Tag Archives: Vladimir Putin

Defence, National Security, Nuclear Weapons

Fears of a more dangerous Cold War

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Intro: As weapons limits expire, the scene is set for a new nuclear arms race between the US and Beijing

Around midday on October 30, 1961, a Soviet plane flying above the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya dropped the most powerful nuclear bomb ever created.

The USSR’s “emperor bomb” was 3,000-times more powerful than the US atomic attack that killed 140,000 people in Hiroshima two decades earlier. On explosion, it unleashed a six-mile-wide fireball and a mushroom cloud that loomed more than 40 miles into the sky. And the Soviets were testing it at only half of its designed capacity.

Since then, decades of negotiations and arms-control treaties have massively reduced American and Russian warhead arsenals, with neither side testing a nuclear bomb in more than three decades.

But the last of these bilateral agreements has expired – and, with it, hopes that the nuclear arms race had been consigned to the history books.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which capped the number of deployed nuclear warheads held by the US and Russia, has now come to an end.

It is the first time since the 1970s that the two powers have had no agreement in place without at least negotiations for a new treaty under way.

At a time of huge geopolitical upheaval, analysts and diplomats are concerned that the stage is set for a new nuclear arms race – one that could prove even more dangerous than the world has seen before.

This is because the competition will not just be confined to Russia and the US.

China has also been developing nuclear weapons at a startling trajectory. It has more than doubled its stockpile of warheads over the last six years.

A three-way race will be hugely destabilising for the world order. If America tries to build an arsenal large enough to deter its twin foes at once, it will spur an even more dramatic increase in their respective stockpiles.

The director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), says that although this is the end of an era, it is not the end of arms control “but it is definitely the end of arms control as we know it.”

Smaller nuclear powers such as Britain and France will also face pressure to bulk up, particularly at a time when US security guarantees feel less reliable. And there will likely be a proliferation of new nuclear states.

Donald Trump has insisted for decades that he wants denuclearisation. But he seems to have no strategy in delivering this. His plans to build a new missile defence system – which he refers to as the “Golden Dome” – are only fanning the flames.

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Britain, Europe, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Europe must awaken or face great insecurity in 2026

EUROPE

THE great Victorian jurist, Sir Henry Maine, wrote: “War appears to be as old as mankind… but peace is a modern invention”. Events in the early part of 2026 will doubtless prove his wisdom by showing the awful fragility of that particular invention.

Even if they had never heard of Maine, the most complacent Europeans should have learnt from Vladimir Putin’s relentless onslaught against Ukraine that peace is neither a natural state nor the default setting of advanced countries, but rather a historical aberration that can only be preserved through strength and vigilance.

Yet, in 2025, we discovered how Europe remains divided between nations that grasp this lesson – or never forgot it – and those that cling with obstinance to old delusions. Leading the former category are Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Having broken free of the Kremlin within living memory, these countries know exactly what it means to be invaded by Russia: they will do anything to prevent this from happening again.

And what of Britain? Despite Sir Keir Starmer’s grandiose rhetoric (“a battle-ready armour-clad nation”), Britain remains firmly imprisoned in the camp of the deluded. The PM revealed his priorities in the Budget when he preferred social policies over defence, such as appeasing Labour backbenchers by abolishing the two-child benefit cap. This Government will allocate another £17bn to welfare by 2030, the exact sum that would have allowed Britain to increase defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP. This looks as if Sir Keir has decided to place his own political survival – and the prejudices of his party – before the national security of his country, and for that there is bound to be a reckoning.

The outcome of those decisions is that Britain will enter 2026 at greater risk than was necessary. The perils ahead could scarcely be greater. The first and most immediate danger is that Donald Trump could collaborate with Putin to impose Russia’s peace terms on Ukraine. The guns along the frozen 800-mile front might then fall silent, but any respite would almost certainly be temporary while Russia rearms and regroups. If Putin achieves what he believes to be victory in Ukraine, he would be emboldened to come back for more. We should remember that today’s tragedy in Ukraine is Putin’s third war of attrition and conquest since the assault on Georgia in 2008. Like all aggressors, his appetite remains insatiable.

If there is a flawed peace in 2026, Putin’s next move could be a renewed attack on Ukraine, to achieve his original goal of subjugating the entire country. He might consider still more dangerous options. If he concludes that Mr Trump no longer cares about defending America’s allies, Putin could risk attacking a NATO member and the signs are ominous. If so, Britain would be obliged to stand with our allies and go to war with Russia, the world’s biggest nuclear power. Do we in Britain have any idea of what this would entail, or where such a crisis might lead?

