Arts, Books, Psychology

Book Review: ‘The Truth About Lies’

LITERARY REVIEW

“Tell me lies, tell me sweet little lies,” are lyrics sang by Fleetwood Mac in 1987. And my, have people delivered. Donald Trump is said to have told a staggering 30,573 lies while in office. Boris Johnson, as we know, can be wholly economical with the truth. Being serially lied to can seriously damage relationships and friendships are often irreparable when the truth emerges.

Aja Raden, an American writer, however, sees lies as a completely normal part of life, something to be understood rather than condemned.

She says that human beings have evolved to tell lies, and that our children only start operating in the real world when they have mastered the ability to tell untruths. There’s no one who doesn’t lie occasionally.

The nub of her argument is that for someone to lie successfully, there needs to be someone else who swallows that lie hook, line and sinker. Think of the last piece of really juicy gossip you were told. It is unlikely you checked whether it was true or not before you started disseminating it yourself. You’ll understand the ripple effect this has and the damage that untruths can leave in its wake.

Over nine hugely entertaining chapters, Raden describes in detail outrageous stories of several classic cons, illustrating the mechanisms by which they all work. She uses both contemporary and historical examples.

At its core, is the question, ‘Why do people believe what they believe?’

We blindly trust certain facts: things we’re taught, things we can observe, and those things which we can work out for ourselves. Once we “know” these things, we never really question them again. It’s called an honesty bias.

Raden writes: “Without this tendency to trust, to assume, to simply believe, every human on earth would be born starting from scratch, unable to benefit from the knowledge of the collective.”

Yet it’s the “honesty bias” that allows us to be fooled by conmen, serially lying friends and unscrupulous U.S. presidents. Our strength, as so often is written, is also our weakness.

The author begins with what she calls the Big Lie, in which the untruth is so enormous that to disbelieve it actually threatens our sense of collective reality.

She cites the example of Gregor MacGregor, a broke Scottish aristocrat of the early 19th century who joined the Royal Navy in search of fame and fortune.

He became a mercenary in central America, where he claimed to have chanced upon the magical kingdom of Poyais, a land of plenty brimming with untapped natural resources.

Returning to London he sold shares in Poyais to the great and good, and persuaded seven boatloads of men, women and children to relocate there to make their fortunes.

When they arrived, they soon discovered Poyais did not exist, that there was just the Mosquito Coast of central America, short on untapped resources but swarming with mosquitoes.

Most of them perished through disease, but when a few survivors of the trip returned to tell their stories, MacGregor absconded to Paris, where he told the same Big Lie again – and sold more shares in something that did not exist.

Next up in the narration is the Shell Game, the street hustle whereby you must guess which of three shells on a table has a ball underneath it.

The ball has meanwhile been removed by sleight of hand so the answer is “none of them”, but by then you have already lost your stake you put down on the one you thought it might be. Raden explains that we don’t “see” everything we think we see; our brains will fill in the gaps.

This is how so much stage magic works, persuading you that you are seeing what you haven’t seen, and that you haven’t seen what you might well have seen but not processed.

In later chapters, she looks at the Guru Con, at the way Rasputin befuddled the House of Romanov in pre-revolutionary Russia, the pyramid schemes of Bernie Madoff and bitcoin; and the selling of snake oil as a patent medicine in the Wild West (which went on long after supplies of genuine snake oil had run out).

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Afghanistan, Britain, Government, Politics, Society, United States

We must do deals with the Taliban

AFGHANISTAN

THE retreat from Afghanistan is over, the humiliation complete. The question facing Western leaders now is something that would have been inconceivable just a few months ago: Can we do deals with the Taliban?

Many will still find it unimaginable that the West could even consider negotiating with the heirs of the barbarians who facilitated the 9/11 atrocity.

Because of the Taliban’s record of supporting al-Qaeda’s terrorism in the past – and, in the last few days, their brutal repression out of sight of the Western media – it seems utterly immoral to have anything to do with the new government in Afghanistan.

Yet, unpopular though it may be in the traumatic aftermath of the West’s debacle, we must try to rescue what we can from the disaster.

We have to negotiate with them to try to save the lives of those poor souls we left behind, as well as doing all we can to prevent the country from again becoming a haven and training ground for terrorists’ intent on attacking the West. Of course, after our humiliating retreat, our leverage is very weak. Threats of sanctions and other financial strangleholds could simply encourage the Taliban to deal with the Chinese and Russians who would happily take advantage of any new influence they could secure. And the fact is the Taliban might not want to deal with us at all.

Yet there are incentives for the new regime in Kabul to be less brutally blinkered in its approach to dealing with the West than its predecessors 20 years ago.

One of the things that led to a flow of popular support from the corrupt former government to the Taliban was the economic plight of so many Afghans.

Drought has left millions dependent on international food aid. Keeping that aid flowing from the West and the prospect of getting Afghanistan’s money held in foreign banks gives the Taliban an incentive to restrain hardliners wanting to confront the world.

TWO

WE also have an enemy in common. The Taliban loathe the even more hard-line Islamic State – or Isis-K – group. Taliban fighters executed the local Isis-K leader when they captured him in Bagram prison, and they are only too aware that the attack on Kabul airport was aimed at destabilising the Taliban as well as murdering the US soldiers and departing Afghans there. Certainly, there are hideous dogmas shared by both the Taliban and Isis-K, but the new Taliban leaders seem anxious to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors in 2001. Whereas Isis-K wants to re-use Afghanistan as a base to attack the West, the Taliban want to avoid provoking another Western intervention.

