Category Archives: Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Government, History, Middle East, Syria, United Nations, United States

The US Secretary of State faces challenges, but is John Kerry sufficiently supported?

US FOREIGN POLICY

John Kerry has illuminated the paradox of current American foreign policy. No where is this more embodied than in the Middle East, the region that continues to consume so much time and effort for the US Secretary of State. Rarely has the diplomacy and energies spent been as active and as bold as they are today. But flamboyant charges that the US is enfeebled and in retreat are also accusations that are running in parallel.

Mr Kerry is tacitly involved on three immensely challenging and overlapping fronts: his efforts to end the bloody civil war in Syria; the continued search for a nuclear deal with Iran that might end more than three decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran; and, the renewed and engaging process to secure a two-state settlement between Israel and Palestinians that has eluded negotiators since 1948.

An analysis of the progress being made will reveal a mixed picture. Encouragingly, the best advances have been made with Iran, with an interim deal that parts of the country’s nuclear programme have been frozen for a period of six months. This deal could yet unravel, but the U.S. and Iran are engaged in a process of constructive dialogue.

To the other extreme, Syria constitutes a total failure. The recent Geneva conference which could not even deliver an agreement on bringing humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of civilians, trapped by the savagery of the conflict, epitomises this rank failure. Vladimir Putin’s Russia continues to arm and supply the regime, while progress on securing Assad’s chemical weapons and stockpiles is, at best, described as being limited. More accurately, it would not be amiss to say that progress in removing Assad’s arsenal has been brought to a stuttering halt.

The current state of play in dealing with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is less clear. Whilst Mr Kerry has been doggedly determined in keeping talks going, his indefatigability may be perceived from different angles of thought. For those who support him, this involvement and persistent diligence is proof of resolve. It is also recognition of his courage by placing his prestige on the line in a way that many of his predecessors never did. For the detractors, though, the US Secretary of State is merely on an ego trip, driven largely by the naïve belief that hope will triumph over experience. The more impartial may wonder whether Mr Kerry’s goal of a ‘framework’ plan – an agreement by the two sides on the shape of the final agreement with the details being worked out later – is really any different from the other diplomatic formulae’, such as the ‘road maps’, that have littered nearly seven decades of futile peacekeeping.

Underpinning Mr Kerry’s efforts on all three fronts is the ‘damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t’ scenario faced by the US in the Middle East. Most expect America to lead, even if its ability to shape and bend the region to its will is often grossly exaggerated. When the U.S. has taken decisive action, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, it has been accused of being a blundering warmonger. Following on from these two long and costly interventions, Americans will have no appetite for another. Yet, when it steadfastly refuses to robustly intervene in Syria (or to a lesser extent in Egypt), it is denounced for abandoning its responsibilities, and of condoning and supporting human rights abuses. It can hardly wave a magic wand and expect all to be well.

American history tends to suggest that the most effective Secretaries of State tend to be those that have been closest to their respective Presidents. Henry Kissinger, for instance, under President Richard Nixon, or James Baker who held post during the reign of President George HW Bush, spring to mind. Secretary of State Kerry is barely a year into his tenure, and so it is too early to say whether he will join this company. Success, however, on one of the three major challenges he is faced with would amount to a distinguished and noteworthy achievement.

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Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, Society, United States

Reconfiguring Defence for reasons of a changed world…

DEFENCE & FUTURE OVERSEAS PARTNERSHIPS

Over the course of the last half-century defence spending has attracted and been a hot issue of contention. This has been brought to the fore in recent times, through government rounds of budget and expenditure reductions. Most notably, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the cuts to overall manning levels to the armed services have brought the issue into sharp focus. Critics argue this has seriously skewed our defence posture and capability towards mammoth (and massively expensive) commitments such as upgrading and maintaining Trident and the development of new aircraft carriers.

