Intro: Russian threats in Ukraine and beyond are rising. Its tactics are crude, but the broader ramifications are starting to become clearer

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President Putin is attempting to operate with tactical deftness in Ukraine, but much of his approach amounts to strategic folly. Events have spiralled this week culminating in several people who have died and many more injured. Tensions in the east of the country have risen sharply.

Putin’s irredentist aggression, masked in a way that deceives no one, is being played up well in the Russian heartland. The wider international impact of his actions, though, should be a concern to Russians, and not dismissed in a flippant way as was done earlier this week by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Mr Lavrov poo-pooed the importance of Russia’s exclusion from the G8, but for a country with a wilting economy and serious depreciation of its currency, as well as a chronic problem with low self-esteem, the loss of G8 membership will be a major blow to the nation’s prestige. What came next was the crude bullying of Ukraine via Gazprom. This has merely reinforced the long-established opinion of Russia being a crude and tyrannical state whose declared adherence to democracy and free trade is nothing more than a sham.

The most plausible analysis of events to date is that, having successfully shorn Ukraine of Crimea, Mr Putin is now bent on doing the same to the eastern parts where there are large numbers of Russian speakers and where strong cultural and historical ties exist with Mother Russia.

Despite the denials, it also seems likely that Russian agents led the storming of police stations and government buildings. As they melted away, in fear of being openly identified, pro-Russian gunmen followed them in. It is quite clear, too, that armed gangs opposed to the Ukrainian government in Kiev are now in charge of these buildings.

For Olexander Turchynov, the interim Ukrainian president, this is a terrifying crisis that seems ready to escalate at any moment. Having already used the country’s armed forces to evict some of the pro-Russian gangs from government buildings, actions which led to nine Russian soldiers being killed, Mr Putin has the very excuse he needs to send in his Russian forces under the pretext of ‘protecting pro-Russian civilians’.

Vladimir Putin may be on the brink of restoring the Russian empire. This may invoke questions over what may happen in the Baltic States and other breakaway countries that forged links with Europe after the fall and demise of the former Soviet Union. Mr Putin is emboldened by the rise of his new and emerging Russian Federation and will want to see those breakaway countries brought back under his autocratic control. Any attempt to do so, however, will be at the cost of driving his country into a diplomatic corner.

The United States is being forced to rethink on why it may have to continue being the world’s policeman, a position it has long wanted to relinquish. Russia’s most dependable ally, China, always nervous and tense when geopolitical questions of territorial integrity arise, looks askance at Mr Putin’s rough handling of Ukraine, as was reflected in its abstention of a UN Security Council vote held in March. Germany, too, long lulled into a state of quasi-pacifism by Russia’s post-Soviet peace plan, has been rudely awakened.

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It has been apt to ask, what is the Russian President’s game? The unrest in eastern Ukraine has been portrayed by the Kremlin as an autonomous phenomenon – an upsurge of nationalistic and patriotic feeling among embattled ethnic Russians who long for the protection of the Motherland against what they see as a neo-nationalist regime in Kiev. It seems true that the initial impulse came from locals acting without Russia’s direct involvement, although it has become clear that, just as in Crimea, many of the pro-Russian ‘separatists’ are not just taking their orders from Moscow, but are very probably Russian troops in thin disguise who themselves are orchestrating events in many areas of eastern Ukraine.

Unlike with how developments unfurled in Crimea, the Ukrainian government is in no mood to sit quietly by and watch a repeat in many of its eastern towns. Its efforts earlier this week to reclaim control of official government buildings seized by pro-Russian forces has already led to bloodshed. It is becoming increasingly difficult to see, however, where and how a line can be drawn between what some may say are ‘anti-terrorist operations’, as against others who purport a state of open war.

