Category Archives: National Security

Britain, Defence, Government, Military, National Security, Politics, Society

New round of British Defence Cuts…

DEFENCE

Intro: Our severely reduced military capability amounts to a mere standing defence force, and one that is barely equipped enough at present to deal with the most basic of future threats

The announcement from Whitehall that there is to be further cuts to Britain’s already shrinking Army, albeit on grounds of economy rather than strategic priorities, is deeply alarming.

The new rounds of cuts are aimed, primarily, at Britain’s elite rapid reaction force – the most unwarranted target for making economies and savings through cost-cutting. A prime target earmarked is 16 Air Assault Brigade, a core component of which is Britain’s elite Parachute Regiment. It is to be stripped of half its regular infantry battalions, as well as reductions in some of its helicopters, artillery and armoured vehicles. The Royal Engineers, who support our elite forces through maintenance of equipment and servicing, are also to suffer wide ranging cuts to its budget. 16 Air Assault Brigade is to be reduced from the current level of 8,000 troops to 5,000 by the end of this year. Such a scaling-down is difficult to discern given Britain’s post-Afghanistan strategy. This was meant to be focused on our military capability deemed agile enough to respond and execute contingency operations as they arise in the future. A diminishing capability raises fresh concerns over the Government’s overall defence policy.

Alarmingly, these latest cost reductions are to be implemented alongside the already massive cuts inflicted on the Armed Forces. The last strategic defence review in 2010 proposed the reduction of the Army’s strength from 102,000 regular soldiers to just 82,000 by the end of the decade. Parallel reductions of 8,000 personnel in the RAF and 5,500 in the Navy were also part of the defence reconfiguration. Not since before the Napoleonic Wars has Britain had such a low level of manning to call upon in the event of defending sovereign interests.

Some £10 billion has already been cut from the defence budget. Whilst understanding the need for austerity and for efficiency gains to be made where they can, of which the Ministry of Defence cannot expect to be excluded given its high wastage rate on incompetent procurement programmes, defence of the realm is a paramount obligation of every government. If that duty is neglected, a government runs the risk of all of its other priorities and government policies becoming compromised in the process. It is crucial, then, that Britain retains an effectively trained army with a full complement of experienced and professional troops. For many, though, our severely reduced military capability amounts to a mere defence force, and one that is barely equipped enough to deal with the most basic of future threats. Yet, the world is a far more dangerous place than it has ever been, and Britain should be punching above its weight: diminution of military resources reduces the UK’s global influence – military cuts which go against the Government’s aspiration of retaining a place at the top table around the world. To have a positive influence, it is crucial that Britain’s Armed Forces are sufficiently maintained if that ambition is to be met.

There is no doubt that Britain’s military Armed Forces have been pared to the bone. It has reached the stage where any further cuts may well imperil national security.

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Afghanistan, Britain, Government, Iraq, Military, National Security, United States

The scandal of the Afghanistan war that no one is to blame…

BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Intro: The futility and waste of British lives in Afghanistan far exceeds that in Iraq. The end of our involvement there is greeted with a mixture of silence and boredom. But these heroic sacrifices require an official inquiry, not least to the memory of the soldiers that died

There is a widespread and justified consensus that we were finagled into a war in Iraq by Tony Blair which has cost Britain dear. On Iraq, there have been several official inquiries, of which the last, chaired by former mandarin Sir John Chilcot, has yet to report. Sir John has been held back in his reporting because the Chilcot inquiry wishes to release information into the public domain not yet seen and whose release is being opposed by the British Government. Of all the inquiries that have been held not one was ever given the terms of reference to examine openly the political machinery used in making the decision that took Britain to war with Iraq.

The war in Afghanistan was, by most measures, an even bigger enterprise. According to the Government, it has cost us £20 billion, though some observers believe it may be as high as £40 billion.

Britain’s engagement in Afghanistan cost the lives of 448 servicemen and women. That’s two and half times the number of fatalities in the Iraq War (179), and getting on for twice the number killed during the Falklands War (258).

Yet, the most extraordinary thing about our involvement in Afghanistan is that neither the political class nor the general public are noticeably worked up about it. Afghanistan has stirred far less debate and controversy than Iraq, and the end of our involvement has been greeted with a mixture of silence and boredom.

Unbelievably, too, there are few, if any, calls for an inquiry into a war which began in early 2006 with the hope expressed by the then Defence Secretary, John Reid, that our troops might soon return ‘without a shot being fired’.

Whilst we may have been duped into the Iraq War by Tony Blair, there were at least dossiers that argued for the case for war, albeit misleadingly, and debates were had in Parliament. In the case of Afghanistan, we shuffled blindfolded into hostilities with no clear plan, no exit strategy, and with virtually no discussion.

Instead of the silence or indifference, there remains an overwhelming case for the most robust analysis of how we drifted into what many analysts believe has been a futile war that has achieved very little.

Our involvement in Afghanistan began after the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001. The decision to topple the Taliban regime by President George W Bush – which he believed harboured Al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the outrages committed against America – was supported by Mr Blair, who said: ‘The kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux, soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder this world around us.’

It was not until the spring of 2006 that British troops were despatched in any numbers to bring order to Helmand. Here, the Taliban were strong and resurgent, but the magnitude of the task was massively underestimated by Mr Blair’s government.

The justification was, and remained, that British streets would be safer as a result of our direct intervention. This was always a very doubtful proposition. For one thing, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have since strengthened enormously in other countries such as Yemen and Somalia. There have also been numerous planned attacks thwarted by our security and intelligence services, none of which have revealed any links to Afghanistan.

