China, Government, North Korea, United Nations, United States

The West’s options in dealing with North Korea

NORTH KOREA

Intro: President Donald Trump says, “all options are on the table”. But which would neutralise Kim without risking a world war?

NORTH KOREA, a small, poor but reckless and belligerent nuclear-tipped country is testing not only the resolve of President Trump and the United States, but the UN Security Council, which has continued to meet in emergency session.

It is one thing for global leaders to say, “all options are on the table”, quite another to choose a line of action that stops North Korea without setting off a nuclear war in East Asia – and, quite probably, World War III.

But at some point, President Trump – and his four generals in his top team – must act to teach North Korea and any other rogue regime with nuclear capabilities or aspirations not to push it too far.

The Kim dynasty has invested everything it has to obtain nuclear weapons to safeguard its regime.

Some in Washington have begun to think the unthinkable. For the moment, however, other options that stop short of triggering Armageddon are more likely. This article looks at what those options are:

. Diplomacy

For some analysts, Kim Jong-un’s provocative actions are what a psychiatrist might call a ‘cry for recognition’. He is a small boy behaving very badly so that the biggest boy on the block, the U.S., will take him seriously.

Treat North Korea as an equal not a rogue, say these analysts.

The problem is that both Kim’s grandfather (Kim Il-sung, who led the invasion of South Korea that started the Korean War of 1950-1953) and father (Kim Jong-il who turned North Korea into a nuclear power) charmed delegations from Washington into reporting back on their plans for reform, when what they were actually doing was relentlessly pursuing their nuclear agenda.

Appeasement has a poor track record in Pyongyang.

In any case, the Trump administration would demand a verifiable halt to further missile development – and Kim won’t willingly give up his only card.

. Sanctions

If Kim can’t be sweet-talked into seeing sense, then even tougher economic sanctions would force him to choose between North Korea’s economic viability and its nuclear prowess. The UN Security Council, which includes China and Russia, has backed sanctions repeatedly since Pyongyang started its nuclear and missile tests a decade ago.

Last month, the UN beefed up existing sanctions with an international ban on key exports from North Korea amounting to $1billion. China and Russia are North Korea’s lifeline to the outside world and could strangle the regime if they acted in tandem to cut all trade and transport links.

However, with more than 90 per cent of North Korea’s trade going through China, the Chinese would take a hit financially, while a chaotic economic collapse in North Korea could see millions of refugees heading for the Chinese border.

A desperate Kim might even, in a last act of defiance, turn his fire on Beijing and Moscow itself.

Even if prepared for that outcome, Presidents Xi and Putin would demand a high price from Trump for that kind of high-risk help. And, the U.S. has recently imposed mandatory sanctions of its own on Russia. Would Congress swallow its pride and repeal them to get Putin on board?

In reality, sanctions are slow to deliver. Decades of sanctions were needed to prod Iran into doing a deal, which Trump and Israel still don’t trust. Would a North Korean deal be any more believable?

. A Limited Strike

A10

A-10 warplanes lined up for takeoff from the United States Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. The U.S. has been conducting joint exercises with Seoul in the Korean Peninsula.

The U.S. has a range of airbases in South Korea, Japan and on the Pacific island of Guam from which to strike, with B1 bombers, cruise missiles, bunker-busting bombs, plus its fleet of nuclear aircraft carriers (each with more attack planes than the entire RAF).

While this firepower would, ultimately, destroy much of North Korea’s military nuclear infrastructure and 10,000 artillery sites, the country is more prepared than ever against an air attack.

It has mobile launchers to move and hide missiles, while the newer North Korean missiles are solid-fuelled (not liquid-fuelled) so can be launched much more quickly in retaliatory strikes at Seoul, the capital of U.S. ally South Korea, where 10 million people live.

There is no safe or full proven way to neutralise Kim Jong-un’s nuclear warheads by a massive airstrike. Simultaneous special forces’ attacks would be required – and all-out war might well result.

. Full Invasion

Despite being far better equipped than North Korea, the U.S. would require the bulk of its military manpower to be deployed to Korea to ensure a rapid and decisive win, leaving it exposed elsewhere in the world.

War in Korea would tie down the U.S. army and marines – unless South Korea’s 650,000 troops also took part. But South Korea is reluctant to engage in a pre-emptive war that would threaten Seoul with instant destruction.

China is a factor, too. It is vehemently hostile to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system that was recently deployed in South Korea.

Beijing’s fear is that the real target of any American military action in the region is ultimately China. For the U.S. to act without being sure of Chinese neutrality runs the risk of a wider and far more perilous conflict.

Even if China was ready to accept the fall of the Pyongyang regime, a conventional invasion would not be swift enough to stop Kim Jong-un’s regime launching some kind of nuclear strike, as well as firing off his stockpile of chemical and biological weapons.

According to U.S. intelligence, North Korea has between 20 and as many as 60 nuclear bombs. If only a couple were successfully launched at South Korean cities, the scale of the casualties would be horrendous.

. Assassination

Taking out Kim Jong-un and his commanders in a so-called decapitation strike is arguably the cheapest and least devastating option in terms of military and civilian casualties.

Unfortunately, a successful assassination wouldn’t stop a barrage of artillery and rockets being fired in instant retaliation against South Korea and Japan.

It might also require a U.S.-South Korean occupation of North Korea that would be faced with guerrilla resistance deploying Kim’s stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. Nor would China – faced with the prospect of millions of refugees heading to its territory – be pleased by a speedy collapse of Kim’s regime.

And if it failed, Kim’s revenge would be indiscriminate attacks aimed at South Korea, Japan and any U.S. bases within range. In reality, a decapitation strike would probably mean all-out war.

. A U.S. Nuclear Strike

The ‘first strike’ option is the “unthinkable” that some in Washington are now considering, using America’s massive nuclear superiority to “eliminate” North Korea.

North Korea Test Sites

Map indicating recent test sites from within North Korea.

But such an attack would kill millions of North Koreans, alarm America’s European allies, and trigger massively increased defence spending by nuclear superpowers China and Russia.

. Pressure on China

China’s rivalry with the U.S. has been a key determining factor in its relationship with North Korea in recent years.

North Korea has served a useful purpose because its nuclear antics required Washington to go cap in hand to Beijing in the hope it would restrain its protégé and stop the region exploding into war.

And China has done well out of its dealings with North Korea. In return for hard currency – which it uses to buy components and expertise for its nuclear programme – North Korea provides cheap labour and raw materials to Chinese businesses.

China, however, has been finding increasingly that the Kim dynasty is not a cosy client. The grisly slaughter of Kim Jong-un’s uncle – reportedly fed to dogs – who had been the regime’s pointman with Beijing back in 2013, was a warning that there were limits to what China could make Kim do.

Without the Chinese support, Kim Jong-un’s militarised economy would suffocate quickly, so why doesn’t China do more than cut oil supplies and stop buying Kim’s coal?

The truth is that Beijing is wary. Kim’s nuclear deterrent can be pointed at China, too; while a regime collapse would mean a flood of refugees into Chinese territory.

Worse still, an American invasion of North Korea might advance to the Yalu River border with China, as it did briefly in 1950. Such a humiliation could turn Chinese nationalist sentiment against their Communist rulers.

Nor does China want U.S. bases in North Korea. It wants a neutral Korean peninsula and for the U.S. to back off from challenging Beijing’s claims to big swathes of the South China Sea.

Only if Washington can offer China a cast-iron deal would Beijing risk pulling the plug on Pyongyang. But can Washington swallow such concessions?

Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, has hinted he could live with some concessions. But can he persuade Trump? Kim is betting there will be no deal with China.

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