TERRORISM
Following a terrorist attack, we can expect to learn more about the perpetrator in the hours and days ahead. Early detail doesn’t necessarily shed much light on how the attack was planned and executed, nor the exact motives as to why it was carried out. It can, too, take some time before we know the identity of the attacker.
However, the bomb detonated at Manchester Arena this week, by Salman Abedi, killing 22, has revealed a lot in a very short space of time. First, we found out that he was known to the authorities, and was a UK national of Libyan descent, the son of Libyan refugees who fled Gaddafi’s regime and were given safe sanctuary in the UK. Then, it quickly emerged that Abedi had recently arrived back in the UK from Libya, where his parents had returned to after the fall of Gaddafi. Reports have also emerged that Abedi displayed the black flag of Islamic State while living in Manchester, was known to have recited Arabic loudly in the street, and was reported to police by two people who knew him about his increasingly extremist views.
A picture is emerging of Abedi being a clear terrorist suspect before his appalling murderous act, and part of a network which may well have built and supplied him with a bomb. He is known to have travelled from London to Manchester in the hours before the attack.
The ability to immediately identify him has, of course, brought much of this information to light. But it is inevitable that questions are going to be asked about why Abedi was not under greater surveillance by the security services, given his background and his recent movements. It is a difficult enough process to prevent the terrorist who was not previously known to the police, but based on the information we have on Abedi, it is becoming clear that our current intelligence gathering has not detected warning signs which, put together, could have raised the alarm when Abedi returned from Libya just a few days before the attack.
Whilst dispiriting to admit, putting troops on the streets would not have deterred Abedi, given the way he carried it out. A military presence might put off an attacker with a knife or a firearm, but the suicide bomber will simply choose one of the countless other soft targets where no armed security force is present. Once the device is detonated, it is too late to respond.
Countering terrorism requires strong intelligence. What we have found this week is that our intelligence services require reinforcement, more of the invisible officers who are required to track those who intend to do us harm. Strong intelligence is an effective weapon against the threat of terrorism.
