Banking, Consumer Affairs, Society, Technology

Changes to security codes on bank cards…

CONSUMER AFFAIRS

A CREDIT CARD with a constantly changing security code is being launched in an attempt to prevent fraudulent transactions.

The three numbers on the back of the card will be replaced by a digital display randomly generating a new combination every hour.

Oberthur Technologies, a digital security company, is in talks with UK banks about introducing the technology and has said the cards will be used by French customers by the end of the year.

The security code on the back of most credit and debit cards is required to make payments online.

Fraud in the UK involving cards, remote banking and cheques totalled £755million in 2015, with more than 20,000 victims.

The mini-screen on the new cards is powered by a small battery designed to last three years.

A cyber-security expert within the industry, said: ‘It’s surprising it has taken so long for this to appear. The technology has existed for some time so now it will be a case of persuading card processors that it is worth doing.’

The insider added: ‘It may be costly for card operators as some extra infrastructure will be required to ensure our cards stay synchronised with the operator, but it happens already for many banks with the dongles they use for login [to online banking].’

One drawback of the card is that customers will no longer be able to memorise their security code and will need to check every time they want to make an online purchase.

The French banks Societe Generale and Groupe BPCE are preparing to issue the cards to customers after a successful pilot scheme last year. They are also being tested in Mexico and Poland.

In another development in digital security, MasterCard has announced that it has developed technology that could allow online shoppers to send a ‘selfie’ of themselves to prove their identity when they make a purchase.

It would do away with the need for passwords used as an additional level of security to the three-digit code. But passwords can be difficult to remember, stolen or intercepted.

Master Card customers currently use a system called SecureCode to verify their identity while shopping online. The process can result in shoppers abandoning their purchase or having the transaction declined if they enter the password incorrectly.

The ‘selfie’ password system involves customers downloading an app to their mobile phone and registering by taking a photo of themselves so their face is stored in the system.

To authorise a payment, they look into the camera and must blink to verify they are not just holding up a photo of someone else. Customers will be able to use a scan of their fingerprint instead of a selfie if they prefer.

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Iraq, Islamic State, Middle East, Politics, Syria, United States

Resolving the crisis in the Arab world requires liberating Mosul…

IRAQ

Intro: By liberating Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, offers high expectations of assuaging Sunni anger

Those bearing the brunt of war across the Fertile Crescent – from the Mediterranean to the Gulf –  are for the most part Sunni Arabs. Whilst they form the largest ethnic group and are heirs and inheritors of fabled empires, many of their great and ancient cities are now in the hands of others: the Jews in Jerusalem, the Christians and Shias in Beirut, the Alawites in Damascus, and, more recently, the Shias in Baghdad. A further study of the disturbing patterns that have emerged also reveals that Sunni’s constitute the bulk of the region’s refugees. Where Sunnis hold on to power, as in the Gulf States, they feel encircled by a hostile and overbearing Iran and abandoned by America that is perceived as being indifferent to the changing demographics of control throughout the Arab world.

The divisions go beyond sectarianism. Almost everywhere the Arab state is in turmoil and crisis aggravated by many years of misrule, often no less than by Sunni leaders. We need look no further than Iraq’s appalling former tyrant, Saddam Hussein, the quintessential Sunni Arab strongman, or of Egypt’s flawed and deposed leader, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. The sense that Sunnis’ are being assailed from all sides helps to explain how the jihadists of Islamic State are offering to restore the ancient caliphate. IS has taken over vast Sunni-populated areas of Syria and Iraq, yet, no battlefield victory against Islamic State can ever be complete, or no diplomatic solution lasting, until the dispossession of the Sunnis’ has been dealt with.

The future of the region is currently being decided in two venerable cities: Aleppo, the last conurbation of the Syrian rebellion against Bashar al-Assad, and Mosul, IS’s most prized possession in Iraq. The conduct of the battles, and the political order that will follow, will ultimately determine the course of the region’s barbaric wars. The best hopes for peace lies in federalism and of decentralisation which would give Sunnis (and others) a proper voice.

Aleppo has become the symbol of the worst sort of external intervention. Russia’s Vladimir Putin is helping Assad’s troops in Syria, as well as their Iranian and Shia allies, and continues to pound the besieged Sunni rebels. It looks now more of an attempt that the entire city will be taken before Barack Obama leaves presidential office next year, convinced that America is now powerless to act in stopping this relentless onslaught. The deliberate and planned brutality, in which hospitals are repeatedly attacked, will only feed Sunni resentment and stoke the flames of extremism even more. So will Russia’s orchestrated choreography that Assad should remain in charge of any future power-sharing government.

