Category Archives: Saudi Arabia

Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia

Water: The Gulf’s most precious resource under attack

WATER AND DESALINATION PLANTS

The Gulf states may have been built on wealth from oil, but it is another liquid – water – that keeps these desert countries running day-to-day.

Recent attacks on desalination plants in countries on both sides of the Iran war have targeted the Gulf’s most precious commodity, and threatened to weaponise a resource needed to prevent the region’s megacities from collapsing.

Just days ago, Bahrain accused Iran of damaging a desalination plant, hours after the Iranians claimed a US air strike had hit one of theirs.

Securing plentiful water in a region with almost no underground supplies or rain has been central to the vaulting ambitions of the fast-growing Gulf countries. The solution has been desalination plants, which turn seawater into drinking water for millions of people in one of the world’s driest regions.

In Kuwait, about 90 per cent of drinking water comes from desalination, along with roughly 86 per cent in Oman, and about 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia.

Everyone thinks of Saudi Arabia and their neighbours as petro-states. But, in reality, they are saltwater kingdoms. They’re human-made fossil-fuelled water superpowers. It’s both a monumental achievement of the 20th century and a certain kind of vulnerability.

Nearly half the world’s total desalination capacity is in the Gulf. The processing of water is needed not only to quench the thirst of fast-growing populations, but also for hotels, resorts, shopping centres, golf courses, and other facilities.

Yet, what has been a marvel of engineering and economic planning, has also been recognised as the dangerous vulnerability it is. Gulf governments and their allies have long warned of the risks these systems pose to regional stability.

In 2010, a CIA analysis said attacks on desalination facilities could quickly trigger national crises in several Gulf states. If critical equipment were destroyed, water processing could be halted for months.

A leaked 2008 US diplomatic cable warned that Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital, “would have to evacuate within a week” if either the Jubail desalination plant on the Gulf coast, or its pipelines or associated power infrastructure were seriously damaged. The cable added that “the current structure of the Saudi government could not exist” without the plant.

Gulf states are thought to have bolstered the resilience of their desalination networks since then, but the recent air strikes have again highlighted their vulnerability.

The Iran war is not the first conflict in the region in which water-processing plants have been targeted. After Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War, Iraqi forces sabotaged power stations and desalination facilities as they retreated.

At the same time, millions of barrels of crude oil were deliberately released into the Gulf, creating one of the largest oil spills in history. Workers deployed booms around the intake valves of desalination plants to prevent the vast slick from contaminating seawater-intake pipes.

The destruction left Kuwait largely without fresh water and dependent on emergency water imports. Full recovery took many years. More recently, Houthi rebels have targeted Saudi desalination facilities.

In the Gulf, desalination facilities are not merely infrastructure. They are essential lifelines that supply drinking water to millions. Striking them risks turning a military confrontation into a direct threat to civilian survival.

Iran, too, uses desalination and must deal with acute water shortages. Tehran claimed that a US air strike had damaged one of its water processing plants last weekend.

Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, said the strikes on Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, had affected the water supply for 30 villages. He warned that in doing so, “the US set this precedent, not Iran”. The US military denied striking the facility.

The Institute for Strategic Studies said it was unlikely the Americans had targeted the desalination plant. However, Qeshm was essential to Iranian plans to block the strait to shipping, and was probably being targeted for other strategic reasons – such as to hit underground stocks of drones and missiles.

What seems certain, given the conflagration, is that the Americans would have been pounding Qeshm Island to take out these underground facilities where the drones and the missiles basically embodied the last strategic option, or one of the last strategic options, of Iran.

For Iran, that would’ve been a nice coincidence to create an information operation to say the Americans are targeting civilian assets. And it would justify the retaliatory attacks on desalination plants without looking like the villain.

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Britain, History, Iran, Israel, Middle East, Politics, Saudi Arabia, Society, United States

Middle East history. It needs to be understood.

MIDDLE EAST

Ancient indifferences are reshaping the Middle East and forging unlikely new alliances

GEOPOLITICAL statements come no more obscure than one given earlier this week by an Israeli news site.

A member of the Saudi Arabian royal family had reportedly told the broadcaster Kan that, in his view, Iran had started the Gaza war by instructing its proxy group Hamas to attack Israel on October 7.

Tehran’s attention, according to this nameless royal, was to thwart the imminent normalisation of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Saudis.

