Category Archives: European Union

Britain, Business, China, Economic, European Union, Government, International trade, Politics, Society

A ruthless new Chinese plan that is grinding the West down

CHINA

Intro: China is single-mindedly building enough industrial might to supply the world with just about every major manufacturing product it needs

The most important economic story of our time, by far, is seriously under-covered by both the media and our political class which has largely been ignored. Preferring to obsess, debate, and divide over mere fripperies while a clear and present danger gathers momentum to our economy, our prosperity, and our very way of life.

The scale of the threat is now unmistakeable: China is single-mindedly building enough industrial might to supply the world with just about every major manufacturing product it needs.

Beijing has more capacity than it needs to meet the demands of its domestic markets. Yet it is still adding more at a rapid rate – all of it geared to exports.

It is the clear policy of President Xi Jinping to make the rest of the world dependent on Chinese exports, destroying much of Western business in the process.

It is no less than a bid for global economic domination, with all the global political power that would follow – without the necessity of a shot being fired.

And, so far, partly thanks to the entrenched myopia of feckless politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, it’s proceeding apace without hindrance.

What’s new? you might say. Isn’t it apparent that we have already lived through what we now call China Shock 1.0, an era which started about 25 years ago when Beijing was granted access to global markets?

The world was quickly flooded with cheap Chinese products that not only drove down prices but also drove many Western companies out of business and workers out of jobs.

Well, yes reader, we have and, despite all the pain and disruption it caused, there was never much pushback from the West. True, there were losers, from America’s mid-West to the textile towns of northern England, where blue-collar communities suffered.

But undoubtedly there were more winners from the lower prices and our political masters on both sides of the Atlantic thought what China was exporting – clothes, toys, furniture, household appliances – were not the sort of goods advanced economies in the 21st century should be involved in making anyway. So we just grew to live with it. China Shock 1.0 became the status quo.

It’s now being superseded by China Shock 2.0, an even bigger disruption and far more of a threat because it targets the advanced industries in which the West thought its future lay.

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We’re talking the sort of sophisticated, high-end manufacturing of goods such as precision machine tools, robotic arms for assembly lines, electric vehicles (EVs), the new breed of batteries they require and a new generation of pharmaceuticals.

China is long past the stage of contenting itself by creating the capacity to supply its own needs for these products. It’s building enough to supply the world. A pipe dream? Far from it – it’s already happening.

China can already build enough EVs to supply the entire European market. That’s ten million cars a year. It will soon have enough capacity to meet the global demand for EVs – and the batteries that make up so much of their value.

Indeed, such is the size of Chinese capacity in EVs and their batteries, not to mention their competitive edge, there is really no scope for anybody else to enter the market at scale. We are approaching an age in which the vast majority of EVs and nearly all the key components in them will be Chinese.

That’s already true of solar panels. Fifteen years ago, Europe – especially Germany – had a thriving solar panel industry. Then China entered the fray. There is now no European solar panel industry worth talking about. Wind turbines will be next.

Perhaps most concerning of all, China is building up an unbeatable lead in the market for precision machine tools and advanced industrial robotics. That’s what makes the threat of China Shock 2.0 so much more existential than China Shock 1.0. We’re no longer talking about cheap clothes for teenagers or toys for children. We’re talking about the industries of tomorrow.

To understand more clearly what’s happening, let’s go, briefly, to two places.

First, Dongyuan in Guangdong Province, just north of Hong Kong. This town used to be full of factories churning out cheap toys, shoes, clothes, and appliances for Western markets. No longer.

Now it’s a “factory for factories” making high-value capital goods for global industry from machine tools to robotic arms and microchips – exactly the sort of advanced manufacturing Germany and Japan used to dominate.

Now let’s go to Dresden in Germany, home to Volkswagen’s showcase plant known as the Transparent Factory, so called because it was designed with glass walls to let the public watch workers and machines assemble VW’s world-beating cars.

