Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

Russia-Ukraine talks: a “charade”

UKRAINE CONFLICT

IT has taken three years for direct talks to be held between Russia and Ukraine, and it should have been a momentous occasion. Since 2022, Russian war crimes have only deepened the chasm between them. It was Donald Trump who demanded this meeting, but who nonetheless underlined that it was largely a charade telling reporters, “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together.” It made plain that Russia felt no pressure to cooperate.

While difficult negotiations often begin on easier ground, the agreement of a mass prisoner swap seemed like a discrete achievement. The real significance of the Istanbul talks, however, lay more in the messages sent by their existence and attendance list.

The hasty proposal was Vladimir Putin’s escape route after European leaders demanded Russia agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire or face increased sanctions and weapons transfers. Ukraine and its backers said there should be no meetings without a ceasefire, but Kyiv was forced to concede when Mr Trump insisted it participate. Painful experience has clearly taught that it does not pay to defy the US president.

Volodymyr Zelensky challenged the Russian president to attend the talks personally, and vowed to wait for him in Turkey. This was, said a Ukrainian official, “a theatre performance for just one audience member”, reinforcing the message that Putin is the obstacle to peace. It is difficult to disagree.

Putin snubbed the meeting. Russia was represented by nationalist ideologues Vladimir Medinsky and Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, the latter a veteran military officer and diplomat who recently told Ukrainians that if they refused to capitulate in the war, “We will keep killing and slaughtering you.” Moscow’s approach did not appear much more diplomatic this time, either. Ukraine said that Russia voiced “unacceptable” things.

Mr Zelensky was adept in portraying the Russian leader’s non-attendance as “disrespect for Trump”. There is evidence of some frustration with Moscow in Washington. JD Vance, the US vice-president, insists that Russia was “asking for too much” and Mr Trump has expressed his displeasure towards Russian belligerence in angry sentiments and undertones. Lindsey Graham, a key Trump ally, says he has sufficient senatorial support to pass “devastating” new sanctions. But while he described his bill as part of the president’s arsenal, it is unlikely that Mr Trump will unleash it. That said, Putin will need to ensure he does not overplay his hand, given Mr Trump’s unpredictability. Putin may think spinning out the conflict is currently in Russia’s interests, but the war is far from cost-free for his country.

The recent narrative twists have revealed much greater coordination and resolve on Europe’s part. That is encouraging. Germany, for instance, has announced that it would hit Mr Trump’s demand for defence spending to reach 5% of GDP by 2032, albeit by including related infrastructure. However, US arms will run out long before Europe is fully ready to step into the breach. The key question surely remains not whether the US president can be coaxed and flattered into being more helpful, but whether he can be dissuaded from becoming actively obstructive – cutting off intelligence or Starlink, or preventing Europe from requisitioning arms for Ukraine. Seen that way, Mr Trump’s observation that “nothing’s going to happen” until he meets Putin sounds even more chilling. Meanwhile, away from the diplomatic front, the Russian attacks have continued in ferocity and intensity: further evidence of the urgent need for a ceasefire.

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Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

US-Russian bilateral talks on Ukraine: Europe is alarmed

UKRAINE

DONALD Trump’s latest attack on Volodymyr Zelensky, and the US administration’s last-minute snub of London peace talks, is the clearest evidence yet that what matters to Mr Trump is not Ukrainian sovereignty and safety, nor the transatlantic alliance, but a deal with Vladimir Putin. The US president says an agreement is close, with Washington recognising annexed Crimea as Russian with Moscow conceding little if anything in return. For Mr Trump, it is Ukraine’s president who is once again harming negotiations by saying he will not recognise Russia’s control.

Putin is fervent in his desire to maximise Russian interests, attentive to every detail, adept in negotiations, and strongly believes that time is on his side. Trump does not care about the outcome as long as he can claim he has ended the war. He has little interest in the detail and has a habit of handing over the prize at the start of the process.

Just prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion, Trump described Russian aggression towards Ukraine as “genius”. His administration is also now abandoning efforts to hold Moscow accountable for war crimes. He holds a grudge against Mr Zelensky, and believes Putin would “keep his word” on a peace deal. Above all else, Trump is in a hurry. Having pledged before coming to the White House for his second presidency that he could end the war “in 24 hours”, he wants something to boast about as he nears the end of his first 100 days in office.

