Iraq, Islamic State, Middle East, Politics, Syria, United States

Resolving the crisis in the Arab world requires liberating Mosul…

IRAQ

Intro: By liberating Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, offers high expectations of assuaging Sunni anger

Those bearing the brunt of war across the Fertile Crescent – from the Mediterranean to the Gulf –  are for the most part Sunni Arabs. Whilst they form the largest ethnic group and are heirs and inheritors of fabled empires, many of their great and ancient cities are now in the hands of others: the Jews in Jerusalem, the Christians and Shias in Beirut, the Alawites in Damascus, and, more recently, the Shias in Baghdad. A further study of the disturbing patterns that have emerged also reveals that Sunni’s constitute the bulk of the region’s refugees. Where Sunnis hold on to power, as in the Gulf States, they feel encircled by a hostile and overbearing Iran and abandoned by America that is perceived as being indifferent to the changing demographics of control throughout the Arab world.

The divisions go beyond sectarianism. Almost everywhere the Arab state is in turmoil and crisis aggravated by many years of misrule, often no less than by Sunni leaders. We need look no further than Iraq’s appalling former tyrant, Saddam Hussein, the quintessential Sunni Arab strongman, or of Egypt’s flawed and deposed leader, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. The sense that Sunnis’ are being assailed from all sides helps to explain how the jihadists of Islamic State are offering to restore the ancient caliphate. IS has taken over vast Sunni-populated areas of Syria and Iraq, yet, no battlefield victory against Islamic State can ever be complete, or no diplomatic solution lasting, until the dispossession of the Sunnis’ has been dealt with.

The future of the region is currently being decided in two venerable cities: Aleppo, the last conurbation of the Syrian rebellion against Bashar al-Assad, and Mosul, IS’s most prized possession in Iraq. The conduct of the battles, and the political order that will follow, will ultimately determine the course of the region’s barbaric wars. The best hopes for peace lies in federalism and of decentralisation which would give Sunnis (and others) a proper voice.

Aleppo has become the symbol of the worst sort of external intervention. Russia’s Vladimir Putin is helping Assad’s troops in Syria, as well as their Iranian and Shia allies, and continues to pound the besieged Sunni rebels. It looks now more of an attempt that the entire city will be taken before Barack Obama leaves presidential office next year, convinced that America is now powerless to act in stopping this relentless onslaught. The deliberate and planned brutality, in which hospitals are repeatedly attacked, will only feed Sunni resentment and stoke the flames of extremism even more. So will Russia’s orchestrated choreography that Assad should remain in charge of any future power-sharing government.

By contrast, however, Mosel could yet emerge as a model for defeating the jihadists by creating a saner political framework that fully recognises the stake that Sunni Arabs’ have in Iraq. With American support, Iraqi, Kurdish and local Sunni tribes are closing-in on the city. The Jihadists have been severely rattled and are far less effective in Mosul than they once were. The loss of Mosul would deal a blow to IS. It was from there that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the IS leader, declared his caliphate.

But much can still go wrong in Mosul. Nobody knows just how hard IS will fight. There are concerns that the Iraqi government has not done enough in preparing for a mass exodus of civilians, or, too, that it will be unable to prevent an armed free-for-all by Shia, Kurdish and rival Sunni militias. Yet, for all its violence and chaos, Iraq offers real hope. Its politics has evolved that is now more open than those of most Arab countries. It has an energetic and lively press and, despite having a parliament that is best described as rowdy and disorderly, cross-sectarian alliances are starting to form. Even Shia politicians are anxious in shaking off their image as proxy clients of Iran. Sunni Arabs in Iraq are moving away from the politics of rejection and are setting their sights on reconquering Baghdad.

Iraq could yet give the Arab world a welcome new model of devolved power, a triumph following the failures of Arab nationalism, Islamism and jihadism. This would make it much harder for murderous dictators to terrorise their people, and by giving diverse ethnic groups a perceived awareness that they rule themselves. Would-be separatists, most notably the Kurds, might be convinced to remain within existing frontiers.

More flexible forms of government might just ease some of the conflicts of the Arab world, even the atrocious bloodletting in Syria. Under such looser forms of government, the balance of power would invariably differ but would be required to follow a few basic principles. Because no region is ethnically pure, the first of these principles would require sub-entities respecting the rights of minority groups. Following on from that would be the need for all groups to have a share of power in central government. A further presumptive principle is that national resources, such as oil, must benefit the whole population. And lastly, perhaps the most difficult, would be to find the right balance of armed force between national armies and local police forces. This would allow minorities to feel protected and by discouraging local warlords and clan chiefs from rebelling or breaking away.

On paper at least, Iraq’s constitution does provide for much of this. It should become a reality. Devolution may not end all political quarrels, but if it stops the bloodshed that will be progress. It is imperative that Mosul be captured judiciously, with care for civilians and political consensus or agreement on how it will be run after the defeat of IS. The city should not only become a test of the maturity of Iraqi politics, but also a measure of the responsibility of outside powers. Saudi Arabia and Iran should support reconciliation and reconstruction. Western forces should be committed to the long-term if stability and political reform is to hold.

