Iran, Islamic State, Saudi Arabia, United States, Yemen

Saudi Arabia’s new tactic in Yemen is a risky military gamble…

YEMEN’S CIVIL WAR

Events in Yemen over the past week have taken on a new dimension. Whilst the civil war in Yemen continues apace, in which a Saudi-backed coalition has been battling Iranian-supported Houthi rebels, the tactics of the coalition has changed somewhat following the landing of at least one armoured brigade at the southern port of Aden. According to reports, the 3,000-strong combined Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) force, equipped with French Leclerc main battle tanks, Russian BMD-3 infantry fighting vehicles and U.S. mine-resistant troop carriers, then set-off on August 2 for the Houthi-held military base at al-Anad, about 65km (40 miles) to the north.

Two days later, and bombarded from the air and heavily outgunned, the Houthis swiftly fled into the surrounding hills. Pro-government forces were back in control of the strategically important base which had, until recently, been used by America for launching drone strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Anad is the biggest air base in Yemen and, once repaired and restored, could be used by Saudi and UAE transport aircraft and fighter-bombers to widen the scope of the offensive and to drive the Houthis out of much of the south.

Localised reports suggest that the Saudi and UAE forces are only there to help train anti-Houthi fighters, but there is little doubt that the high-tech and advanced weaponry is being operated by professionals. They are being assisted by tribal fighters who support the internationally-backed government that the Houthis drove out. They know the territory and geography well and can hold ground once it has been taken. But it now looks increasingly clear as if the coalition has decided that only well-equipped regular forces and commandos can bring the campaign against the Houthis to a conclusion.

Yet this is both a major escalation and a military gamble. The Houthi insurgents have nowhere near the level of sophisticated weaponry being deployed against them, and the history of conventional foreign forces fighting in conditions of chaotic irregular warfare is not encouraging, either. Early gains can often be followed by military stalemate and quagmire.

How the Houthis’ Iranian backers will respond if the Houthis are seen to be facing defeat is another unknown. Iran, whose involvement is anyway limited, can do little to resupply the Houthis, whose airports having been bombed and ports blockaded. Besides, it is at full stretch in its fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – and, certainly not the moment to turn a small-scale proxy war into a wider conflict with the Gulf Arabs.

Even if the Iranians show restraint, the Saudi coalition could still run into trouble in other ways. It has, for example, made some unlikely allies in its effort to crush the Houthis in the form of al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which are treated with suspicion at home. Friends like that will call into question the continued support of America, who consider AQAP the most deadly al-Qaeda franchise. And Egypt’s President, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, regards the Brotherhood as a much greater threat than the Houthis. With the humanitarian situation in Yemen also increasingly desperate, the chances of anyone emerging a winner in this conflict are remote.

Map of the conflict zone in Yemen's civil war.

Map of the conflict zone in Yemen’s civil war.

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Saudi Arabia, United Nations, United States, Yemen

War and conflict in Yemen…

YEMEN

THE RAGING WAR in Yemen is a paradigmatic dispute in a faraway country between people of whom the world knows very little. But sometimes, however, its internal power struggles become entangled in wider geopolitical issues of the day. In the 1960s, for instance, the rivalry between monarchists and Arab nationalists split the Arab world. Then, Egypt intervened on the side of the nationalist republicans against the loyalists of the Zaydi imamate, backed by Saudi Arabia. Today, the great line of demarcation is the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which feeds the ravage sectarianism between Sunnis and Shias respectively. Now Saudi Arabia and Egypt are allies, often intervening to support Sunnis against the Houthis (a northern Zaydi militia, that is backed and supported by Tehran).

The conflict in Yemen is escalating. Three weeks into the air campaign, and with civilian casualties growing, there is little sign that the Saudi-led coalition has much of a political or military strategy. The difference in strengths couldn’t be starker: the poorest country in the Arab world is being bombed by one of the richest.

For the United States, which is backing the Saudi operation with logistical support and intelligence, Yemen presents two dangers. First, it is a fertile breeding ground for transnational jihadists (AQAP: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the most dangerous of the group’s branches), and secondly, it offers Iran an opportunity to extend its influence and nurture a Shia ally (which some fear might become akin to Hezbollah in Lebanon). Both risks are being piqued by the chaos.

The Houthis fought repeated conflicts with the Yemeni government led by the former strongman, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following a popular uprising and coup, the president stepped down in 2011 and power passed to a transitional government led by Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But the Houthis, now allied to the hip with Mr Saleh, took the capital, Sana’ a, last September and then marched on Aden, to which Mr Hadi had fled.

Sectarianism is not particularly strong in Yemen, and there is uncertainty about how much support Iran provides the Houthis. But, in a rhetorical sense, Iran’s backing has become strident. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, said Saudi attacks in Yemen amount to genocide. Using the social networking site Twitter, he has mocked the recently enthroned King Salman, particularly his son and defence minister, Prince Muhammad, who is in his thirties: ‘inexperienced #youngsters have come to power & replaced composure w barbarism.’ (sic)

Amid the chaos, AQAP has taken over Mukalla, a Yemeni port – although it has suffered a setback when a US drone killed one of its leaders on April 15th.

Certainly, Saudi action might have prevented the Houthis from taking all of Aden, but they are still making steady gains. Air strikes alone will not defeat them, but the ground option is receding after Pakistan rebuffed a Saudi request to send troops. Egypt is in no rush to send soldiers to Yemen, either.

The question does loom as to whether the time has come for a political deal. There are increasing calls for a ceasefire and negotiations. On April 14th the UN Security Council passed a resolution placing an arms embargo on the Houthis and Mr Saleh’s family. It also recognised the Saudi call for UN-mediated talks in Riyadh, a condition that the Houthis cannot agree to. The Saudis are pushing for the restoration of Mr Hadi, but he is an unpopular ally, not least because he fled the country. Mr Hadi has appointed Khaled al-Bahah as his deputy. A former prime minister, Mr Bahah is seen as just about the only unifying figure in Yemen. Still, Saudi Arabia has set out no clear political objectives. Whether that leads to the annihilation of the Houthis, or by allowing Iran to act as peacemaker, is yet to become clear.

Appendage:

Graphical and geographic depiction of who controls Yemen.

Graphical and geographic depiction of who controls Yemen.

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