Category Archives: Financial Markets

Britain, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Society

Brexit, oil prices and global trade: factors hindering economic recovery

ECONOMIC

DESPITE the uncertainties surrounding Brexit the range of expectations for UK growth for 2019 is relatively narrow – between 1 per cent and 2 per cent. A recent poll found that no economist expected an outright contraction next year; nor did any expect a boom. Rather, the most likely scenario is for growth of 1.5 per cent, which, the Bank of England believes, is around the UK’s new lower trend rate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has also refreshed its global forecasts, expects roughly this same rate of growth in Britain to persist over the next five years.

The Brexit saga is probably the most obvious risk facing the economy. Whatever one’s view of the longer-term Brexit effect, a “no-deal” outcome could lead to the economy plunging into recession, while a “good deal” could boost confidence, investment and consumer spending and thereby economic growth. But Brexit is far from the only risk in town.

Indeed, there are plenty more global concerns that may yet scupper the recovery. After all, the British economy – unlike the United States and other relatively “closed” economies – is highly dependent on the outlook for global growth. And across much of the world forecasters see growth slowing over the coming years, even without some of the more disastrous risk scenarios crystallising.

What are the key global risks that might come back to bite the UK? First, there’s China. Many think of China as being a source of cheap imports but it is also Britain’s sixth largest goods export market. On one measure, published by the IMF, China overtook the US as the world’s largest economy in 2014, so attempts to reduce its debt pile after many years of spending could present a significant threat to global growth.

Fiscal largesse in the US is boosting growth there, but as President Trump’s splurge comes to an end the economic hangover could spread far beyond its shores. On this side of the Atlantic, the European Commission is likely to complain about the high budget deficits planned by Italy’s populist government, providing another source of market stress. Then there’s the issue of protectionism. Global tariffs have fallen significantly since the interwar period and remain low even after recent increases between the US and the EU/China. Even if these moves do not directly affect Britain, an escalation in trade disputes could yet be the precursor to weaker global confidence and exports, both to the UK’s detriment.

Oil prices could become a destabilising global force. Prices have fallen a little over the past few weeks but remain high at above $80 per barrel. Had strong global demand been the cause, that might have provided a counterbalance. But when prices rise because of supply constraints net oil importers such as the UK suffer increased costs with no improvement in demand conditions.

Higher energy prices also tend to leak into general price inflation. For now the inflation genie remains in the bottle, with rates of inflation across the G7 in a tight 1 per cent to 3 per cent range. But past above-trend rates of economic growth alongside unemployment rates at their lowest in a generation suggest upside risks to inflation. If not met with rising wages, that would reduce household spending power and could also prompt central banks to raise interest rates more quickly. Not only does that directly curtail domestic spending but for those countries that have taken out foreign currency loans (such as Turkey or Argentina) rising global interest rates push up their repayments and the risk of more widespread emerging market panic.

Recent moves in equity prices reflect all of these concerns; the FTSE 100 index fell to below 7,000 to a six-month low earlier this month. Investor concerns relate to the fact that neither central banks nor government exchequers can be sure their armoury is sufficient to deal with another crisis, should one arise. Banks may be more resilient now but they may not be the source of the next economic downturn.

Brexit is one of many global concerns that have increased the risks of another downturn in Britain and beyond. These risks will require careful navigation by policymakers if another downturn is to be avoided.

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Britain, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Politics, Society

The real crisis of capitalism

ECONOMIC

THE past week has been a time for recalling the events of September 2008, their long shadow over the economics and politics of the past ten years and for drawing the right lessons for the future.

In particular, did the financial crisis prove that capitalism is fundamentally unstable and that a new model involving greater control and a much bigger role for the state, as favoured by Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, is a better one? Or, the fact that the guilty men and women mainly got away with it, meant that public anger over the crisis was never assuaged?

We should understand that the financial crisis did not begin on the weekend of September 13-14, 2008, which saw frantic but unsuccessful efforts to save Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street investment bank. The crisis had been simmering for well over a year, a period that saw the run on Northern Rock and the start of Britain’s deepest recession in the post-war period.

The bankruptcy of Lehman, announced on September 15, turned a smouldering crisis into a ravaging forest fire that spread rapidly around the world. Banks were bailed-out by free-market governments using public funds. Alongside near-zero interest rates, central banks including the Bank of England did things they never would have contemplated in normal circumstances, most notably quantitative easing (or the printing of free money). Governments spent vast sums of money that ran into the billions boosting their economies to ease the impact of the crisis, but on the basis that they would cut back later. Austerity, on a scale and duration not seen in this country since the Geddes axe of the 1920s, was the course chosen by the coalition government in 2010.

