Tag Archives: Intelligence and Security Committee

Britain, Government, Intelligence, National Security

A grave betrayal by British intelligence

TORTURE AND RENDITION

IT HAS taken almost 15-years to produce an official government report into British involvement in the torture and kidnap of terror suspects.

This is far too long and is disgracefully and shamefully overdue.

It shows that British involvement in George W. Bush’s illegal and barbarous programme of kidnap for torture was far deeper and more extensive than we have previously been told.

The figures within the report are stupefying: 13 incidents where British intelligence officers witnessed the mistreatment of suspects; 25 incidents where our intelligence personnel were told by the detainees they were being mistreated; and, a further 128 incidents where intelligence officers were informed by foreign liaison services about instances of mistreatment.

Thanks to the report delivered by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), we at last learn for certain that there was direct ministerial involvement. It contains the revelation that the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, authorised, at least once, the payment of “a large share” of the costs for an aircraft that was used for rendition purposes.

Quite simply, that is reprehensible.

The report doesn’t disclose the identities of the victims of that particular operation. It does, however, reveal they were taken to a location with a “real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

Mr Straw signed off this payment in September 2004, and yet just over a year later he made a remarkable statement in the House of Commons which bears repeating in full: “Unless we all start to believe in conspiracy theories and that officials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this is some kind of secret state which is in league with some dark forces, and let me also say, we believe that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is lying, there simply is no truth in the claims that the United Kingdom has been involved in rendition.”

 

MR Straw’s conspiracy theory, we now know, was true. This report lays that bare. Yet Mr Straw continues to maintain he didn’t know what was going on, insisting that he learned the truth of what had been happening for the first time from the ISC investigation.

This isn’t remotely good enough. The former Foreign Secretary was responsible for the British overseas intelligence service (MI6) at a time when something was dreadfully wrong.

Many will now believe that his emphatic statement in the Commons when answering questions about extraordinary rendition 13 years ago is remotely compatible with his protestations of ignorance today. Mr Straw’s conduct was deplorable.

So, too, was that of Sir Richard Dearlove, who was head of MI6 at the time when the US embarked, with British collusion, on its programme of extraordinary rendition and torture after the attack on the Twin Towers on 9/11.

The ISC report highlights the fact that British intelligence knew very early on that the US had changed its policy on torture to be far more aggressive, and yet they did not react, or even apparently deign to tell ministers.

In fairness, it was a very difficult time. There were fears of a follow-up attack and intelligence officers felt a patriotic duty to protect their fellow citizens. Some argued that the use of torture was justified by the extreme urgency of the international crisis which followed 9/11. It is worth reminding readers that in the late summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the government of the day sent an instruction around Whitehall saying that under no circumstances should British officials make use of intelligence obtained under torture.

Something changed after 9/11, and not for the better.

It is essential to bear in mind that one of the most important pieces of information leading to the decision to go to war with Saddam Hussein in 2003 was obtained through the torture of Libyan terror suspect Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi.

He told his interrogators that Saddam had close links with al-Qaeda. This information was widely used to justify the invasion of Iraq by President Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and others.

It was also completely untrue. Shaykh al-Libi disclosed later that he had fabricated these claims in order to mitigate his suffering.

This is one example where the use of torture proved utterly counter-productive. There are many other cases we know where it was simply worthless. Some victims pulled off the street were innocent of any terror involvement. For years, British intelligence and politicians lied about all of this.

It is important to remember that the first ISC inquiry into extraordinary rendition, which was carried out as long ago as 2007, concluded that nothing had been amiss.

MI6 withheld vital documents from the inquiry, causing the committee to reach a false conclusion and verdict.

 

SIR John Scarlett, successor to Sir Richard at MI6, was head of the agency at the time. This is the same John Scarlett who, as the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) at the start of the century, oversaw the deeply misleading dodgy dossier on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In effect, that was a propaganda weapon to sell the calamitous Iraq invasion to the British people.

