Category Archives: Turkey

Iraq, Middle East, Syria, Turkey

A Briefing on The Complexities of the Kurdish Landscape in the Middle East

ETHNIC KURDS

Kurds2

The Kurdish Peshmerga, many of them veterans, are spearheading the defence against IS militants in Iraq.

Conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Turkey have unleashed a tangle of political and military organisations among the Kurds. This is an article concerning who’s who in a struggle that is shaping the Middle East.

Up to 35 million ethnic Kurds are spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran and are at the forefront of multiple conflicts reshaping the Middle East. In Syria and Iraq, US-backed Kurdish forces are leading the fight against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS).

However, “the Kurds” are riven by intra-Kurdish rivalries both within their respective states and across greater Kurdistan. As the United States backs Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, it has found itself in the middle of these rivalries and at odds with NATO ally Turkey.

The main intra-Kurdish fault line is between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – and its affiliates – and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani, the president of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG).

A divided Kurdish quasi-state

The KRG has many characteristics of a state – an executive, legislature, judiciary and security forces – all recognised under the Iraqi constitution’s federalist structure. The United States, as well as European states including Germany, provide assistance to their long-time Iraqi Kurdish allies.

However, the Iraqi Kurdish army, known as peshmerga, or “those who face death,” are not united under the same command even though they cooperate. Barzani’s KDP and its main political rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each have separate peshmerga forces.

The PUK is closer to the PKK, the Iraqi central government and Iran. These rivalries play out in Syria and with Turkey, which is close to Barzani and his KDP.

US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces

In Syria, the United States backs the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with weapons, airstrikes and about 900 Special Forces. Considered the best fighters against IS, the SDF is a roughly 50,000 strong force composed of Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen and Christian militia. It was formed in 2015 with US encouragement and in part to address Turkey’s concerns over the dominance of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).

The YPG and the all-female Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are the armed wings of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a left-leaning Kurdish political party in Syria. Together they make up about half of the SDF.

Kurdistan Communities Union

The PYD, in turn, is a part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a pan-national umbrella political group established in 2005 by Kurdish parties. Alongside the PYD, the KCK comprises the PKK, the Iranian branch Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the much smaller Iraqi affiliate, Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK).

The KCK and its subset political parties are composed of various political, social and military subunits. They subscribe to the ideology of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in a Turkish prison since his capture in 1999.

Though Ocalan continues to be the PKK’s nominal head, the de-facto leader of KCK is its co-chair, Cemil Bayik, one of the five founders of the PKK and a top leader of the group.

The PKK has carried out a nearly four-decade long armed struggle against the Turkish state resulting in the death of about 40,000 people. Turkey, the United States and European Union consider the PKK a terrorist organisation.

Turkey considers the YPG/PYD, as well as the SDF terrorist organisations for their ties to the PKK. This view stems in part from the fact that from the 1980s to late 1990s, the PKK and Ocalan operated out of Syria and Lebanon with the support of former Syrian President Hafiz Assad.

Syria kicked out the PKK in 1998 after Turkey threatened to invade, but then essentially handed over parts of northern Syria to the PYD shortly after the onset of the Syria civil war in 2011.

PKK under a different name?

The PKK and PYD deny that they have organic organisational ties. The PKK and PYD say they have a different substructure, command and ultimately different goals in their respective countries, Turkey and Syria, given the different political situation in each with regards to the Kurds.

Unlike the PKK, which primarily fights the Turkish state, the PYD/YPG is focused on fighting IS and on occasion Turkish-backed Syria rebel groups. The PYD/YPG has not sided with Assad, with whom they have a tacit understanding. It also has not aligned with either Islamist rebel factions or Turkish-backed opposition, saying it has no designs on Turkey and wants to avoid conflict.

But the YPG counts hundreds of Turkish Kurds within its ranks, including PKK fighters who transferred to the fight in Syria. The PKK has traditionally drawn about a third of its fighters from Syria, raising further questions over its links to the YPG.

