Afghanistan, Britain, Iraq, Society, United States

20 years after the ‘War on Terror’, abandonment leaves a bitter legacy

ESSAY

THE scene is a familiar one. On the dusty and sandy plains of Afghanistan, a trail of refugees’ head for the beleaguered capital. On the streets of Kabul itself, frequent car bombs are killing members of the government along with innocent bystanders.

In the western city of Herat, people huddle in their homes as enemy rockets pound down. And in the southern province of Helmand – where hundreds of British servicemen lost their lives in recent years – dozens of civilian bodies lie rotting on the country roads.

Such is the lawless state in Afghanistan, where the resurgent Taliban have made extraordinary territorial gains in recent days. Across much of the country, their white flag now flies unchecked.

The situation in Afghanistan now is as serious as it has ever been. It’s a quarter of a century since the Taliban swept to power claiming vast swathes of land, imposing a hideously oppressive Islamist regime that treated women as slaves and banned films, TV, music and dancing.

Perhaps more significantly, in just a few weeks it will be exactly 20 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington.

It was in reaction to these atrocities that Tony Blair and George W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom, promising to dismantle the al-Qaeda training camps, overthrow the Taliban and usher the Afghan people into a brave new world of democracy.

‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. How darkly ironic that mission sounds today.

For the Afghan people, the cause of freedom now hangs by a thread. Ever since the spring, when President Joe Biden announced that the last U.S. personnel would leave at the end of this month, the Taliban have swept across much of the country again.

Only a few weeks ago, U.S. intelligence analysts reportedly warned that without Western intervention, the government in Kabul might have just six months left. And now, with an estimated 85,000 Taliban fighters pressing towards the capital, that bleak prognosis looks decidedly optimistic.

Yet this is merely part of a bigger picture.

Twenty years after the War on Terror began, it’s time that we took a long, unsparing look at what it really achieved.

To revisit reports from 2001 feels like entering a different world. At the Labour Party conference, Tony Blair tells his delegates and party members that he intends to fight for freedom “from the deserts of Northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan.”

“Let us re-order this world around us,” he says grandly, as if there are no limits to his ambitions. A few weeks later, his close friend Bush appears before the U.S. Congress, pledging to dismantle an “Axis of Evil” that threatens the peace of the world. He names three regimes in particular: Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

How arrogant, how criminally naïve this sounds today. The regime in Iran is more hard-line, its position apparently as secure as ever. North Korea, too, remains stubbornly defiant, having built an estimated stockpile of some 40 nuclear weapons.

As for Iraq, that desperately sad story has become only too familiar. However you measure it, the carnage since the Anglo-American invasion of 2003 has cost at least 150,000 lives, and perhaps more than a million according to some estimates.

I say ‘has cost’, rather than ‘cost’, because Iraq is still not at peace. It has never been at peace. Even now, the Baghdad government and its Western sponsors are fighting a low-level Islamist insurgency, with bombings and killings almost every single day. What, then, is the verdict on the so-called War on Terror?

There’s no doubt that some of its progenitors, at least, had noble motives. When Blair says he genuinely wanted to export Western freedoms to Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s not hard to disbelieve.

But the verdict must be utterly damning.

How can this naïve, undefined, unachievable crusade go down in history as anything other than a catastrophic failure?

Take the cost in lives first. Some 456 British servicemen and MoD civilians were killed in Afghanistan, and a further 179 in Iraq. And for what?

As the Taliban surge towards Kabul, many of the bereaved must be asking themselves: was it all in vain?

Then there’s the financial cost. In June this year, the Ministry of Defence admitted that the war in Afghanistan cost British taxpayers a staggering £22 billion, with the campaign in Iraq estimated to have cost a further £10 billion.

The grim irony, of course, is that our politicians blew all that money just before the financial crisis of 2007-08, from which the Western economy has never fully recovered. And given that Britain was about to be plunged into a long period of economic austerity, many will argue that we should have saved it for other things.

One of the greatest costs of all, though, is much harder to measure. It’s the price in moral capital and political credibility, which Britain and the U.S. are still paying to this day.

Remarkably, the invasion of Afghanistan was much closer in time to the end of the Cold War than it is to us today. The U.S. was the world’s unchallenged “hyper-power”, the march of democracy seemed unstoppable, and some American thinkers were even proclaiming the “end of history”.

The events of the last two decades, however, turned that story on its head. For the Iraqi people, the Allied invasion brought a living nightmare. For the people of Afghanistan, meanwhile, it brought a gruelling, apparently interminable campaign, which now seems likely to end as it began – with the Taliban as masters of their native land.

No wonder, then, that America’s image abroad has plummeted over the last 20 years. According to the respected Pew Research Centre, people in almost ever major Western country now have an unfavourable impression of the U.S.

In Japan, its popularity has dropped by 30 per cent since 2001. In France, too, it has fallen by 30 per cent, in Germany by almost 50 per cent. And what of faith in democracy – the one thing for which Blair and Bush claimed they were fighting?