Except there’s no point going there – because car production ceased last December. Reeling from China Shock 2.0, VW is now slashing tens of thousands of jobs in Germany, closing plants and, to cap it all, is opening an export hub in China from which to supply global markets. Just days ago, VW announced that 50,000 workers will lose their jobs. The company’s share price reacted favourably.

The plight of VW is the plight of German industry. Last year, Germany lost 150,000 skilled, well-paid industrial jobs. This year, it’s still losing them at a rate of 10,000 a month.

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Politicians in Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany’s hitherto prosperous manufacturing heartland, now speak openly of it becoming the “Detroit of Europe”. This is a reference to the US city nicknamed “Motown” thanks to its domination of car manufacturing, which saw its population decline from close to two million in the 1950s to just over 600,000 in 2020 as the car giants moved out.

That prospect tells us something else about China Shock 2.0. Whereas the first shock took more of a toll in America, where there was more low-end manufacturing than in Europe, it is advanced manufacturing in Europe that will bear the brunt of the second Chinese wave.

We can date the start of China Shock 2.0 to 2021 when, in the wake of the world’s biggest ever property crash, President Xi decided it was time to move resources out of property and into advanced manufacturing. That was only five years ago. And yet there’s already been an explosion of Chinese exports to Europe.

The European Union runs a trade deficit with China of one billion euros per day. It’s heading for an annual deficit of half a trillion euros next year – twice the pre-Covid deficit. And, even though we’re only in the early days of the shock, it’s already exacting a grim economic toll.

Bankruptcies and insolvencies in the EU are at a ten-year high. European growth is sluggish. Industrial production is actually declining. Germany now imports more sophisticated capital goods from China than it exports to China – Shock 2.0 in action.

America erected trade barriers to China Shock 2.0, including a 100 per cent tariff on Chinese EVs. Other Chinese products face tariffs of around 25 per cent, far higher than European tariffs where, par for the course, the EU has dithered in its response to China. It’s still dithering, making Europe a much softer target.

It’s not as if the EU hasn’t been warned. France’s official planning agency starkly reported earlier this year that, without action, Europe was heading for “industrial devastation”.

Entire chunks of European industry – cars, machine tools, wind turbines – would go the way of European solar panels. “Rapid industrial wipeout in under a decade” beckoned, with 55 per cent of European manufacturing at risk (60 per cent in Germany).

But what of the UK? The good news (in relative terms) is that because we don’t have that much advanced manufacturing we are less exposed than the EU in general and Germany in particular.

The bad news is that we’re governed by politicians who have no idea there is any kind of threat or, if they do, simply ignore it.

In fact, it’s worse than that. Far from even modestly protecting our interests, we’ve reduced tariffs on imports from China to facilitate the Government’s bizarre dash for Net Zero.

As energy secretary, Ed Miliband actually embraced China Shock 2.0 to further his own green goals. We stuck with a standard 10 per cent tariff on cheap Chinese EVs because he wanted people to buy them.

And, not content with making it easy for Chinese EVs, the Government decided to penalise our own carmakers for not selling enough EVs.

In July, British vehicle output was a mere 64,000 units, down 12 per cent on the year. A decade ago we produced 1.5 million vehicles a year.

This year it is expected we won’t produce even half of that. In 2025, we managed under 720,000, down 8 per cent on the year before. Thanks to China Shock 2.0 and our own Government’s folly, we probably will not have a car industry at all in ten years’ time.

As for so-called “green jobs”, we already have precious few of them. Thanks to the Net Zero obsession, our green supply chains for all manner of things – batteries, cathodes, anodes, solar/wind turbine components, critical minerals – are already China-dominated.

Had we taken our time, we could have fostered more domestic suppliers. Instead, the Government decided to embrace cheap Chinese green tech to meet its artificial climate targets, which have taken precedence over everything else.

There is no coming back from this. We have favoured China and sacrificed any hope of a new industrial base, while jeopardising our security. So much for industrial policy, despite rampant talk of it in Labour circles. Not so in China, where industrial policy is paramount. The scale of the commitment is breathtaking – even frightening. There was a time when Chinese industrial policy was confined to backing a few favoured sectors.