An inquiry on Afghanistan is needed so that Blair and Reid, and indeed David Cameron, who endlessly repeats the mantra that our servicemen have been dying to keep us safe, answer the clarion call as to where the evidence is to support this assertion?

These politicians should also be questioned about their failure to bring opium cultivation under control, which back in 2006 was offered by Tony Blair as a major reason for sending troops to Afghanistan. Production of the drug has soared, and hundreds of millions of pounds of aid has been wasted in uselessly attempting to curb it.

Members of Blair’s government, along with senior civil servants at the Ministry of Defence, should also be asked to explain why they sent young men and women to Afghanistan in Land Rovers that offered poor protection against hidden roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices. Dozens of troops have died in these vehicles which might otherwise have been saved if the politicians had bothered to give any prior thought to what they were doing. These are serious matters which should not be brushed aside.

Servicemen join up believing, even hoping, that someday they will be asked to fight. They have a right, though, to assume that their lives will be risked in a reasonable cause with an expectation of success, and that they will be given adequate weaponry and protection.

It seems incredible that there has been no proper official inquiry, although there have been parliamentary investigations which have lacked the clout or scope to be taken seriously.

The purpose of an inquiry is partly to try to make sure that mistakes are not repeated – that we do not go to war again on an agenda of shifting objectives, none of which is ever realised. And it’s partly to restore people’s faith in our political system as people have become inured to the idea of a government’s ineptitude and deviousness.

The British Government will declare a job well done in Helmand, yet people will look at rising opium production and know that the job was far from complete. Much of Helmand province, where our soldiers risked and gave their lives, is as lawless as it was eight years ago.

On Sunday, the Afghan presidential elections will be held. None of the candidates seems at all alluring. One is a Uzbek warlord once described by his running mate as a ‘known killer’.

Many doubt that the victor will be an improvement on the outgoing president, Hamid Karzai, who has presided over the world’s most corrupt government.

It was Karzai who recently suggested with mind-boggling ingratitude that the presence of British and other Western troops in his country had made things worse.

An official inquiry is the very least that should be offered to the memory of the soldiers who sacrificed their lives, and to their grieving families. Much blood and treasure has been squandered in an enterprise far more deluded than events which transpired in Iraq.

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Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Middle East, National Security, Society, United States

The ‘war on terror’ doctrine has failed, but why?

‘WAR ON TERROR’

Intro: The ‘war on terror’ has failed, and failed unnecessarily

It is now more than twelve and a half years since the Al-Qaeda attack on America’s Twin Towers of 9/11. Yet, despite all the efforts by the West in dealing with additional terrorist threats under its catch all phrase ‘war on terror’, al-Qaeda and its affiliate type organisations (of which there are many) now control an area the size of Britain in western Iraq and eastern Syria. This size increases still further if we factor in Afghanistan, Libya and vast swathes of Somalia.

The rapid expansion and spread of jihadi groups comes amid the west’s ongoing fight and struggle of George W Bush’s infamous war on terror doctrine. In the name of such a struggle, great sums have been expended; wars have been fought in Iraq and Afghanistan; civil rights have been curtailed; and the practices of torture, rendition, detention without trial and domestic espionage have been justified. What is so extraordinary is that the attempts made by the West to eliminate the supposed enemy have wholly failed.

It was never an inevitable outcome that organisations and splinter groups aligned to the ideology and methods of Osama bin-Laden should have survived and flourished like they have. Al-Qaeda inspired jihad is now stronger than ever.

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia was crucial to the rise of the original al-Qaeda based group. On the 9/11 attacks, 15 out of 19 hijackers were Saudi and the Commission Report in the aftermath revealed that Saudi donors were the main financial supporters and backers for al-Qaeda. More than 28 pages of the report relating to Saudi involvement have never been published, and the Bush administration never sought for a moment to pin blame or any measure of responsibility on Saudi Arabia. This failure has enabled the Saudis to go on playing a central role in the funding and recruitment for jihadi groups across much of the Muslim world. Instead, Bush sought to wholly attribute blame for 9/11 on Saddam Hussein and Iraq, without a shred of acceptable evidence.

Policies of wrong-footedness have continued. Since the start of the Arab Spring the US, Britain and their allies have supported jihadis who manoeuvred and appeared to be on their side – much in the same way as they backed them in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Rebel groups in Syria and Libya, much like al-Qaeda, have been viewed tolerantly thanks to their opposition and denouncements of Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. The US ambassador to Libya, J Christopher Stevens, paid with his life after Washington underestimated the danger posed by the jihadis with whom America had been cooperating.

The willingness of the US, Britain, and their allies to cooperate with theocratic absolute regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf does have aspects to it which are hypocritical. The absurd pretence that they want to establish secular democracies in Syria, Libya and Iraq is the clearest example. There is a sustained unwillingness, too, to admit that the Sunni monarchs are viscerally anti-Shia. We need to look no further than the sectarian hate propaganda proliferating on well-funded Arabic satellite television stations, across social media sites, and through the internet in general.

But ‘why’ you may ask has the West been so gentle with the Saudis (and their allies) responsible though they are for sustaining the jihadi movement. The reason is the kingdom’s financial might. Washington and London’s hunger for lucrative arms deals and the lure of consultancy contracts and other personal benefits for powerful individuals is a prime driver.

The ‘war on terror’ has failed, and failed unnecessarily. Greater accountability should have been delivered by now for those who were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

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