According to an extensive international study by Cambridge University, satisfaction with democracy has never been lower. In almost every country on earth, faith in the Western capitalist model has plummeted in the last 20 years – especially among the young, to whom the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are simply incomprehensible.

And here’s another brutal irony. At the very point when Britain and the U.S. were wasting huge sums of money and with so many lives expended on their Middle Eastern misadventures, the real threats to Western democracy were hauling themselves off the canvas and preparing to rebuild.

The winners of the War on Terror were not the British and American people, and still less the natives of Afghanistan and Iraq. They were Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the authoritarian strongmen of Russia and China, who watched with undisguised satisfaction as the Western powers discredited their own values.

That is the real legacy of the past 20 years: a shattering reversal of Western progress, for which we will be paying – quite literally – for the rest of our lives.

But perhaps it would be wrong to end by talking about ourselves. After all, the greatest casualties of the last two decades came among the people of Afghanistan and Iraq themselves, who have never known a single day of peace since the War on Terror began.

Nobody can say how their lives would have turned out if we had left well alone. No doubt they would have endured more than their fair share of tragedies anyway. Afghanistan has always been a turbulent and war-torn country.

What can be said, however, is that they have paid a terrible price for our politicians’ hubris and folly. And if we fail to learn that lesson, it would be the greatest betrayal of all.

. Appendage

Map highlighting who controls Afghanistan. Map Source: BBC

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Iraq, Middle East, Syria, Turkey

A Briefing on The Complexities of the Kurdish Landscape in the Middle East

ETHNIC KURDS

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The Kurdish Peshmerga, many of them veterans, are spearheading the defence against IS militants in Iraq.

Conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Turkey have unleashed a tangle of political and military organisations among the Kurds. This is an article concerning who’s who in a struggle that is shaping the Middle East.

Up to 35 million ethnic Kurds are spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran and are at the forefront of multiple conflicts reshaping the Middle East. In Syria and Iraq, US-backed Kurdish forces are leading the fight against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS).

However, “the Kurds” are riven by intra-Kurdish rivalries both within their respective states and across greater Kurdistan. As the United States backs Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, it has found itself in the middle of these rivalries and at odds with NATO ally Turkey.

The main intra-Kurdish fault line is between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – and its affiliates – and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani, the president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG).

A divided Kurdish quasi-state

The KRG has many characteristics of a state – an executive, legislature, judiciary and security forces – all recognised under the Iraqi constitution’s federalist structure. The United States, as well as European states including Germany, provide assistance to their long-time Iraqi Kurdish allies.

However, the Iraqi Kurdish army, known as peshmerga, or “those who face death,” are not united under the same command even though they cooperate. Barzani’s KDP and its main political rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each have separate peshmerga forces.

The PUK is closer to the PKK, the Iraqi central government and Iran. These rivalries play out in Syria and with Turkey, which is close to Barzani and his KDP.

US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces

In Syria, the United States backs the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with weapons, airstrikes and about 900 Special Forces. Considered the best fighters against IS, the SDF is a roughly 50,000 strong force composed of Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen and Christian militia. It was formed in 2015 with US encouragement and in part to address Turkey’s concerns over the dominance of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).

The YPG and the all-female Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are the armed wings of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a left-leaning Kurdish political party in Syria. Together they make up about half of the SDF.

Kurdistan Communities Union

The PYD, in turn, is a part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a pan-national umbrella political group established in 2005 by Kurdish parties. Alongside the PYD, the KCK comprises the PKK, the Iranian branch Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the much smaller Iraqi affiliate, Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK).

The KCK and its subset political parties are composed of various political, social and military subunits. They subscribe to the ideology of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in a Turkish prison since his capture in 1999.

Though Ocalan continues to be the PKK’s nominal head, the de-facto leader of KCK is its co-chair, Cemil Bayik, one of the five founders of the PKK and a top leader of the group.

The PKK has carried out a nearly four-decade long armed struggle against the Turkish state resulting in the death of about 40,000 people. Turkey, the United States and European Union consider the PKK a terrorist organisation.

Turkey considers the YPG/PYD, as well as the SDF terrorist organisations for their ties to the PKK. This view stems in part from the fact that from the 1980s to late 1990s, the PKK and Ocalan operated out of Syria and Lebanon with the support of former Syrian President Hafiz Assad.

Syria kicked out the PKK in 1998 after Turkey threatened to invade, but then essentially handed over parts of northern Syria to the PYD shortly after the onset of the Syria civil war in 2011.

PKK under a different name?

The PKK and PYD deny that they have organic organisational ties. The PKK and PYD say they have a different substructure, command and ultimately different goals in their respective countries, Turkey and Syria, given the different political situation in each with regards to the Kurds.

Unlike the PKK, which primarily fights the Turkish state, the PYD/YPG is focused on fighting IS and on occasion Turkish-backed Syria rebel groups. The PYD/YPG has not sided with Assad, with whom they have a tacit understanding. It also has not aligned with either Islamist rebel factions or Turkish-backed opposition, saying it has no designs on Turkey and wants to avoid conflict.

