Tag Archives: Bank of England

Banking, Britain, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Politics, Society

Financial deregulation of the City: too risky by far

BRITAIN

THE UK Government has launched a consultation about whether it is time to lighten the rules governing alternative asset managers, including private equity and hedge funds, in the belief that doing so will boost growth.

That is radical because, in its desire to ensure the City of London remains attractive post-Brexit, the government seems to have forgotten one of the major lessons of the 2008 financial crisis: when regulation is lax, risks accumulate. And there is little evidence to support this idea, but every reason to think it could exacerbate systemic risks.

The proposal is consistent with the Treasury’s belief that expanding the financial sector will deliver economic prosperity. It has suggested that post-crisis regulations went “too far”. Those regulations included an EU directive targeting alternative investment funds. Before 2008, these funds operated mostly in the dark. There was no means of systematically tracking the leverage they were using, nor the dangers this might pose.

Under the EU rules, leveraged funds managing Euros100m or more in assets had to comply with strict reporting requirements and hold enough capital to absorb losses. The Chancellor is now considering lifting that threshold to £5bn, which would exempt many funds from the full list of EU rules. It will fall to the Financial Conduct Authority to decide which rules to apply. This is troubling.

The FCA has been instructed to encourage financial “risk-taking”, and the regulator has boasted about slashing “red tape”. Taken together, this sounds like a recipe for recklessness. Though the marketplace for private equity and hedge funds was too small to cause a crisis back in 2008, it has since tripled in size. Many private equity funds have started borrowing from shadow banks, which aren’t subject to the same regulations or capital requirements as normal banks. Others have begun taking on even more debt than usual. The Bank of England raised the alarm about these risky practices in 2023, and has suggested that mainstream banks may be unwittingly exposed to the industry. Hence, these are reasons for more financial oversight and discipline, not less.

If the FCA loosens the rules, fund managers will be less constrained in their dealings. They lobbied to have the EU directive watered down in 2010, and the UK was one of the few countries to oppose the rules. Then, as now, the government wanted to protect the City, believing it to be a goose that lays golden eggs. This antipathy towards financial regulation was a prelude to the “Singapore on Thames” worldview promoted by Brexiters. Hedge fund and private equity managers donated heavily to their cause: a study of Electoral Commission data by the academics Théo Bourgeron and Marlène Benquet revealed some £7.4m was donated to the leave campaign, as opposed to just £1.25m for remain.

The Treasury seems to be of the belief that unless the City gets what it wants, Britain may lose its fund managers to countries such as Luxembourg. There are many reasons to be wary of liberalising finance. One is that it will hinder, rather than help, economic growth. Research suggests that once the sector exceeds a certain size, it starts to become a drag on growth and productivity. A study from the University of Sheffield found that the UK lost out on roughly three years of average GDP growth between 1995 and 2015 thanks to its bloated financial sector. Watering down regulations might be helpful for fund managers who like to take huge risks, but it is hard to see who else would benefit.

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Britain, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Politics

Spring statement 2025: A stage built on myths

BRITAIN

BRITAIN is tightening its belt. The chancellor’s spring statement arrives with the gloomy tone of inevitability. Welfare payments for the sick and disabled will be shrunk, and public services from transport to criminal justice face much leaner times. The language is that of necessity. There is no money. The choices are hard, but unavoidable. So runs the rhetorical script.

The notion that painful cuts are inevitable is political theatre and grandstanding. Either Rachel Reeves knows the constraints are self-imposed – or, more troubling, believes they are real. Last October, she announced £190bn in extra spending, £140bn in additional borrowing, and £35bn more in taxes than previously forecast. The Treasury has expounded upon this by insisting “you can’t pour that amount of money into the state and call it austerity”.

Yes you can. Particularly where tens of billions are siphoned off in debt interest to uphold economic orthodoxy rather than meet social needs. The UK now spends more than £100bn a year on debt interest not because it is financially insolvent, but to a substantial degree because the Bank of England is offloading vast amounts of gilts, bought during quantitative easing, at a loss. The Treasury must cover these losses, while the flood of gilts into financial markets drives up interest rates on new borrowing. This is quantitative tightening (QT), with the state left to foot the bill for soaring interest costs and Bank payouts. Nonetheless, the Office for Budget Responsibility assumes that it will continue, locking in high costs.

This is ideology posing as policy. And it’s far from prudent. No money for free school meals or youth clubs, some parliamentarians warn, yet billions pour into the pockets of bondholders, for the sake of “stability”. Ending QT could redirect that money to public services – a better priority than reassuring markets with symbolic gestures.

If the Bank won’t stop on its own, it must be pushed. Under Gordon Brown, the Central Bank gained its independence in 1998 but included a safeguarding caveat: in “extreme economic circumstances” ministers can override the Bank in the public interest. If £100bn in spending isn’t extreme, what is? QT should be paused. The Bank stands alone among G7 peers in actively selling bonds and demanding Treasury cash to cover paper losses. This is self-defeating in a dangerously volatile world. Gilts could be strategically managed. Before New Labour, Kenneth Clarke often ignored the Bank’s advice – and was often right. But such thinking is now deemed heretical in a political culture that treats Central Bank independence as sacred, even when it deepens and exasperates public hardship.

