Tag Archives: Damascus

Britain, Finance, Government, Middle East, United Nations, United States

Armed intervention in Syria is an agonising decision…

WESTERN INTERVENTION IN SYRIA

Western military intervention in Syria is moving closer. America’s reluctance to admit that its ‘red line’ had been crossed, said yesterday that there was ‘very little doubt’ that Bashar al-Assad’s forces had killed up to 1,500 civilians in a chemical attack last week. This followed statements from Britain that the only ‘plausible explanation’ for the deaths was an attack by Syrian government forces, and from France who said that a ‘reaction with force may be necessary’ if this is proved to be the case.

Though Damascus has belatedly signalled that UN inspectors can access the site of the attack, its prevarication over the last 6-days to allow inspectors in, means the evidence will have deteriorated or possibly even disappeared altogether.

The outcome of military intervention – most likely air strikes or cruise missile attacks from the U.S. naval fleet operating in the region – is impossible to predict. The threat to stability posed by the Syrian regime must now take account of the use of chemical weapons which violates international law, which implicitly undermines the authority of the UN. Whilst President Obama correctly identified it as a line which could not be crossed with impunity, failure to hold the Assad regime to account will only encourage more of the same. Mr Assad is known to have stockpiles not only of sarin gas, but also of the much more potent and deadly vx nerve gas, both types of chemical nerve agents having been moved around at will in the past few months. The strain is intensifying with refugees amassing on the borders with Jordon and Lebanon. Over the weekend, the UN declared that more than one million children have now been displaced in Syria.

The strategic risks of doing nothing are horribly clear. Armed intervention in a disintegrating Syria is an agonising choice, because the domino effect is an important factor in the equation – Iran, for example, will take heart in its pursuit of a nuclear warhead, which would possibly prompt others to follow suit in a Middle East nuclear arms race, including Israel moving closer towards unilateral military action against Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme.

One may hope that the acceptance by Syria’s backers, Russia and Iran, that chemical weapons have been used will lead to a unanimous Security Council resolution at the UN which will force Assad and his opponents to the negotiating table. That hope may well remain a pious one.

Last week’s hideous images of gassed children mean something must now be done. There can be no further delays, and contingencies should be activated in dealing with the flood of refugees pouring over the Lebanese and Jordon borders: quotas, for instance, should be drawn up in granting many of them asylum – as happened in Indochina after the fall of Saigon in 1975. A humanitarian and emergency response is now desperately needed.

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Iran, Syria, United States

Will Iran’s new president alter its policy on Syria?

Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, is faced with a plethora of national and international challenges.

Rouhani’s presidential term starts at a particularly challenging time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing an unprecedented level of regional and international isolation, largely due to the US/EU sanctions because of Iranian aspirations in building a nuclear bomb.

One of the most crucial foreign policy objectives in Rouhani’s agenda will be the Syrian conflict, which has now entered its third year.

Iran’s election result raises vital questions as to whether its foreign policy towards the Assad regime will be altered or whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance will evolve into a new phase. The presidency of the centrist Rouhani could change the diplomatic ties with Damascus, with a change possible in Iran’s support for Assad. Tehran has provided the Syrian state with political, military, intelligence and advisory support to its army and security services. That support has, until now, been unconditional.

While there are high expectations among Western political leaders that the election of the centrist Rouhani might influence a change in Iran’s support of Assad, that enthusiasm must be balanced against a number of factors including the realism of Iran’s centrist ideology, the power of the presidential office, Iran’s political structure, and Tehran’s foreign policy objectives.

The political spectrum of the centrists in Iran analyses Syria more from a religious and geopolitical angle and how the realms of the balance-of-power lies. It is least interested in any deterioration in human rights.

Although Rouhani argues for constructive interactions with other countries, and supports applying a softer political tone – as opposed to the combative, controversial and provocative language used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Rouhani has not yet called for an overall sweeping shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Rouhani has neither asked Assad to step down from power nor pressed to halt the intelligence, financial and advisory support to Damascus.

However, withdrawing support to Damascus could be perceived by some centrists as an attempt to undermine Tehran’s geopolitical leverage and balance of power in the region, which ultimately could endanger their own influence and power. This is particularly significant to those Iranian leaders who argue that they are surrounded by what they perceive as ‘existential and strategic enemies’. Military bases of the United States, for instance, are located throughout Iran’s borders and in the Gulf Arab states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The role of the Supreme Leader, too, plays a significant part in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. It may then be unrealistic to argue that Rouhani would be in a position to immediately alter Iran’s current political status quo towards the Assad regime. Iran’s policy towards Damascus is closely guarded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the high generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Etela’at – Iran’s intelligence service. Rouhani will, though, have the ability to set the tone in regional and international circles for the Supreme Leader.

Ali Khamenei has been very clear about his political stance on Syria, stating that Assad’s regime is targeted by Israeli and US-backed groups, foreign conspirators and terrorists.

The religious and pious angle is hugely important. One of the major pillars of Iran’s foreign policy has been that it has proclaimed itself as the safe-guardian of Islamic values, particularly Shi’ite. The Alawite sect-based state of Syria serves as a crucial instrument for advancing, empowering, and achieving this foreign policy objective. Many analysts will be of the view that Rouhani is unlikely to push for regime change in Syria, or by asking Assad to step aside as many Western and Arab Gulf states have done. The domino effect of halting any advisory assistance, be it political, military, or intelligence, to Assad’s ruling Alawite and socialist Bath party, would likely weaken Iran’s own regional influence and foreign policy leverage.

If the Alawites lose power, the next government in Syria is likely to be constituted from the current opposition groups: the Sunni majority in Syria comprises around 74% of the population. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Islamic Sunni parties were the ones who won the elections, in Damascus, the Sunni groups are more likely to win most of the parliamentary seats in any new government after Assad. When this happens this will be regarded as a considerable shift in regional and international power against Iran and in favour of the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Meantime, it seems likely that Iran will continue implementing its current strategies towards Syria to preserve Iran’s regional influence, its political and economic national interests, and the survival of the ruling clerics.

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