Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Military, National Security, Syria, United States

Arming the Syrian rebels is looking less likely…

SYRIAN REBELS

Downing Street has ditched plans to arm the Syrian rebels after the Prime Minister has been warned that there is little point sending weapons unless he is prepared for all-out war with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, along with other commanders believe that sending small arms or ground-to-air missiles will hardly be worth it, since it would it would make little difference to the outcome of the conflict. Military chiefs have also said that even options like a no-fly zone (NFZ) would require air attacks on Syrian defences that would last weeks or even months.

The assassination last week of Kamal Hamami, a top commander of the Syrian Free Army, by a hardline group linked to Al-Qaeda, has compounded anxieties over plans by Britain and other Western countries to give military help to rebels fighting the Assad regime. Those fears are aggravated by the possibility that weapons and expertise provided to the rebels could be turned against the UK and her allies by radical Islamists. There are also growing rivalries between the Syrian Free Army and Islamists, who have sometimes joined forces on the battlefield.

But senior ministers and Whitehall officials have revealed that the Coalition is drawing up plans to help train and advise ‘moderate’ elements of the opposition forces who continue to battle with Assad’s forces.

The British Prime Minister has been keen to act on Syria and demanded last month an end to the EU arms embargo on the country to give him options. The EU reluctantly relented, but sending weapons to the beleaguered rebels in Syria remains an option open to the prime minister if parliament was to approve, though that does seem a remote possibility at the present moment given the lack of support among Tory whips.

Following a meeting of the National Security Council, in which British military commanders were asked to present options on the conflict, the Government was told that although it might make them feel better (by sending weapons) it was hardly worth it in terms of altering the balance of forces on the ground. Whilst Syria is known to have good air defences, military chiefs have also said that engaging Syria militarily would mean weeks of bombing and air strikes. A decision to engage is one that couldn’t be undertaken half-heartedly.

But given the lack of organisation within the rebel movement, training and advising the rebels remain district possibilities for Britain. The UK is concentrating on areas where it feels it has the expertise to contribute. The supply of weapons into Syria is continuing to be made by Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

It is understood that military advisers could be stationed in Jordon to advise Syria rebel leaders on strategy and tactics. UK chiefs are wary of being accused of having British boots on the ground in Syria or by making any ground incursion into the country.

Ministers believe it could take 18 months of further conflict before Assad is forced to the negotiating table. The civil war has already claimed more than 100,000 lives with millions more displaced on the borders with neighbouring countries.

There is also frustration about the approach taken by US Secretary of State John Kerry in pushing regime figures to the negotiating table. There is little idea of the solution Mr Kerry is seeking. Knowing where you are trying to get to in order to get there should surely be central in any negotiations over Syria, but this underpinning remains distinctly absent even after almost three years of intense fighting.

Standard
Iran, Syria, United States

Will Iran’s new president alter its policy on Syria?

Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, is faced with a plethora of national and international challenges.

Rouhani’s presidential term starts at a particularly challenging time. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing an unprecedented level of regional and international isolation, largely due to the US/EU sanctions because of Iranian aspirations in building a nuclear bomb.

One of the most crucial foreign policy objectives in Rouhani’s agenda will be the Syrian conflict, which has now entered its third year.

Iran’s election result raises vital questions as to whether its foreign policy towards the Assad regime will be altered or whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance will evolve into a new phase. The presidency of the centrist Rouhani could change the diplomatic ties with Damascus, with a change possible in Iran’s support for Assad. Tehran has provided the Syrian state with political, military, intelligence and advisory support to its army and security services. That support has, until now, been unconditional.

While there are high expectations among Western political leaders that the election of the centrist Rouhani might influence a change in Iran’s support of Assad, that enthusiasm must be balanced against a number of factors including the realism of Iran’s centrist ideology, the power of the presidential office, Iran’s political structure, and Tehran’s foreign policy objectives.

The political spectrum of the centrists in Iran analyses Syria more from a religious and geopolitical angle and how the realms of the balance-of-power lies. It is least interested in any deterioration in human rights.

