Category Archives: NATO

Britain, Defence, Europe, Government, NATO, Society, Ukraine, United States

Britain could do much more in Ukraine

UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

THE UK has been at the forefront in providing military aid to Ukraine, coming second only to the US in the total support it has given.

In some areas, however, Germany is supplying more military hardware than Britain, even though it has been accused of reluctance in supporting Ukraine.

Britain is Europe’s biggest military donor to Kyiv, with some £2.3bn spent in 2022, and as much again is to come in 2023.

The Berlin government says it has so far issued licences for the export of military goods to Ukraine worth a total of nearly £2.1bn.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Britain this week came with a shopping list and appealed for more assistance for his embattled troops.

Fighter jets were at the top of his list – and he made a pointed rebuttal to Rishi Sunak’s suggestion that it would take Ukrainian pilots three years to learn to fly the RAF’s Typhoons, saying he would send air crew who have “already trained for two and a half years”.

Here, it is assessed what Britain could do to enhance its military support for Ukraine:

Typhoon Fighter Jets

The UK has 137 Typhoons, of which around 100 are “on the flight line”, in other words operational. These are based at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland and RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire. Only a few days ago No 10 shot down Boris Johnson’s demands for the UK to provide fighter jets, insisting “it was not practical” – in part due to the training requirements for Typhoons and the F-35 and complications involving their integration with other aircraft and technological systems in the war zone.

But within hours of Mr Zelensky’s plea for British jets to protect Ukraine, the rhetoric from Downing Street had changed saying the UK was “actively looking at just that”.

Sunak’s change of stance also followed Mr Johnson reiterating there was “no conceivable reason” why the UK should not send aircraft.

But, frustratingly for Ukraine, Sunak stopped short of an unequivocal commitment.

The Prime Minister described the announcement that the RAF would train Ukrainian fighter pilots as a “first step” towards sending jets. He also insisted it takes three years to train a Typhoon pilot – hence why the UK is not sending any combat aircraft yet.

But Mr Zelensky dismissed the Prime Minister’s excuse for inaction, insisting Ukraine would be sending pilots to the UK with two and a half years’ experience.

Many military analysts claim the UK’s fast-jet fleet is not suited to the conflict, and Ukraine would gain more from the F-16s operated by NATO partners such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland. These are simpler to use than the UK’s jets.

The US would need to sign off any transfer to Ukraine, as it controls the export licences.

Recent indications from the White House suggest this would not be problematic – although President Biden does not want to send the US’s own F-16s into aerial battle against Russia.

F-16 donations could happen within weeks, and President Zelensky’s visits to Paris and Brussels should provide added impetus.

The Netherlands has 40 F-16s and is transitioning to the more advanced F-35, made by the same manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. So it has jets to spare that are easier to operate than UK aircraft.

That so many NATO allies operate F-16s also gives advantages for training and supply chains.

Even relatively primitive fighter jets are unlikely to be available in the short term, so will not play any part in the anticipated spring offensive being planned in Kyiv.

France also hasn’t ruled out sending fighter jets, albeit with strict non-escalation clauses, including a ban on any French jet attacking inside Russia’s internationally recognised border.

Germany has ruled out sending fighter jets to Ukraine.

Challenger Tanks

The UK has 227 Challenger 2 tanks, of which 14 have already been committed to Ukraine. As Mr Sunak has pledged, they will reach the battlefield next month.

The conventional wisdom is that Britain could do more to help Ukraine. A further 14 Challenger 2s are being brought to “high readiness”, and could be transferred to the war zone.

Mr Johnson highlighted the absurdity of British tanks patrolling rural Wiltshire when they could be sent to the Donbass.

Arguably, the UK’s provision of Challenger 2s was primarily a political gesture intended to convince Germany to release and deploy its Leopard 1 and 2 tanks – which were always Kyiv’s preferred options. Being lighter and more mobile these tanks are considered better suited to the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Germany has agreed to supply 14 Leopard 2s – and said earlier this week it would join the Netherlands and Denmark to provide up to 178 older Leopard 1s. Leopards are used across NATO so it will be easier to resupply the German-made tanks than the Challenger 2s, which are used only by the UK.

The Challenger 2 is also due to be withdrawn from service. Of the 227, 148 will have their engines tuned, their turrets replaced and their main guns replaced. The same hulls will be used for what will be called Challenger 3.

These upgraded tanks will start entering service from 2027.

How many Challenger 3s are built is subject to a review by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace. The review will consider lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, which has changed the debate about the role of armour in modern warfare.

The Ministry of Defence says the Challenger 3 will reach 60mph and have more range. It will also be the UK’s fully digitised tank, able to share live data with other vehicles and attack helicopters.

Ukraine said it needed 300 Western tanks to make a significant difference on the battlefield. Ukraine has reached that target, mostly Leopard 1s and 2s, so it does not desperately need a tank with logistical issues such as Challenger 2 – and it does not have the time to wait for its successor Challenger 3.