By contrast, however, Mosel could yet emerge as a model for defeating the jihadists by creating a saner political framework that fully recognises the stake that Sunni Arabs’ have in Iraq. With American support, Iraqi, Kurdish and local Sunni tribes are closing-in on the city. The Jihadists have been severely rattled and are far less effective in Mosul than they once were. The loss of Mosul would deal a blow to IS. It was from there that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the IS leader, declared his caliphate.

But much can still go wrong in Mosul. Nobody knows just how hard IS will fight. There are concerns that the Iraqi government has not done enough in preparing for a mass exodus of civilians, or, too, that it will be unable to prevent an armed free-for-all by Shia, Kurdish and rival Sunni militias. Yet, for all its violence and chaos, Iraq offers real hope. Its politics has evolved that is now more open than those of most Arab countries. It has an energetic and lively press and, despite having a parliament that is best described as rowdy and disorderly, cross-sectarian alliances are starting to form. Even Shia politicians are anxious in shaking off their image as proxy clients of Iran. Sunni Arabs in Iraq are moving away from the politics of rejection and are setting their sights on reconquering Baghdad.

Iraq could yet give the Arab world a welcome new model of devolved power, a triumph following the failures of Arab nationalism, Islamism and jihadism. This would make it much harder for murderous dictators to terrorise their people, and by giving diverse ethnic groups a perceived awareness that they rule themselves. Would-be separatists, most notably the Kurds, might be convinced to remain within existing frontiers.

More flexible forms of government might just ease some of the conflicts of the Arab world, even the atrocious bloodletting in Syria. Under such looser forms of government, the balance of power would invariably differ but would be required to follow a few basic principles. Because no region is ethnically pure, the first of these principles would require sub-entities respecting the rights of minority groups. Following on from that would be the need for all groups to have a share of power in central government. A further presumptive principle is that national resources, such as oil, must benefit the whole population. And lastly, perhaps the most difficult, would be to find the right balance of armed force between national armies and local police forces. This would allow minorities to feel protected and by discouraging local warlords and clan chiefs from rebelling or breaking away.

On paper at least, Iraq’s constitution does provide for much of this. It should become a reality. Devolution may not end all political quarrels, but if it stops the bloodshed that will be progress. It is imperative that Mosul be captured judiciously, with care for civilians and political consensus or agreement on how it will be run after the defeat of IS. The city should not only become a test of the maturity of Iraqi politics, but also a measure of the responsibility of outside powers. Saudi Arabia and Iran should support reconciliation and reconstruction. Western forces should be committed to the long-term if stability and political reform is to hold.

Mosul offers the only real opportunity to convince beleaguered Sunnis that there is a better alternative than the nihilism of jihad. If the politics that emerges feeds their sense of dispossession, expect the violence to go on. What happens in Mosul matters to many other places outside of Iraq; it might even give hope to the desperate situation in Aleppo.

iraqmap

Map highlighting the most important strategic locations in Iraq.

 

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Africa, Government, Politics

The fragility of political reform in Africa…

AFRICA

Intro: African countries need to diversify away from their dependence on exporting commodities, which in turn would mean reforming and liberalising markets and bolstering independent institutions

SINCE the end of the cold war multiparty democracy has spread far and wide across the African continent, often with a moving and impressive intensity. Some have referred to it as Africa’s second liberation. Following freedom from European colonisers came freedom from African despots. 1994 is etched into history when many South Africans queued for hours to bury apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela as president in their country’s first all-race vote.

The start of the liberation saw many of Africa’s Big Men swept away. Ethiopia’s despot Mengistu Haile Mariam fled in 1991; Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) decamped in 1997; and, a year later Sani Abacha of Nigeria died in suspicious circumstances. In parts of Africa autocrats are still in power and wars still rage. But most leaders now seek at least a veneer of respectability, elections have become more frequent and economies have opened up.

