Britain, Business, Defence, Government, National Security, Politics, United States

Defence Secretary to be quizzed by MPs over hostile bid for GKN

TAKEOVER BID OF GKN THREATENS NATIONAL SECURITY

GOVERNMENT ministers face a grilling in the House of Commons this week over the hostile £7.4billion takeover bid for engineering giant GKN.

Theresa May is under pressure to intervene amid mounting concern about the impact the buyout could have on industry and national security.

Redditch-based GKN makes parts for the F-35 Anglo-American fighter jet, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the US’s B-21 stealth bomber, as well as car parts such as driveshafts for the automotive industry.

Its future has been thrown into doubt after the City turnaround group Melrose lodged a £7.4billion offer last month. GKN’s board is attempting to fight the deal. Melrose is known for asset stripping which often leads to large numbers of people losing their jobs through restructuring.

It has emerged that the Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson is set to be questioned about the bid when he appears this week before the defence select committee. Its chairman Julian Lewis said: “The committee have had correspondence strongly against and in favour of the hostile takeover bid and I therefore wouldn’t be surprised if the topic came up [during the committee hearing].”

There is growing concern across Whitehall about the impact this aggressive takeover of GKN would have, especially the long-term defence and security implications it may have for the UK.

The takeover already faces the prospect of wider investigations, with the business, energy and industrial strategy committee expected to scrutinise it further after initial questions were raised by chairman Rachel Reeves.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is understood to be monitoring the situation closely, and a senior civil servant has been appointed to examine the impact of a takeover.

The US’s own committee on foreign investment will also have to examine any takeover, as will the authorities in France and Germany.

GKN dates back nearly 260 years and made cannonballs for the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars.

It now has around 6,000 employees in the UK among 58,000 worldwide. It is a key supplier to aerospace firms including Airbus, with bases in towns including Redditch, Luton and Telford.

Melrose specialises in buying underperforming firms and selling them on at a profit within three to five years. Liberal Democrat leader Sir Vince Cable has urged the Government to block the bid for GKN, calling Melrose an “utterly unsuitable owner”.

Speaking in the Commons earlier this month, the Prime Minister said: “Of course the Business Department will be looking closely at, and has been following closely, the issue. I and the Government as a whole will always act in the UK national interest.”

Concern about a GKN takeover has also been raised in the United States, where Congressman Neal Dunn has written to the committee on foreign investment urging it to block the bid.

He said: “In addition to concerns over who may ultimately acquire GKN, Melrose’s business strategy will undermine long-term investments in research and development and secure supply chains, which are critical to the major defence platforms GKN currently supplies.”

Any takeover would have to be considered by Germany’s federal ministry of economic affairs and energy and the French ministry of economy, according to documents made available by Melrose.

Melrose’s executive officers say that they “welcome any and all opportunities to explain to government why we [Melrose] believe a merger with GKN will create an industrial powerhouse of which the UK can be rightly proud”.

They added: “Melrose builds businesses to long-term health and prosperity and has an impeccable pension track record.”

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Government, National Security, Society

Any new anti-terrorist measures must not be rushed

ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS

Intro: Theresa May has called for a review of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy but she should be wary of pushing through legislation for the sake of being seen to act.

Amid the reaction to the horrific events over the past few weeks in London and Manchester, it has become apparent that there is no simple answer over how best to respond to the serious terrorist threat the UK is facing.

There have been calls for the general election on Thursday to be postponed, which mercifully have not gained much traction. There was also immediate criticism of MI5 and our intelligence agencies for failing to detect the hiring of a van and the possession of widely-available knives by those who have wreaked havoc on our streets.

As public order is restored and the dust settles, some have reverted to a less fevered analysis by revisiting anti-terrorism measures. New legislation might emerge in dealing with the insidious threat we now face. We have, of course, been here before, with the stand-out example being Tony Blair’s response to the London bombings of 2005. The then prime minister swiftly drew up several new measures to help thwart further attacks, but it barely required the benefit of hindsight to reach the conclusion that most of those measures could be described as a knee-jerk reaction. Some of the proposals were enacted into law, others were never heard of again. Mr Blair’s strategy was largely driven by a desire to be seen to be doing something when strong leadership should have been the imperative and priority. Legislation that is rushed, however, is hardly ever appropriate or even practical.

Theresa May’s verdict following the most recent attacks in London that ‘enough is enough’ is an uncomfortable conclusion, but her call for a review of counter-terrorism strategy is correct. We know to our cost that the measures put in place after 2005, and since then, have given the police extensive new powers but have not been able to stop the three terrorist attacks on the UK in 2017.

The Government should now pause before re-writing the statute book, and act only after thorough consultation on what is required, and what is possible. The time that any new laws or amendments to current legislation would take by using such an approach should not be seen as a frustrating delay, because it must be recognised that the threat we face is changing. There is also not an off-the-shelf strategy to counter it. Whatever measures are introduced must be workable and effective, otherwise they become a waste of time and vital resource.

We have to be sure, too, that existing statutory provisions are being used properly – for example, there have been numerous claims after recent attacks that the authorities were alerted previously to the behaviour of those involved.

At a time when the public is being asked to be increasingly vigilant, and to report any suspicious activity, we have to be confident that this kind of intelligence is being fully utilised. It’s vitally important that it is.

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Britain, Government, Intelligence, National Security, Terrorism

UK intelligence has questions to answer over Manchester attack

TERRORISM

Following a terrorist attack, we can expect to learn more about the perpetrator in the hours and days ahead. Early detail doesn’t necessarily shed much light on how the attack was planned and executed, nor the exact motives as to why it was carried out. It can, too, take some time before we know the identity of the attacker.

However, the bomb detonated at Manchester Arena this week, by Salman Abedi, killing 22, has revealed a lot in a very short space of time. First, we found out that he was known to the authorities, and was a UK national of Libyan descent, the son of Libyan refugees who fled Gaddafi’s regime and were given safe sanctuary in the UK. Then, it quickly emerged that Abedi had recently arrived back in the UK from Libya, where his parents had returned to after the fall of Gaddafi. Reports have also emerged that Abedi displayed the black flag of Islamic State while living in Manchester, was known to have recited Arabic loudly in the street, and was reported to police by two people who knew him about his increasingly extremist views.

A picture is emerging of Abedi being a clear terrorist suspect before his appalling murderous act, and part of a network which may well have built and supplied him with a bomb. He is known to have travelled from London to Manchester in the hours before the attack.

The ability to immediately identify him has, of course, brought much of this information to light. But it is inevitable that questions are going to be asked about why Abedi was not under greater surveillance by the security services, given his background and his recent movements. It is a difficult enough process to prevent the terrorist who was not previously known to the police, but based on the information we have on Abedi, it is becoming clear that our current intelligence gathering has not detected warning signs which, put together, could have raised the alarm when Abedi returned from Libya just a few days before the attack.

Whilst dispiriting to admit, putting troops on the streets would not have deterred Abedi, given the way he carried it out. A military presence might put off an attacker with a knife or a firearm, but the suicide bomber will simply choose one of the countless other soft targets where no armed security force is present. Once the device is detonated, it is too late to respond.

Countering terrorism requires strong intelligence. What we have found this week is that our intelligence services require reinforcement, more of the invisible officers who are required to track those who intend to do us harm. Strong intelligence is an effective weapon against the threat of terrorism.

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