Long-Range Artillery

Britain has committed to sending 30 AS-90 self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine when its combat troops have completed training on the weapon in the UK.

According to reports the British Army ordered 179 AS-90s from its manufacturer, BAE Systems – so there should be significant scope for further donations to Ukraine.

The weapon weighs around 44 tons, has a range of 15 miles and can fire three shots every ten seconds. It is operated by a five-man crew.

The UK has also given six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) firing M31A1 missiles up to 50 miles, letting Ukraine hit targets behind Russian lines.

Germany has provided five of an equivalent system, the Mars II rocket launcher, complete with ammunition. The UK is understood to have critical shortfalls of ammunition used by the AS-90 and GMLRS as a result of the conflict. Shortages of the anti-tank Stinger, Javelin and N-LAW weapons have also been reported.

The UK must increase production and procurement of munitions and guided-weapons systems, not only to support Ukraine but to ensure the UK can defend itself and meet NATO obligations.

A former senior military commander, Major General Jonathan Shaw, said: “Russia has mobilised its society and industry for war – we must respond. Wars are fought by nations, not armies. The West must mobilise its society and industries to win.”

But the UK is competing with NATO allies such as Poland and the US for many of the same requirements, such as additional GMLRS stocks.

DEFENCE analysts refute that RAF Typhoons should be offered to Ukraine. Their arguments should be considered before any deployment is made.

Our Typhoon fleet is routinely described as “overstretched” due to its operational commitments. Some missions are arguably by choice and not necessity.

Given the acute threat to British and regional security posed by a possible Russian victory in Ukraine, some might say that these responsibilities need be reconsidered so that Typhoons could be released to Kyiv.

The Typhoons flying over Iraq and Syria are based at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. Regional partners could be petitioned and encouraged to fly more sorties, freeing up the eight jets based at Akrotiri.

It is almost two months since any RAF assets hit an Islamic State target – when an unmanned Reaper drone fired a pair of Hellfire missiles to destroy a building. It is possible that drones could take the place of the Typhoons. That would be a strategic decision.

Four more Typhoons are in the Falklands and have flown “deterrence patrols” there since 2009.

The overall Typhoon force – 100 aircraft – is spread thinly and worn out. Numbers are compromised by spare part problems, engineer shortages and pilots lacking training hours. The first Typhoons, introduced in 2002, have flown longer than was originally planned and suffer from wear and tear.

To defeat Russian fighter jets in dogfights, Ukrainian-flown aircraft need advanced air-to-air missiles. The options are limited and the European Meteor missile – the weapon of choice for aerial engagement – is not compatible with early Typhoons.

To avoid Russian air defence systems, the Typhoons would need to fly at low altitude, and they were not designed for this.

However, the Typhoon has some advantages over rivals – it is faster than the MIG-29 and has a much bigger payload.

The claim that logistical support and maintenance is difficult is highly valid. The Typhoon is complex to maintain and significant numbers of UK contractors would be needed as well as arrays of support equipment. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has likened the Typhoon to a Formula One racing car, with good reason. The Typhoon is a highly complex aircraft.

The RAF Typhoon jets are especially susceptible to engine damage from objects being sucked into its air intakes, meaning smooth and constantly maintained runways are a must. Such runways would become a Russian target.

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European Union, Kosovo, NATO, Serbia, United States

NATO needs to strengthen its hand in Kosovo

KOSOVO

Intro: Two decades since NATO intervened in Kosovo, and almost 15 years since the country declared independence, Serbia’s refusal to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty is increasing the possibility of renewed conflict in the region

EARLY last month, ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo – near the Serbian border – started setting up roadblocks. They were protesting against the arrest of an ethnic Serb former police officer. The situation soon escalated into a dangerous impasse between Kosovo and Serbia, with Pristina calling on NATO-led international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to intervene, and Belgrade announcing its forces was on “the highest level of combat readiness” due to tensions at the border.

Following dialogue between Serbia’s President Alexandar Vucic and Kosovo’s Western partners that no arrest would be made over the incident, the protesters eventually started dismantling the roadblocks on December 29.

With the reopening of border crossings, the crisis appeared to come to an end. But the escalation in December was not the first incident that almost pushed Serbia and Kosovo into open conflict. It is unlikely it will be the last. The fragile relationship between the two neighbouring countries has been on the verge of collapse since last summer, when Kosovo’s government started taking steps to exercise sovereignty over the country’s entire territory. This included the demand that all citizens of Kosovo (including ethnic Serbs) start carrying IDs and using licence plates issued by Kosovo. In response, ethnic Serbs in the north barricaded roads and threatened violence, leading KFOR forces to start patrolling the streets in the region. A few days later, following mediation by the EU and US, Pristina and Belgrade reached a deal on ID documents but left the issue of licence plates to be resolved at a later date. That was resolved in November, with a signing of a deal that required Serbia to stop issuing licence plates with markings indicating Kosovo cities and Kosovo to cease its demands for reregistration of vehicles carrying Serbian plates.