There are still ways of ensuring that we never have to find out. We can rally our European allies to deliver more support to Ukraine, protecting Volodymyr Zelensky from being muscled into a false peace that rewards aggression. And we must do whatever is necessary to secure America’s commitment to NATO. Both imperatives require Britain and the rest of Europe to emulate Poland and its neighbours and spend far more on defence.

The second danger and the threat is rising is that China’s colossal military build-up might culminate in a confrontation with the United States and its allies in the Pacific. In 2025 alone, China commissioned 14 frigates and destroyers into its fleet; the Royal Navy, by contrast, has only 13 of these warships. 2026 has begun with China conducting intensive exercises in the waters around Taiwan, apparently simulating a blockade of that democratic island.

A full-scale invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely, this year, though Xi Jinping is believed to have ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready in 2027. But no possibility can be excluded and China’s lightning military expansion will heighten the danger. That threat is likely to reach its peak later in this decade.

Elsewhere, Mr Trump is going to have to decide whether to go to war in Venezuela to overthrow Nicolas Maduro’s autocracy. The biggest deployment of US forces in the Caribbean for nearly 40 years cannot be sustained indefinitely. If the president orders US forces into action, the first new conflict of 2026 would be a regime change operation in Caracas, probably combining air strikes with covert action on the ground.

Another authoritarian anti-Western leader who may be fearing for his regime’s future is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. The new year is opening with mass protests in Tehran and other cities.

The Ayatollah’s authority was severely weakened by the successful Israeli-US strike on Iran’s nuclear plants last June. As Khamenei approaches a point of maximum weakness, there must be a chance that 2026 could see the downfall of Iran’s regime, though no-one knows who will take over.

Above all, this has to be the year when Europe finally awakens to the threats and relearns the art of defending itself against aggression. If not, it may be too late to save the modern invention of peace.

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Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

Russia-Ukraine talks: a “charade”

UKRAINE CONFLICT

IT has taken three years for direct talks to be held between Russia and Ukraine, and it should have been a momentous occasion. Since 2022, Russian war crimes have only deepened the chasm between them. It was Donald Trump who demanded this meeting, but who nonetheless underlined that it was largely a charade telling reporters, “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together.” It made plain that Russia felt no pressure to cooperate.

While difficult negotiations often begin on easier ground, the agreement of a mass prisoner swap seemed like a discrete achievement. The real significance of the Istanbul talks, however, lay more in the messages sent by their existence and attendance list.

The hasty proposal was Vladimir Putin’s escape route after European leaders demanded Russia agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire or face increased sanctions and weapons transfers. Ukraine and its backers said there should be no meetings without a ceasefire, but Kyiv was forced to concede when Mr Trump insisted it participate. Painful experience has clearly taught that it does not pay to defy the US president.

Volodymyr Zelensky challenged the Russian president to attend the talks personally, and vowed to wait for him in Turkey. This was, said a Ukrainian official, “a theatre performance for just one audience member”, reinforcing the message that Putin is the obstacle to peace. It is difficult to disagree.

Putin snubbed the meeting. Russia was represented by nationalist ideologues Vladimir Medinsky and Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, the latter a veteran military officer and diplomat who recently told Ukrainians that if they refused to capitulate in the war, “We will keep killing and slaughtering you.” Moscow’s approach did not appear much more diplomatic this time, either. Ukraine said that Russia voiced “unacceptable” things.

Mr Zelensky was adept in portraying the Russian leader’s non-attendance as “disrespect for Trump”. There is evidence of some frustration with Moscow in Washington. JD Vance, the US vice-president, insists that Russia was “asking for too much” and Mr Trump has expressed his displeasure towards Russian belligerence in angry sentiments and undertones. Lindsey Graham, a key Trump ally, says he has sufficient senatorial support to pass “devastating” new sanctions. But while he described his bill as part of the president’s arsenal, it is unlikely that Mr Trump will unleash it. That said, Putin will need to ensure he does not overplay his hand, given Mr Trump’s unpredictability. Putin may think spinning out the conflict is currently in Russia’s interests, but the war is far from cost-free for his country.

The recent narrative twists have revealed much greater coordination and resolve on Europe’s part. That is encouraging. Germany, for instance, has announced that it would hit Mr Trump’s demand for defence spending to reach 5% of GDP by 2032, albeit by including related infrastructure. However, US arms will run out long before Europe is fully ready to step into the breach. The key question surely remains not whether the US president can be coaxed and flattered into being more helpful, but whether he can be dissuaded from becoming actively obstructive – cutting off intelligence or Starlink, or preventing Europe from requisitioning arms for Ukraine. Seen that way, Mr Trump’s observation that “nothing’s going to happen” until he meets Putin sounds even more chilling. Meanwhile, away from the diplomatic front, the Russian attacks have continued in ferocity and intensity: further evidence of the urgent need for a ceasefire.

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