Britain, Business, Economic, Financial Markets, Government, International trade, United States

The US dollar: down but not out

ECONOMIC

Intro: Reports of the declining status of the US currency have been greatly exaggerated

For economists, the impact of a falling US dollar and how that impacts Britain will be observed and monitored closely. Of interest will be why the dollar has fallen of late, what President Trump’s attitude is towards the US currency, and how that impact will be felt.

The dollar lost around 2pc during January against a basket of major currencies (as measured by the DXY index). At the time of writing, the DXY is close to a four-year low of 96.79 – a staggering 10.7pc lower than this time last year. This significant weakening of the dollar has been driven by US policy shifts, tariff uncertainties, and geopolitical tensions. It also, to a lesser extent, reflects global effort to “de-dollarise” led by China and other large emerging markets.

Just days ago, the Federal Reserve held its main policy rate at 3.5-3.75pc. But the US central bank previously cut rates by 25 basis points at three consecutive meetings – in September, October, and December 2025. Lower rates typically weaken the dollar by reducing its appeal to yield-seeking investors, prompting capital flight to higher-return assets elsewhere. Financial markets are anticipating one or two more US rate cuts in 2026, putting further downward pressure on the dollar.

Since Trump took office last January, Fed boss Jerome Powell has come under intense pressure to cut rates faster and further, with the President eager to stimulate investment.

Nominated by Trump during his first term and reappointed four years later by President Biden, Powell has resisted. He has warned of the dangers of US inflation – 3pc as recently as September and still up at 2.7pc, above the 2pc target. Trump’s announcement that he wants Kevin Warsh as the next Fed boss when Powell’s term ends in May has seen the dollar strengthen, given Warsh’s reputation as an inflation-fighting hawk. Warsh, however, is also son-in-law of Trump’s long-standing friend and billionaire donor Ron Lauder. It is doubtful whether he’d be the president’s pick without having pledged to nudge the Fed’s policy committee towards lower borrowing costs – so the pace of rate cuts could quicken, putting more pressure on the dollar.

In theory, Trump’s tariffs should have bolstered the US currency by reducing imports and improving the US trade balance. But the scale of the measures announced on “Liberation Day” in April 2025 instead contributed heavily to the dollar’s fall in value.

The president’s measures – initially hiking average effective tariffs from 2.5pc to 27pc within a month – sparked market turmoil, including an asset sell-off that pressured the US currency. Direct retaliation from major trading powers including China and the EU further eroded investor confidence and prompted US capital outflows. Trump’s tariffs, while they are less punitive than first announced, have combined with broader macroeconomic concerns – including the rise of America’s debt from 100pc to 125pc of GDP over the last decade – to drive considerable “sell America” outflows to other major currencies.

While the related dollar weakening has aggravated US inflation, a cheaper currency helps US exporters, not least “rust belt” manufacturers that are a priority among Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement. That’s why many are inclined to think the president wants the dollar to keep on falling.

Trump has fuelled these concerns, pointing to the “great valuation” of the sharply depreciated US currency. There are suspicions the White House initially made its maximalist tariff demands not only as a bargaining ploy, but to strategically devalue the currency. The president’s dollar stance is nuanced – and often contradictory. He values “reserve currency status”, which sees the dollar demanded around the world both for payment transactions and a store of value. That supports the US currency, allowing America to run looser monetary policy without the inflationary impact of a dangerously weak dollar. Nonetheless, Trump has also shown willingness to tolerate and even encourage dollar depreciation for export gains (given his emphasis on appealing to blue-collar workers). Talk of the dollar’s demise, and its loss of reserve currency status, is, without doubt, overdone. The US currency still accounts for about 60pc of global foreign exchange reserves and almost 90pc of global transactions by value, underscoring its entrenched role.