No longer. The whole might of Chinese Communism – state-owned banks, state-owned companies, local government – has been mobilised in pursuit of what’s being called “the industrial policy of everything”. China’s economic growth, which secures the continued dominance of the Communist Party, is increasingly dependent on exports.

China’s currency, the yuan, is manipulated down against other currencies to make these exports even more competitive – and to make goods that China imports more expensive.

There you have another key feature of China’s second shock: it isn’t just the biggest export drive the world has ever seen, it’s a strategy to reduce China’s dependence on imports. Investment has been showered on those parts of advanced manufacturing which Beijing perceives to be over-dependent on imports.

Replace imports with homegrown production, keep the currency cheap to favour exports and, voila, you have a modern mercantilism – an ancient economic doctrine which promotes exports above all else and which fell out of favour years ago.

President Xi has revived it and combined it with autarky, a policy of national self-sufficiency. Those who think we can live with China Shock 2.0 because China’s massive domestic market will still be open to our exporters really have no idea what they’re talking about.

First, it was never open in the first place. Second, the shutters are coming down. Third, President Xi thinks autarky works.

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China now runs a traded goods surplus of $1.2 trillion (£900 million) with the rest of the world, with bigger surpluses to come. Xi isn’t doing this just because he can. He’s doing it because with economic dominance comes global political power.

When you dominate global trade the way China envisages, you dominate global supply chains. Just as America has projected its power and influence through its effective control of the global financial system so China aims to do the same through its control of global supply chains.

It’s already flexed its muscles. Japan learned how vulnerable it was to Chinese supply chains when it recently had the temerity to stand up for Taiwan.

The EU fears retaliation if it takes a tough line against China. Even America has backed off confronting China on trade. Say hello to the shape of things to come.

We are in no position to deal with it. The EU is rudderless. America is run by a President who prefers to pick fights with allies rather than build the united front needed to confront China Shock 2.0. Our own political leadership could not be less equipped to rise to the challenge.

By the time they grasp the implications of 2.0, we’ll be on to China Shock 3.0. It’s already stacking up. This won’t involve Chinese exports of EVs or robotic arms. Not a single container ship will be involved.

It will be the export of the operating system itself. Chinese-built AI models embedded in the software running Western factories, Chinese-standard batteries and chips wired into the next generation of Western infrastructure and EVs. Chinese firms setting the technical rules the rest of us will have to follow because, by then, there will be no alternative supplier left standing.

Beijing will own the plumbing of the modern global economy. Domestic politicians in the West will be left talking about issues that have little or no significance.

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Britain, Defence, Economic, European Union, Government, Military, Politics

Labour’s defence spending. A ruse

UK DEFENCE SPENDING

Intro: Ministers are resorting to desperate measures to boost Britain’s military budget

“We cannot defend Britain with an ever-expanding welfare budget … We are under prepared. We are under insured. We are under attack. We are not safe … Britain’s national security and safety is in peril.”

If these words had been said by James Cartlidge, Britain’s almost invisible shadow defence secretary, no one would have batted an eyelid. This sort of rhetoric is what Opposition politicians are supposed to say, whether justified or not.

But when it’s said by no less a Labour stalwart than Lord George Robertson – a former secretary general of NATO and the principal author of the Government’s recent Strategic Defence Review – it really is time for everyone to sit up and take notice.

Robertson is blunt and direct in his language when he says policy was being determined by the “corrosive complacency” of non-military experts in the Treasury. This has led to repeated delays to the 10-year investment plan caused by arguments over how to fund it.

It is of course a core part of the Treasury’s function to say no to the constant stream of departmental demands for more money. Someone has to keep the lid on burgeoning government spending and it falls to the Treasury to perform that role.

It should be said that this would be an understandable, even an admirable, characteristic if it were applied across the board to all forms of public spending.

What so infuriates military chiefs, however, is the double standards the Treasury seems to apply, not to mention the vast gap that separates the political dogma from reality. There could scarcely be a more vital government function than defence of the realm, for everything depends upon it from national to an individual person’s basic security; yet ministers pay lip service to its importance.

