Category Archives: Military

Britain, Government, Human Rights, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, United Nations, United States

Rendition…

(From the archives) Originally posted on April 19, 2012 by markdowe

 MURKY POLITICAL WORLD

EVEN welcome regime change can have treacherous effects, transforming once-needed allies into enemies, or vice versa. And rarely have the risks been more graphically illustrated recently than with Libya, where a former dissident, Abdelhakim Belhaj, is now head of post-Gaddafi Libya’s armed forces. Not only is he suing the British government for allegedly colluding with Colonel Gaddafi to have him forcibly returned to Libya and tortured, but – as of yesterday – he is also taking legal action against a named official: Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary in the last British government.

The drama has unfolded in two stages. The first was last September, when documents found in Tripoli appeared to support claims that British intelligence had supplied information that allowed the CIA to spirit the fugitive Mr Belhaj and his wife back to Libya in 2004. The second has played out over the past week, after a newspaper quoted sources alleging that Mr Straw personally signed off on the operation. The former cabinet minister is accused of complicity in torture and misfeasance in public office.

It is thought to be the first time that such proceedings have been launched against a former Foreign Secretary – which is one reason why the full implications are as yet unclear. That there are implications, however, and potentially serious ones – both positive and negative – is beyond doubt. On the plus side, the latest lawsuit could mean that real light is finally cast on the still-murky subject of rendition and the involvement of the last British government. That rendition – the clandestine detention and transfer of suspects to their own country or third countries – and interrogation under torture were weapons deployed by the United States during George Bush’s “war on terror” is known and largely admitted. What is less known and mostly not admitted – though not expressly denied either – is how much the British government of the day knew about, and actively co-operated with, such actions with its transatlantic ally.

Co-operation may have taken many forms: from supplying information that permitted rendition (as Mr Belhaj’s lawsuit alleges), through facilitating it by, for instance, allowing the use of planes or refuelling stops, to providing the questions and witnessing, or even conducting, interrogations that entailed torture. Such accusations have featured in the testimony of many former British prisoners at Guantanamo, and in most cases the government has paid compensation rather than have the charges aired in court. The justification given is that crucial intelligence methods might be divulged. The suspicion must be, however, that there is another consideration: fear that the real role of the British state in the ill-conceived “war on terror” would be laid bare. If the lawsuits initiated by Mr Belhaj force genuine information about this shameful chapter into the open, that can only be a good thing. The people of this country have a right to know what was being done in their name.

The novelty of Mr Belhaj’s latest lawsuit, however, is that it names Jack Straw personally. And here the arguments become more complicated. Of course, individual ministers – like military commanders – must act within the law, hence the controversy about Lord Goldsmith’s rulings on the Iraq war. But does knowledge of rendition or torture break the law? Or would it take active involvement? What about ordering information to be passed to the US (a major ally)? And does the legal responsibility reside with the minister or the Prime Minister or the government collectively?

In principle, a minister’s responsibility is political – to Parliament – rather than judicial. But are there instances where that line is crossed? It might be salutary for that question to be tested. But if ministers are to be held personally accountable before the courts for their (or their boss’s) decisions, the risk is that no significant decisions – right or wrong – will be taken at all.

ANALYSIS

IT IS NOT UNKNOWN for ministers to be sued in the civil courts. During the last Conservative government, both John Patten and Michael Heseltine were sued – separately and successfully – for libel. The rule of thumb in such cases is that if the minister is found to have transgressed while performing ministerial duties (as was the case with Lord Heseltine), the government covers any damages, while if he was acting in a private or party political capacity (as was Lord Patten) he has to foot the bill himself. This may come as a relief to Jack Straw, the former foreign secretary, who is being sued by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Mr Belhadj alleges that Mr Straw personally authorised his rendition in 2004 when he was seized by CIA agents and handed over to the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. The LIFG had links to al-Qaeda and Mr Belhadj claims he was tortured by the Libyan regime. He is already suing the British government and its security services.

Rendition is not a crime. The British government’s position on this was set out in 2008 by the then foreign secretary, David Miliband. He said that the agreement this country has with the United States meant permission for rendition via UK territory or airspace would be given only if it accorded “with UK law and our international obligations; and how we understand our obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture”. If rendition is not a criminal offence, complicity in torture is, and in his complaints against Mr Straw and the British government, Mr Belhadj appears to be eliding the two. Yet Mr Straw last year explicitly denied any involvement in torture: “We were opposed to any use of torture or similar methods. Not only did we not agree with it, we were not complicit in it and nor did we turn a blind eye to it.”

It is self-evident that criminal allegations against a minister should be investigated by the police. But civil actions, where the burden of proof is less rigorous, are more problematical. The difficulty facing both Mr Straw and the Government is the reluctance of the intelligence services to contest such accusations as Mr Belhadj’s in the civil courts because it would expose their own officials to unwanted public scrutiny. This is what led to the payment of many millions of pounds in compensation to 16 Guantánamo detainees two years ago. Perhaps it is the prospect of such easy pickings that lies behind this case. In these circumstances, and in the unlikely event of this case ever reaching the courts, fairness demands that Mr Straw be indemnified against financial outlay. Otherwise a dangerous precedent will have been set in a complex and contentious area.