But the YPG counts hundreds of Turkish Kurds within its ranks, including PKK fighters who transferred to the fight in Syria. The PKK has traditionally drawn about a third of its fighters from Syria, raising further questions over its links to the YPG.

Meanwhile, the United States has said it sees enough difference between the PYD and terrorist-categorised PKK to back the YPG and SDF units fighting in Syria. And, as that relationship has grown over the past two plus years, the PYD/YPG has sought to publicly distance itself from the PKK.

What binds the PKK and PYD, they say, is an adherence to Ocalan’s Marxist-Leninist ideology and a shared desire to beat back jihadist forces. Ocalanism incorporates women’s rights, human rights, environmentalism, communalism and ”democratic autonomy,” a grassroots form of federal governance viewed by its followers as a model for democracy in Middle East.

This political model contrasts with that in Iraqi Kurdistan led by Barzani. There, the system is based on family and tribal ties, crony capitalism and patron-client relationships.

Facts on the ground

Off the battlefield, the PYD has set up an autonomous political structure based on Ocalan’s ideas in areas under its control in northern Syria, known as Rojava. By creating facts on the ground, the PYD hopes to bolster Kurdish political claims in any future settlement in Syria.

Turkey fears Syrian Kurdish gains will embolden its own Kurdish population and create a PKK statelet on its southern border. This has created strains in Ankara’s relations with Washington, including setting up the prospect that Turkey could clash directly with the United States in one of the many attacks it has carried out against the YPG.

A sustained conflict between the SDF/YPG and Turkey would undermine a key US goal, namely defeating IS and rooting it out of its self-declared capital Raqqa.

The PYD’s detractors, including other smaller Syrian Kurdish parties, accuse it of monopolising power and repressing dissent. They also accuse it of allying with the Assad regime.

As a result, Barzani’s KDP has supported other Syrian Kurdish factions and, similar to Turkey, implemented a border embargo over PYD controlled areas, fuelling intra-Kurdish tensions.

The next conflict

Adding to those tensions, the PKK has created armed units among the ethno-religious Yezidi population in Iraq in their heartland around Sinjar to defend against IS. These Yezidi units pose a direct challenge to Barzani, whom many Yezidis accuse of abandoning them to genocide when IS swept through in 2014.

For the PKK, Sinjar is strategic geography. With the retreat of IS, Sinjar will provide the PKK with a potential land corridor and transportation hub linking Syria to the Kurdish group’s headquarters in Qandil. This route would cut south of KDP controlled areas, through Iraqi government territory and onto friendlier PUK dominant territory in the eastern part of the KRG.

Turkey seeks to prevent the PKK from establishing a second headquarters based in Sinjar. To this end, it bombed Sinjar last month and has threatened a military operation to root out the PKK from the area.

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Afghanistan, Britain, Government, Iraq, Politics, Society, Terrorism

A dangerous world means Britain cannot retreat

afghan

Greater economic development and democratic consolidation are key to stability.

Intro: The world is, and always has been, a dangerous place. We should not hide from those dangers

The British Defence Secretary, Sir Michael Fallon, recently spoke candidly about the condition of Afghanistan and the possible continuing consequences for Britain. Sir Michael deserves credit for raising the issue so openly. The country remains a base for international terrorists who mean us harm, he said. He also suggested that the ‘collapse’ of the fragile state could send millions of young Afghan men west in a new phase of European migration that would inevitably affect the UK.

Such a premonition paints a grim picture, but all the more so because it comes more than 15 years after British troops were sent to Helmand Province in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks of 2001 on the US.

The military mission, at first, was to render ineffective an international terrorist group that meant us harm; yet, today, al-Qaeda under various Arabic guises and splinter groups remain operably active. Later, the British mission shifted to one of nation-building and the reinforcement of Afghanistan’s fragile and desperate government. It was done so to avoid precisely the sort of collapse that Sir Michael now refers too.

To some, the lack of significant progress in Afghanistan will be proof that Western military interventions in poor and unstable countries are doomed to fail. Iraq, and more recently Libya, the nexus of why Europe is facing unmitigated levels of migration, might equally be cited as additional evidence for that case. What is clear is that all three interventions have been flawed, suffering from a lack of political leadership and, in some cases, extremely poor military planning.

To those who believe Britain has no inalienable right to remake the world, Theresa May’s professed scepticism about wars of liberal intervention will be a welcome shift in approach when it comes to foreign policy. Yet, healthy doubt about military adventurism does not necessarily mean a British retreat from the world.

The defence secretary’s words and rhetoric are a stark reminder, whether we like it or not, that the consequences of previous Western interventions continue to this day.

They must be dealt with, not ignored. We should indeed go on working to support a democratic government in Afghanistan, including the aiding of its security forces if needed.

In Iraq, where government forces are pushing back Islamic militants in Mosul, has shown that with continued Western backing, local military units can take responsibility for securing their country.

Britain’s role in Afghanistan must continue, and may have to expand by putting boots back on the ground there. If that means spending more on defence, for the security and stability of the West, so be it. The world is, and always has been, a dangerous place. We should not hide from those dangers.

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