Category Archives: Asia

Asia, Government, North Korea, United Nations, United States

Pentagon warns North Korea, ‘You will be destroyed’

NORTH KOREA

DONALD TRUMP’S military chief has warned North Korea that action against the United States would ‘lead to the end of its regime and the destruction of its people’.

Pentagon head Jim Mattis said that Kim Jong-Un would lose any arms race or conflict it started after Pyongyang threatened to strike the American territory of Guam.

Earlier, the US President had declared that his nuclear arsenal was ‘far stronger and more powerful than ever’.

Mr Mattis said that, while Washington was pursuing a diplomatic solution, the military power of the US and its allies was the most robust on Earth. Mr Trump had sent a shudder through Asia this week, threatening to unleash ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’ against Kim Kong-Un’s regime.

Mr Trump’s comments came after US intelligence concluded that the Korean dictator had developed a nuclear warhead small enough to fit inside a ballistic missile – years sooner than expected.

Supersonic bombers from the American air force then carried out a ten-hour mission over the Korean peninsula, prompting Pyongyang to brand the US ‘nuclear war maniacs’.

The Korean People’s Army said it was ‘carefully examining’ a plan to strike the island of Guam in the Western Pacific – where US bombers are stationed.

Amid fears of nuclear war, Mr Trump continued to boost of his country’s military power on Twitter.

He posted: ‘My first order as president was to renovate and modernise our nuclear arsenal.

‘It is now far stronger and more powerful than ever before. Hopefully we will never have to use this power, but there will never be a time that we are not the most powerful nation in the world!’

However, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson sought to ease tensions and said there was no imminent threat from North Korea.

Mr Trump’s chief diplomat suggested that the president’s sabre-rattling had been deliberately robust – because it was the only language that Kim would understand.

He said: ‘I think Americans should sleep well at night, have no particular concerns about this particular rhetoric of the last few days.’

Mr Tillerson’s comments came as his plane refuelled in Guam, which is 2,131 miles from North Korea, on the way to the US after a trip to Asia.

He added: ‘Nothing I have seen and nothing I know of would indicate that the situation has dramatically changed in the last 24 hours.

‘What the President is doing is sending a strong message to North Korea in language that Kim Kong-Un would understand, because he doesn’t seem to understand diplomatic language.’

Tensions over the North Korean peninsula heightened as Pyongyang tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles.

It was understood they were capable of hitting Alaska, but not the US mainland.

But earlier in the week it was reported that intelligence agencies were convinced North Korea has produced a miniaturised nuclear warhead that could fit on one of its ballistic missiles.

The Defence Intelligence Agency’s assessment suggested Kim’s quest to turn North Korea into a fully-fledged nuclear power had been accelerated by several years.

Officials also increased estimates of the number of nuclear bombs in Kim’s arsenal to 60.

And they revised expectations of how soon the regime could mount a nuclear strike on the American mainland.

Critics countered that they did not believe North Korea has yet mastered the technology required to prevent its long-range missiles burning up in the atmosphere during re-entry from space.

Asia experts claim Mr Trump’s combative language is playing into the hands of Kim by allowing him to convince his people that he is protecting them from a real US threat to their existence.

Although analysts tend to believe North Korea’s ruler does not want war, they have warned he is willing to push tensions with the US as far as possible.

Mr Tillerson said he hoped international pressure – including from Russia and China – could persuade North Korea to reconsider and begin talks.

Britain’s Foreign Office said it would work to ‘maintain pressure on North Korea’.

COMMENT

FOR the second time this year, the escalating tensions in the Korean peninsula are a cause for serious concern.

Over Easter, random missile tests by Pyongyang and US sabre rattling alerted the world to how potentially dangerous the situation in this volatile region could be.

When the stand-off ended, there was at least some hope that North Korea would end its provocative weapons tests.

But instead, the country’s unhinged dictator Kim Jong-Un has doubled down, pressing ahead with the development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles which he now claims can hit the US mainland.

According to reports sourced to US intelligence, North Korean scientists have overcome a critical technological hurdle in the production of a miniaturised nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles.