Mosul offers the only real opportunity to convince beleaguered Sunnis that there is a better alternative than the nihilism of jihad. If the politics that emerges feeds their sense of dispossession, expect the violence to go on. What happens in Mosul matters to many other places outside of Iraq; it might even give hope to the desperate situation in Aleppo.

iraqmap

Map highlighting the most important strategic locations in Iraq.

 

Standard
Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Iran, Iraq, Islamic State, Middle East, Politics, United Nations, United States

The Iranian foe has suddenly become a crucial ally…

IRAN

Not since the Shah was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s hardline Islamic theocracy in 1979 has a British prime minister met with an Iranian leader.

Truly, this week was an historic encounter as David Cameron made entreaties to the enemy and met Hassan Rouhani at the UN General Assembly in New York.

This, it should be remembered, is a country that has sponsored terrorism against the West on myriad occasions, has frequently declared that Israel should be wiped from the map , and was infamously labelled – along with Iraq under Saddam Hussein and North Korea – a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ by George W Bush. Its nuclear ambitions so terrify Western leaders that they have imposed sanctions that have devastated Iran’s oil exports and revenues.

But times change, and now the West needs Iran, regarding it as a potential ally in the fight against Islamic State (IS).

Iran has reached out, too. Ever since Rouhani replaced his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in August 2013, he has been trying to bring Iran back in from the cold.

Ahmadinejad’s bellicose anti-Western rhetoric during the eight years of his rule ensured the country’s deepening isolation on the international stage.

And while Rouhani may be a plausible figure, the regime’s religious hardliners are still uniformly grim, imposing their moral puritanism on a young, vibrant and educated population which, behind the scenes, enjoys partying, illicit drinking and casual sex.

Last year Iran executed 624 people for various offences, some of them publicly strangled as they were hoisted aloft by large mechanical cranes. Torture is commonplace and stoning seen as just punishment.

Yet Cameron was clearly in the mood for conciliation and his diplomatic offensive throws up a number of questions. Why would Iran want to help the West in its fight against IS? And what kind of concessions would the Iranians demand in return for discreetly siding with the coalition of Western and Arab countries now launching air strikes on IS’s headquarters in the Syrian city of Raqqa?

There is no doubt that Iran wants to see the back of IS. Its Shia-led regime considers Iraq and Syria as allies – both are also governed by Shia Muslims. The brutal butchers of IS are all extreme Sunni Muslims, deadly rivals of the Shia, and Iran rightly believes them to be a dangerously destabilising force in the Middle East.

Officially Iran is not part of the efforts to degrade and destroy IS – America is still seen as the great evil by its hardliners and theocrats who will not countenance US troops back in Iraq.

Covertly, however, the country’s head of ‘subversive warfare’ – the 56-year-old General Qassem Suleimani, supremo of the elite Iranian Quds force – is already working alongside his US counterpart General Michael Bednarek in Baghdad’s Green Zone.

Members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are also hidden among the sizeable Shia militias defending the holiest Shia shrines in Iraq such as Karbala and Najaf, while Iran has warned IS to stay away from its borders.

To consider whether Iran can help defeat IS, we have to examine the force they would be taking on.

Obama has made an analogy between IS and an insufferable disease that is spreading like a plaque. By 2010, Western and Iraqi special forces had eliminated all but 10 per cent of Al-Qaeda in Iraq as a result of capturing or assassinating their operatives.

But that 10 per cent metastasised into IS under their ruthless leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who decided to exploit the civil war in Syria as a source of recruitment, funding and territory. Two thirds of its 30,000-strong army now lurks there.

Intelligence agencies have largely failed to detect how this army organised from its Syria base a systematic assassination campaign of Iraqi army and police chiefs, or a series of spectacular prison breaks, including one at the notorious Abu Ghraib jail where Iraqi prisoners were tortured by their Western captors.

****

Few noticed how in January IS fought off an Iraqi army force of several divisions trying to recapture the Iraqi city of Fallujah. Long before they captured Mosul last month, IS was raking in some £5million a month through nightly extortion in this huge city.

The IS leadership consists of hardened Al-Qaeda veterans, but the tactical sophistication derives from a group of former generals who served under Saddam Hussein.

They have used Iraq’s modern road network to bring to bear their core spearhead of about 3,000 men, who soften up targets with vehicle-borne suicide bombers wiping out command and control centres. Social media bring fear and terror to a Shia-dominated Iraqi national army, whose corrupt officers have stolen their soldiers’ pay.

Soldiers then become demoralised that simply flee or desert, or are murdered. IS are also formidable in defence. They blow up bridges and unleash controlled floods to hamper counter-attacking forces, while using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to defend approaches in the way regular armies would use mines.

Worse still, IS anticipates their enemies. They knew Obama’s air-strikes on Raqqa were coming, and will have moved their command and control centres to outlying regions and villages. They thwart the West’s recruitment of moderate Sunni rebels. IS’s online multilingual magazine Dabiq (The Ark) suggests neutralising any attempts to turn the local Sunni tribes against them by co-opting them into their own administration – and it’s a tactic that has worked effectively.

