Category Archives: Intelligence

Government, Intelligence, National Security, Society, Technology

Britain’s security and intelligence services: Responsibility not just power

SECURITY SERVICES

Intro: Given the extent of their reach and a recent parliamentary report into their activities an operational realignment is called for

Our security and intelligence agencies face greater challenges today than ever before. Advanced and sophisticated technology has become commonplace, and the world strains to keep up or nearly buckles under the weight of our digital communications. Monitoring the activities of terrorists, criminals and other malign forces have become difficult to spot because of the subversive methods they use in defying detection.

Bodies such as GCHQ, though, are hardly mere victims of the electronic advance. You may often hear security chiefs talking about their desperate searches for needles in haystacks, but the fact is they have an impressive operational capacity to cut through a lot of the chaff in order to find what they seek.

The Security and Intelligence Services (SIS) ability to obtain and examine vast swathes of raw data and processed information has been furiously debated ever since the revelations of Edward Snowden, the US fugitive, about how the British agency received data relating to UK citizens from America’s National Security Agency up to 2014 – a practice which was branded unlawful by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Notwithstanding, there will always be a divergence of views between those who place primacy on GCHQ doing anything in its power to maintain public safety, and those who feel unease at the prospect of innocent people being subjected to continued intrusion.

Earlier this month a report on these matters by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee was a notable intervention. The committee members, like many of their peers across other government departments, believe that the bulk collection of data by GCHQ is legitimate and does not amount to unjustified, Orwellian surveillance. But they do appear to accept that the current legislation, which sets the parameters for such activities, is overly complex and lacks transparency. The legislation may have political oversight in regulating the activities of SIS, but its lack of public transparency and accountability was summed up well by the committee’s description of the existing legal framework. Intelligence agencies, they said, were being provided with a ‘blank cheque to carry out whatever activities they deem necessary’. In essence that is a damning indictment on the legislation that governs the work of our intelligence agencies. The committee has called for a new, single piece of legislation to replace and clarify current statutes as a matter of priority by the next government.

The discovery that a handful of intelligence officers have misused surveillance powers and have subsequently been disciplined by their superiors should also be of concern. The committee may speak reassuringly about the number of wrongdoers being in ‘very small single figures’ but the disclosure will hardly boost public confidence in the integrity of Britain’s security personnel. The recommendations of the committee are right, therefore, to suggest that the next government should consider criminalising such improper use of surveillance techniques.

Despite these positive proposals, there is nevertheless something troublingly simplistic about the committee’s top-line conclusion about GCHQ’s bulk interception capability. It says soothingly: ‘GCHQ are not reading the emails of everyone in the UK’. Whilst it is true that thousands of emails are read by security analysts every day, and that there remains a feeling that individual privacy of citizens comes a poor second to other considerations, few would have suggested otherwise against GCHQ’s simple assertion. That may be comforting for some, but surveillance does have the ability to antagonise as well as protect.

At a time when threats to this country are at a pitch not previously seen Britain’s security and intelligence agencies have a difficult job in tracking and monitoring those who wish to do us harm. But it must not be forgotten that the powers invested at their disposal are immense and more than proportionate for which they are needed. Simply asking that they be used responsibly is surely reason enough to help appease those who clamber to an argument of unnecessary state intrusion into many innocent people’s lives. Such a request stems from a belief that the glue which binds British society is primarily the combined force of its liberal values, not one that erodes it through a heavy-booted security capability.

 

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Asia, China, Economic, Europe, Government, Intelligence, Middle East, Military, National Security, NATO, Society, United States

US Defence Strategy…

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 7, 2012 by markdowe

SHIFT IN AMERICA’S DEFENCE STRATEGY

On Saturday, 07 January, 2012, the Editorial of the Daily Telegraph focused on America’s shift in defence strategy, following Thursday’s announcement by President Barack Obama. The US is to focus less on Europe and more on Asia following the rising threat of China.

The Editorial states:

‘The Pentagon briefing room rarely hosts all of America’s service chiefs, let alone the president. Its use by Barack Obama to announce the conclusions of his defence review was designed to add a sense of drama – and the occasion certainly lived up to its billing. Future historians will probably conclude that this was the week when America’s entire foreign and defence strategy pivoted decisively away from Europe and towards the Pacific. More ominously, it might also mark the onset of a new, if concealed, arms race between the US and its aspiring rival, China.