If true, this rogue state is close to having the power to inflict unimaginable death and destruction, and now presents the gravest of threats to the region and the West.

Whatever individual feelings are of President Trump, most people should accept that under such circumstances no president of the world’s most powerful democracy could stand by and do nothing. Mr Trump’s stance is in stark contrast to the softly-softly approach of the Obama administration, which arguably allowed the situation to dangerously escalate.

Yes, Trump is guilty of using inflammatory rhetoric when he says threats against the US will be met with ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’. But the message is at least unequivocal, and expressed in language the North Korean regime cannot fail to understand as it threatens a missile strike against the US territory of Guam in the South Pacific.

The problem with such rhetoric, however, is that if the President fails to deliver on his threat, he will seem weak.

What is needed now is not more bellicose language but calm thinking by diplomats and Mr Trump’s senior generals, some of whom have impressive pedigrees. What is also vital is that the Chinese, who could have imposed reform on North Korea – effectively their client state – years ago, now behave responsibly and sensibly.

To their credit, they and Russia have supported the new UN sanctions against Pyongyang. Those sanctions must now be given the chance to work.

Kim’s Target:

guam-map

Protecting the island is the US military’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, used to shoot down ballistic missiles.

. Andersen Air Force Base, located in the south-west of the island, hosts B-52 bombers, as well as B-1B Lancer bombers and B-2 Stealth bombers.

. Guam is a 210-square mile volcanic island in the Western Pacific.

. It has a population of just 160,000 with some 6,000 US troops stationed there.

. 4 nuclear submarines. A Naval Base is located in the north-east of the island.

 

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Asia, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United Nations, United States

The U.S. says the use of pre-emptive force against North Korea is an option

NORTH KOREA

DMZ

The Korean Peninsula continues to remain in a technical state of war. Soldiers patrol the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), a Cold War vestige created in 1953.

Intro: U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has outlined a tougher strategy to confront North Korea’s nuclear threat after visiting the world’s most heavily armed border near the tense buffer zone between rivals North and South Korea.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said it may be necessary to take pre-emptive military action against North Korea if the threat from their weapons program reaches a level “that we believe requires action.”

Tillerson outlined a tougher strategy to confront North Korea’s nuclear threat after visiting the world’s most heavily armed border near the tense buffer zone between the rivals Koreas. He also closed the door on talks with Pyongyang unless it denuclearises and gives up its weapons of mass destruction.

Asked about the possibility of using military force, Tillerson insists: “all of the options are on the table.”

He said the U.S. does not want a military conflict, “but obviously if North Korea takes actions that threatens South Korean forces or our own forces that would be met with (an) appropriate response. If they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action that option is on the table.”

But he said that by taking other steps, including sanctions, the U.S. is hopeful that North Korea could be persuaded to take a different course before it reaches that point.

Past U.S. administrations have considered military force because of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them, but rarely has that option been expressed so explicitly.

North Korea has accelerated its weapons development, violating multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and appearing undeterred by tough international sanctions. The North conducted two nuclear test explosions and 24 ballistic missile tests last year. Experts say it could have a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the U.S. within a few years. Pyongyang insists it has the capability in delivering such a long-range ballistic missile.

Tillerson met with his South Korean counterpart Yun Byung-se and its acting president, Hwang Kyo-ahn on the second leg of a three-nation trip which began in Japan and will end in China. State Department officials have described it as a “listening tour” as the administration seeks a coherent North Korea policy, well-coordinated with its Asian partners.

Prior to that meeting, Tillerson touched down by helicopter at Camp Bonifas, a U.S.-led U.N. base about 400 meters (438 yards) from the Demilitarised Zone, a Cold War vestige created after the Korean War ended in 1953. He then moved to the truce village of Panmunjom inside the DMZ, a cluster of blue huts where the Korean War armistice was signed.

Tillerson is the latest in a parade of senior U.S. officials to have their photos taken at the border. But it’s the first trip by the new Trump administration’s senior diplomat.

