Arts, Books, History, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, Society, United States

Book Review: The Nuclear Age

LITERARY REVIEW

FOLLOWING that day in the summer of 1945 when, on a testing ground in the New Mexico desert – when the first nuclear bomb exploded – many people of that era and generation have lived their entire lives under the threat of universal extermination.

It caused Robert Oppemheiemer, the brilliant scientist heading the US’s Manhattan Project, to proclaim melodramatically (but entirely accurately) an ancient Hindu prophecy: “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” Just three weeks later, in early August, the bomb was used for real for the first time against an enemy – in a blinding flash, and a shockwave that destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

Pavements melted, skin peeled off faces, more than 60,000 perished immediately, and in the following five months another 60,000 died from injuries and radiation.

Three days later, Nagasaki was given the same treatment. The original target had been a different city but heavy cloud cover saved it, diverting the US B29 bomber 125 miles south. Two square miles of the city centre were pulverised. Some 70,000 people died a horrible death.

And amazingly, those were the last fatalities of nuclear explosions. Eighty years on the world has somehow managed to avoid that apocalyptic and life-threatening tripwire of its own making.

So far.

This history is necessary to understand and should be imprinted on all our brains. It’s a miracle we are still here. Because in an unstable world (and increasingly so) we are all one reckless move, one miscalculation, one technical glitch, one individual’s moment of madness, away from Doomsday.

How the lid has been kept on nuclear Armageddon is plotted by acclaimed historian Serhii Plokhy in this chilling and bewildering book.

Bewildering because all we have ever done is make the threat greater, while posturing about the importance of containing it, claiming nonsensically that massive overkill is making the world a safer place.

In 1962, Soviet Union ships carrying nuclear weapons headed for a clash with an American blockade of Fidel Castro’s Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was the nuclear confrontation between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that came toe to toe.

If no one blinked, it was inevitable that those red buttons would have been pushed, missiles would’ve been fired, and the world would have been a goner. The end of history itself had beckoned.

Other than being flippant towards the world ending, how else could you deal with the apocalypse being hours, minutes, or just seconds away? Because the very idea is impossible to grasp. Do you hide under a desk as a civilisation built up over millennia is blown apart and a world of abundance is reduced to ashes?

With Cuba, the moment passed. The world survived. Plokhy argues that neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev was ready to push the button. They both pulled back.

And next time? Can we rely on the same calculated response from today’s leaders, from the likes of Putin, Trump, Kim Jong-un, Xi?

Since that’s the threat we live under, and yet we not only get on with our lives and look the other way, but we up the arsenal – increasing the destructive power to the point of absurdity.

Only recently, Putin boasted of a new Russian super-submarine with “unstoppable” weaponry that can fire nuclear drones at Western coastlines from thousands of miles away. In direct response, Trump ordered the US to restart nuclear testing.

Escalation and proliferation like this are the underlying narratives of the nuclear age: the powerful few believing they can keep the weapons to themselves, but finding all they have done is to provide an incentive to other nations to follow suit as quick as possible for fear of being left behind. The cat- and- mouse of the nuclear age; history is littered with such examples. The US threw its scientists into nuclear research for fear of Hitler getting there first and the Nazis snatching a late victory in the Second World War.

Then Stalin had to have his, Britain, too, then France, China, Israel, India. The club just got bigger; containment became harder and much more problematic. World leaders talked non-proliferation, but that’s easier said than done once the genie is firmly out of the bottle.

That genie is now ubiquitous. Officially there are nine fully fledged nuclear-armed states in the world. Yet, the most worrying assertion of all in this deeply disturbing book is that around 40 more states have access to the requisite technology, raw material and capability to produce nuclear weaponry, in some cases at very short notice.

That’s the size and extent of the timebomb each and every global citizen is sitting on.

Those scientists – the Einsteins, Bohrs, and so on – who first developed the principle and then the practicality of releasing unimaginable amounts of energy through nuclear fission and fusion, begged their political and military leaders to concentrate on the massive peaceful benefits of their discoveries.

Presidents and generals agreed; but first, they said, there is the enemy to defeat, this opponent and adversary to match, this military threat to see off.

Eight decades on, that’s where we still are. Plokhy’s account of the nuclear age hardly inspires optimism for the future.

He concludes that fundamentally it is the fear of annihilation that has kept us from the brink – the general agreement that it is in no one’s interest to perish in a global nuclear apocalypse. That held true in the Cuba crisis. He writes: “We must enhance the instinct of self-preservation shared by friends and foes alike to save the world once again.”

And keep our collective fingers crossed.

– The Nuclear Age by Serhii Plokhy is published by Allen Lane, 432pp

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Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

Russia-Ukraine talks: a “charade”

UKRAINE CONFLICT

IT has taken three years for direct talks to be held between Russia and Ukraine, and it should have been a momentous occasion. Since 2022, Russian war crimes have only deepened the chasm between them. It was Donald Trump who demanded this meeting, but who nonetheless underlined that it was largely a charade telling reporters, “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together.” It made plain that Russia felt no pressure to cooperate.

While difficult negotiations often begin on easier ground, the agreement of a mass prisoner swap seemed like a discrete achievement. The real significance of the Istanbul talks, however, lay more in the messages sent by their existence and attendance list.

