Category Archives: Foreign Affairs

Asia, China, Foreign Affairs, United States

China: An international ruling over the South China Sea

CHINA

Intro: The ruling was made by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, following a case which was brought by the Philippines

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS China has displayed an often aggressive stance over its vast territorial grab in the South China Sea. This has terrified its neighbours and set it on a collision course with the United States, long seen as the guarantor of peace in East Asia. In the last few days an international tribunal has demolished China’s vaguely defined claims to most of the South China Sea. How Beijing now reacts to this ruling is of the utmost geopolitical importance. If, in its anger, China flouts and ignores the verdict and continues its creeping annexation, it will be perceived as elevating brute force over international law as the arbiter of disputes among states. Continued bullying by China of its neighbours greatly raises the risk of a local clash and which could escalate into a war with America. The stakes couldn’t be higher.

The ruling was made by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, following a case which was brought by the Philippines. The verdict is firm, clear and everything which China did not want to hear. The judges decreed that the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) should solely determine how the waters of the South China Sea are divided among countries, and rejected China’s ill-explained ‘nine-dash line’ which implies the sea belongs to China. They ruled that none of the Spratly Islands in the south of the sea, claimed (and occupied) by several countries including China, can be defined as islands that can sustain human life. In practice, this means that no country can assert an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles around them.

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Map depicting the disputed islands in the South China Sea

While the court had no power to decide who owns which bits of land in the South China Sea, the judges said that by building on rocks visible only at low tide (and thus not entitled under UNCLOS to any sovereign waters), China had encroached illegally into the Philippines’ EEZ. The court also determined that China had violated UNCLOS by blocking Philippine fishing boats and oil-exploration vessels, and cited that Chinese ships had acted dangerously and unlawfully in doing so. Moreover, China’s island-building had caused ‘severe harm’ to the habitats of endangered species, and Chinese officials had turned a blind eye to such practices.

For China, this is undoubtedly a humiliation. Its leaders have been quick to denounce the proceedings as illegal. Its massive recent live-firing exercises in the South China Sea implies it may be planning a tough response. This might involve the imposition of an ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ of the kind it has already declared over the East China Sea. Or it might mean that China starts building on the Scarborough Shoal, which it wrested from the Philippines in 2012 after a stand-off involving patrol vessels. That would be hugely provocative. Although the U.S. is deeply reluctant to risk a conflict, President Barack Obama is believed in March to have warned his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, that any move on Scarborough Shoal would be seen as threatening American interests (the Philippines is a U.S. ally). Any attempt by China to call its bluff in a sea that carries $5.3 trillion in annual trade would be reckless and irresponsible.

There is a better way. China could climb down, and, in effect, quietly recognise the court’s ruling. That would mean ceasing its island-building, letting other countries fish where UNCLOS allows and putting a stop to poaching by its own fishermen. It should have good reason: its prestige and prosperity largely depends on a rules-based order. It certainly would be in China’s own interests to secure peace in its region by sitting down with the Philippines, Vietnam and other South-East Asian neighbours and trying to resolve differences.

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Foreign Affairs, Syria, United Nations, United States

Syria gas attacks are continuing…

SYRIA & CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Intro: Despite Syria agreeing to dismantle its chemical weapons programme, Bashar Assad is using chlorine against his people

IN 2013 Washington went back on its pledge to strike at the heart of Bashar al-Assad’s regime for having used sarin nerve gas against Syrians in Damascus that summer. Brokered by Russia, the Syrian regime agreed to dismantle its chemical weapons programme.

Theoretically, the deal has been a success: to date, 98% of the country’s banned substances have been eliminated and destroyed, and Syria has joined the treaty against their use. Yet, as is his convoluted way, Assad still appears to be making a mockery of the agreement.

Since 2014 there have been increasingly frequently reports of chlorine gas attacks against towns and villages held by the rebels, most recently in three separate incidents on May 7th. Chlorine is not a banned substance since it has industrial and commercial uses, but it is strictly prohibited when used as a weapon. Inhalation causes a burning sensation, and fluid can accumulate in the lungs resulting in suffocation.

Then, on May 8th, reports surfaced from the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPWC) that unexplained traces of sarin and VX nerve agent had been found at a research centre in Damascus. Suspicions that Syria had failed to declare all its facilities first arose in 2014 when the regime suddenly added four new sites to the list it handed over in 2013.

Few believe the regime’s claims that the rebels are responsible for the chemical attacks, including the one in the summer of 2013 that left hundreds dead. The physical evidence points the other way, too. Chlorine is usually delivered in barrel bombs dropped by helicopters, which only the regime possesses. All have been targeted at rebel-held areas. More recently, the attacks have been concentrated on Idleb, the north-western province where the regime is losing ground.