The DMZ, which is both a tourist trap and a potential flashpoint, is guarded on both sides with land mines, razor wire fence, tank traps and hundreds of thousands of combat-ready troops. More than a million mines are believed to be buried inside the DMZ. Land mine explosions in 2015 that Seoul blamed on Pyongyang maimed two South Korean soldiers and led the rivals to threaten each other with attacks.

Hordes of tourists visit both sides, despite the lingering animosity. The Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty, which means the Korean Peninsula remains in a technical state of war.

President Donald Trump is seeking to examine all options — including military ones — for halting the North’s weapons programs before Pyongyang becomes capable of threatening the U.S. mainland.

Tillerson declared an end to the policy “strategic patience”, a doctrine of the Obama administration, which held off negotiating with Pyongyang while tightening of sanctions but failed to prevent North Korea’s weapons development. Tillerson said the U.S was exploring “a new range of diplomatic, security and economic measures.”

Central to the U.S. review is China and its role in any bid to persuade Pyongyang to change course. China remains the North’s most powerful ally. Tillerson is now expected to meet with top Chinese officials including President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

While the U.S. and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo implore Beijing to press its economic leverage over North Korea, the Chinese have emphasised their desire to relaunch diplomatic talks.

Tillerson, however, said that “20 years of talks with North Korea have brought us to where we are today.”

“It’s important that the leadership of North Korea realise that their current pathway of nuclear weapons and escalating threats will not lead to their objective of security and economic development. That pathway can only be achieved by denuclearising, giving up their weapons of mass destruction, and only then will we be prepared to engage with them in talks,” he said.

Six-nation aid-for-disarmament talks with North Korea, which were hosted by China, have in fact been stalled since 2009. The Obama administration refused to resume them unless the North re-committed to the goal of denuclearisation, something that North Korea has shown little interest in doing.

Tillerson urged China and other countries to fully implement U.N. sanctions on North Korea.

He also accused China of economic retaliation against South Korea over the U.S. deployment of a missile defence system. He called that reaction “inappropriate and troubling” and said China should focus on the North Korean threat that makes the deployment necessary. China sees the system as a threat to its own security.

Last week, North Korea launched four missiles into seas off Japan, in an apparent reaction to major annual military drills the U.S. is currently conducting with South Korea. Pyongyang claims the drills are a rehearsal for invasion.

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Arts, Asia, Books, China, Economic, Government, Politics, Society, United States

Book Review – Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century

THE EMERGING NEW SUPERPOWERS

easternization

Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century by Gideon Rachman is published by Bodley Head (£20)

Intro: As eyes look East, can Gideon Rachman’s new book predict what will happen next? By the year 2025, some two-thirds of the world’s population will be living in Asia.

THIS summer’s Olympic Games in Rio surprised many when the UK pipped China to second place in the overall medal table. That aside, we should be under no illusions as to who the big players are when it comes to global affairs. The British Government’s decision under prime minister Theresa May to review its plans for the Hinckley Point C nuclear power plant suggests that Mrs May has erred more on the side of caution when it comes to dealing with China than David Cameron and George Osborne. Mrs May’s initial prevarication was met by a warning from the Chinese state news agency that her apparent ‘suspicion towards Chinese investment’ threatened the arrival of the ‘China-UK golden era’ that President Xi Jinping declared on his trip to London last year. On her first trip to China as Prime Minister earlier this month, our American friends would have been watching closely. The U.S. was left frustrated last year when the UK announced it was to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In 2014, the IMF announced that China had become the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power. There are, though, many indices by which the United States remains way out in front: mineral wealth, oil and other energy sources, and its geopolitical neighbourhood is far more secure and stable.

At the end of this insightful book which focusses largely on the ‘Asian century’ that lies ahead, Gideon Rachman makes the point that the current position of the West is supported by certain inbuilt advantages, such as its representative institutions and open (albeit increasingly fractious) societies.

The reader is enlightened to the well-grounded assertions that the tectonic plates of global influence is changing. By 2025, some two-thirds of the world’s population will be living in Asia, with 5 per cent in the United States and 7 per cent in Europe. Even the US National Intelligence Council warns that the era of Pax Americana is ‘fast winding down’. Despite Barack Obama’s announcement in 2011 of America’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia, however, such policies are yet to assume a tangible form. Washington’s approaches to Asia remain torn, ranging from ‘primacy’ to ‘offshore balancing’ and from ‘containment’ to ‘accommodation’. Better political fluidity is needed rather than a bumper-sticker approach.