Although Rouhani argues for constructive interactions with other countries, and supports applying a softer political tone – as opposed to the combative, controversial and provocative language used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – Rouhani has not yet called for an overall sweeping shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Rouhani has neither asked Assad to step down from power nor pressed to halt the intelligence, financial and advisory support to Damascus.

However, withdrawing support to Damascus could be perceived by some centrists as an attempt to undermine Tehran’s geopolitical leverage and balance of power in the region, which ultimately could endanger their own influence and power. This is particularly significant to those Iranian leaders who argue that they are surrounded by what they perceive as ‘existential and strategic enemies’. Military bases of the United States, for instance, are located throughout Iran’s borders and in the Gulf Arab states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The role of the Supreme Leader, too, plays a significant part in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. It may then be unrealistic to argue that Rouhani would be in a position to immediately alter Iran’s current political status quo towards the Assad regime. Iran’s policy towards Damascus is closely guarded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the high generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Etela’at – Iran’s intelligence service. Rouhani will, though, have the ability to set the tone in regional and international circles for the Supreme Leader.

Ali Khamenei has been very clear about his political stance on Syria, stating that Assad’s regime is targeted by Israeli and US-backed groups, foreign conspirators and terrorists.

The religious and pious angle is hugely important. One of the major pillars of Iran’s foreign policy has been that it has proclaimed itself as the safe-guardian of Islamic values, particularly Shi’ite. The Alawite sect-based state of Syria serves as a crucial instrument for advancing, empowering, and achieving this foreign policy objective. Many analysts will be of the view that Rouhani is unlikely to push for regime change in Syria, or by asking Assad to step aside as many Western and Arab Gulf states have done. The domino effect of halting any advisory assistance, be it political, military, or intelligence, to Assad’s ruling Alawite and socialist Bath party, would likely weaken Iran’s own regional influence and foreign policy leverage.

If the Alawites lose power, the next government in Syria is likely to be constituted from the current opposition groups: the Sunni majority in Syria comprises around 74% of the population. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where the Islamic Sunni parties were the ones who won the elections, in Damascus, the Sunni groups are more likely to win most of the parliamentary seats in any new government after Assad. When this happens this will be regarded as a considerable shift in regional and international power against Iran and in favour of the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Meantime, it seems likely that Iran will continue implementing its current strategies towards Syria to preserve Iran’s regional influence, its political and economic national interests, and the survival of the ruling clerics.

Standard
Britain, Syria, United States

Decision time over Syria. Avoid making historic mistake…

As world leaders gather for the G8 conference in Northern Ireland, one issue seems certain to dominate all others: the Syrian civil war.

On Friday, President Obama triggered an escalation in this already terrifying crisis by announcing the US will shortly send weapons to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition.

William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, then rushed out a statement of support, saying ‘we have to be prepared to do more to save lives’ and put pressure on the Russian-backed Assad regime to negotiate.

Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, has been visiting Britain today, and, officially, Downing Street insists no decision has been taken for Britain to deliver arms to the rebels. Worryingly, though, there is every indication that, where the US leads, Britain will wish to follow.

Of course, it’s not difficult to sympathise with politicians wanting to find a solution to a humanitarian disaster which has already claimed more than 90,000 lives. Millions more have been displaced.

But, as Conservative MP John Baron has said: ‘Arming the rebels and escalating the violence could be a mistake of historic proportions.’

In Syria, the ineluctable truth is we simply do not know who the enemy are. There is absolutely no way of preventing the supply of weapons falling into the hands of the extremists who are bolstering the ranks of the opposition forces – including Al-Qaeda.

Nor, even more frighteningly, can Downing Street predict the extent to which ramping up the violence in Syria will further destabilise a wider region which – with tensions simmering in Lebanon, Turkey and Israel – already resembles a fraught tinderbox.

We should not forget how Tony Blair’s egomania (and the subsequent suspension of the democratic process) enabled the former British prime minister to plunge Britain into its worst foreign debacle since Suez.

David Cameron has promised Parliament a say before Britain is dragged any further into Syria. He must honour his word on this. Making a historic mistake with Syria would prove disastrous.

Standard