Meanwhile, the United States has said it sees enough difference between the PYD and terrorist-categorised PKK to back the YPG and SDF units fighting in Syria. And, as that relationship has grown over the past two plus years, the PYD/YPG has sought to publicly distance itself from the PKK.

What binds the PKK and PYD, they say, is an adherence to Ocalan’s Marxist-Leninist ideology and a shared desire to beat back jihadist forces. Ocalanism incorporates women’s rights, human rights, environmentalism, communalism and ”democratic autonomy,” a grassroots form of federal governance viewed by its followers as a model for democracy in Middle East.

This political model contrasts with that in Iraqi Kurdistan led by Barzani. There, the system is based on family and tribal ties, crony capitalism and patron-client relationships.

Facts on the ground

Off the battlefield, the PYD has set up an autonomous political structure based on Ocalan’s ideas in areas under its control in northern Syria, known as Rojava. By creating facts on the ground, the PYD hopes to bolster Kurdish political claims in any future settlement in Syria.

Turkey fears Syrian Kurdish gains will embolden its own Kurdish population and create a PKK statelet on its southern border. This has created strains in Ankara’s relations with Washington, including setting up the prospect that Turkey could clash directly with the United States in one of the many attacks it has carried out against the YPG.

A sustained conflict between the SDF/YPG and Turkey would undermine a key US goal, namely defeating IS and rooting it out of its self-declared capital Raqqa.

The PYD’s detractors, including other smaller Syrian Kurdish parties, accuse it of monopolising power and repressing dissent. They also accuse it of allying with the Assad regime.

As a result, Barzani’s KDP has supported other Syrian Kurdish factions and, similar to Turkey, implemented a border embargo over PYD controlled areas, fuelling intra-Kurdish tensions.

The next conflict

Adding to those tensions, the PKK has created armed units among the ethno-religious Yezidi population in Iraq in their heartland around Sinjar to defend against IS. These Yezidi units pose a direct challenge to Barzani, whom many Yezidis accuse of abandoning them to genocide when IS swept through in 2014.

For the PKK, Sinjar is strategic geography. With the retreat of IS, Sinjar will provide the PKK with a potential land corridor and transportation hub linking Syria to the Kurdish group’s headquarters in Qandil. This route would cut south of KDP controlled areas, through Iraqi government territory and onto friendlier PUK dominant territory in the eastern part of the KRG.

Turkey seeks to prevent the PKK from establishing a second headquarters based in Sinjar. To this end, it bombed Sinjar last month and has threatened a military operation to root out the PKK from the area.

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European Union, NATO, Russia, Turkey, United States

Russia and Turkey’s rapprochement

RUSSIA/TURKEY

Intro: For Russia, this is an opportunity to drive a hard wedge between Turkey, NATO and the EU

The unfolding diplomatic rapprochement between Russia and Turkey is likely to become a significant challenge for the European Union and NATO. For centuries now, these two countries have remained implacably opposed to each other. Efforts just a decade ago to forge a strategic partnership were curtailed by the civil war that has been raging in Syria. With Moscow clearly propping up Bashar al-Assad, Ankara either stayed out or implicitly supported his enemies. In more recent times, relations hit another low point last November when Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber near the Syrian border for violating Turkey’s airspace. Russia imposed sanctions and the damage to relations between the two countries seemed irreparable.

But even before events last month in which an attempted military coup failed, President Erdogan had decided he could no longer afford a cold war of attrition and stalemate with Moscow and began making overtures with the Kremlin. The putsch appears to have expedited matters: yesterday Mr Erdogan met with Vladimir Putin to agree the normalising of relations. This will send shock waves through the EU at a time of unprecedented uncertainty.

For Russia, this is an opportunity to drive a hard wedge between Turkey, NATO and the EU and will help to abate Russian anger over the jet incident. President Putin must recognise in Mr Erdogan a leader cut from the same cloth – a democratically elected nationalist who has been behaving more like a despot.

