EUROPEAN REALIGNMENT
FANATICS of Britain’s departure from the European Union have struggled to quantify the Brexit dividend and what benefits it brought, but when Donald Trump unveiled his schedule of global tariffs they finally had a number to point towards. It was the difference between the 20% levy imposed on all continental exports and the 10% baseline figure payable on British goods.
A week later the gap closed leaving Brexiteers melancholic and dejected when Mr Trump reversed his plans. What the tariff schedules will look like at the end of the 90-day “pause” is no more predictable than any other feature of current US policy. There is no obvious concession from the UK government that might induce Washington to lower its 25% barrier against car exports, and the 10% rate on everything else looks non-negotiable.
Meanwhile, dialogue with the EU about closer cooperation continue apace. The UK hopes to have a framework agreement in place in time for a summit in London in May. The primary focus is security, but that is intended to be a forerunner to closer trade alignment.
As an indication of accelerating rapprochement, Rachel Reeves, the Chancellor, has just attended a meeting of EU finance ministers in Warsaw. Plans have been announced for a pan-European defence procurement fund with the UK expressing an interest to be included. There are hurdles still to be overcome but also strong will on both sides to make it happen. It is a measure of how much more constructive diplomacy has become under Labour. No Tory government would have sought such collaboration. Regime change in Westminster made a closer EU-UK relationship possible, then Mr Trump’s rampage of destruction through the norms of transatlantic security and global trade made it urgent.
The Brexit withdrawal treaty and subsequent trade and cooperation agreement were deliberately shaped by Boris Johnson’s government to impede reintegration on any level. Irreversible divergence was the whole point. But, while there is no great appetite in Brussels to revisit the terms of Brexit that damaged British businesses and interests more than the EU, recognition of a mutual strategic interest and a more constructive disposition are necessary. The long-term economic rational is being hampered as the UK continues to operate within red-lines drawn by domestic electoral imperatives.
European leaders fully understand that democratic politicians must defer to public opinion. But with Sir Keir Starmer having earned goodwill through his diplomatic advances, the prime minister’s reluctance to ever challenge the fallacious premises of Brexit, even after winning a landslide general election victory last year, raises doubts about the true scale of his ambition when it comes to the EU reset. That misgiving is magnified whenever British ministers talk enthusiastically about their dealings with Mr Trump, who doesn’t hide his hostility to the European project. Sir Keir insists it is not a binary choice, but it will become one as soon as concessions to the White House threaten to destroy trust in Brussels or further impede access to the single market.
The claim that the UK can be equidistant between Europe and the US may feel like keeping options open, but in Brussels it looks like a reversion to typical British Eurosceptic ambivalence. Sir Keir faces a stark strategic dilemma, and his options get worse the longer he defers the choice.