The international community is deeply troubled. Some members broke down at a recent UN Security Council session when they were shown graphic video images of the aftermath of one attack and heard testimony from doctors who were at the scene. On March 6th the Council passed a resolution expressing ‘extreme concern’ about the attacks and authorising the UN to use chapter VII (military action or sanctions to enforce its decisions) against anyone found responsible.

The UN is now setting up a commission to determine who is carrying out the attacks rather than just whether they actually happened, as has been the case in past investigations. The OPCW and Human Rights Watch are satisfied that chlorine was used in at least three of the several reported instances. Diplomats from America, Britain and France are convinced that the Syrian leader is still using chemicals as a weapon. Assad’s regime is the only government in the world to do so since 1988 when Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds in Halabja in northern Iraq.

However, there is unlikely to be much more than public censure. It is probable that Russia would veto any chapter VII action, and the appetite by Western countries’ for ousting Assad has greatly diminished since the emergence of Islamic State.

Throughout this long and protracted civil war the regime has carefully calibrated its actions to deliberately avoid triggering western intervention – the sarin attack in 2013 is reckoned to have been far bigger than the regime planned, and only a handful of people have died in the recent chlorine attacks. Using an alternative to conventional weapons also suggests a calculated choreography. Bashar al-Assad is getting away with saying one thing whilst clearly doing another.

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China, Economic, Foreign Affairs, Japan, Society, United States

A bilateral trade agreement between Japan and America looms…

TRADE AGREEMENT

Intro: But why is this potential agreement being treated as a weapon? It shouldn’t be used to contain China

Congressional leaders in America rarely agree on anything, but last week some good news stemmed from Washington. A bipartisan bill has been presented to Congress which, if passed, would for the first time in many years give the president ‘fast-track’ authority when negotiating trade deals. A huge trade deal looms, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the bill would provide a major boost for its prospects. It would bind America with 11 economies (including Japan but not China) around the Pacific Rim. The TPP is being mightily embraced. As Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, heads to Washington for a much anticipated trip – including an invitation to address a joint session of Congress – Mr Abe claimed that America and Japan were close to agreeing the terms of a bilateral agreement on trade.

However, there are two major caveats. First, ‘fast track’, formerly known as Trade Promotion Authority, may still fall foul of Congress. And second, Japan may not make any serious cuts to tariffs that protect its farmers. Yet, underlying this potential trade agreement is that both have been too quick to cast the TPP as a weapon in its desire to contain China.

Flanked by Japan and America, the TPP would link countries which make up 40% of global GDP. That could boost world trade and output by as much as $220 billion a year by 2025. It is aimed at reforming difficult areas such as intellectual property, state-owned firms and environmental and labour standards. It would link economies that lie at different ends of the spectrum of development – from Vietnam to Australia.

But, crucially, the TPP will not happen without fast track, which forces Congress into a yes/no vote on any pending trade deal (avoiding the risk that it will be amended into oblivion). And the passage of fast track will no-doubt face a lot of scepticism from congressional Democrats. There are those who will be implacably opposed, whilst others will want America to have a bigger arsenal with which to fight against unfair traders. Driven by a conviction that China artificially holds its currency down and destroys American jobs, some, such as the New York senator Charles Schumer, remain determined that fast track should include a provision that would make sure any specific trade deal included sanctions on currency manipulation.

Attaching a currency-manipulation clause to trade deals is a poor idea. Not only are they hard to define but the addition of such clauses makes reaching an agreement less likely. But Mr Schumer’s demands are hard to ignore given that the Obama administration has already, mistakenly, directly pitched TPP as a counterbalance to an assertive China.

While Mr Abe has also committed his country to joining the TPP on strategic grounds, the same mistaken logic of counterbalancing China looks set to cause problems in Japan. For example, Mr Abe is a born admirer of free trade. When he first entered negotiations, some of his backers believed that, by playing the China card, Japan would be spared from making real concessions: that America would care more about a pact that excluded China than about prising open Japan’s most protected markets, particularly rice.

Japan will want to keep tariffs high. The best it may offer will be to allow in a fixed quota of tariff-free rice from the other TPP members (including America).

If the China-containment logic prevails and leads to a minimalist agreement, then the economic gains from TPP will be slim. That was never TPP’s aim, but by having real value to set high new standards for world trade. That requires the boldest possible agreement.

In the long run, the world must surely gain if China joins the pact. Yet, the rhetoric makes trade negotiations sound like a contest. It shouldn’t be that way. This is a battle where the more you give away the more you win.

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