Quite clearly, as the dollar has weakened, certain “safe haven” currencies have gained, with the Swiss franc up 13pc against the dollar during 2025. And despite its recent volatility, gold has soared from around $3,100 to over $4,900 an ounce since April 2025, such has been the impact of Trump’s “shock and awe” tariff announcement and the escalation of geopolitical tensions ever since.

When it comes to pound sterling, and the broader UK economy, a weaker dollar delivers a mixed offering. Benefits in lower import costs and inflation are offset by challenges for exporters, investors, and multinational firms. Since Trump’s second term, the pound has strengthened around 12pc against the dollar, from roughly $1.23 to $1.37. This makes dollar-denominated imports cheaper, reducing costs for US goods and dollar-priced commodities like oil.

And while the UK remains an inflation outlier, with a headline rate of 3.4pc in December, up from 3.2pc the previous month and higher than other G7 nations, domestic price pressure would have been even worse were it not for a falling US currency. Tourists and businesses travelling to, or dealing with, the US have also gained, with pounds stretching further abroad.

Yet the downsides are significant, particularly for UK-based companies with substantial US exposure. British-based exporters to the US have found their goods more expensive in dollar terms, undermining competitiveness and demand – especially amid US tariffs that add further barriers.

Overall, while a weaker dollar has flattered the value of sterling, and helped keep a lid on UK inflation, it has also exposed many of the UK’s structural weaknesses – a trend that looks set to continue.

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Britain, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

UK-US trade deal: Parliament must vote on any agreement

TRADE DEAL

Intro: Abolishing tariffs would be welcome for UK firms, but not at the price of reducing high regulatory standards or a reset with the European Union

LOOKED at dispassionately and objectively, a bilateral trade agreement between Britain and the United States is of relatively small economic significance to this country. Even ardent supporters of UK-US relations will find it difficult to argue otherwise. Back in 2020, for instance, Boris Johnson’s government estimated that a US deal “could increase UK GDP in the long run by around 0.07%” – a statistical calculation that is not exactly transformative. The view touted by some Brexiters that a US trade deal would fire up the entire British economy was always fantastical. Based on the assumption of a yearning for deregulation, there was little public support, even among leave voters themselves. Any urge of that kind now is even more delusional, in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariff wars.

The deregulatory alarm is hopefully a thing of the past. But global trade has new traumas too. Trump’s protectionist policies and bullying of US rivals are resetting the terms. There are nevertheless specific reasons why it is in Britain’s interest to pursue free trade talks with the US. Chief among these is the direct threat posed by current tariffs, especially on cars and pharmaceuticals. There is also the distinct prospect that a 10% tariff will be re-imposed on all UK exports to the US after the current 90-day pause ends in July.

The problem with any trade deal lies with the prices that the US may try to extract for tariff reductions or exemptions. And while the U.S. vice-president, J.D. Vance, has said that he sees a “good chance” of a deal, this could still be contingent on UK concessions in sectors such as agriculture, sanitary rules, and digital regulation. These are the same sectors that, for good reason, proved to be stumbling blocks in the post-Brexit discussions. Efforts to rebrand things like AI, biotech, and digital infrastructure, as strategically vital industries of the future, do not dispel some real threats now facing British food standards, healthcare, or online controls.

All this is multiplied by the Trump administration’s unreliability and geostrategic approach. Trump’s policy in Europe is to weaken and destroy the EU. Urged on by right-wing Brexiter politicians, the president sees pulling Britain away from the EU’s orbit as part of that effort. So, however, does the EU. As a result, any attempt by Washington to offer generous terms to the UK in particular sectors is likely to make any reset with the EU far more problematic. Sir Keir Starmer says that Britain does not need to make an either/or choice. Insisting that Britain can have its cake and eat it, that’s hardly the brutal reality being faced; neither the US nor the EU will necessarily take the same generous view that Starmer holds.

