Britain, Government, Iran, United Nations, United States

The Iranian deal exposes concerns but it’s worth the risk…

GENEVA AGREEMENT

Whilst the initial period of the Geneva agreement lasts only six months, and much of what has been agreed is based on trust, there is no doubt that Iran could have been in a position to assemble a nuclear device by next summer. Even a modest hiatus in its atomic preparations should be embraced as it pretty much ensures Israel will take no precipitate action.

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The interim agreement is a good way of testing if Iran can be trusted to keep its word. Tehran has agreed to give UN and IAEA inspectors’ better access to its reprocessing facilities, a promise that will be difficult to fudge or renege on without exposing bad faith or some covert hidden agenda. Critics are right in their assertions that the accord does nothing to dismantle Tehran’s capability to process weapons grade uranium whenever it wants, but securing the right to inspect the regime’s nuclear plants is a necessary and vital concession. This establishes a clear diplomatic tripwire that Tehran crosses at its peril.

There is, though, still much to worry about in this deal. The Iranian economy has been brought to its knees by western sanctions and the regime has been more than desperate to win a respite to mollify internal dissent and unrest. In many ways, President Hassan Rouhani has achieved that objective at comparatively modest cost, and has subsequently strengthened the grip of Iran’s religious dictatorship.

Israeli fears are well known in letting Iran off the hook. But others, too, notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, have greeted the Geneva agreement with stony silence. They fear that a diplomatic win for Tehran will strengthen the resolve even further of President Assad in Syria, Iran’s client state and political ally.

On the balance of things, the Geneva deal should be deemed a worthy risk. Tehran has felt the full throttle of western sanctions and the sharpness of its teeth. It must also realise that having offered Iran diplomatic concessions and held Israel in check, President Obama will have no option but to take punitive military action if Iran reneges on its nuclear promises.

The onus in turning this interim deal into something permanent is now on Barack Obama and William Hague, Britain’s Foreign Secretary. Their job will be to tame and dismantle Tehran’s nuclear threat once and for all. Any final agreement must see Iran disband its tens of thousands of uranium processing centrifuges – far more than is needed for any purely civilian atomic energy programme. Iran’s plant for making plutonium – which can only have a military intent – must also be dismantled. It would also make sense for Tehran to dispose of the excessive amounts of low enriched uranium it already possesses – enough to make at least six atomic bombs if those stocks were sufficiently enriched to weapons grade material.

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Government, Iran, Israel, Middle East, Politics, United Nations, United States

The Geneva agreement between the U.S. and Iran…

INTERIM DEAL

The interim deal between the United States and Iran has made significant progress that will halt the advancement of the Iranian nuclear program, but it is also weak in some important respects.

The deal makes no mention of potential military action if Iran does not live up to its obligations. However, the deal is a ground-breaking agreement that will attempt to resolve longstanding concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The interim deal ties Tehran to an ongoing diplomatic process whose primary rewards remain deferred until a far more ambitious and comprehensive agreement can be achieved.

Describing the agreement as an ‘initial, six-month deal’, President Obama said it includes ‘substantial limitations’ that will deter Iran from creating a nuclear weapon.

U.S. negotiators said the deal addresses Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and its existing enriched uranium stockpiles, but details on this remain unclear. It also dealt with Iran’s centrifuges, a component part needed which can enrich uranium for fuel for a bomb, and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor.

Mr Obama, both in his televised statement to the nation and the fact sheet issued by the White House, committed to no additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran as long as Iran abides by it. Many in Congress, though, have said new sanctions are necessary to make sure Iran abandons what they consider a path toward developing nuclear weapons. Others say that whilst they share Mr Obama’s desire to resolve the nuclear dispute with Iran through diplomacy continuity for stronger sanctions against Iran is still needed to make sure diplomacy succeeds. Bipartisan legislation is expected in the United States that will impose tough new economic sanctions if Iran undermines the interim accord or if the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is not underway by the end of the six-month period.

For some, the interim deal provides the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism with billions of dollars of cash in exchange for cosmetic concessions which will neither freeze nor significantly roll-back its nuclear infrastructure.

Whilst there is also a perception that this is a deal that reflects Iran buckling under the weight of international sanctions which has truly bowed to global pressure, there is also a risk of the final deal being buttressed if factors such as a hard deadline for a final agreement is pursued, a caveat previously imposed by the United Nations Security Council. The UN has passed multiple resolutions demanding that Iran suspend its production of nuclear fuel, with a threat of military force if terms are not met.

Contentiously, before the deal in Geneva had been announced, Iranian officials said that any interim deal must declare production of nuclear fuel as an ‘Iranian sovereign right’. But even limited enrichment facilities will allow Iran to still be in a position to build all the elements to acquire a nuclear infrastructure without ever actually turning it on. The permission to enrich will ensure that the Iranian nuclear program remains an international issue for many years.

ISRAEL

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now appears to have little choice but to accept this deal that he has derided as deeply flawed.

