YEMEN’S CIVIL WAR
Events in Yemen over the past week have taken on a new dimension. Whilst the civil war in Yemen continues apace, in which a Saudi-backed coalition has been battling Iranian-supported Houthi rebels, the tactics of the coalition has changed somewhat following the landing of at least one armoured brigade at the southern port of Aden. According to reports, the 3,000-strong combined Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) force, equipped with French Leclerc main battle tanks, Russian BMD-3 infantry fighting vehicles and U.S. mine-resistant troop carriers, then set-off on August 2 for the Houthi-held military base at al-Anad, about 65km (40 miles) to the north.
Two days later, and bombarded from the air and heavily outgunned, the Houthis swiftly fled into the surrounding hills. Pro-government forces were back in control of the strategically important base which had, until recently, been used by America for launching drone strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Anad is the biggest air base in Yemen and, once repaired and restored, could be used by Saudi and UAE transport aircraft and fighter-bombers to widen the scope of the offensive and to drive the Houthis out of much of the south.
Localised reports suggest that the Saudi and UAE forces are only there to help train anti-Houthi fighters, but there is little doubt that the high-tech and advanced weaponry is being operated by professionals. They are being assisted by tribal fighters who support the internationally-backed government that the Houthis drove out. They know the territory and geography well and can hold ground once it has been taken. But it now looks increasingly clear as if the coalition has decided that only well-equipped regular forces and commandos can bring the campaign against the Houthis to a conclusion.
Yet this is both a major escalation and a military gamble. The Houthi insurgents have nowhere near the level of sophisticated weaponry being deployed against them, and the history of conventional foreign forces fighting in conditions of chaotic irregular warfare is not encouraging, either. Early gains can often be followed by military stalemate and quagmire.
How the Houthis’ Iranian backers will respond if the Houthis are seen to be facing defeat is another unknown. Iran, whose involvement is anyway limited, can do little to resupply the Houthis, whose airports having been bombed and ports blockaded. Besides, it is at full stretch in its fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – and, certainly not the moment to turn a small-scale proxy war into a wider conflict with the Gulf Arabs.
Even if the Iranians show restraint, the Saudi coalition could still run into trouble in other ways. It has, for example, made some unlikely allies in its effort to crush the Houthis in the form of al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which are treated with suspicion at home. Friends like that will call into question the continued support of America, who consider AQAP the most deadly al-Qaeda franchise. And Egypt’s President, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, regards the Brotherhood as a much greater threat than the Houthis. With the humanitarian situation in Yemen also increasingly desperate, the chances of anyone emerging a winner in this conflict are remote.
Map of the conflict zone in Yemen’s civil war.
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