At the same time, too, they’ve squeezed defence spending to virtual oblivion. The proportion of national income devoted to welfare and public sector pay, coincidentally, has run out of control.

This didn’t happen by accident. It was done deliberately from the end of the cold war onwards. The resources once thought necessary for defence were instead diverted into social and health spending – a so-called peace dividend that allowed for a massive expansion of the welfare state.

Defence spending has meanwhile shrunk from about 5pc of GDP at the time of the Falklands war in the early 1980s to just 2.3pc last year.

Only belatedly have ministers realised their peril. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was warning enough. US threats to withdraw from NATO provided another wake-up call. Then came the national humiliation of being unable to field a single frigate to defend British interests in the latest outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.

There seems to be plenty of money that can be found when it comes to inflation-busting increases in public sector pay, yet ministers struggle to find the resources needed to sustain an operational navy. Somewhere along the line, the Government lost its sense of priority.

While welfare spending, taxes, and borrowing mushroom, there are still no answers as to how to deliver even the relatively unambitious targets the Government has set for defence – 3pc of GDP by the end of the parliament and 3.5pc by 2035.

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In acts of desperation, ministers are reaching for what they amusingly call “creative solutions”, apparently unaware of the unfortunate connotations the expression carries in accountancy circles – as in “creative accounting”.

If increased defence spending can somehow be kept off the public balance sheet, then miraculously it immediately becomes perfectly “affordable”.

In pursuit of such sleight of hand, the UK is exploring setting up a new mechanism for collectively funding defence spending with the Netherlands and Finland. There is also the possibility of Poland and other NATO allies joining in.

The attraction of the scheme is that under international accountancy conventions, the additional spending moves “off balance sheet” if the entity pursuing it is multinational. Typically, a minimum of three countries is required to satisfy these requirements.

It’s cajolery and a swindle, because whichever way you cut it, and however the entity is funded, ultimately it’s the customer that pays, and the customers here are the three countries involved. Eventually, the costs will bounce back on to the British taxpayer.

Still, if it helps support the additional spending the military so desperately needs, it would perhaps be perverse to knock it. But it is also just an accounting ruse that allows the Government to spend money that it doesn’t have. Markets are sensing hidden deception and that something is wrong, and rightly so.

As is apparent from International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis just published, Britain is in a dire fiscal hole, with fast rising taxes and borrowing struggling to keep up with increased welfare and other forms of government spending.

The peace dividend is gone, so the Government is desperately searching for ways of cooking the books in the hope that nobody notices. In practice, few are going to be fooled by this kind of window dressing.

Already, there are hundreds of billions of pounds worth of government liabilities conveniently shunted into the shadows of off-balance sheet finance, including the costs associated with previous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would further add to them.

How Britain is going to pay for increased defence spending is anyone’s guess. Even the Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, said that the Government was still trying to figure out how to do it in conjunction with European partners. Many will be sensing what he meant is the charade of international defence procurement and financing.

Seeking solutions in Europe is becoming a bit of a thing with this Government. Getting closer to the EU is also proposed as a solution for the country’s lack of growth, even if it is hard to see how a little “dynamic alignment” in standards is going to make much of a difference. But this halfway house doesn’t get the Prime Minister or the country anywhere. It is certainly not going to get the UK out of the fiscal hole it has dug for itself.

In terms of the public finances, Britain is on the ropes. It is also widely considered to be acutely vulnerable to the current energy price shock. The IMF expects UK growth this year to be slower and inflation higher than any other major advanced economy.

Worse still, the tax burden is projected to rise by more than anywhere else in the world during the remainder of this parliament, and that’s on the basis of what we already know about the Government’s plans. It is eminently possible to imagine further shock announcements to come. And yet public debt is still expected to swell to more than 100pc of GDP by 2029.

A rational person would have thought that somewhere in this developing financial Armageddon, the money might have been found to at least keep the military operational.