Last month, former US defence secretary, Robert Gates, asserted that defence cuts in Britain have left the UK unable to be a ‘full partner’ in future military operations with the United States. As a result of defence cuts, Mr Gates believes that the UK no longer has ‘full-spectrum capabilities’. This, he says, will affect the UK’s ability to be a full partner and will change the dynamics of how operations are conducted in the future. His comments came in the wake of remarks by General Sir Nicholas Houghton, the Chief of the Defence Staff, who said that manpower is increasingly being perceived as an ‘overhead’ and that Britain’s defence capabilities have been ‘hollowed out’.

It is right that these cuts have been questioned in the UK. The concerns over the knock-on direct and indirect effects on local economies, and the dangers of global military over-stretch, have been well aired. At the same time, however, many have long queried the need for such a large and over-bloated defence budget, particularly when our appetite for overseas engagements in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts has greatly diminished.

The world has changed, too. Britain is certainly not the global power she once was. There is perhaps room for debate on the reasons for this relative decline, but some truths are incontrovertible. The growing focus of global power and wealth from West to East, the profound change in the nature and structure of armed conflict and the threats that we face to our national security are all factors that must enter the equation if we are to explain and account for how the world has changed and how, as a consequence, our influence has declined. Our reduced military capabilities reflect in large part the need to bear down and address our massive budget deficit and public debt. Such considerations have, as Gates himself stated, also forced spending reductions in the US.

But what is also true is that Britain is less committed in performing the role of being an acquiescent subordinate to the United States in international affairs. Widespread disquiet has also stemmed from the ubiquitous relationship that US intelligence has with Britain’s intelligence services and the close links that have existed between America’s National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s communications and listening posts at GCHQ in Cheltenham. In light of these considerations, it is only right and proper that the UK’s military relationship with the US be subject to re-examination.

Public ambivalence is not likely to stop there, either. It should also lead in due course to a more searching examination of Britain’s future commitment to Trident and what justifications there are in keeping a nuclear deterrent. Particularly so, given the changing political landscape in the UK and the very real prospect of Scotland (where Trident and the nuclear deterrent is housed against its will) becoming an independent nation. The referendum for Scottish independence is to be held this year in September.

It may be tempting to compare our defence capacity with what the country was able to sustain in the past and no-doubt some will rue Britain’s reduced capabilities. But the fact remains that the world has changed and with it the shifting balance of global power. It is to the future, not the past, which we should now look in how our overseas partnerships are formed. Britain’s defence arrangements will become a reflection of these changed requirements.

 

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Foreign Affairs, Government, Politics, Syria, United Nations

Solving the Syrian peace conundrum will be a struggle…

GENEVA PEACE TALKS

It will be a struggle, if not an impossible conundrum, to bring together all the interested parties in Syria’s civil war around the same negotiating table. With peace talks in Geneva due to start tomorrow consider the obstacles to these talks if Iran is present. The Syrian opposition would likely walk out, closely followed by Saudi Arabia. But shun Iran, and the outside power with the greatest influence on events will be freed from any obligation to accept whatever agreement is reached.

It remains uncertain whether all the parties with a vested interest will actually attend the summit. Amid the diplomatic manoeuvring, though, some central and underlying points are worth restating.

Common humanity dictates that all those countries with an interest should, on the face of it, be able to find points of agreement. This should be possible regardless of how their interests differ. For instance, who would deny the need for humanitarian aid to reach the areas sealed off by the regime of Bashar al-Assad? Or, what of his use of barrel bombs – devastating weapons that are packed with nails, petroleum and high explosives.

For Syria’s opposition there is a deeply uncomfortable truth it must accept and come to terms with. Whilst many will not like it, Iran will have to be party to any settlement that is reached. Tehran has sent thousands of troops from its Revolutionary Guard to fight in support of Assad. The Syrian dictator is clearly a leader being kept in power with Iranian backing. Iran’s signature will be needed if any agreement is to work.

All the parties concerned must be aware of the paradox that has stemmed from Assad’s narrative that Syria’s civil war has become a contest between his regime and al-Qaeda, and that Assad himself is the lesser of two evils. The enigma is that Assad has actively encouraged extremists to win influence within the opposition, precisely to confront us with this very choice. That should expose Assad’s derisive cynicism as much as he has become known for his cold-blooded brutality.

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