Even if the prospective UK-US deal is less wide-ranging than it once might have been, it is still significant. Politically, the Trump factor also makes any such deal more explosive. UK treaties and international trade deals are traditionally delivered under prerogative powers. As the Brexit argument about a “meaningful vote” showed, there is a very limited role for parliament. That needs to change. It would be intolerable in the UK-US case. This is clearly a matter for parliament to debate, both during and after negotiations, and for both houses of parliament to vote on.

In recent days, the Labour chairs of the Commons foreign affairs and trade select committees called for such votes. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are both in favour. The UK government should make clear that no agreement will go ahead without a meaningful Commons vote in favour. Democracy cannot be usurped on this issue.

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China, Economic, Government, International trade, Politics, Society, United States

Global trade war: America is advancing its own decline

ECONOMIC

Intro: China is braced for economic turbulence due to swingeing tariffs. But it sees an opportunity by taking the longer-term view: a decline in US hegemony 

THERE can be no winners in Donald Trump’s ferocious trade war that he has unleashed, least of all among consumers and workers. In strongarm tactics, this has become a game of who can bear more pain. And because trade is at the heart of US ties with its biggest tariff target, China, the rest of the bilateral relationship is likely to deteriorate. That too is concerning.

Yet, paradoxically, despite the economic struggles of recent years, China may see a longer-term opportunity in the current crisis. Beijing’s response to the initial US tariff announcements was measured. Now it vows to “fight to the end” and has imposed an additional 50% tariff on US goods – taking total tax charges to 84% – in retaliation for reciprocated tariffs that Mr Trump now says will hit 125%.

Such an approach is unlikely to falter first. Any concessions would likely be taken as a sign of weakness, encouraging the US to ramp up the pressure even more. Xi Jinping is also a strongman who has dialled up nationalism as economic growth has slowed. Backing down would be humiliating, especially when the US vice-president, JD Vance, speaks dismissively of “Chinese peasants”.

Beijing is already allowing the yuan to weaken, but a major devaluation in the currency is thought unlikely. It has been preparing for this moment. China’s demographic boom is at an end, Mr Xi’s new vision for his nation, the impact of the pandemic, Donald Trump’s first term in office, and US bipartisanship have all turned against China in reshaping the world economy. But China has diversified in areas such as agricultural imports and found new markets for its goods – though exports to the US still account for just under 3% of its GDP. In recent weeks, it announced plans to “vigorously boost” domestic consumption, although previous action on that long-held ambition has not matched the rhetoric.

Mr Trump’s sudden announcement that he is suspending punitive tariffs on other countries for 90 days highlights an apparent underlying intention to make them distance themselves from China and stop them being used as a conduit for its goods. Still, if he goes ahead, high rates risk pushing them towards Beijing instead. Trump’s erratic policy may also reflect growing anxieties about the impact of those tariffs, not least among his own supporters. China is quietly confident that the U.S. will come under growing pressure to rethink from billionaire backers, ageing workers worried that their retirement funds are losing value, farmers, employees fearing for their jobs, and consumers contemplating higher prices in everyday consumables. A bilateral deal is not impossible, but sense needs to be restored.

Beijing does not like what lies ahead. But in the longer term, it has more confidence in its trajectory. It looks back to the 2008 financial crisis, when it “saved the world” with its massive stimulus package, and looks ahead now with emboldened self-assurance following its launch in January of its AI DeepSeek platform.

Above all, Beijing believes that when this storm has passed, few will regard the US as a dependable economic or security guarantor, with China becoming a more predictable and likeable partner. At February’s Munich security conference – where Mr Vance’s sneering attacks on European allies made the headlines – China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, pledged that China would be “a steadfast constructive force” and “factor of certainty in this multipolar system”. Some countries may feel forced to live with Beijing’s own trade and investment restrictions, and its use of economic coercion for political purposes. But others may simply drift from America’s orbit.

China expects to suffer, but as it watches on it will not be entirely unhappy as the US advances its own decline.

This is a transformational moment in the global order.

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