But no, social spending priorities continue to eclipse all else.

Resorting to accounting tricks only makes matters worse.

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Denmark, Europe, European Union, Government, Greenland, NATO, Politics, Society, United States

The reasons behind Trump’s desire to acquire Greenland

UNITED STATES – GREENLAND

It is said that Donald Trump’s much-vaunted desire to acquire Greenland is all about US national security.

First, the US president claimed the Arctic island, a self-governing territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, was being swarmed by Russian and Chinese vessels. Then he said ownership of the sprawling territory was vital for his planned “Golden Dome” missile defence shield.

There are hints of truth in both claims, but security experts have broadly argued that a US acquisition of Greenland is not necessary to address the national security concerns.

The sparsely populated island plays an outsized role in the United States’ and NATO’s wider air defence architecture. It sits smack bang in the middle of the shortest flight path between Moscow and Washington – known as the great-circle distance.

Technically, the island is 2,000 miles from Washington and 2,000 miles from Moscow.

Since the end of the Second World War, the US has had military personnel stationed at Pituffik Space Base, on the far north coast of Greenland. It serves as the US military’s northernmost base, about 900 miles from the North Pole and is home to about 150 troops. It is a key cog in Washington’s early warning system for missiles. If Russia or China were to fire a ballistic missile at the US, its path would probably cross directly over Greenland, which is why the primary role of the personnel at Pituffik is to scan the skies for incoming aerial threats.

However, America’s military footprint on Greenland has significantly dwindled since the end of the Cold War.

At its peak, Washington had 17 installations and 15,000 soldiers on the island, hunting for Soviet submarines and ships, as well as being ready for a feared invasion.

This was underpinned by a 1951 agreement signed between the US and Danish governments. Copenhagen has repeatedly argued this deal still stands, and there is nothing preventing Mr Trump from deploying more soldiers to Greenland without the need to acquire the island.

This includes hosting any assets that would contribute to the US’s Golden Dome project – a $175bn (£131bn) air defence system that would mimic Israel’s Iron Dome, but on a vastly larger scale. Mr Trump had not mentioned Greenland, however, as being vital to this decade-long project until just recently – suggesting it has become a convenient excuse for the White House to use.

The Golden Dome project, it has been claimed, would also involve a system of satellites – some that track missiles and others that fire their own projectiles to shoot them down.

While analysts have questioned whether such technology even exists, or is likely to exist any time soon, US ownership of Greenland would not be a prerequisite for an American satellite defence system.

In real terms, Pituffik’s importance is expected to grow as climate change reshapes the polar Arctic by opening up new trade routes close to North America.

Greenland sits where the Arctic Ocean meets the Atlantic.

Russian ships and submarines leaving the country’s Arctic region bases to head south have to pass nearby to do so. One of the main routes sees the Russian vessels pass through the waters between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK – known as the GIUK Gap.

A second gap, the Bear Gap, between Norway and Iceland has also emerged as a favoured option.

Since Vladimir Putin ordered his invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increased its aerial and naval patrols in the area. Denmark says it will invest £1.73bn to bolster its Arctic Command with new ships, drones, and surveillance aircraft to guard the region. The spending was announced in January last year to deter Mr Trump’s interest in Greenland.

Again, as with missile defence, bolstering security in the waters around Greenland does not require acquisition of the island.

Denmark insists Washington could use existing treaties to address those national security concerns.

Greenland’s geography might provide the easiest route to explaining Mr Trump’s desire to acquire the territory. The island’s capital is closer to Washington than it is Copenhagen.

But it could be down to the maps drawn by Gerardus Mercator in the 16th century, and still commonly used.

On the Mercator Map, areas near the poles are greatly exaggerated in size.

Greenland can appear to be the same size of Africa, despite being 14-times smaller. South America also appears smaller than the Arctic island.

Mr Trump has publicly spoken of his love of maps, and for the size of perceived regional superpowers, such as the US or Russia. To some, the Mercator Distortion could just make a combined US-Greenland landmass look bigger than Russia.

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