It was once said that the health of a nation can be measured by the health of its intelligence services. If so, then something went very badly wrong with British intelligence, and Britain itself, at the start of the century.

Tony Blair, the Prime Minister at the time, must bear the heaviest responsibility, even though the ISC has produced no smoking gun linking him to torture. But Sir Richard and Sir John bear much of the blame.

Many unanswered questions remain, partly because Theresa May refused permission for key officials to be interviewed by the inquiry.

Pertinently, how much did Jack Straw really know? Why did intelligence chiefs not tell ministers the truth? What we do know for sure is that the intelligence services betrayed the values that Britain stand for.

So far, there has been barely a squeak of contrition from anyone involved. That isn’t good enough, because torture, and collusion with torture, are not just a betrayal of British values. They are against the law.

Action should follow. Dearlove and Scarlett should be stripped of their knighthoods. They have brought shame and disgrace not just on MI6 but also on Britain.

In less tolerant countries than ours, intelligence chiefs who have made much less serious errors get shot at dawn. As for Straw, he should be stripped of his Privy Councillorship.

And the question of prosecution must be reopened.

For our intelligence services to be effective, they need to have the trust of the British people, something they enjoyed for many years.

The ISC investigation suggests they are worthy only of contempt after their cynical betrayal of all that we stand for as a proud, civilised and humane nation. The torture revelations and the extent of the collusion is a disaster for British intelligence, and a disaster for Britain.

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Government, Intelligence, National Security, Society, Technology

Britain’s security and intelligence services: Responsibility not just power

SECURITY SERVICES

Intro: Given the extent of their reach and a recent parliamentary report into their activities an operational realignment is called for

Our security and intelligence agencies face greater challenges today than ever before. Advanced and sophisticated technology has become commonplace, and the world strains to keep up or nearly buckles under the weight of our digital communications. Monitoring the activities of terrorists, criminals and other malign forces have become difficult to spot because of the subversive methods they use in defying detection.

Bodies such as GCHQ, though, are hardly mere victims of the electronic advance. You may often hear security chiefs talking about their desperate searches for needles in haystacks, but the fact is they have an impressive operational capacity to cut through a lot of the chaff in order to find what they seek.

The Security and Intelligence Services (SIS) ability to obtain and examine vast swathes of raw data and processed information has been furiously debated ever since the revelations of Edward Snowden, the US fugitive, about how the British agency received data relating to UK citizens from America’s National Security Agency up to 2014 – a practice which was branded unlawful by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Notwithstanding, there will always be a divergence of views between those who place primacy on GCHQ doing anything in its power to maintain public safety, and those who feel unease at the prospect of innocent people being subjected to continued intrusion.

Earlier this month a report on these matters by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee was a notable intervention. The committee members, like many of their peers across other government departments, believe that the bulk collection of data by GCHQ is legitimate and does not amount to unjustified, Orwellian surveillance. But they do appear to accept that the current legislation, which sets the parameters for such activities, is overly complex and lacks transparency. The legislation may have political oversight in regulating the activities of SIS, but its lack of public transparency and accountability was summed up well by the committee’s description of the existing legal framework. Intelligence agencies, they said, were being provided with a ‘blank cheque to carry out whatever activities they deem necessary’. In essence that is a damning indictment on the legislation that governs the work of our intelligence agencies. The committee has called for a new, single piece of legislation to replace and clarify current statutes as a matter of priority by the next government.

The discovery that a handful of intelligence officers have misused surveillance powers and have subsequently been disciplined by their superiors should also be of concern. The committee may speak reassuringly about the number of wrongdoers being in ‘very small single figures’ but the disclosure will hardly boost public confidence in the integrity of Britain’s security personnel. The recommendations of the committee are right, therefore, to suggest that the next government should consider criminalising such improper use of surveillance techniques.