The deeper irony cannot be lost on anyone. The chancellor refuses to raise taxes on the wealthy, will not relax her fiscal rules, and has ruled out borrowing more. So she claims that there is no alternative to cuts. Yet, these are self-imposed constraints – combined with deference to an unelected monetary authority – that sustain the illusion of necessity. Labour has been here before: Snowden did the same in the 1930s, and very nearly destroyed his party.

The spring statement is a performance. She asks the public to accept a diminished state as the result of external forces, when actually it’s the result of internal dogma. Worse, she may believe the script – failing to recall the economic tools once used to steer interest rates, debt, and public investment. Austerity isn’t the price of prudence, but the cost of forgetting. We have a chancellor of the exchequer who wears the mask of making tough decisions, but on a stage built on myths. The better choice would be to trim the Bank’s power, even if the spotlight has been carefully trained away from its damaging role.

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Banking, Britain, Business, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, Society

Banking practices of the Royal Bank of Scotland referred to City regulators…

DAMNING REPORTS

The latest accusations being levelled at the Royal Bank of Scotland are as incriminating as any in its recent chequered history.

Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) have long complained that they cannot get the loans they need, despite protestations by the banks to the contrary. A newly released report from Sir Andrew Large, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England, on the bank’s small-business-lending, confirms that much of the criticism levied at the bank in recent times is justified and the taxpayer-rescued institution must explain why it has not been doing all it could to assist Britain’s economic recovery. In normal circumstances, such practices would be worrying enough for the newly installed chief executive of the bank, Ross McEwan.

But these are not normal circumstances; Mr McEwan is also faced with a more troubling contention. According to another published document from Lawrence Tomlinson – deemed a successful businessman and ‘entrepreneur in residence’ at the Department of Business – RBS may have sunk to even greater depths in its condescending and haughty treatment of Britain’s SMEs. Contemptuous, because not only has the bank been transferring perfectly legitimate and profitable companies into its high-risk Global Restructuring Group (GRG), but the West Register (the bank’s property division), has reportedly been acquiring their assets on the cheap after imposing deliberate and exorbitantly high fees on them. Many companies in this high-risk category, deemed perfectly viable, have been unable to pay these fees imposed and as such have found themselves having their assets taken over by the bank at heavily discounted prices.

Both these reports must be put into context. Prior to 2008, RBS had been reckless over a number of years in its dealings, over-extending loans to many small firms that did not justify such levels of confidence. As the bank now struggles to repair its balance sheet, bad debts are continually being written off and lending practices have been tightened.

The findings contained within these reports have left many feeling aghast, not least Mr Tomlinson himself. His inquiries and formal deliberations suggest something altogether more serious. Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, has acted quickly and sent the evidence to City regulators. For his part, Mr McEwan has called in the law firm Clifford Chance to conduct an internal review of the bank’s practices. Such deviant and acute methods would be inexcusable from any bank, but from one that is largely owned and controlled by the state makes matters even worse.

COMMENT & ANALYSIS

The claims made in Lawrence Tomlinson’s report into the way the Global Restructuring Group at the Royal Bank of Scotland has dealt with struggling enterprises are truly dire.

It rightly is a matter that needs to be examined by the regulators the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).

Forcing struggling firms into insolvency when there may have been a chance of survival is bad enough. Ruthlessly seizing property and assets for its own gain is immoral and much worse.

Yet, should we be surprised? RBS had a hand in almost all the post-crisis scandals, including Libor fixing, interest rate swaps and the sale of payment protection insurance. The bank is also being sued by investors for failing fully to disclose the parlous state of its finances ahead of the £12bn rights issue to shareholders in 2008.

Tomlinson and the Department of Business also have some questions to answer. The in-situ ‘entrepreneur in residence’, for example, is a little mysterious. How was he chosen for this appointment, what is the scope of his role and how much did he tell civil servants and the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, about his own business affairs before he took on this rather curious role?

What also of the poor judgement by Tomlinson not to disclose that NatWest, RBS’s main operating offshoot, had granted him an overdraft and that in the last couple of years he was engaged in a major refinancing operation? Financial analysts will find it extraordinary that this was not considered a relevant factor either by Tomlinson or the Department for Business, and that it was not disclosed in the report. Making a strong case against the predatory behaviour of RBS is one thing, the dealings and judgments of Mr Tomlinson are clearly and significantly related.

The published accounts of Tomlinson’s business LNT Group are, even by the standards of many private empires, on the opaque side. They show a group that is indebted and making losses, with a host of intercompany relationships that are difficult to untangle.

The main product of Tomlinson’s dealings looks to be the design and building of new care homes, something the UK badly needs. But this is a notoriously difficult sector in which to operate – as was seen from the fate of Southern Cross – and management often has to choose between keeping costs under control and maintaining high standards of care.

Before giving Mr Tomlinson a government imprimatur one should trust that Vince Cable and his Department looked carefully at all his dealings before approving the appointment.

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