Yet, African democracy has stalled – or even possibly gone into reverse. Often, the continent has become an illiberal sort of pseudo-democracy in which the incumbent lavishly attacks the opposition, exploits the power of the state to stack the electoral contest in his favour and by removing any constraints on his power. That bodes ill for a continent where institutions are still fragile, corruption rife and economies weakened by the fall of commodity prices. One of the previous fastest-growing economies of the world has now become one of the slowest. For Africa to fulfil its promise, the young, dynamic continent must rediscover its zeal for democracy.

Zambia is the latest worrying example. It was one of the first African countries to undergo a democratic transition, when Kenneth Kaunda stepped down after losing an election in 1991. Just last month Edgar Lungu was re-elected president with a paper-thin majority in a campaign that was marred by the harassment of the opposition, the forced closure of the country’s leading independent newspaper, and accusations of vote-rigging and street protests.

Central parts of Africa appear most troubling. Incumbent leaders are changing or sidestepping constitutional term limits to extend their time in office, which often provokes unrest. Kenya, where political tension is rising, is facing concerns over threats of violence in next year’s general election. Freedom House, an American think-tank, reckons that in 1973 some 30% of sub-Saharan countries were ‘free’ or ‘partly free’. In its most recent report that share now stands at 50%. Whilst a big improvement it is down from the 71% which was reported in 2008. Countries that are ‘not free’ still outnumber those that are. A big chunk in the middle is made up of flawed and fragile states that are only ‘partly free’.

The people of Africa deserve much better. For democracy to work, the elected must not be greedy with those losing seats or failing to win accepting defeat. There must also be trusted institutions that invariably act as arbiters and stabilisers for democracy to flourish. In many places, some or all of these basic elements are missing.

Expanding and strengthening Africa’s middle class is the best way for democracy to thrive. Increasingly interconnected to the world, Africans know better than anyone the shortcomings of their leaders. Consider South Africa. Despite its model constitution, vibrant press and diverse economy, it has been tarnished under its president, Jacob Zuma. Whilst he has hollowed out institutions, some of which were tasked with fighting corruption, moves which were an attempt to strengthen his own position, South Africa has also demonstrated the power of its voters. In recent municipal elections, the powerful African National Congress lost control of many major cities. For the first time, a plausible alternative political party of power has emerged in the liberal, business-friendly Democratic Alliance.

Societies and economies which are free reinforce each other. African countries need to diversify away from their dependence on exporting commodities, which in turn would mean reforming and liberalising markets and bolstering independent institutions. The rest of the world can help by expanding access to rich-world markets for African goods, particularly in agriculture.

Other than promoting a middle class, diversification mitigates the ill-effects of a winner-takes-all politics. When a country’s wealth is concentrated in natural resources, controlling the state gives its leader access to the cash needed to maintain power. The problem is aggravated by the complex, multi-ethnic form of many African states, whose national borders may have been created by colonial whim. Voting patterns often follow tribal customs rather than class or ideology, which tends to lock in the advantage of one or other group. Political defeat at an election can mean being cut out of the spoils indefinitely. Dealing with variegated polities require structural changes in society such as decentralisation (as in Kenya), federalism (as in Nigeria) and requirements for parties or leaders to demonstrate a degree of cross-country or cross-ethnic support.

For those democracies which are fragile, the two-term rule for heads of government is invaluable, as it forces change. Nelson Mandela set the example by stepping down after just one term. The two-term rule should be enshrined as a norm by Africa’s regional bodies, just as the African Union forbids coups.

It’s also worth considering what else the outside world can do other than providing African countries with access to markets. China, for instance, has become Africa’s biggest trading partner, supplying aid and investment with few or no strings attached in terms of the rule of law and human rights. Even China, however, now that its own economy has markedly slowed, will not be in the business of propping up financially destitute African autocrats.

This means that Western influence, although diminished, remains considerable – for historical reasons, and because many African countries still look to the West for aid, investment and sympathy from international lending bodies. With the commodity boom at an end, a growing number of countries are facing a balance-of-payments crisis. Any fresh liquidity, particularly in the form of loans, should be conditional on strengthening independent institutions.

Yet, the West has flagged in its efforts to promote open and accountable democracy, especially in places such as those around the Horn of Africa (see appendage) and the Sahel, where the priority is to defeat jihadists. That is myopic. Decades of counter-terrorism teaches that the best bulwarks against extremism are states that are prosperous and just. That is most likely to come about when rulers serve at the will of their people.

Appendage:

hornafrica

Map depicting countries that make up the Horn of Africa.

 

 

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