The question moreover, then, is what does Mr Putin really hope to gain from his continuing excursions. His annexation of Crimea may have been illegal, but it seems to have been grudgingly accepted by the international community as a fait accompli. Not satisfied with merely banking that gain, he has continued to provoke and by doing everything in his power to destabilise Ukraine. Along with threats to cut off vital energy supplies, Putin has further violated its sovereignty by supporting and orchestrating civil unrest within its borders. Maybe he thinks he is able to snip off further pieces of territory at will, or by freely setting up more autonomous enclaves on his borders where Russia’s writ can be massaged as it sees fit.

It is becoming harder to see how further violence, chaos and economic turmoil can be avoided. The only person who can calm the situation is Mr Putin himself – but really he seems in no mood to be backing down.

In many respects, the crisis in Ukraine has marked Mr Putin as not acting from strength but weakness. We may argue that he is acting and resembling a stance similar to that of Slobodan Milosevic, whose reckless attempt to turn the former socialist and collapsing Yugoslavia into a Serbian super-state was instigated by the fact that the basis of his power had already crumbled. This was a desperate bid by Milosevic to secure a new foundation and powerbase for his Communist Party. Then, Europe stood idly by and watched it happen.

Mr Putin’s power is not under quite the same threat in the same way, but Russia is a nation that is in steep decline, as was Yugoslavia. The lesson from the Yugoslav tragedy, surely, is that the West should hardly go easy on continued Russian aggression in Ukraine.

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The Geneva meeting of the so-called ‘big four’ which met on Thursday to discuss the Ukraine crisis was convened against a far from promising backdrop. As the US Secretary of State, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Ukraine’s interim Foreign Minister and the EU’s foreign policy chief were settling down for business, the unabated row over whether armed separatists in eastern cities (such as Donetsk) were special forces operatives from over the border showed no sign of letting up. To agitate matters further, Vladimir Putin freely acknowledged that his troops had been in Crimea ahead of its pre-annexation referendum, and announced during a 4-hour phone-in that ‘he very much hoped’ not to have to exercise his country’s ‘right to use military force’ in eastern Ukraine, too.

Given that, only pessimism was expected by the time the protagonists in Geneva took to their post-conference podia in the afternoon. Contrary to expectations, though, the mood was lifted as the list of agreements came thick and fast. The parties agreed that all sides must refrain from the use of violence, with a proviso that all armed groups must give up their weapons, and all occupied government buildings must be vacated forthwith. An amnesty has been guaranteed for protestors for all but capital crimes.

Part of the agreement also includes measures which will help to restore order and stamp out a further rise in divisiveness, racism and anti-Semitism. Monitors from OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), who are already in the country, will expand their operations to assist the interim government in Ukraine to regain control. In a rather precarious new spirit of unity, Europe, the US and Russia will also provide extra monitors.

Kiev’s interim government has also committed to a ‘comprehensive and inclusive’ process for constitutional change. This will mean canvassing opinion across all regions of the country, and by ensuring the inclusive participation of all social groups and political parties.

The US Secretary of State, John Kerry, described the efforts as a ‘good day’s work’. As Ukraine was sliding dangerously towards civil war, the stand-off between Russia and the West was alarmingly reminiscent of the Cold War. But with a turn of fate that has unexpectedly delivered an agreement on common ground, one which surpasses even that which the most optimistic had predicted, does raise a real possibility that the crisis will be brought to an end.

The agreement looks good and a peaceable solution is much craved for. Yet, despite restraint from Kiev, scuffles between the authorities and pro-Russian protesters have been on the rise in recent days. With tensions running high and many armed groups moving around at will, the risk of disturbance remains.

To effectively implement the agreement, much will depend on Russia. Whilst Mr Lavrov has convincingly called for a cessation of violence, it remains to be seen whether Moscow will make good on its promise by withdrawing its clandestine support for the militants. Kiev, too, will have to act equally quickly if its pledges of inclusivity and reform are to prove sufficiently convincing to many of Ukraine’s opponents – of which there are many, both within and outside the country.

The situation in Ukraine is a complex matter. All sides have legitimate concerns, and the Geneva talks have made a good start in attempting to address them. The test, however, will come in the days and weeks ahead. Evidence of progress will be needed; otherwise this week’s agreements will be powerless to stop the chaos from continuing.