Syria’s President Assad – with his sponsor Iran’s tacit approval – was notified in advance of the air strikes, and warned that his entire air defence system would be obliterated if he objected. But why should Assad object anyway, if his most deadly opponents are being eliminated?

Yet, as previous recent conflicts have shown, air strikes alone will not be enough. Ground troops will have to be involved. Which is why Obama, who can at least rely on the help of Kurdish Pesmerga forces and durable elements of the Iraqi army, is now pumping £300million into a new force of ‘moderate’ secular-minded Syrian tribes, 5,000 of whom will be rapidly trained in Saudi Arabia?

This throws up its own problems. The moderates have been fighting against IS alongside another extremist group Jabhat al-Nusra – which was itself targeted by US airstrikes this week because of fears they were accessories to planned terrorist attacks.

Throw in the Iranians, and the confusion over loyalties becomes even greater. Many of the Sunni moderates Obama is trying to woo consider Iran’s Shia regime a greater enemy than IS. This means it would be impossible for Iranian troops to engage overtly in Iraq or Syria – it would incite fury among the Sunni in those countries.

Cameron’s talks with Rouhani have been tantamount to a negotiator’s minefield. Cameron will want him to stop backing Assad but Rouhani will never concede to giving up on such a long-standing Shia ally.

Rouhani will want to persuade the West to relax sanctions in return for help against IS. Any movement, though, to accommodate Iran’s nuclear programme could infuriate Israel. And Israel, if provoked, could destroy the West/Arab coalition.

But despite the enormous geopolitical difficulties and complexities, Cameron is right to engage with Rouhani.

We cannot be in any doubt. IS presents an existential threat to the entire region and must be tackled and beaten. And Iran is such a major player that it is far better to try to enlist its help and keep its president onside than to continue to treat it as a pariah.

See also:


Supplementary

MD Twitter timeline – entries made 25 Sept 2014:

. For the first time the U.S. has used its precision based F-22 Raptor Stealth Fighter.

. The F-22 contains over 30 radar receivers which are able to warn of threats from 250 miles away.

. The armaments of the F-22 are stored internally. This provides its stealth capability, and helps greatly with its aerodynamics.

. The F-22 is armed with JDAM (The Joint Direct Attack Munition). This is a GPS guidance system with a range of up to *___ * miles.

. The F-22’s radar changes frequency more than 1,000 times per second. This confuses enemy tracking systems.

. Khorasan, a little-known Al-Qaeda affiliate, have become a prime target for U.S. air strikes in northern Syria.

. Other U.S. aircraft used in attacking ISIL positions include its B-1 bombers, F-15E attack warplanes, F-16 fighters, F/A-18 Super Hornets and two types of drone aircraft.

. The U.S. has also fired Tomahawk cruise missiles from destroyers in the Red Sea and the northern Persian Gulf. The ships involved are the USS Arleigh Burke and the USS Philippine.

Standard
Foreign Affairs, Government, Islamic State, Military, NATO, Politics, United States

Downing Street insists there has been no US air strike request…

AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE

Britain joining air strikes against jihadists has not been requested and is not currently under discussion, Downing Street has insisted, despite reports that Barack Obama is hoping to win agreement to bring allies into the air campaign by next week’s NATO summit.

The United States has launched scores of bombing attacks on Islamic State (IS) militants in northern Iraq in a bid to assist Kurdish and Iraqi forces in their fightback against the terrorists.

Reports in The Times said the Pentagon had been exploring whether western allies such as Britain and Australia, and allied Gulf states, would assist in a broader campaign in Syria against the group, which was formerly known as ISIL.

Britain joining air strikes against jihadists has not been requested and is not currently under discussion, Downing Street has insisted.

Britain joining air strikes against jihadists has not been requested and is not currently under discussion, Downing Street has insisted.

But a spokesperson for No 10, said: ‘There’s been no request for us to deliver air strikes and this is not something under discussion at the moment.

Our focus remains on supporting the Iraq government and Kurdish forces so that they can counter the threat posed by ISIL, for example with the visit of our security envoy to Iraq this week and the provision of supplies to Kurdish forces.’

The report suggested US president Barack Obama asked the Pentagon to carry out a ‘scoping exercise’ with allies to discover their approach to joining a campaign.

NATO members are due to gather at Celtic Manor, south Wales, on September 4 and 5, for a summit.

The Commons rejected British bombing in Syria in a historic vote almost exactly a year ago when Prime Minister David Cameron sought approval for military strikes in response to chemical attacks.

And The Times reported scepticism about whether domestic politics would allow Britain to become involved.

An unnamed Conservative minister told the Times: ‘David Cameron is simply not going to want to get involved this close to the election, even though it’s the right thing to do. The risks are too big.’

A Whitehall source also questioned the idea, saying: ‘The idea that we could somehow do military action in Syria without a parliamentary vote when there has already been a parliamentary vote disallowing it, it’s just not going to happen.’

Any action in Syria would go ahead without the permission of the Assad regime, raising the risks involved.

Standard