 

MOST of what people think they know about the past decade is wrong. The danger in 2008 was of a prolonged period of deflation – falling prices and economic depression, a modern version of the 1930s. The reality is that both were avoided. After the shock of the crisis the economy grew more slowly than had been the norm, but it grew. All advanced economies were afflicted by weaker growth.

Income inequality in Britain has fallen since the crisis, not least because the burden of tax faced by the highest earners has increased. This financial year, 2018-19, the top 1% will pay almost 28% of all income tax, compared with just over 24% in 2007-08, paying £12bn a year more in tax than before the near meltdown. The top 10% accounts for 59.7% of all income tax revenues, up from 54.3%.

Austerity, as practised by the coalition led by David Cameron and now by a Tory minority government under Theresa May, was never about shrinking the size of the state for ideological reasons. The coalition’s mantra before the crisis was that after the spending splurge under Gordon Brown, the “proceeds of growth” would in future be shared between tax cuts and increased public spending.

Even faced with the task of reducing an out-of-control budget deficit, Mr Cameron ring-fenced NHS spending and imposed a target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on foreign aid. A better criticism of Tory austerity is that too much of it involved cuts to government investment and that the process has dragged on for too long, partly because it was leavened with tax cuts, mostly for working people.

 

THE financial crisis and its aftermath were painful but too many Tories seem to have been cowed by it from making a robust case for capitalism. This leaves the way open for Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell, Labour’s anti-capitalist chancellor. When a privatised rail company messes up, or a housebuilding boss is awarded a bonus running into tens of millions of pounds, there is rightly an outcry. The crisis itself was the product, yes, of many greedy bankers and a few in handcuffs might have satisfied public opinion, but it was also the consequence of regulators whose job it was to stop them failing. In many cases, including the recent collapse of Carillion, many of these problems arise at the interface between the public and private sector.

Of course, we all want to return to a time when living standards are rising at a decent pace. That will be achieved only when productivity growth also returns to something approaching past norms. Capitalism in Britain has, since the crisis, delivered something like seven times the number of new jobs as those cut by the public sector. Unemployment is at its lowest since the mid-1970s. It is the private sector, not failed prescriptions of anti-capitalism, that will deliver prosperity in the future.

 

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Britain, Economic, Europe, European Union, Financial Markets, Government, Italy, Politics

Italy’s populist vote and the uncertainty of the euro

EUROZONE CRISIS

IN a continuation of a wave of populist voting following Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, Italy has now followed suit. The ousting and forced resignation of Matteo Renzi, a very successful prime minister in Italy, adds yet more resonance to an EU that is breaking at the seams.

Despite what Marine le Pen, the far-right leader of France’s National Front, would like to portray, Italy’s revolt was not particularly based on an anti-EU stance. The top populist parties in Italy, Five Star and the Northern League, are not opposed to membership of the EU itself but they are averse to the Eurozone.

Nevertheless, it will hardly be seen as a ringing endorsement of the actions of the EU. The issues that have driven this latest referendum result – fears over the waves of refugees from Africa, a desire to rise up against the establishment, and unhappiness over the way the economy has been managed – are the same dissenting signals that we have seen elsewhere.

It is the economic impact that we have most to fear from the Italian result. There is also the issue of what that might mean for the negotiations over Britain’s exit from the EU. The Italian economy is far from healthy, despite marginal improvements in unemployment rates, and the banks remain weak. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, at a staggering 133 per cent, is second only to Greece’s in the Eurozone. Despite Italy being the Eurozone’s third largest economy, the country has contracted by around 12 per cent since the financial crisis of 2008.

President Sergio Mattarella will be anxious now to ease fears of instability. But regardless of what action he takes there will be a delay as the markets adjust. In reality, he remains helpless as to what he can do to ease those fears. How long that period of instability lasts is the biggest uncertain factor the markets face. Financial markets do not like uncertainty or instability.

There is a risk that the failure of a major Italian bank, such as the troubled Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, could set off a wider crisis. Making the banks strong enough becomes more difficult amid political ambivalence.

That could well provoke another crisis in the euro, at a time when Britain will be in negotiations about its withdrawal from the EU. The fusion of these events is not going to help any new euro crisis or aid Theresa May and her government getting a favourable Brexit deal.

The most telling comment yet has come from the German finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who has said there was no reason for a euro crisis but that Italy urgently needs a functioning government. Startling. Mr Schaeuble infers that a currency crisis was not inevitable. Unfortunately, ending the uncertainty is more than just an Italian problem.

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