Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, is faced with a plethora of national and international challenges.

Rouhani’s presidential term starts at a particularly challenging time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing an unprecedented level of regional and international isolation, largely due to the US/EU sanctions because of Iranian aspirations in building a nuclear bomb.

One of the most crucial foreign policy objectives in Rouhani’s agenda will be the Syrian conflict, which has now entered its third year.

Iran’s election result raises vital questions as to whether its foreign policy towards the Assad regime will be altered or whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance will evolve into a new phase. The presidency of the centrist Rouhani could change the diplomatic ties with Damascus, with a change possible in Iran’s support for Assad. Tehran has provided the Syrian state with political, military, intelligence and advisory support to its army and security services. That support has, until now, been unconditional.

While there are high expectations among Western political leaders that the election of the centrist Rouhani might influence a change in Iran’s support of Assad, that enthusiasm must be balanced against a number of factors including the realism of Iran’s centrist ideology, the power of the presidential office, Iran’s political structure, and Tehran’s foreign policy objectives.

The political spectrum of the centrists in Iran analyses Syria more from a religious and geopolitical angle and how the realms of the balance-of-power lies. It is least interested in any deterioration in human rights.

Although Rouhani argues for constructive interactions with other countries, and supports applying a softer political tone – as opposed to the combative, controversial and provocative language used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Rouhani has not yet called for an overall sweeping shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Rouhani has neither asked Assad to step down from power nor pressed to halt the intelligence, financial and advisory support to Damascus.

However, withdrawing support to Damascus could be perceived by some centrists as an attempt to undermine Tehran’s geopolitical leverage and balance of power in the region, which ultimately could endanger their own influence and power. This is particularly significant to those Iranian leaders who argue that they are surrounded by what they perceive as ‘existential and strategic enemies’. Military bases of the United States, for instance, are located throughout Iran’s borders and in the Gulf Arab states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The role of the Supreme Leader, too, plays a significant part in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. It may then be unrealistic to argue that Rouhani would be in a position to immediately alter Iran’s current political status quo towards the Assad regime. Iran’s policy towards Damascus is closely guarded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the high generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Etela’at – Iran’s intelligence service. Rouhani will, though, have the ability to set the tone in regional and international circles for the Supreme Leader.

Ali Khamenei has been very clear about his political stance on Syria, stating that Assad’s regime is targeted by Israeli and US-backed groups, foreign conspirators and terrorists.

The religious and pious angle is hugely important. One of the major pillars of Iran’s foreign policy has been that it has proclaimed itself as the safe-guardian of Islamic values, particularly Shi’ite. The Alawite sect-based state of Syria serves as a crucial instrument for advancing, empowering, and achieving this foreign policy objective. Many analysts will be of the view that Rouhani is unlikely to push for regime change in Syria, or by asking Assad to step aside as many Western and Arab Gulf states have done. The domino effect of halting any advisory assistance, be it political, military, or intelligence, to Assad’s ruling Alawite and socialist Bath party, would likely weaken Iran’s own regional influence and foreign policy leverage.

If the Alawites lose power, the next government in Syria is likely to be constituted from the current opposition groups: the Sunni majority in Syria comprises around 74% of the population. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Islamic Sunni parties were the ones who won the elections, in Damascus, the Sunni groups are more likely to win most of the parliamentary seats in any new government after Assad. When this happens this will be regarded as a considerable shift in regional and international power against Iran and in favour of the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Meantime, it seems likely that Iran will continue implementing its current strategies towards Syria to preserve Iran’s regional influence, its political and economic national interests, and the survival of the ruling clerics.