For the UK, the rise of China is likely to trigger a harbinger of dilemmas. Hinkley Point and the collapse of the British steel industry are just the mere tip of an economic revolution that will become far reaching. For example, to what extent will Britain seek to synchronise its approach with the next US administration (especially given its stated position of seeking a bespoke trade deal and strong defensive alliance with Washington)? The irreconcilable should not be overlooked. Instructive in the argument here is the experience of Australia, which also lives under the US security umbrella but is umbilically tied to Asian markets. In July of this year, when an international tribunal at The Hague ruled against China’s territorial claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, Australia joined the U.S. and the Japanese in calling for the Chinese to respect the verdict. Australia has now become a source of major Western irritation for Beijing. Like many other countries, Australia has become increasingly wary of Chinese investment in its energy infrastructure.

Earlier this year in Washington, the Australian prime minister, Malcolm Turnball, gave a speech and expressed concern about the ‘Thucydides Trap’. Named after the classical Greek historian, this notional concept is a creation of the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison. He determined that in 12 of the 16 cases in which a rising power has confronted a status quo power over the last 500 years, war has always prevailed. Former and past iterations of Chinese strategy under Xi’s predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, spoke in terms of China’s “peaceful rise”, its amenability to international rules and its apparent willingness to fit in with the existing order. But the period of “hide and bide” may now have passed. Fu Ying, a former Chinese ambassador to the UK, has said that the US-led world order is a suit that no longer fits for China and the emerging Asian markets. Close observers and analysts of Chinese reform even suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is exerting a growing influence on decision-making, and that the Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy by riding on the back of nationalist sentiment.

Politically, both Washington and Beijing have very long-term and all-encompassing definitions of what their peripheries and first line of defences are. War games, for example, often scope out a series of alarming scenarios. The Pentagon views Chinese defensive strategy as “anti-access and area denial” and has developed its own “air-sea battle” doctrine in response. And, concurrently, China’s “belt and road” strategy, by which it aims to reconstitute a Silk Road through the Eurasian landmass, can be explained partly by historical fears of Western blockades of Chinese ports or incursions into its territorial waters.

The historical enmities and divisions in Asia are marred with flashpoints that could ignite a larger conflagration on land or sea. There are territorial disputes in the South China Sea over a series of uninhabited islands – those such as the aptly named Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs – which, according to Beijing, fall within the “nine-dash line” by which China’s territorial waters are defined. There are large numbers of ethnic Chinese in places such as Malaysia and Indonesia for whom Beijing feels some responsibility. Meanwhile, however, Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has assumed a much more offensive posture in response to Chinese claims to the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (as the Japanese call them) in the East China Sea. South Korea has endeavoured to reach an understanding with Beijing but Vietnam has looked to the US for protection as relations with China have soured.

 

In Easternisation, Rachman calls for a rapid improvement in the West’s situational awareness. The book is a welcome rebuttal of the tendency to view Asia through the prism of the markets alone. Although it has become fashionable and customary to speak of the “Pacific century”, the author suggests that an “Indo-Pacific” lens might be a more helpful way of viewing Asian geopolitics from the West. For instance, the development of the relationship between China and India – which share a contested land border and are highly suspicious of each other – is worthy of focus and attention.

India has already emerged as a global powerhouse in its own right. It has a similar size population to China, but a much healthier demographic balance and more established and experienced military.

Whilst still something of a geopolitical outsider, with India having no seat on the UN Security Council, there is gathering consensus that it could become a “swing state” and be harnessed to form part of a newly constituted democratic alliance. For the new superpowers in the East, the learning curve for tilting global powers in its favour might still be steep and perilous, though the West does appear to have tacitly accepted that the certainties of the past are passing. The US “pivot” towards Asia is a clear acknowledgement of this shift.

 

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