First things first: America’s military dominance will remain unchallenged for the foreseeable future. Mr Obama might have announced spending cuts of almost $500 billion over the next decade, but this amounts to a light trim for a defence machine with an annual budget of $650 billion, amounting to 45 per cent of all military expenditure in the world. America is not axing capabilities in the foolish fashion of British governments; rather, its power is being focused on the great strategic challenges of the next century. These can be simply summarised: the struggle for mastery in Asia, home of the world’s most populous countries and fastest-growing economies, and responding to sudden crises. To this end, the US will reduce its presence in Europe, cut 90,000 soldiers and bulk up in the Pacific, with new bases in Australia and elsewhere. As for other flashpoints, few will be surprised that the US policy stresses the goals of containing Iran and guaranteeing free passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

On a purely military level, two points stand out. The US might be cutting its army, but it has ruled out reducing its fleet of 11 aircraft carriers, each of which packs more punch than the entire air forces of most countries. While China’s defence budget has recorded double-digit increases for the past decade, it has still launched only one carrier – an old Russian model of doubtful combat value. Second, Mr Obama stressed his determination to invest in “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance”. Put simply, the US will seek to extend its lead in the most advanced combat systems: where scores of troops – and hundreds of support staff – might once have been required to dispatch a senior al-Qaeda operative, now one unmanned drone can do the job.

America’s new course could well be shifted by a strategic shock akin to the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, this plan will have momentous consequences for Europe and Asia alike. For decades, the US has underwritten the security of the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, effectively allowing Europe a free ride and permitting a string of Nato members the luxury of running down their defence budgets. This era is rapidly coming to a close. Yet with a few honourable exceptions, such as Britain and France, European powers have failed to fund their armed forces adequately, or deploy them when needed. Germany, in particular, must overcome the burden of its history and face up to the responsibilities that go with being the Continent’s leading economic power.

Mr Obama’s address studiously refrained from mentioning China, the country that probably has most at stake. Beijing’s leaders will now have to make far-reaching choices of their own. As events in Burma have shown, China’s “peaceful rise” has alarmed many of its neighbours: for most countries in the region, American power and values remain far more appealing. Moreover, China has grown rich largely thanks to trade, not least with the US. Faced with the net of containment that America is quietly laying across the Pacific, China will search for the Achilles’ heel of the US Navy, perfecting a new generation of missiles capable of destroying aircraft carriers from hundreds of miles away, working out how to cripple the internet, and how to blind the US satellite network, on which all its military assets now depend.

The world will pay a bitter price, however, if this veiled arms race between America and China escalates. History shows that free trade and military rivalry – however disguised – make for uncomfortable bedfellows. Beijing has gained rapidly in both wealth and power. The manner in which it chooses to pursue them now will have consequences for us all.’ [sic]

 

MD responded:

Whilst the US has declared China as a threat and announcing Asia as a priority, America is also to invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India. India will become the new powerful Asian ally of the United States in the region. In rolling out its new strategy, the Pentagon has made clear that the fronts for potential conflicts are shifting towards China. The US says that all of the trends – whether that is demographic, geopolitical, economic or military – are shifting towards the Pacific and, that over the long-term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the US economy and security in a variety of ways.

It shouldn’t be in any doubt that China has unsettled its neighbours over several years with the expansion of its navy and improvements in missile and surveillance capabilities. The Pentagon is anxious about China’s strategic goals as it begins to search for a new generation of weapons.

The US defence strategy followed a major diplomatic push by Washington to expand security partnerships with its allies in the region. Last month, the US, India and Japan held their first trilateral meeting in an attempt to counter China’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific.

China has advanced its influence in the region, along with allies like North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Over recent years it has established itself as a growing, and sometimes bullying power in the Pacific, particularly in East Asia. Most of the countries, though, in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have festering territorial disputes with China. America’s new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China also stems from the fact that the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the centre of gravity of world economic activity.

But is America’s new stance the beginning of something that could fan Cold war-style antagonism?

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Britain, Government, Human Rights, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, United Nations, United States

Rendition…

(From the archives) Originally posted on April 19, 2012 by markdowe

 MURKY POLITICAL WORLD

EVEN welcome regime change can have treacherous effects, transforming once-needed allies into enemies, or vice versa. And rarely have the risks been more graphically illustrated recently than with Libya, where a former dissident, Abdelhakim Belhaj, is now head of post-Gaddafi Libya’s armed forces. Not only is he suing the British government for allegedly colluding with Colonel Gaddafi to have him forcibly returned to Libya and tortured, but – as of yesterday – he is also taking legal action against a named official: Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary in the last British government.