Mr Erdogan’s ruthless purge of opponents after the thwarted coup has alarmed EU leaders who had encouraged Ankara to believe it could join the European Union at some future point and had pledged to introduce visa-free access for Turkish travellers to the Schengen area. No date, however, has ever been set or given for either and several EU countries have made it abundantly clear they would veto Turkey’s accession citing its human rights record, loss of press freedom and other economic shortcomings. Angela Merkel of Germany has been desperate to keep both options open in order to stop Turkey reneging on a deal to keep Syrian refugees from crossing into Europe.

But Mr Erdogan seems to have been cooling towards Europe, none of whose leaders have been to Ankara since the failed coup. Turkey’s leader is seeking alliances elsewhere. Improving relations between Russia and Turkey will have significant implications both for policy on Syria and for NATO itself. The US nuclear base at Incirlik is a key part of western defences, but, if Turkey were to leave its loss would be a serious blow to the organisation.

These developments will be concerning for European leaders. But for the Russian president this is a chance to cause fresh consternation in the capitals of Europe and in Washington. Mr Putin seems certain to grab a gift horse that couldn’t have come at a better time for his own interests.

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Middle East, Turkey, United States

Turkey’s failed coup raises concerns for the west…

TURKEY

News of a failed coup attempt in a NATO member country bordering the European Union would surely merit loud expressions of relief. Relief that the death toll has stopped rising from the 290 fatalities already recorded.

With almost every passing hour since last Friday’s putsch searching questions continue to arise over the nature of this coup attempt and what the resulting arrests of 6,000 people, including senior army commanders and some 3,000 judges, now means for the country and for geopolitical stability across the region.

Whether Turkey can now be considered a functioning democratic state within its own right must now be open to question in the wake of a remarkably swift and sweeping series of arrests of government critics. Not only have few dissenting voices been spared, but the imagery used by the country’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to describe them suggests an orchestrated retaliation altogether better organised (and more vicious) than the coup attempt itself. Mr Erdogan has wasted no time in expressing vitriolic language, declaring: ‘We will… continue to cleanse the virus from all state institutions, because this virus has spread… (and) has enveloped the state.”

USAF

A US aircraft takes-off from Incirlik air base, a strategically important base for raids against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Such use of language, combined with the seizure and arrest of so many members of the country’s judiciary, suggest that President Erdogan is making full use of the opportunity to move against anyone he considers an enemy.

He has also taken advantage of the opportunity to accuse the American-based Turkish cleric, Fethullah Gulen, of being directly behind the plot and is demanding his extradition. No evidence has yet been furnished to support this demand and Mr Gulen strongly denies any involvement. The attempted coup, however, as mystifying in its origins as in its failure to succeed despite a notable mutiny of army personnel and air power support, has been swiftly seized upon to buttress Mr Erdogan’s position and to provide the pretext for further measures and reforms to tighten his already extensive grip on power. Autocracy is what Mr Erdogan ultimately craves.

Among the arrests was the military commander of Incirlik air base in the south, a strategically important site used by US-led coalition jets for raids against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It is said he and 10 other soldiers had been detained for their role in the coup.

In addition, 50 senior soldiers were detained in the western province of Denizli. Those arrested in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup included the commander of the Third Army, the commander of the Second Army and the former Chief of Air Staff.

One of the country’s most senior judges, Alparslan Altan, was among thousands of the senior judiciary taken into custody. Quite how Turkey can comply with US President Barack Obama’s stricture that it should remain within the rule of law is moot.

The putsch has created problems for western powers dependent on Turkey’s co-operation both in military actions against IS strongholds, and in curbing the flow of migrants into the EU. The country is also a putative EU member; and, it is widely thought that in order to secure Turkey’s continuing co-operation in migrant control its application for full EU membership has proceeded this far.

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