Tag Archives: Eurasian Union

Economic, European Union, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Ukraine and its future stability…

Intro: For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured

Despite all the tumult of recent weeks, the crisis in Ukraine is just at the beginning. Europe’s seventh most populous country will be without a fully-elected government until at least May, a situation that has arisen following its former president who was stripped of his power and who has been on the run since being forced out. It is believed Viktor Yanukovych has found safe haven in Russia, Ukraine’s closest ally in the region.

The underlying mood appears to be one of score settling. Separatism in the east is stirring, especially in Crimea, which is predominately Russian by culture and history. Ukraine is strategically important for Moscow: the Russian’s maintain a major naval base at Sevastopol, allowing the Russian navy to deploy quickly into the Black Sea as the need arises.

Ukraine is broke, precipitated by the immediate origins of the crisis which was economic. The currency, the hryvnia, has depreciated by 12 per cent since the start of the year, and the public finances are teetering on the verge of collapse. According to the interim-government in Ukraine, one which is attempting to aid transition to a newly elected government, the country needs £21 billion between now and the end of 2015 simply to pay its bills. Mr Yanukovych is widely reported as having taken bribes in accepting Russian aid and membership of the Moscow sponsored Eurasian Union, rather than entering into trade deals and agreements with the EU.

The West needs to be careful in any vainglorious attempt of portraying or by assuming it has won following the overthrow of Mr Yanukovych. The geopolitics, best seen as a tug-of-war, is fraught with difficulties. For Ukraine to have a stable future it is imperative that Russia, the European Union and the US work together in collaboration if that stability is to be assured. The danger is that any one of these superpowers treats the country as the prize in a zero-sum game.

America’s approach has been cautious. President Obama has, thus far, shown no desire for a full-scale showdown with Moscow. But this attitude is shared by his European allies, too, as they strive to put together an economic rescue package in which Russia would ideally be involved. In reality, though, the real uncertainty surrounds how Moscow will react to the fate of its southern neighbour. Where culture and history are so closely interwoven, Russia is likely to be wary of any western driven agenda.

The initial response of the Kremlin to events in Kiev was one of ferocious outrage. Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister, accused Europe of turning a blind eye to the dictatorial and ‘sometimes terrorist methods’ used by the new authorities to suppress dissent in eastern Ukraine – the area of the country which is particularly sympathetic to Russian ideals. Mr Medvedev has also declared that the opposition had seized power by an ‘armed mutiny’, a belief which could still lead to direct military action by Russia in the Crimea. A request by the Crimeans for Russian protection would be the pretext for the worst possible outcome.

However, since that outburst, the tone from Moscow has been more restrained. Earlier this week, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, indicated that the policy of ‘non-intervention’ would continue. He said, rather curiously, that it was in Moscow’s interests for Ukraine to be part of a ‘broad European family’. However, the Kremlin has an array of options of how it might influence events such as how it will control vital gas exports to all parts of the Ukraine.

Gauging how the crisis will end is no easy task. A form of partition is one possibility, but that can only happen if the considered consent is given by all interested parties. Demarcation along similar lines to the 1993 ‘velvet divorce’ between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is one model that might prove helpful if negotiators are looking for historical references in bringing about an ordered and peaceful outcome in Ukraine.

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European Union, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine

Ukraine, Russia and the wider issue of morality…

TUG OF WAR

Many Ukrainians are now so desperate to join the European Union that they are prepared to protest in ways not seen before in the country. They run the risk of brutality from President Viktor Yanukovych’s security forces, for whom the concept of community policing remains alien and an anathema. Mass anti-government protests in Ukraine have brought large swathes of the country to a standstill, largely prompted by Moscow’s strong-arm and bully-boy tactics aimed at halting Kiev’s attempts to improve the country’s trading ties with the EU. This fervour stems from a particular theory of Ukrainian nationhood, where many of its electorate believe the country should be an equal partner in the European Union, rather than remaining little more than a Russian satellite.

International opinion has, at times, questioned the morality of Russian decisions, such as that in 2009 when Moscow turned off the gas supplies to Ukraine in the middle of winter to dissuade it from forging closer ties with Brussels. The arrogance of Russian ambitions towards Ukraine could hardly have been laid barer. Continued threats over the continuity and supply of gas, as Russia continues to apply its power over Ukraine, underlies more cynical Russian ambitions. Mr Putin’s plan is for Ukraine to join Belarus and Kazakhstan in a political trading bloc to be known as the Eurasian Union.

For many Ukrainians, though, that is not only a poor substitute for the EU, but also an uncomfortable reminder of Ukraine’s position as a member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Russia is seeking to capitalise on how Eurasian integration will likely generate increased interest from its other neighbours through the usual warm rhetoric of international diplomacy. But, in truth, the West would be right to assume a more menacing aspect to it. As Mr Putin is the dominant partner in this new Eurasian Union, it is worth examining and putting into perspective some of his recent comments and actions. For example, what of his attitude to the legitimate interests of other nations in the Arctic and his unnecessarily harsh treatment of those seeking to preserve the environment there? Russia is motivated by the rich new oil wells recently located in the Arctic and the huge benefits that exploration will bring to the Russian economy. Mr Putin’s rather indifferent attitude to human rights doesn’t bode well, either, for the Eurasian Union becoming a model template of tolerance and openness.

However, not all people in Ukraine are worried over Russia’s attempt to wrest control over its affairs. Many Ukrainians do support President Yanukovych’s decision to ditch his negotiations with the European Union and seem undisturbed about the record of human rights in their own country or in Russia.

The tragedy of Ukraine being forced to choose between traditions and that of regional power blocs is its nemesis. Geography dictates that fate, at least to some degree, is inevitable. Ethnic, economic and cultural ties do naturally tug in the opposite direction when a country is caught between two bigger powers. Yet, in all practicalities Ukraine should not have to make such a choice and would not need to if Russia would allow her to develop her links with Europe.

Conceivably, Ukraine could do that as well as being closely aligned to Russia. Ukraine should be allowed to maintain her trading and other relationships, but as part of a wider settlement between the EU on one hand and Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus on the other.

Mr Putin’s stance between his own nation and that of his close neighbours is generally perceived and accepted as a zero-sum game – the EU’s gain, for instance, must be Russia’s loss. But persisting with such a position will leave Ukraine at best in a state of uncertainty or limbo, and at worst a target for permanent bullying.

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DURING last week’s annual state of the nation address, Vladimir Putin emphasised his belief that Russia takes a morally superior world-view to the West. It is hard to credit Mr Putin with that surprising claim considering the level of violence taking place on a daily basis in countries such as Syria and Ukraine.

Moscow’s staunch and unrelenting support for the dictatorial regime of Bashar al-Assad has been a prime reason why diplomatic efforts to stem the bloodshed have been thwarted in a raging civil war that has now claimed the lives of more than 100,000 people and displaced millions more.

Mr Putin claims that there is a clear moral compass behind his government’s domestic policies. But where is the evidence? Modern day Russia is a country where political opponents are killed or dispatched to Siberian labour camps, where gangsterism is rife, and where free speech is actively discouraged. Widespread and endemic corruption has persuaded Russian businessmen to flee the country in their droves to escape the constant threat of state-sponsored violence and extortion.

Mr Putin’s personal ambition of reviving Russia’s fortunes as a world power is a self-evident prophecy. He may well believe that, by resisting the tide of what he refers to as the West’s ‘non-traditional values’, his aspirations will be realised. In truth, so long as the Russian President remains intent on crushing political dissent at home and intimidating his enemies abroad, no one is going to be endeared to his sense of moral teaching.

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