The drama has unfolded in two stages. The first was last September, when documents found in Tripoli appeared to support claims that British intelligence had supplied information that allowed the CIA to spirit the fugitive Mr Belhaj and his wife back to Libya in 2004. The second has played out over the past week, after a newspaper quoted sources alleging that Mr Straw personally signed off on the operation. The former cabinet minister is accused of complicity in torture and misfeasance in public office.

It is thought to be the first time that such proceedings have been launched against a former Foreign Secretary – which is one reason why the full implications are as yet unclear. That there are implications, however, and potentially serious ones – both positive and negative – is beyond doubt. On the plus side, the latest lawsuit could mean that real light is finally cast on the still-murky subject of rendition and the involvement of the last British government. That rendition – the clandestine detention and transfer of suspects to their own country or third countries – and interrogation under torture were weapons deployed by the United States during George Bush’s “war on terror” is known and largely admitted. What is less known and mostly not admitted – though not expressly denied either – is how much the British government of the day knew about, and actively co-operated with, such actions with its transatlantic ally.

Co-operation may have taken many forms: from supplying information that permitted rendition (as Mr Belhaj’s lawsuit alleges), through facilitating it by, for instance, allowing the use of planes or refuelling stops, to providing the questions and witnessing, or even conducting, interrogations that entailed torture. Such accusations have featured in the testimony of many former British prisoners at Guantanamo, and in most cases the government has paid compensation rather than have the charges aired in court. The justification given is that crucial intelligence methods might be divulged. The suspicion must be, however, that there is another consideration: fear that the real role of the British state in the ill-conceived “war on terror” would be laid bare. If the lawsuits initiated by Mr Belhaj force genuine information about this shameful chapter into the open, that can only be a good thing. The people of this country have a right to know what was being done in their name.

The novelty of Mr Belhaj’s latest lawsuit, however, is that it names Jack Straw personally. And here the arguments become more complicated. Of course, individual ministers – like military commanders – must act within the law, hence the controversy about Lord Goldsmith’s rulings on the Iraq war. But does knowledge of rendition or torture break the law? Or would it take active involvement? What about ordering information to be passed to the US (a major ally)? And does the legal responsibility reside with the minister or the Prime Minister or the government collectively?

In principle, a minister’s responsibility is political – to Parliament – rather than judicial. But are there instances where that line is crossed? It might be salutary for that question to be tested. But if ministers are to be held personally accountable before the courts for their (or their boss’s) decisions, the risk is that no significant decisions – right or wrong – will be taken at all.

ANALYSIS

IT IS NOT UNKNOWN for ministers to be sued in the civil courts. During the last Conservative government, both John Patten and Michael Heseltine were sued – separately and successfully – for libel. The rule of thumb in such cases is that if the minister is found to have transgressed while performing ministerial duties (as was the case with Lord Heseltine), the government covers any damages, while if he was acting in a private or party political capacity (as was Lord Patten) he has to foot the bill himself. This may come as a relief to Jack Straw, the former foreign secretary, who is being sued by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Mr Belhadj alleges that Mr Straw personally authorised his rendition in 2004 when he was seized by CIA agents and handed over to the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. The LIFG had links to al-Qaeda and Mr Belhadj claims he was tortured by the Libyan regime. He is already suing the British government and its security services.

Rendition is not a crime. The British government’s position on this was set out in 2008 by the then foreign secretary, David Miliband. He said that the agreement this country has with the United States meant permission for rendition via UK territory or airspace would be given only if it accorded “with UK law and our international obligations; and how we understand our obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture”. If rendition is not a criminal offence, complicity in torture is, and in his complaints against Mr Straw and the British government, Mr Belhadj appears to be eliding the two. Yet Mr Straw last year explicitly denied any involvement in torture: “We were opposed to any use of torture or similar methods. Not only did we not agree with it, we were not complicit in it and nor did we turn a blind eye to it.”

It is self-evident that criminal allegations against a minister should be investigated by the police. But civil actions, where the burden of proof is less rigorous, are more problematical. The difficulty facing both Mr Straw and the Government is the reluctance of the intelligence services to contest such accusations as Mr Belhadj’s in the civil courts because it would expose their own officials to unwanted public scrutiny. This is what led to the payment of many millions of pounds in compensation to 16 Guantánamo detainees two years ago. Perhaps it is the prospect of such easy pickings that lies behind this case. In these circumstances, and in the unlikely event of this case ever reaching the courts, fairness demands that Mr Straw be indemnified against financial outlay. Otherwise a dangerous precedent will have been set in a complex and contentious area.

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