The hasty proposal was Vladimir Putin’s escape route after European leaders demanded Russia agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire or face increased sanctions and weapons transfers. Ukraine and its backers said there should be no meetings without a ceasefire, but Kyiv was forced to concede when Mr Trump insisted it participate. Painful experience has clearly taught that it does not pay to defy the US president.

Volodymyr Zelensky challenged the Russian president to attend the talks personally, and vowed to wait for him in Turkey. This was, said a Ukrainian official, “a theatre performance for just one audience member”, reinforcing the message that Putin is the obstacle to peace. It is difficult to disagree.

Putin snubbed the meeting. Russia was represented by nationalist ideologues Vladimir Medinsky and Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, the latter a veteran military officer and diplomat who recently told Ukrainians that if they refused to capitulate in the war, “We will keep killing and slaughtering you.” Moscow’s approach did not appear much more diplomatic this time, either. Ukraine said that Russia voiced “unacceptable” things.

Mr Zelensky was adept in portraying the Russian leader’s non-attendance as “disrespect for Trump”. There is evidence of some frustration with Moscow in Washington. JD Vance, the US vice-president, insists that Russia was “asking for too much” and Mr Trump has expressed his displeasure towards Russian belligerence in angry sentiments and undertones. Lindsey Graham, a key Trump ally, says he has sufficient senatorial support to pass “devastating” new sanctions. But while he described his bill as part of the president’s arsenal, it is unlikely that Mr Trump will unleash it. That said, Putin will need to ensure he does not overplay his hand, given Mr Trump’s unpredictability. Putin may think spinning out the conflict is currently in Russia’s interests, but the war is far from cost-free for his country.

The recent narrative twists have revealed much greater coordination and resolve on Europe’s part. That is encouraging. Germany, for instance, has announced that it would hit Mr Trump’s demand for defence spending to reach 5% of GDP by 2032, albeit by including related infrastructure. However, US arms will run out long before Europe is fully ready to step into the breach. The key question surely remains not whether the US president can be coaxed and flattered into being more helpful, but whether he can be dissuaded from becoming actively obstructive – cutting off intelligence or Starlink, or preventing Europe from requisitioning arms for Ukraine. Seen that way, Mr Trump’s observation that “nothing’s going to happen” until he meets Putin sounds even more chilling. Meanwhile, away from the diplomatic front, the Russian attacks have continued in ferocity and intensity: further evidence of the urgent need for a ceasefire.

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Europe, Russia, Ukraine, United States

US-Russian bilateral talks on Ukraine: Europe is alarmed

UKRAINE

DONALD Trump’s latest attack on Volodymyr Zelensky, and the US administration’s last-minute snub of London peace talks, is the clearest evidence yet that what matters to Mr Trump is not Ukrainian sovereignty and safety, nor the transatlantic alliance, but a deal with Vladimir Putin. The US president says an agreement is close, with Washington recognising annexed Crimea as Russian with Moscow conceding little if anything in return. For Mr Trump, it is Ukraine’s president who is once again harming negotiations by saying he will not recognise Russia’s control.

Putin is fervent in his desire to maximise Russian interests, attentive to every detail, adept in negotiations, and strongly believes that time is on his side. Trump does not care about the outcome as long as he can claim he has ended the war. He has little interest in the detail and has a habit of handing over the prize at the start of the process.

Just prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion, Trump described Russian aggression towards Ukraine as “genius”. His administration is also now abandoning efforts to hold Moscow accountable for war crimes. He holds a grudge against Mr Zelensky, and believes Putin would “keep his word” on a peace deal. Above all else, Trump is in a hurry. Having pledged before coming to the White House for his second presidency that he could end the war “in 24 hours”, he wants something to boast about as he nears the end of his first 100 days in office.

After so many deaths and so much devastation, no one wants peace more than Ukrainians. Kyiv understands that there will be no magical restoration of territorial integrity, but the indications are that it is ready to negotiate, not to surrender.

JD Vance, the US vice-president, has a simple answer: it is time for the two sides to “either say yes or for the US to walk away from this process”. US military aid to Ukraine is already reaching its end, intelligence could soon follow, and Washington could also restrict arms purchases even if Europe was willing and able to fund them to the extent needed.

Putin has played an expert hand so far, throwing expediency to the cause at opportune moments – as with the offer of an “Easter truce”, which did not halt attacks. His most recent gambit is reportedly to offer to cede claims on Ukrainian land that Russia does not actually control – concessions that Trump will undoubtedly laud. He does not want a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine, said to be part of the US proposal, but may also conclude that its significance would be limited without a US security guarantee.

The timing of the US plans, as well as demeaning Europe’s diplomatic efforts – meaning London’s discussions were downgraded – reinforces the European understanding that a US-brokered deal may be a beginning, not the end, for Russian ambitions. But such a grotesquely one-sided, imposed agreement would encourage territorial aggression elsewhere too. It isn’t surprising that Putin sees Europe as an obstruction and prefers bilateral talks. It should continue to alarm and appal us that the US, too, now sees its old allies as the problem, and not part of any solution.

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