QUESTION OF ‘SECURITY’

NATO’s main role during the Cold War was to counter Soviet expansionism. That stand-off ended 25 years ago. As military budgets started falling following the end of the Cold War, and with less political and public appetite for military confrontation, the organisation was beginning to look irrelevant in today’s world. Questions have been continually asked of its modern-day role and purpose.

NATO certainly faces a renewed challenge on its eastern European border from an increasingly hostile and belligerent Russia. In the long-term this may even herald a reboot in Russian expansionism. Further afield, the insidious threats of Islamic State terrorists and continuing instability in the Middle East cannot be ignored either.

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• Nato requires direction and purpose…

When NATO talks in terms of security, it should be imperative that also includes the security of energy supplies. Currently, we depend on both Russia and the Middle East for much of our energy. Recent events serve to highlight the vulnerability of our energy supplies and the political constraints that results from our wholesale dependence on fuel imports from these volatile regions. Without political stability in those regions, there can be no energy security at home.

One immediate question that should come to mind is whether Russia might choose to use its energy exports to the EU as a political bargaining tool. The threat that it could happen is starting to be taken seriously. Reports that the EU is drafting emergency plans that would impose rationing on industry this winter, has serious economic repercussions.

Secure, sustainable and predictable supplies of energy are essential for economic growth and prosperity. A $20 rise in the price of oil for two economic quarters is likely to reduce global GDP by 0.5 per cent.

Stability in the price of oil is also important. Price volatility is an ongoing risk for all sectors of the economy. The armed forces, for example, consume large amounts of fuel. Rapid and unexpected increases in the price of oil can disrupt the capacity of our forces’ to operate effectively, be it through less time at sea for training or fewer hours flown in helicopters and jets.

The economic and supply disruption risks are especially acute in those countries with a high dependency on imported energy. The EU, for instance, imports 53 per cent of the energy that it consumes. The UK sources about 40 per cent of its coal imports from Russia.

The political corollary of dependence on energy from unstable and unsavoury regimes is that it constrains the response that the UK, Europe and NATO are able to give when faced with aggression. Whilst Germany has been more active of late in calling for sanctions, its stance towards Russia is partly determined by the continuing need to keep Russian gas flowing.

More troubling, though, and looking further ahead, how would we deal with a situation in which the Islamic State became established as a permanent presence, including control of oil and gas exports?

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The quickest and most effective form of energy security is to use less.

Lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that energy efficiency is embedded in military thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only does it improve military effectiveness but it reduces risk and saves money.

The same needs to happen with national energy strategies. There needs to be a comprehensive programme of energy efficiency measures across all sectors – particularly across utility companies, transportation and the need to improve energy usage in both domestic and commercial buildings. The programme should be demanding, for only when the full benefits have been delivered can we be sure of relying less on energy imports. The wider gains from improved air quality and reduced greenhouse emissions would be presumptive in any such programme.

More important still is that it makes economic sense for Europe to be at the forefront of energy efficiency measures as this will improve competitiveness with the US and China, both of whom enjoy the benefits of scale and low cost energy.

EU ministers are currently debating whether to approve a target of improving energy efficiency by 30 per cent (from 2005 levels) by 2030. The Ukraine crisis has indicated that this has to happen. Some analysts believe that 40 per cent energy efficiency targets could be met without incurring any unnecessary economic penalties.

Alongside this, continuing to invest in domestic sources of energy, particularly established ones such as wind, solar and nuclear, and new entrants such as wave and tidal power, is crucial. We cannot always rely on imported energy, but the tide will always flow and ebb twice a day.

NATO should become a powerful platform for promoting this change, by explicitly articulating the threat that we face. Efficiency and diversity in domestic energy generation are not issues that should be seen as just part of the ‘green’ agenda. They are vital to our national and regional security.

The challenges posed by increasing geopolitical instability and the threats to our energy security are only like to grow. Reducing energy consumption and investing in new forms of energy is a strategy that simultaneously defends against international volatility, improves our economy and liberates our response to aggression from the stranglehold of dependency.

NATO has a role to play in reducing our vulnerability.