BREXIT

LONG before the people of the UK voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, before the term Brexit had even been coined, it was Grexit that was preoccupying the minds of Eurocrats.

Greece came close to crashing out of the single currency on at least four separate occasions after a vast black hole opened up in the country’s accounts in 2009.

At one stage in 2012, the British banknote printers De La Rue was asked by the government in Athens to make contingency plans to print new drachma notes (Greece’s pre-euro currency) in preparation for what many called the “Double D” solution to the economic problems Greece was facing: default on the country’s debt and devaluation with the return of the drachma.

Today, Greece remains one of the 17 members of the eurozone – and this fact alone should lift the spirits of the UK negotiators. Armed with her newly acquired Parliamentary majority, Theresa May returns to Brussels seeking at the very least to put a time limit on the Irish backstop deal she signed up to.

Each time a Greek default loomed into view, threatening the stability of the eurozone and raising the possibility that Italy or one of the other member countries might also head for the exit, the main protagonists – the hard-line German-dominated European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt and the European Commission in Brussels – caved in and authorised a bailout.

Last-ditch negotiations, usually conducted over a weekend when the financial markets were closed, would typically go into the early hours of Sunday morning.

Late-night deals were hatched against a backdrop of TV screens showing central Athens on fire and anti-austerity protesters ripping up flagstones in the capital’s Syntagma Square.

The first £38bn bailout was agreed in the dead of the night on April 23, 2010, by the troika of the ECB, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. It was one of several rescue packages for Greece, some of which required a change of government to get them over the line.

 

WHAT happened to Greece is typical of the Eurocrat tendency to fudge, to muddy the waters and eventually to seek compromise in a crisis situation.

Indeed, the history of the EU is littered with examples of Britain locked into eleventh-hour talks with eurocrats as the UK has sought changes in our terms of membership.

John Major worked through the night in 1991 to secure Britain’s opt-out from the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty which would have dictated working conditions in Britain and could have undermined the labour market reforms pioneered by his predecessor Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, she herself was a fierce negotiator in organising rebates from Brussels from the UK’s oversized contributions to the EU budget. In 1984, in the imperial grandeur at the historic palace of Fontainebleau in France, European leaders painfully conceded the famous British EU budget contribution rebate – or as the French sarcastically called it “le chéque Britannique”.

And let’s not forget that in the teeth of his promise to hold an in/out referendum, David Cameron returned from Brussels in the early hours one day in February 2016 with draft reform proposals agreed by European Council President Donald Tusk which he claimed would give Britain “special status”.

In the event, the pledges made by Brussels were so anaemic that they failed to convince British voters that sovereignty could be maintained by voting remain – a huge mistake by the eurocrats who failed to recognise the strength of anti-EU feeling among large swathes of the UK population.

Both in national negotiations and in commercial transactions, reaching an accord more often or not comes down to the wire.

With the clock now ticking inexorably to March 29, the desperation of the leaders of the other 27 EU countries to avoid an economic and financial crisis at the very moment that Germany and the eurozone are facing the bleak prospect of recession may be Theresa May’s best hope. This is regardless of how unyielding Brussels negotiators have been to date and their willingness to play havoc with business confidence and financial stability by its brinkmanship.

 

THE potential loss to Brussels of a £39bn one-off payment to a Commission cash starved as it is following years of economic slowdown, could potentially be a bargaining chip for the Prime Minister in the last-chance saloon.

In the final analysis, the anecdotal evidence of what the late-night sessions in Brussels, Nice, Maastricht and other destinations should tell us, is that it’s Germany and, to a lesser extent, France which decide.

Besieged by increasingly hostile populist movements, neither Berlin or Paris will want to make political life tougher than it already is.

The politics of the EU, at their most raw, are little different to those of the bazaar. The natural tendency should be now to relish an aggressive haggle but then, eventually, to compromise.

. See also Should we really despair over Brexit? Europe is in a mess.