After so many deaths and so much devastation, no one wants peace more than Ukrainians. Kyiv understands that there will be no magical restoration of territorial integrity, but the indications are that it is ready to negotiate, not to surrender.

JD Vance, the US vice-president, has a simple answer: it is time for the two sides to “either say yes or for the US to walk away from this process”. US military aid to Ukraine is already reaching its end, intelligence could soon follow, and Washington could also restrict arms purchases even if Europe was willing and able to fund them to the extent needed.

Putin has played an expert hand so far, throwing expediency to the cause at opportune moments – as with the offer of an “Easter truce”, which did not halt attacks. His most recent gambit is reportedly to offer to cede claims on Ukrainian land that Russia does not actually control – concessions that Trump will undoubtedly laud. He does not want a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine, said to be part of the US proposal, but may also conclude that its significance would be limited without a US security guarantee.

The timing of the US plans, as well as demeaning Europe’s diplomatic efforts – meaning London’s discussions were downgraded – reinforces the European understanding that a US-brokered deal may be a beginning, not the end, for Russian ambitions. But such a grotesquely one-sided, imposed agreement would encourage territorial aggression elsewhere too. It isn’t surprising that Putin sees Europe as an obstruction and prefers bilateral talks. It should continue to alarm and appal us that the US, too, now sees its old allies as the problem, and not part of any solution.

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Britain, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

UK-US trade deal: Parliament must vote on any agreement

TRADE DEAL

Intro: Abolishing tariffs would be welcome for UK firms, but not at the price of reducing high regulatory standards or a reset with the European Union

LOOKED at dispassionately and objectively, a bilateral trade agreement between Britain and the United States is of relatively small economic significance to this country. Even ardent supporters of UK-US relations will find it difficult to argue otherwise. Back in 2020, for instance, Boris Johnson’s government estimated that a US deal “could increase UK GDP in the long run by around 0.07%” – a statistical calculation that is not exactly transformative. The view touted by some Brexiters that a US trade deal would fire up the entire British economy was always fantastical. Based on the assumption of a yearning for deregulation, there was little public support, even among leave voters themselves. Any urge of that kind now is even more delusional, in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariff wars.

The deregulatory alarm is hopefully a thing of the past. But global trade has new traumas too. Trump’s protectionist policies and bullying of US rivals are resetting the terms. There are nevertheless specific reasons why it is in Britain’s interest to pursue free trade talks with the US. Chief among these is the direct threat posed by current tariffs, especially on cars and pharmaceuticals. There is also the distinct prospect that a 10% tariff will be re-imposed on all UK exports to the US after the current 90-day pause ends in July.

The problem with any trade deal lies with the prices that the US may try to extract for tariff reductions or exemptions. And while the U.S. vice-president, J.D. Vance, has said that he sees a “good chance” of a deal, this could still be contingent on UK concessions in sectors such as agriculture, sanitary rules, and digital regulation. These are the same sectors that, for good reason, proved to be stumbling blocks in the post-Brexit discussions. Efforts to rebrand things like AI, biotech, and digital infrastructure, as strategically vital industries of the future, do not dispel some real threats now facing British food standards, healthcare, or online controls.

All this is multiplied by the Trump administration’s unreliability and geostrategic approach. Trump’s policy in Europe is to weaken and destroy the EU. Urged on by right-wing Brexiter politicians, the president sees pulling Britain away from the EU’s orbit as part of that effort. So, however, does the EU. As a result, any attempt by Washington to offer generous terms to the UK in particular sectors is likely to make any reset with the EU far more problematic. Sir Keir Starmer says that Britain does not need to make an either/or choice. Insisting that Britain can have its cake and eat it, that’s hardly the brutal reality being faced; neither the US nor the EU will necessarily take the same generous view that Starmer holds.

Even if the prospective UK-US deal is less wide-ranging than it once might have been, it is still significant. Politically, the Trump factor also makes any such deal more explosive. UK treaties and international trade deals are traditionally delivered under prerogative powers. As the Brexit argument about a “meaningful vote” showed, there is a very limited role for parliament. That needs to change. It would be intolerable in the UK-US case. This is clearly a matter for parliament to debate, both during and after negotiations, and for both houses of parliament to vote on.

In recent days, the Labour chairs of the Commons foreign affairs and trade select committees called for such votes. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are both in favour. The UK government should make clear that no agreement will go ahead without a meaningful Commons vote in favour. Democracy cannot be usurped on this issue.

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