Despite these positive proposals, there is nevertheless something troublingly simplistic about the committee’s top-line conclusion about GCHQ’s bulk interception capability. It says soothingly: ‘GCHQ are not reading the emails of everyone in the UK’. Whilst it is true that thousands of emails are read by security analysts every day, and that there remains a feeling that individual privacy of citizens comes a poor second to other considerations, few would have suggested otherwise against GCHQ’s simple assertion. That may be comforting for some, but surveillance does have the ability to antagonise as well as protect.

At a time when threats to this country are at a pitch not previously seen Britain’s security and intelligence agencies have a difficult job in tracking and monitoring those who wish to do us harm. But it must not be forgotten that the powers invested at their disposal are immense and more than proportionate for which they are needed. Simply asking that they be used responsibly is surely reason enough to help appease those who clamber to an argument of unnecessary state intrusion into many innocent people’s lives. Such a request stems from a belief that the glue which binds British society is primarily the combined force of its liberal values, not one that erodes it through a heavy-booted security capability.

 

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Britain, Government, Intelligence, National Security, Society, Technology, United States

The appearance of the heads of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Services before Parliament…

A WELCOME STEP

Yesterday, the heads of the three intelligence services in Britain – MI5, MI6 and GCHQ – gave evidence in public for the first time before Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).

Underlying the examination was one of the oldest questions about the nature of state-sponsored surveillance: who monitors and regulates the watchers? An analysis of what was said should glean that we did not learn a great deal that we did not already know. The transparency element, for example, went only so far. They appeared suitably nondescript, too, with faces you would quickly forget in a crowd, a prerequisite for any spymaster.

MI6 chief Sir John Sawers, GCHQ chief Sir Iain Lobban and Andrew Parker, who handles intelligence agents in the UK, deserve some credit for showing up, given their keen professional aversion to public exposure in a political theatre. This should be seen as a welcome step in the right direction if the work of the agencies is to be more open and less susceptible to caricature by conspiracy theorists.

Three developments compelled yesterday’s momentous public appearance. The first is the leaks by the former US national security contractor Edward Snowden which revealed extensive spying by GCHQ and the US National Security Agency. The scope and extent of this surveillance, its modus operandi and authorisation frameworks are matters of high public interest and concern given our historic traditions of personal privacy and public angst over the monitoring activities of government into citizens’ lives.

The second is the revolution wrought by communications technology with subsequent and resultant concerns over data protection. And the third is the sizeable increase to the budget of the security services to combat ‘terrorist’ threats. Balancing the duty to protect the public from dangerous and highly-organised would-be killers with how that objective is achieved by SIS (Security & Intelligence Services) is bound to create conflicts.

For spymasters, whose stock in trade is secrecy, it is perhaps too much for others to expect answers to be given in public about what they do. Such shortcomings soon became apparent during exchanges about the impact of the leaks perpetrated by Mr Snowden. Sir Iain Lobban denounced the way the disclosure of thousands of covert documents had hampered his agency’s efforts to thwart the nation’s enemies. Sir Iain claimed it had put the security effort back many years. In a similar vein, Sir John Sawers insisted our adversaries were ‘rubbing their hands with glee’ as a result. When asked, though, for specific details they retreated behind a cloak of secrecy, saying that to divulge such information would compound the damage.

Because of the synthetic nature of the exercise, the imperfections exposed matters that could not be revealed and which the public would not expect to be told. It is from this point, then, where we have to rely on systems of parliamentary oversight and surveillance protocols to work effectively.

It is indicative that the parliamentary committee for security and intelligence hold the chiefs accountable in private for the allegations they have made and to establish whether their concerns are substantively genuine. The ISC should then report its findings to the public.

The issue of mass surveillance was also raised at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep an appropriate balance between intrusion and security because communications technology is developing so rapidly. On being asked how legislation setting out their powers can possibly be relevant today when it was last updated 13 years ago, Mr Parker of MI5 said the law was a matter for parliament, not the intelligence chiefs. They also punctured the notion that simply because something is secret does not mean it is also sinister.

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