This is so important because it symbolises the extraordinary transformation under way in the politics of the Middle East. For a Saudi royal to express such a view – that a Muslim country instigated the conflict for the purpose of spreading discord – would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. But that’s not the only way in which the winds of change are resettling alliances in this volatile region.

Five days ago, the ayatollahs of Iran inflicted their first direct attack on Israel since they came to power in 1979.

For some 45 years, the Islamic Republic has plotted the destruction of what its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls “the evil Zionist regime”. But it has left the actual attacks to its proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

This fresh assault did almost no damage, thanks to the defensive coalition that shot down almost all of the weapons directed at Israel.

The US and UK played a role in this. But they were joined by two other countries for whom defending the Jewish state would have been fanciful until recently: Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

For most of the time Israel has existed, Saudi, as one of the leading Muslim nations and home to the holy city of Mecca, has been its implacable foe. But now it is on the verge not just of tolerating Israel but becoming an ally.

Similarly, back in 1967, Jordan actually invaded Israel – a disastrous move which lost it the territories of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Yet now Jordan, too, has stood alongside Israel to protect it from Iranian bombs. This newfound cooperative spirit continues apace: it has emerged that both the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates had passed helpful intelligence to America to use in Israel’s defence, with Jordan further agreeing to let the US and “other countries’ warplanes” use its airspace, as well as sending up its own jets. The rise of Iran – and its chilling proximity to a nuclear weapon – has driven old foes closer.

Iran now dominates a vast region from its borders with Iraq, through Syria and Lebanon, to the Mediterranean. Through its Yemeni proxies, the Houthis, and its own navy, it is causing chaos and major disruption in the key Red Sea trade route.

And it has turned the Palestinian cause into a strategic vehicle for its own ambitions through two other proxies, Hamas (Gaza) and Hezbollah (Lebanon). This chaotic and meddlesome statecraft has appalled other Muslim countries.

The story of the Middle East used to be “Israel versus everyone else”. However, that is no longer true. To understand how all this has come about, you need to go back to the very roots of Islam – and the schism within it. In 610AD, Mohammed unveiled a new faith. By the time he died in 632AD, he and Islam were all-powerful in Arabia, and within a century it had subjugated an empire stretching from Central Asia to Spain.

But as history teaches us, Islam was split over who should succeed the Prophet. One faction argued the leadership should be passed through his bloodline. They became known as Shias, from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for “partisans of Ali”, who was Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law.

The others, the Sunnis (followers of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic) said leadership should be determined on merit.

Ali was elected as “caliph” (spiritual leader) in 656AD but within five years was assassinated, enshrining an enduring split.

Fast forward to 2024, and about 85 per cent of the world’s 1.6billion Muslims are Sunni, while 15 per cent are Shia.

Two countries now vie for the leadership of Islam, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. Since the mullahs seized power in Tehran 45 years ago, the divisions and mutual hatreds have only grown.

As a minority within Islam, the Shiites have historically been treated as subordinate in Sunni-dominated countries. But there has been a significant growth of the Shiite population in Gulf nations. This has increased anxiety among Sunni rulers over the growing power of Shia Iran.

In Gulf states such as the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and especially Saudi Arabia, the Shia threat – in other words the threat from Iran – is seen as existential.

Egypt, too, which has had a peace treaty with Israel since 1979, is also an arch enemy of the mullahs. In Israel’s 2006 Lebanon war with Hezbollah, Sunni countries were, behind the scenes, willing Israel to triumph, just as it is said now that Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia want Israel to destroy Hamas in Gaza.

The rapprochement of some Sunni countries was embodied in the 2020 Abraham Accords which normalised relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel, and later Morocco and Sudan.

There is logic, then, to the deepening alliances between Sunni states and Israel. The Arab nations understand that while Israel has no ambitions to dominate its neighbours, Iran seeks to control all of the Middle East.

What’s indisputable is that if you don’t understand this split and history, you can’t understand the Middle East at all.

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Britain, Foreign Affairs, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States, Yemen

Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the West…

YEMEN

yemen-houthi

Map depicting Houthi controlled Yemen and the struggle for control

Intro: Saudi Arabia should limit its war in Yemen. Despite the difficulties of late the West should be in a position to help, not by rescinding an almost century-old alliance.

The recent air strike earlier this month that hit a funeral in Sana’a did far more than kill some 140 civilians and wounding 500. For once, it drew rare attention to Saudi Arabia’s 20-month war in Yemen and the strained relationship which now exists with America. That alliance is now under threat with the U.S. reconsidering its military support for the campaign.