The latest standoff at the borders came just a few weeks after this landmark deal, demonstrating quite clearly that the tensions between Kosovo and Serbia are chronic. They will not be truly resolved until mutual recognition is achieved.

Recent escalations between Serbia and Kosovo have followed a clear pattern. Kosovo attempts to exercise sovereignty over its whole territory; Belgrade responds by stoking unrest using the ethnic Serbs in the north as its proxies. The EU steps in, brokers a deal and stops the unrest from escalating into cross-border conflict. Then the cycle is repeated.

All of this shows that the recurring tensions have little to do with the practicalities of governance (such as licence plates), and everything to do with one core issue: Kosovo’s independence.

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Britain, Europe, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States

The nuclear détente withdrawal makes the world far more dangerous

ARMS CONTROL TREATY

TENSIONS between the world’s two nuclear superpowers have reached a level not seen since the early 1980s.

During an election rally in Nevada, President Trump said that Russia was cheating on the 1987 arms control treaty. The treaty banned land-based cruise missiles in Europe.

An agreement had been made back in 1987 between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev – leaders who trusted each other enough to take a decisive step in ending the arms race which had been a key feature of the Cold War for the previous four decades.

Now Trump, in response to Putin’s cheating, is saying he will pull out of the treaty altogether. And the world is back to the hair-trigger situation faced before détente introduced arms control between East and West.

The fact is that the new highly-mobile missiles which Russia have developed undoubtedly make the world a far more dangerous place. And Donald Trump’s aggressive chest-beating response risks making an already fraught situation worse.

To understand why, we must look at how Putin has broken his treaty obligations.

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty banned Russia from having any land-based intermediate nuclear missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. Sea-launched missiles were allowed, however – the theory being that they were more difficult for Russia to hide because the submarines and warships from which they were launched could be tracked and monitored by the West.

As a result, instead of the lumbering land-based SS20 missiles which worried the West so much in the 1980s, Russia has concentrated over the decades on developing much smaller missiles that can be launched from the sea. Such missiles, albeit without nuclear warheads, were used to devastating effect against rebels in Aleppo in Syria.

What Putin’s technicians have now done is to adapt these Kalibr sea-launched systems to make land-based cruise missiles capable of being transported by small trucks. They can be moved across country at 50mph and it would be impossible to track every one of them – making a surprise attack technically possible.

And the missiles, which fly under the radar, have been fitted with supersonic boosters which makes them practically impossible to intercept. This puts a vast swathe of NATO countries, including Britain, theoretically in the firing line.

 

WHY this is so disturbing is that it fits into Putin’s tactical strategy. Today’s Kremlin chief is ruthless, but worse he runs a Russia much less moribund than the wheezing Communist colossus of the 1980s. Putin’s armed forces are much leaner and meaner than in those days.

War in the 21st century has been practised already from Syria to Ukraine and in cyberspace. Putin knows he doesn’t need two million badly trained soldiers to be sacrificed in the trenches.

If it comes to war, he’ll need the best cyber-sabotage, the most effective special forces and, crucially, unstoppable medium-range nuclear missiles. Which he now seems to have acquired, despite the treaty.

This is why Trump has reacted so vigorously. Playing the tough guy also plays well to his core supporters, and he faces mid-term elections in two weeks’ times.

The trouble is that by dropping the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty now might suit Russia better in the coming years than the US. While for America the INF treaty has been a useful bulwark against nuclear escalation and proliferation, Putin’s strategists have chafed at the restrictions INF imposed on them.

By ripping it up, Trump will be criticised by European leaders – Germany was the first US ally to do so, with foreign minister Heiko Maas urging Washington to consider the consequences both for Europe and for future disarmament efforts.

All of this will delight Putin because it plays into his divide-and-rule approach to Europe.

More worryingly, if Trump does dump the INF agreement, there will be nothing to stop Putin’s generals from building and refining as many of these new faster-than-sound land-based nuclear missiles as possible.

Other nuclear powers, especially China and probably India and Pakistan, will want to buy them if they can’t build their own.

This technology is so easy to hide, swift to deploy and difficult to stop that it steeply increases the chances of a successful surprise nuclear attack. Worse still, without the trust between the US and Russian leaders that existed in Reagan and Gorbachev’s day, diplomacy is on a hair trigger – as in the worst days of the Cold War.

President Trump has declared he wants to make America safer, but we should fear he has made the world an even more dangerous and tense place. According to Mikhail Gorbachev, pulling out of the historic US-Russia arms treaty now “endangers life on Earth”.

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