Tag Archives: Iran

Foreign Affairs, Government, Iran, Lebanon, Middle East, Syria, United States

The conflict in Syria spills over into Beirut…

Intro: The urgency of getting all sides to the conflict around the negotiating table

The double bomb attack on the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon’s capital city of Beirut marks a horrifying and sinister escalation of the Syrian conflict. Not since 1999 has a suicide bomber struck a non-military target in Lebanon. This is also the first time that the Iranian Embassy has been attacked, although Shia civilians in southern Beirut have been regularly targeted. The Al-Qaeda affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades claim to be behind the atrocity and, if true, the explosions bring an apocalypse in the region that much closer – that fearful day when Lebanon is fully swallowed up in the Syrian civil war.

Since the first uprisings against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in the spring of 2011, many tens of thousands of people have died. But the war itself, and the subsequent refugee crisis it has caused, with millions of people displaced, reaps less attention from the outside world as time goes on.

Diplomatically, many will be expressing a sigh of relief that the West decided against taking military action over Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Evidently, the risk of how the West almost became embroiled in yet another Middle Eastern quandary is clearer to see now and was simply too high. Today, the United States is involved in delicate political and diplomatic negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programmes which may even produce a preliminary deal as early as this week. While much emphasis is being placed on a deal, not even this should distract global attention from the urgency of stopping the Syrian war.

The timing of the attack may be related to the fact that Assad’s forces are gaining ground, with the capture in recent days of a strategic village and the fall of a key rebel commander. The Beirut bombs are a clear and stark reminder that the Sunni rebellion can still strike back with relative impunity. That aside, and with the US so heavily involved diplomatically elsewhere, the risk now is that Assad and his supporters will believe they can win the war by military means. That, though, is not a view that can be allowed to prevail. Assad and his regime has committed too many crimes for the world to sit back and allow the violent anarchy to continue, mayhem which is steadily erupting inside Lebanon and Turkey as time goes on.

The urgency of getting all sides to the conflict around the negotiating table to thrash out a peace deal must now be a priority in light of the Beirut bombs.

Standard
European Union, Government, Iran, Middle East, Politics, Society, United Nations, United States

Negotiations between Iran and the West on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions…

A NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Expectations of an agreement over the Iranian nuclear programme have been high ever since the recent trip to Washington by Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, who declared to the United Nations he wanted better relations with the West. It is little surprise, however, that such a realisation has not been met. The immense difficulties facing the negotiations in Geneva in the last few days faded into the background amid speculation of a ‘historic deal’ and an imminent end to decades of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding. The Geneva talks concluded last weekend without any deal in sight, with many analysts branding the discussions a failure.

Related:

There is still some cause for optimism. Since Mr Rouhani took over the Iranian presidency from the bellicose and belligerent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June, the rhetoric emanating from Tehran has been markedly softened in tone and style. With international sanctions – both EU and US – biting hard on ordinary Iranians, domestic pressure for a deal on its nuclear programme with the West cannot be ignored. Particularly so given that inflation is running at 40 per cent, and that Iran’s economy has shrunk by more than 5 per cent since the imposition of sanctions took effect. The number of families below the poverty line has doubled to four in ten, exasperated by several currency devaluations that have had an adverse effect on the net worth of many Iranian families. Assets have depreciated and net incomes have been seriously eroded. Focusing minds, too, is the threat of Israeli air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, not to mention the Islamic Republic’s pivotal position in a volatile and unstable region, including that of Syria.

The difficulties for the West in reaching a mutual agreement with Tehran still rest upon two primary sticking points. One is the question about the future of the heavy-water reactor being built at Arak. The other is what to do with Iran’s existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and centrifuges. Tehran appears determined to retain its ‘rights to enrichment’ (enriched uranium is required and allowed for its medical programmes), though the international community, not unreasonably, remains sceptical. Enriching uranium to weapons grade material that would fit into the head of a ballistic missile is easily enough done.

Yet, we are far from stalemate. Just as those predicting immediate success were unduly hasty, so are those now rendering and calling for defeat. John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, spent eight hours at the negotiating table, the longest such high-level talks between the US and Iran since 1979 – no small achievement in itself. Mr Kerry’s assertion that ‘we are closer now than when we came’ cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. With negotiations to restart in a week’s time – albeit between diplomats rather than foreign ministers – the process is far from over.

Coupled into the equation is the danger of the moment. Barack Obama’s critics in Congress, largely fuelled by Israeli’s inflammatory opposition to a deal, are already pushing for more sanctions. In Iran, the frustration of public demands for immediate relief could well erode support for further discussions that many Iranians feel infringe on national sovereignty. Apparent divisions in the international community, exemplified by France’s outspoken warnings about a ‘fool’s game’ before the Geneva talks were concluded, will not help either.