Critics are adamant that it is time for the West to abandon its embarrassing alliance with the Saudis. They ask, how can the West denounce the bloodshed and carnage in Syria when its own ally is indiscriminately bombing civilians in Yemen? If the Saudis, with Western support, can intervene to defend the government of Yemen, why shouldn’t Vladimir Putin of Russia not defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria?

Morally, and perhaps also legally, the U.S. and Britain are directly implicated in Saudi actions: they sell warplanes and provide munitions and armaments to the Saudi regime; they assist with air-to-air refuelling and help with targeting. Critics also point to the fact that Saudi Arabia is a woeful ally against jihadism. They insist that the Saudis are inflaming global extremism through its export of intolerant Wahhabi doctrines.

Such arguments do have strength. On balance, though, the West should not forsake the Saudis. Rather, it should seek to restrain the damage of their ongoing air campaign, and ultimately aim to bring it to an end. Western support cannot be deemed to be unconditional.

Consider first the moral position and balance. The two conflicts are both ghastly, but not equally so. Around 10,000 have died in Yemen, too many, but far fewer than the 400,000 or so that have perished in Syria. The Saudi-led coalition has not used chemical gas – although it has undoubtedly been careless. It has bombed several hospitals, and its blockade of Yemen and the subsequent damage to its infrastructure has caused dire hardship. A famine now looms, with more than half the country deemed to be hungry or malnourished.

The political context is also different. The Assad regime wrest power in a coup, and has held onto it through tyrannical brutality. Its deliberate crushing of peaceful protests and dissent in 2011, and its indiscriminate and repeated slaughter since then, has removed any speck of legitimacy it may have had. By contrast, Yemen’s president, Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, though ineffectual and flawed, has at least presided over a broad coalition that was established through UN-backed negotiations (which followed the resignation of the former strongman, Ali Abdullah Saleh). The Shia Houthis and Mr Saleh, backed by Iran, overturned that deal by force. They frequently fire missiles indiscriminately at Saudi cities, although the damage is often limited.

While the West has little reason to join the war, it has much at stake if it goes wrong. Al-Qaeda’s local franchise has been strengthened, and the Houthis have begun firing missiles at ships in the Bab al-Mandab strait, one of the world’s vital sea lanes. America launched cruise-missile strikes against Houthi-controlled radar sites after attempts were made to attack one of its warships patrolling the region.

The West’s involvement with the Al Sauds is important to understand. Its long alliance, which dates back nearly a century, was also built on its extensive commercial interests that the West has had in the Gulf. Over the decades, the Saudis have put up with many American blunders in the Middle East, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They were shocked, too, by how the West abandoned the former Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak, during the mass protests and upheaval of 2011. Last year’s deal between America and Iran to restrict Tehran’s nuclear programme, and Mr Obama’s skewered rhetoric and offhand tone about the Saudis, has deepened their own fear of abandonment. And, the Congressional approval for a bill to allow the families of victims of the 9/11 attacks of 2001 to sue Saudi Arabia, overriding Mr Obama’s presidential veto, is further evidence that the disenchantment is mutual.

Yet, despite this, there are still good reasons for the West to maintain ties to Saudi Arabia. The alternative to the Al Sauds is not liberalism but some form of radical Islamism. Saudi Arabia remains the world’s biggest oil exporter, and holds guardianship of Islam’s two holiest shrines. Better surely that these be in the hands of a friendly power than a hostile one. Whilst slow to respond to the emerging threats of fundamental Islam, it is now a vital partner in the fight against jihadism. It will be better placed than the West to challenge their nihilistic and radical ideologies. The chaos of the Middle East, a tinderbox of tension and hatreds, stems at least in part from Sunni Arabs’ sense of dispossession. The best hope of containing the volatility is to work and collaborate with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia.

As uncomfortable as it is, the West should stay close to the Saudis. Riyadh should be encouraged to reform economically and politically, while acknowledging widespread concern in the Gulf about the spread of Iranian influence. As the U.S. has said, Western support cannot be ‘a blank cheque’; the more the West helps Saudi Arabia wage war in Yemen, the more it becomes exposed and liable for war crimes. If the Saudis want to fight with Western weapons, they must be obliged to respect the laws of war.

But above all, the West should use its influence and diplomatic powers to help the Saudis end the bloody stalemate. It should promote a reasonable power-sharing agreement that directly involves the Houthis. That would make Yemen a model by which the future of Syria could also follow suit.

 

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