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Defence, Government, Military, National Security, Politics, Society

Britain’s Military and the 2015 Defence Review…

(From the archives) Originally posted on January 23, 2013 by markdowe

 2015 SECURITY & DEFENCE REVIEW

Intro:-

David Cameron should use the next defence review in 2015 to develop a more ambitious strategy that builds on the unrivalled skills of our Armed Forces. Give the Armed Forces the support they need

Following the hostage crisis in Algeria and Britain’s support for French intervention in Mali, David Cameron warned the House of Commons on Monday that this country faces an existential threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliates: we must steel ourselves, he said, for a “generational struggle” that could last for decades. Yesterday, the Government announced the latest tranche of military cuts, with 5,300 jobs to go in the Army, many through compulsory redundancy. The Ministry of Defence also confirmed that soldiers serving in Afghanistan are likely to be sacked when the fourth and final round of cuts is implemented in a year or so.

Such infelicitous timing has served to raise renewed doubts about the extent to which the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review can meet the challenges outlined by the Prime Minister. When he published that review, Mr Cameron insisted it was not simply a cost-cutting exercise, but was about “taking the right decisions to protect our national security in the years ahead”. That is not how it is working out. As he has shown in Mali and in Libya, Mr Cameron is prepared to intervene militarily in distant conflicts if he deems it to be in Britain’s national interest. Yet he is reluctant to will the means. Many analysts have long argued that to protect any government budget is a mistake at a time when spending needs to be reined in everywhere – but to safeguard departments such as health and international development while leaving defence to face the axe is positively perverse. The same sentiments were expressed yesterday by Lord West, the former security minister.

Our military clout is one of the reasons this country punches above its weight globally. The values we espouse as a mature liberal democracy are widely admired, and the fact that we are ready to fight for them if necessary is important. But as General Stanley McChrystal, America’s former commander in Afghanistan has previously warned, Britain will be shut out of key decisions if it does not maintain a credible capability.

Mr Cameron cannot have it both ways. Either he must restrain his ambitions and accept that Britain is destined to become just another middle-ranking European power, or he should use the next defence review in 2015 to develop a more ambitious strategy that builds on the unrivalled skills of our Armed Forces. We should favour the second course. Britain is in danger of losing the ability to fight alone – without ever having had a proper discussion about whether that is something we can or should live with. In a dangerous world, that leaves us ill-prepared to cope with the unexpected.

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Britain, Defence, Europe, European Union, Government, Islamic State, Military, National Security, NATO, Politics, Russia, Society, United States

NATO requires direction and purpose…

NATO

The two-day NATO summit in Newport, Wales, represents a key and defining moment in the organisation’s 65-year history. More recently it has become apt to question whether the post-war transatlantic alliance even has a future, particularly when NATO ends combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of the year. Defence budgets among the leading European powers have been severely cut and, coupled with the crippling lack of political will to reach consensus on vital security issues, critics of this Western alliance have been able to make a convincing case that the organisation is in real danger of becoming obsolete.

NATO’s future continuity and preservation as a global entity for good will now depend to a large extent on how leaders of the 28-nation alliance respond to the alarming array of new challenges that threaten not only the security of Europe, but the wider world.

The horrific and gruesome murders of two American journalists by Islamic State terrorists in Iraq, and the imminent possibility that a British hostage could soon suffer a similar fate, has highlighted in graphic and disturbing detail the very serious threat to Western security posed by radical militants associated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State – one that has taken root in lawless areas of northern Syria and Iraq. Then there is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s blatant and ruthless military intervention in Ukraine, actions which have led to Russia brazenly supporting rebel and pro-militia groups loyal to the Kremlin in maintaining the tempo over the challenge to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and encroachment of a sovereign state. The true extent of the rebel support was realised earlier this week when a Russian tank column was identified as being in support of capturing Luhansk airport. As if to confirm his disregard for Western attempts to rein in Mr Putin’s new-found spirit of adventurism, Moscow even boasted that it could take Kiev in just two weeks if it wanted to.

When considering too the continuing threats posed by al-Qaeda, the uncertain fate that awaits Afghanistan when the US-led NATO mission completes its withdrawal later this year, and the endemic lawlessness in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, it is clear that the West is facing its most difficult period since the end of the Cold War.

NATO’s ability to provide an effective response to these multifarious threats will depend ultimately on whether it can summon the collective political will and leadership to take decisive action against its enemies. For an organisation whose decision-making process requires consensual agreement, attempts to find a common policy amongst all the nations of the alliance have all too often been hampered by deep political divisions. Most recently these have surfaced in the way the major European powers have sought to respond to Russian aggression in Ukraine, with countries such as Germany and Italy unwilling to back the more robust stance favoured by Britain and the U.S. But neither has the NATO cause been helped by President Barack Obama’s reluctance to become involved in overseas conflicts. Mr Obama’s detached approach was evidentially confirmed in the last few days when the president admitted ‘we don’t have a strategy yet’ for dealing with Islamic State militants: this, despite their murderous assaults on American citizens.

There are some encouraging signs that NATO is preparing to rise to Mr Putin’s bellicosity in eastern Europe. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the outgoing NATO secretary-general, has already announced the establishment of a new, 4,000-strong rapid-reaction force capable of reacting to any future crisis in eastern Europe with just 48 hours’ notice. Many European member states will also come under pressure to honour the NATO commitment of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. The decision to establish new logistics centres along the Russian border to enable the rapid provision and requisition of military equipment in the event of a crisis is also another welcome indication that NATO’s members are not prepared to tolerate any further territorial incursions by the Kremlin. Whilst encouraging that there are signs the alliance has rediscovered a real sense of purpose, effective political leadership is now urgently needed.

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