Monthly Archives: November 2014

Climate Change, Research, Science, Society

Declarations of interest…

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 25, 2013 by markdowe

ANONYMITY IS SELF-SERVING

Declarations of interest are now standard practice for scientists who publish their work in recognised peer-reviewed journals. In medical research, for instance, it is important to know not just the findings and methodology of a particular study, but who actually paid for the work. And it would be unacceptable for scientists to put their names to a study involving a certain kind of drug if they refused to say whether they were paid by the drug company.

The same is true of climate research. If an organisation such as Greenpeace commissioned a climate study that was then published in a journal, we would expect the scientists involved to make it clear who funded the work. That, indeed, is the definition of declaration of interest.

It is clear, however, that some wealthy individuals feel they can hide behind anonymity when it comes to the funding of climate “scepticism”. As an example, the curiously labyrinthine route through which American billionaire industrialist, Charles Koch, funded his climate scepticism, was documented this week in order to preserve his anonymity.

In Britain, the climate-sceptic Global Warming Policy Foundation has received as much as £1m in anonymous donations since it was set up in 2009. The organisation has repeatedly refused to name its backers, yet the foundation has pursued climate scientists relentlessly for their alleged lack of transparency over data and methodology.

The foundation, which is registered as an educational charity, could just as well be described as an attack dog of the wealthy climate sceptics who have supported it. Yet the public does not know the identity of these individuals and can only guess at their motives. Surely, if the Global Warming Policy Foundation was genuinely concerned about the transparency of climate research, it should also tell us whose money it is relying upon.

Standard
Defence, Government, Military, National Security, Politics, Society

Britain’s Military and the 2015 Defence Review…

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 23, 2013 by markdowe

 2015 SECURITY & DEFENCE REVIEW

Intro:-

David Cameron should use the next defence review in 2015 to develop a more ambitious strategy that builds on the unrivalled skills of our Armed Forces. Give the Armed Forces the support they need

Following the hostage crisis in Algeria and Britain’s support for French intervention in Mali, David Cameron warned the House of Commons on Monday that this country faces an existential threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliates: we must steel ourselves, he said, for a “generational struggle” that could last for decades. Yesterday, the Government announced the latest tranche of military cuts, with 5,300 jobs to go in the Army, many through compulsory redundancy. The Ministry of Defence also confirmed that soldiers serving in Afghanistan are likely to be sacked when the fourth and final round of cuts is implemented in a year or so.

Such infelicitous timing has served to raise renewed doubts about the extent to which the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review can meet the challenges outlined by the Prime Minister. When he published that review, Mr Cameron insisted it was not simply a cost-cutting exercise, but was about “taking the right decisions to protect our national security in the years ahead”. That is not how it is working out. As he has shown in Mali and in Libya, Mr Cameron is prepared to intervene militarily in distant conflicts if he deems it to be in Britain’s national interest. Yet he is reluctant to will the means. Many analysts have long argued that to protect any government budget is a mistake at a time when spending needs to be reined in everywhere – but to safeguard departments such as health and international development while leaving defence to face the axe is positively perverse. The same sentiments were expressed yesterday by Lord West, the former security minister.

Our military clout is one of the reasons this country punches above its weight globally. The values we espouse as a mature liberal democracy are widely admired, and the fact that we are ready to fight for them if necessary is important. But as General Stanley McChrystal, America’s former commander in Afghanistan has previously warned, Britain will be shut out of key decisions if it does not maintain a credible capability.

Mr Cameron cannot have it both ways. Either he must restrain his ambitions and accept that Britain is destined to become just another middle-ranking European power, or he should use the next defence review in 2015 to develop a more ambitious strategy that builds on the unrivalled skills of our Armed Forces. We should favour the second course. Britain is in danger of losing the ability to fight alone – without ever having had a proper discussion about whether that is something we can or should live with. In a dangerous world, that leaves us ill-prepared to cope with the unexpected.