Perseverance in seeking a deal along current lines remains key as no other constructive alternative exists, but in reaching an agreement concessions will be required from both sides. The notion that the Islamic Republic continues with some degree of uranium enrichment may not be palatable and will be contested by those who remain deeply sceptical of Iran’s objectives. However, it is allowed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and – in return for close controls and even closer oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – it is a better and plausible option than either accepting an Iran with nuclear weapons or by attempting to bomb them out of existence.

A deal with Iran may have a high price, but the value will be enormous. This will not only patch up one of the world’s most dangerous and intractable disputes but, an accord between Iran and the West could also help to resolve any number of issues bedevilling the Middle East, not least the internecine civil war and bloody conflict in Syria.

Standard
Iran, Syria, United States

Will Iran’s new president alter its policy on Syria?

Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, is faced with a plethora of national and international challenges.

Rouhani’s presidential term starts at a particularly challenging time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing an unprecedented level of regional and international isolation, largely due to the US/EU sanctions because of Iranian aspirations in building a nuclear bomb.

One of the most crucial foreign policy objectives in Rouhani’s agenda will be the Syrian conflict, which has now entered its third year.

Iran’s election result raises vital questions as to whether its foreign policy towards the Assad regime will be altered or whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance will evolve into a new phase. The presidency of the centrist Rouhani could change the diplomatic ties with Damascus, with a change possible in Iran’s support for Assad. Tehran has provided the Syrian state with political, military, intelligence and advisory support to its army and security services. That support has, until now, been unconditional.

While there are high expectations among Western political leaders that the election of the centrist Rouhani might influence a change in Iran’s support of Assad, that enthusiasm must be balanced against a number of factors including the realism of Iran’s centrist ideology, the power of the presidential office, Iran’s political structure, and Tehran’s foreign policy objectives.

The political spectrum of the centrists in Iran analyses Syria more from a religious and geopolitical angle and how the realms of the balance-of-power lies. It is least interested in any deterioration in human rights.

Although Rouhani argues for constructive interactions with other countries, and supports applying a softer political tone – as opposed to the combative, controversial and provocative language used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Rouhani has not yet called for an overall sweeping shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Rouhani has neither asked Assad to step down from power nor pressed to halt the intelligence, financial and advisory support to Damascus.

However, withdrawing support to Damascus could be perceived by some centrists as an attempt to undermine Tehran’s geopolitical leverage and balance of power in the region, which ultimately could endanger their own influence and power. This is particularly significant to those Iranian leaders who argue that they are surrounded by what they perceive as ‘existential and strategic enemies’. Military bases of the United States, for instance, are located throughout Iran’s borders and in the Gulf Arab states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The role of the Supreme Leader, too, plays a significant part in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. It may then be unrealistic to argue that Rouhani would be in a position to immediately alter Iran’s current political status quo towards the Assad regime. Iran’s policy towards Damascus is closely guarded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the high generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Etela’at – Iran’s intelligence service. Rouhani will, though, have the ability to set the tone in regional and international circles for the Supreme Leader.

Ali Khamenei has been very clear about his political stance on Syria, stating that Assad’s regime is targeted by Israeli and US-backed groups, foreign conspirators and terrorists.

The religious and pious angle is hugely important. One of the major pillars of Iran’s foreign policy has been that it has proclaimed itself as the safe-guardian of Islamic values, particularly Shi’ite. The Alawite sect-based state of Syria serves as a crucial instrument for advancing, empowering, and achieving this foreign policy objective. Many analysts will be of the view that Rouhani is unlikely to push for regime change in Syria, or by asking Assad to step aside as many Western and Arab Gulf states have done. The domino effect of halting any advisory assistance, be it political, military, or intelligence, to Assad’s ruling Alawite and socialist Bath party, would likely weaken Iran’s own regional influence and foreign policy leverage.

If the Alawites lose power, the next government in Syria is likely to be constituted from the current opposition groups: the Sunni majority in Syria comprises around 74% of the population. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Islamic Sunni parties were the ones who won the elections, in Damascus, the Sunni groups are more likely to win most of the parliamentary seats in any new government after Assad. When this happens this will be regarded as a considerable shift in regional and international power against Iran and in favour of the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Meantime, it seems likely that Iran will continue implementing its current strategies towards Syria to preserve Iran’s regional influence, its political and economic national interests, and the survival of the ruling clerics.

Standard