Mr Netanyahu believes the six-month deal leaves Iran’s military nuclear capabilities largely intact, while giving Iran relief from painful economic sanctions, undermining negotiations on the next stage. At the same time, Israel’s strongest piece of leverage, the threat of a military strike on Iran, seems to be out of the question despite Netanyahu’s insistence it would remain on the table. Mr Netanyahu has referred to the deal as a ‘historic mistake.’

He said Israel was not bound by the agreement, and reiterated Israel’s right to ‘defend itself by itself,’ a veiled reference to a possible military strike against Iran.

Mr Netanyahu has spent years warning the world against the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran, calling it an existential threat due to Iranian references to Israel’s destruction, its support of hostile militant groups on Israel’s borders and its development of missiles capable of reaching Israel and beyond.

Israel also believes that a nuclear-armed Iran will provide militant groups like Lebanon’s Hezbollah an ‘umbrella’ of protection that will embolden them to carry out attacks.

Netanyahu had said that any deal must ensure that Iran’s enriching of uranium — a key step toward making a nuclear bomb — must end. He also said all enriched material should be removed from the Islamic Republic, and called for the demolition of a plutonium reactor under construction.

A deal that would satisfy Israel was never likely from the outset due to differing ‘red lines’ between Israel and the U.S.

While Israel sees any enrichment as a cause for concern, the U.S. was willing to tolerate nuclear development as long as it was unable to produce weapons.

U.S. negotiators have said that the relief from sanctions was minimal and that the most biting economic measures, including sanctions on Iran’s vital oil industry, remained in place and more could be imposed if Iran fails to follow through.

Israel’s relationship with the U.S. will be critical as it conducts peace talks with the Palestinians in the coming months. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who is mediating the talks, has set an April target date for reaching an agreement, and there is widespread speculation that the Americans will step up their involvement as the deadline approaches. Given this, Israel’s main card – military action against Iran – appears to be out of the question despite some hard hitting Israeli rhetoric on the Geneva agreement.

Enrichment is at the heart of the dispute because it can be used for peaceful purposes or for producing a nuclear bomb. Tehran insists its nuclear program is for civilian usage such as energy production and for use in medical treatment.

Uranium at low levels of enrichment, up to 20 percent, is used in research or generating electricity. Uranium must be enriched to a far higher level — above 90 percent — to produce a warhead. So far, Iran is not known to have produced any at that level, but Israel argues that the technology for doing so is the same as that for enriching at lower levels.

Under the compromise, enrichment would be capped at the 5 percent level, and Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent uranium would be ‘neutralised,’ effectively preventing it from reaching weapons-grade level. Also construction on the plutonium reactor is to be suspended. The White House also promised ‘intrusive monitoring’ of Iranian nuclear facilities.

Israel says any enriched uranium in Iranian hands is potentially dangerous, since its centrifuges can quickly convert it to weapons grade. Israel believes that Iran’s ability to keep its nuclear infrastructure intact will allow it to quickly resume the program if the talks fail.

In all, about 250 kilograms (550 pounds) of highly enriched uranium is needed to make a weapon. Iran already has about 200 kilograms (440 pounds) of enriched uranium.

The Geneva accord is not all bad for Israel, since Iran is deemed to have capped enrichment activity and slowed construction of the plutonium reactor. However, Iran’s ability to ‘break out and make a nuclear explosive device does remain intact, and is a concern being expressed by Israeli officials.

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Aid, Government, Society, United Nations

Self-serving aid agencies often make things worse…

INTERNATIONAL AID AND RELIEF

As the harrowing television footage from the Philippines has shown, the world is once again faced with another gigantic humanitarian catastrophe. Helplessly, we wonder if there is anything we can do, or contribute, to aid the rescue operation that is now in full swing.

For all our economic difficulties in recent years, we should reflect how fortunate we are to live in a prosperous country that suffers no more than relatively benign weather. Adverse climate conditions in the UK are nothing compared with those in Asia, where almost 70 per cent of the 1.3 million people killed by natural disasters in the first decade of this century lived.

The instant reaction for many people is to send and donate money to one of the many charities working in difficult and harrowing circumstances to help bring relief to the injured, homeless and starving. The courageous work of aid agencies is admired by most people.

But as the multi-billion pound aid industry continues to appeal for more money – so keen to display their logos in front of the television cameras – we often ignore an under-implied caveat, where sometimes they can do more harm than good.

Some commentators have witnessed at first hand the operational problems aid agencies can cause rather than solve. In the wake of the cataclysmic earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010, for example, the enraged mayor of the country’s capital described the relief agencies as a ‘second earthquake’ after being swamped by international aid organisations.

In Haiti, as in many other disaster zones, the world responded in sympathy – sending billions of pounds in donations. But, sadly, as has become the norm, we were given a demonstration of the arrogance and deficiencies of an ever-expanding global relief industry. This tends to lead to chaos on the ground caused by the needs of so many competing agencies, which often leads to extortionate sums of money being blown on ill-conceived and vainglorious projects.