Standard
History, Human Rights, Legal, Second World War, Society

International Re-evaluation: ‘Were the Nuremberg War Trials (1945-6) a Travesty of Justice?’…

(From the archives) Originally posted on February 7, 2011 by markdowe

HISTORY: NUREMBERG WAR TRIALS

Intro:-

THE ACTIONS carried out by the Nazis in the Second World War led the Allied powers as early as 1943 to promise to bring war criminals to justice. These trials were held in Nuremberg between November 1945 and August 1946. The Allies set up an international Military Tribunal to judge the accused, the bench comprising four judges, with a deputy for each in case of illness, representing the four main Allied powers: Britain, France, the USA and the USSR. Some 199 were accused at Nuremberg, but thousands of others were tried elsewhere: in Allied military courts, by their own countrymen after the Allied withdrawal, and in former occupied countries. Important questions about the legality of the trials were raised even at the time, and continue to be asked by those who think they were inspired more by vengeance than by justice.

 

AT NUREMBERG, the prisoners were tried on four counts: crimes against peace – preparing and carrying out acts of aggression; war crimes – the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilian populations; extremes of brutality against individuals or groups; and conspiracy – participation in plans to commit the other three offences. A number of the accused, including Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler, were already dead. Another, Robert Ley, former Head of the Nazi Labour front, hanged himself before the trial started; another, Hermann Goering, swallowed cyanide when it was over in order to avoid the gallows. Another Gustav Krupp, was senile and did not understand the charges; his son Alfred was later tried and sentenced in his place. Of the twenty-four who were brought to trial, three were acquitted. Three, including Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, received life imprisonment. Two got twenty years, one fifteen and Doenitz, who had made the final surrender to the Allies, got ten years’ imprisonment. A number of the accused, including Adolf Eichmann (responsible for administering the ‘Final Solution’ for the Jews) and Franz Stangl (the former Commandant of the camps at Treblinka and Sobibor), were later found abroad, brought to trial and convicted. Twelve were hanged on 16 October 1946.

Week after week, the evidence had mounted up during the trial, evidence at the same time chilling and overwhelming. One of the accused, Hess, gave every sign of mental derangement; only Goering maintained his quick-witted awareness to the end. The others were broken men. One, Hans Frank, whose thirty-eight volume diary gave irrefutable evidence of his involvement in murder, starvation and extermination, despaired completely and summed up what many of them felt when he said: ‘A thousand years will pass, and this guilt of Germany will not pass away!’

How justified was this trial and its outcome? Few disputed the moral justification for it. The crimes involved were so dreadful and so overwhelming that no one imagined there was no redress; everyone supposed that the legal basis for the trial lay in The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The general reaction, therefore, was to welcome the trial as going some way towards atoning for unprecedented atrocities.

..

YET THERE REMAIN disturbing features. How could aggression be illegal if there was no legislative agreement under which it could be punished? It was highly unusual for any state or individual ruler to be punished for breaking a treaty, though a number of such trials have been held since Nuremberg. To spare the Soviet Union’s embarrassment, for the USSR had also been guilty of exactly the same offences against Poland and Finland, the charge was confined to aggression by the Axis powers alone. Thus the offence seemed to be specially designed to fit the crime and was applied only selectively. No Italians were ever charged. Italy had changed sides, and to indict an ally would have opened the door to a similar indictment against the USSR.

The accused were also condemned for crimes that were not crimes in international law at the time they were committed. If extreme crimes against humanity, or conspiracy to commit such crimes, were now offences against international law, the same charges could have been brought against Churchill for his complicity in the bombing of Dresden, if the Germans had been victorious instead of defeated.

Furthermore, the accused were not allowed to say: ‘But I was only obeying my orders.’ To expect an individual subordinate to be able to distinguish between a legal order and a criminal one was quite unrealistic. The Allies themselves, throughout the war, considered men bounded by superior orders, and not legally liable for them. But now the Allies were saying that obedience to orders was not a defence, but only a mitigation. This would have certainly been bad news to the bombardier aboard Enola Gay who was ordered to drop the first atom bomb on Hiroshima.

But the most fundamental criticism was the simplest. For punishment to have at least the appearance of justice, the prosecutor must not also be the judge. The judges at Nuremberg represented the nations that were parties to the action, and therefore could not be said to be impartial. It would have been better that the judges should have been empanelled from among neutral nations such as Sweden or Switzerland, for this would have given a greater impression of impartiality. The partiality of the bench gave ammunition to those who maintained that the trials were merely acts of vengeance carried out by the victor against the vanquished. As Goering himself shrewdly observed at the trial: ‘The victors will always be the judge, the vanquished the accused.’ Such a criticism will always weaken the moral justification of the Nuremberg Tribunal, though it will not lessen the frightfulness of the crimes that brought the trials about.

Standard