YEMEN
Map depicting Houthi controlled Yemen and the struggle for control
Intro: Saudi Arabia should limit its war in Yemen. Despite the difficulties of late the West should be in a position to help, not by rescinding an almost century-old alliance.
The recent air strike earlier this month that hit a funeral in Sana’a did far more than kill some 140 civilians and wounding 500. For once, it drew rare attention to Saudi Arabia’s 20-month war in Yemen and the strained relationship which now exists with America. That alliance is now under threat with the U.S. reconsidering its military support for the campaign.
Critics are adamant that it is time for the West to abandon its embarrassing alliance with the Saudis. They ask, how can the West denounce the bloodshed and carnage in Syria when its own ally is indiscriminately bombing civilians in Yemen? If the Saudis, with Western support, can intervene to defend the government of Yemen, why shouldn’t Vladimir Putin of Russia not defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria?
Morally, and perhaps also legally, the U.S. and Britain are directly implicated in Saudi actions: they sell warplanes and provide munitions and armaments to the Saudi regime; they assist with air-to-air refuelling and help with targeting. Critics also point to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a woeful ally against jihadism. They insist that the Saudis are inflaming global extremism through its export of intolerant Wahhabi doctrines.
Such arguments do have strength. On balance, though, the West should not forsake the Saudis. Rather, it should seek to restrain the damage of their ongoing air campaign, and ultimately aim to bring it to an end. Western support cannot be deemed to be unconditional.
Consider first the moral position and balance. The two conflicts are both ghastly, but not equally so. Around 10,000 have died in Yemen, too many, but far fewer than the 400,000 or so that have perished in Syria. The Saudi-led coalition has not used chemical gas – although it has undoubtedly been careless. It has bombed several hospitals, and its blockade of Yemen and the subsequent damage to its infrastructure has caused dire hardship. A famine now looms, with more than half the country deemed to be hungry or malnourished.
The political context is also different. The Assad regime wrest power in a coup, and has held onto it through tyrannical brutality. Its deliberate crushing of peaceful protests and dissent in 2011, and its indiscriminate and repeated slaughter since then, has removed any speck of legitimacy it may have had. By contrast, Yemen’s president, Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, though ineffectual and flawed, has at least presided over a broad coalition that was established through UN-backed negotiations (which followed the resignation of the former strongman, Ali Abdullah Saleh). The Shia Houthis and Mr Saleh, backed by Iran, overturned that deal by force. They frequently fire missiles indiscriminately at Saudi cities, although the damage is often limited.
While the West has little reason to join the war, it has much at stake if it goes wrong. Al-Qaeda’s local franchise has been strengthened, and the Houthis have begun firing missiles at ships in the Bab al-Mandab strait, one of the world’s vital sea lanes. America launched cruise-missile strikes against Houthi-controlled radar sites after attempts were made to attack one of its warships patrolling the region.
The West’s involvement with the Al Sauds is important to understand. Its long alliance, which dates back nearly a century, was also built on its extensive commercial interests that the West has had in the Gulf. Over the decades, the Saudis have put up with many American blunders in the Middle East, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They were shocked, too, by how the West abandoned the former Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak, during the mass protests and upheaval of 2011. Last year’s deal between America and Iran to restrict Tehran’s nuclear programme, and Mr Obama’s skewered rhetoric and offhand tone about the Saudis, has deepened their own fear of abandonment. And, the Congressional approval for a bill to allow the families of victims of the 9/11 attacks of 2001 to sue Saudi Arabia, overriding Mr Obama’s presidential veto, is further evidence that the disenchantment is mutual.
Yet, despite this, there are still good reasons for the West to maintain ties to Saudi Arabia. The alternative to the Al Sauds is not liberalism but some form of radical Islamism. Saudi Arabia remains the world’s biggest oil exporter, and holds guardianship of Islam’s two holiest shrines. Better surely that these be in the hands of a friendly power than a hostile one. Whilst slow to respond to the emerging threats of fundamental Islam, it is now a vital partner in the fight against jihadism. It will be better placed than the West to challenge their nihilistic and radical ideologies. The chaos of the Middle East, a tinderbox of tension and hatreds, stems at least in part from Sunni Arabs’ sense of dispossession. The best hope of containing the volatility is to work and collaborate with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia.
As uncomfortable as it is, the West should stay close to the Saudis. Riyadh should be encouraged to reform economically and politically, while acknowledging widespread concern in the Gulf about the spread of Iranian influence. As the U.S. has said, Western support cannot be ‘a blank cheque’; the more the West helps Saudi Arabia wage war in Yemen, the more it becomes exposed and liable for war crimes. If the Saudis want to fight with Western weapons, they must be obliged to respect the laws of war.
But above all, the West should use its influence and diplomatic powers to help the Saudis end the bloody stalemate. It should promote a reasonable power-sharing agreement that directly involves the Houthis. That would make Yemen a model by which the future of Syria could also follow suit.
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