The Polish case is not an exception. Romania’s defence budget is to reach 2.5 per cent next year, well over the NATO benchmark of 2 per cent. The Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – will also hit a target of spending 2.5 percent of their GDPs over the next few years. These countries feel directly threatened by Russia’s continuing belligerence.

The newly acquired clout European countries have within the EU and NATO must also be considered. For many years, Poland and the Baltic states were dismissed as being too hawkish over Russia. Germany’s cautious approach, relying on dense commercial links in creating commonality of interest with Moscow, prevailed and was embraced by other major Western European powers, including France. 

That was the case even after Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and the first stage in the war in the Donbas region in 2014-2015.

But this year’s attack on Ukraine overturned that. Now the EU is applying increasingly rigorous sanctions against Moscow, including on its lucrative energy sector. And Poland and the Baltic states are at the forefront of that effort, pushing for ever more severe penalties against Moscow. They have become emboldened and are driving EU policy.

At the same time, the war has empowered Putin’s ‘friends’ in Eastern Europe. Consider, for instance, the opportunity for Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban who reversed his falling approval ratings by winning re-election in April for a record third time. He skilfully inflated and exploited voters’ fears that their country could be dragged into the conflict.

Later, Orban managed to carve out an exemption from the EU embargo on Russian oil reaching Hungary through the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline via Belarus and Ukraine. He also used his veto power on a $19bn aid package for Ukraine as leverage to lift a freeze on EU funds that Brussels had conditioned on his government implementing reforms on the rule of law.

Hungary’s pro-Kremlin stance has acted as a spoiler on efforts to help Ukraine, but it has also contributed to Eastern Europe’s growing centrality on Brussels’ agenda.

Over the past 10 months, the EU has shown a much more serious commitment to aspiring candidates for membership along its eastern border. Some Eastern European states have been quite active in this process. Poland, Romania and other nations in the region have pushed hard for Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Union. They were granted candidate status in June.

Under the Czech presidency of the EU, which started in July, Brussels has also intensified engagement efforts in the Western Balkans. Earlier this month, Bosnia and Herzegovina officially became a candidate while Kosovo was, at long last, given a green light for visa liberalisation (due in 2024). Slovenia lobbied hard for Bosnia’s candidate’s status, even though Sarajevo had failed to meet many of the political conditions.

The EU-Western Balkans summit held in Tirana on December 6th has also demonstrated the EU’s commitment to the region. Significantly, it was the first time the union’s leadership gathered in a non-member country.

During the summit, EU and Balkan leaders mapped out a way forward towards a regional common market. Brussels pledged to spend billions in building cross-border infrastructure and ‘greening’ and ‘digitising’ Balkan economies. It also announced a $1.06bn package to help non-EU members in the region cope with the energy crisis caused by the Ukraine war.