We should hope that we don’t see a similar experience in the Philippines. But, unfortunately, the omens are not good. Despite undoubted dedication in often difficult and extreme conditions, good intentions backfiring have become commonplace. Even at this early stage, we have already seen examples of the charities exaggerating the gravity of the disaster while raising money. A cavalier approach to the facts was laid bare last week when the chief executive of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) indicated that the disaster could be as bad as the 2004 tsunami, which claimed the lives of 250,000 people in several countries. After being challenged as to whether the storm had really been that deadly, the DEC accepted that the comparison was misleading and promptly corrected the number of dead at about 2,500. 24 hours later, DEC’s appeal website was still claiming 10,000 fatalities.

One may say that this was a minor quibble and administrative blip, given the grievous circumstances. But, it brings into question the approach of the aid industry, where the big players increasingly resemble corporate giants: senior executives pocket six-figure salaries with their organisations presiding over slick publicity machines. Relief agency work has become such a highly competitive sector that one may ask why aid charities are so desperate to be first on the scene by getting their names into news and media reports? The realisation here concerns vast sums of money that are raised following natural disasters. Consider, for example, the still £310 million of unspent cash held by the Red Cross at the end of last year, following its Haiti earthquake appeal. This is a staggering sum of money.

The number of aid groups, too, has soared to such a level as evidenced by the ballooning numbers that are ever-present at various international crises – particularly so in recent decades. In 1980, there were 40 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the Thai border helping Cambodian refugees after the fall of the brutal Pol Pot regime. Just a decade later, there were 250 active NGOs during the Yugoslavian war. By 2004, some 500 were helping tsunami victims in Sri Lanka alone, and another 2,500 were registered as providing aid relief in war-torn Afghanistan.

Questions of operational logistics are also noteworthy. Some relief groups have been known to send entirely inappropriate items. For instance, in Cambodia, people were offered food that had previously been declared unfit for animals in a Western zoo. During the Balkan wars in the Nineties, Bosnians fighting in the former Yugoslavia were gifted anti-depressants well past their sell-by dates. During the famine in Somali, laxatives were sent to the starving. And, with so many aid groups jostling to be part of the relief effort, the inevitable logistical bottlenecks at key entry points is always a factor – hampering the smooth running and operational effectiveness of relief work. It has even been reported that locals – who tend to know what’s best on the ground – frequently get elbowed aside by the big global organisations.

Other instances of how aid organisations vie for dominance can be seen in their actions. In the Sumatran city of Banda Aceh following the tsunami, there were reports of children developing symptoms of measles after being vaccinated three times by competing agencies.

In the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, dozens of meetings each week were required to co-ordinate the sprawling array of aid groups – invariably held in English rather than the French or Creole that is spoken locally. During the election of a steering committee, 60 international bodies voted without any Haitian agencies or representatives present.

Perhaps this is why, that £5.6 billion has been spent on Haiti, a nation of just ten million people. However, at least 200,000 people remain homeless with no more than 7,500 permanent new homes having been built (against 300,000 destroyed or badly damaged after the quake). There is still no running water or reliable electricity even in the capital. Sanitation facilities are well below the expected standards with families being forced to bathe babies in sewer-contaminated water. Cholera was imported – almost certainly by United Nations troops – to a country that had, until then, been free and clean of the disease. Around 8,300 people were killed, and more than half-a-million contracted the disease, with the life threatening condition having now spread to neighbouring countries.

Chaos and confusion often stems from publicity campaigns that are promoted by aid groups. As the confusion gathers pace the unaccountable aid machine simply moves on to the next high profile disaster. Even the well-respected medical journal The Lancet has warned of the troublesome publicity given out by aid organisations.

What is more, few in the relief sector admit how little money trickles down to those most in need; one expert suggested ten pence in every pound donated, while Haiti’s prime minister has inferred that 40 per cent of aid went on supporting those handing out the donations.

Of Concern, too, is that some of the money has even ended up in the hands of terrorists: in Somalia, aid groups paid substantial ‘taxes’ to al-Shabaab, the group behind the recent Kenyan shopping mall attack, while rebel Tamil Tigers imposed levies on post-tsunami reconstruction work in Sri Lanka.

People are broadly more supportive of campaigns that help specific disaster victims than of governments blowing billions on flawed and outdated theories of international aid development. Just 4.3 per cent of the British government’s very generous £10.8 billion aid budget goes on direct emergency relief.

What may be done, then, to make sure those in need, get proper help? Giving money to any organisation whose core activity is emergency work should be a necessary prerequisite. This includes organisations which don’t spend huge sums on fund-raising, which doesn’t overpay its executives, but which is open and transparent about the difficulties of delivery. Medecins Sans Frontieres is one such body that typifies professional excellence along with its work ethic. It even limits fund-raising when it has raised enough after specific disasters.

Local organisations should also be encouraged to take the lead if they clearly have the right expertise. Donating directly to them via the internet, or to regional branches, is a possible route.

Exercising careful caution is also important. Fake charities are sometimes set up after disasters to dupe foreigners, and projects that seem authentically attractive can prove utterly counter-productive. Eschewing false prophets who bedevil the aid industry is easily done with a little research. Giving money to those who will genuinely pass it on to the victims (like those poor and embattled people of the Philippines who have suffered so much) will make the best possible impact. This is the least we owe such people.

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