

Although Rouhani argues for constructive interactions with other countries, and supports applying a softer political tone – as opposed to the combative, controversial and provocative language used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Rouhani has not yet called for an overall sweeping shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Rouhani has neither asked Assad to step down from power nor pressed to halt the intelligence, financial and advisory support to Damascus.

However, withdrawing support to Damascus could be perceived by some centrists as an attempt to undermine Tehran’s geopolitical leverage and balance of power in the region, which ultimately could endanger their own influence and power. This is particularly significant to those Iranian leaders who argue that they are surrounded by what they perceive as ‘existential and strategic enemies’. Military bases of the United States, for instance, are located throughout Iran’s borders and in the Gulf Arab states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The role of the Supreme Leader, too, plays a significant part in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. It may then be unrealistic to argue that Rouhani would be in a position to immediately alter Iran’s current political status quo towards the Assad regime. Iran’s policy towards Damascus is closely guarded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the high generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Etela’at – Iran’s intelligence service. Rouhani will, though, have the ability to set the tone in regional and international circles for the Supreme Leader.

Ali Khamenei has been very clear about his political stance on Syria, stating that Assad’s regime is targeted by Israeli and US-backed groups, foreign conspirators and terrorists.

The religious and pious angle is hugely important. One of the major pillars of Iran’s foreign policy has been that it has proclaimed itself as the safe-guardian of Islamic values, particularly Shi’ite. The Alawite sect-based state of Syria serves as a crucial instrument for advancing, empowering, and achieving this foreign policy objective. Many analysts will be of the view that Rouhani is unlikely to push for regime change in Syria, or by asking Assad to step aside as many Western and Arab Gulf states have done. The domino effect of halting any advisory assistance, be it political, military, or intelligence, to Assad’s ruling Alawite and socialist Bath party, would likely weaken Iran’s own regional influence and foreign policy leverage.

If the Alawites lose power, the next government in Syria is likely to be constituted from the current opposition groups: the Sunni majority in Syria comprises around 74% of the population. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Islamic Sunni parties were the ones who won the elections, in Damascus, the Sunni groups are more likely to win most of the parliamentary seats in any new government after Assad. When this happens this will be regarded as a considerable shift in regional and international power against Iran and in favour of the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Meantime, it seems likely that Iran will continue implementing its current strategies towards Syria to preserve Iran’s regional influence, its political and economic national interests, and the survival of the ruling clerics.

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