The Taliban are well aware of what has changed since 2001. More than half the population has been born since then. The younger generation grew up loathing the corrupt Ghani regime and did not want to fight for it. These young people have also been socialised by mobile phones and social media rather than in rigid Islamic madrassas.

Keeping hordes of discontented, jobless young people from becoming a problem is a priority. Letting some of these unhappy people emigrate is one way to keep a lid on things while appeasing Western concerns.

Kabul is already mindful of a massive refugee crisis on its borders, particularly with Pakistan – a country that helped foster the Taliban – which has said that the West must engage with the new Afghan government to ensure it “remains moderate.”

The fact is that the West must engage. We should make best use of the few carrots we have – like aid money and diplomatic recognition – to reduce the terrorist threat.

Since our diplomats have long dealt with fundamentalist regimes like Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Office should be able to adapt to the Taliban’s new norms. It is depressing to admit defeat but swallowing our pride could still rescue something from the horror.

. Appendage

– A Boeing C-17A Globemaster III left Kabul (KBL) for the final time on Monday for Qatar. Shortly after taking off, an orbiting KC-135R tanker refuelled the aircraft.
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Afghanistan, Britain, Society, United States

Taliban’s £62bn haul of US military equipment

AFGHANISTAN

THE Taliban have seized American military equipment worth an astonishing £62 billion, a US politician has revealed.

Jim Banks, a Republican member of the House of Representatives, said the “negligence” of Joe Biden’s administration had allowed the militants to acquire an astonishing cache of weaponry.

Mr Banks said the Taliban may have taken 75,000 vehicles, 600,000 guns and more than 200 planes and helicopters.

In an emotive speech on the steps of the US Capitol building, he revealed the militants now had more Black Hawk helicopters than “85 per cent of the countries in the world.”

Astonishingly, the Taliban also have access to biometric devices, which have the fingerprints, eye scans and biographical information of the Afghans who have helped the Allied forces since 2001.

All the military hardware was donated to the Afghan army by the US over the past 20 years to help fight the insurgents. But the speed of the US withdrawal has meant much of it was abandoned by Afghan soldiers.

Mr Banks, who served in Afghanistan as an officer in charge of supplying weapons, revealed the militants also had US-issue body armour, night-vision goggles and medical supplies. He said: “Due to the negligence of this administration, the Taliban now has access to $85 billion (£62 billion) worth of American military equipment. Unbelievably, and unfathomable to me and so many others, the Taliban now has access to biometric devices.

“This administration still has no plan to get this military equipment or supplies back.”

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan admitted he did not have a “complete picture” of how much of the missing inventory could now be in the hands of the enemy.

“We don’t have a complete picture, obviously, of where every article of defence material has gone, but certainly a fair amount of it has fallen into the hands of the Taliban,” he said.

Attempts were made by Allied forces to destroy some of the bigger weapons.

One US official said: “Everything that hasn’t been destroyed is the Taliban’s now.”

Current and former US military chiefs say there is concern that those weapons could be used to kill civilians or be seized by other groups such as the Islamic State. There are also fears they could be sold to China and Russia.

Michael McCaul, who sits on the US foreign affairs committee, said: “We have already seen Taliban fighters armed with US-made weapons they seized from the Afghan forces.

“This poses a significant threat to the United States and our allies.”

Video footage has emerged within the last few days of militants with a £4.4 million Black Hawk helicopter at an airport near Kandahar.

The chopper taxied on the tarmac but the pilot was unable to get it into the air.

TWO

WHEN British soldiers deployed to Helmand 15 years ago their Taliban counterparts were shabbily dressed in tattered traditional outfits and armed with decades-old Russian rifles and grenade launchers.

While they possessed guile in spades and knew every inch of the jungle-like “Green Zone” where battles were fought, they were poorly equipped and poorly trained.

Now, following the withdrawal of international forces, the Taliban has been bequeathed a £62 billion bounty of military equipment, including hundreds of fixed-wing aircraft and tactical helicopters, tens of thousands of armoured vehicles and hundreds of thousands of weapons. The transformation in the group’s appearance and capability could scarcely be more vivid or disturbing.

Sandals and shalwar kameez have been replaced by combat boots and tailored camouflage uniforms.

Ancient AK47s are nowhere to be seen. Instead, today’s Taliban carry US Green Beret-issue M4 carbines with telescoping sights. The Taliban of 15 years ago were seldom if ever seen wearing helmets. But today their headwear is more expensive and more advanced than that worn by British troops.

The group appears to have helped themselves to the state-of-the-art MBITR-2 (Multi-band Intrateam Radios) favoured by US Green Berets but denied to most conventional UK personnel. They were issued to Afghan government forces.

What’s more, their weapons appear immaculately clean and well maintained, their uniforms looked washed and ironed and they carry their weapons as British soldiers are taught to carry theirs.

The UK and the US have picked up the tab not only for the eye-wateringly expensive hardware, but also the training budget – as the Taliban’s ranks have been swollen by defectors from the Afghan National Security Forces.

The irony is that the Taliban’s newfound arsenal was supposed to prevent Afghanistan falling into Taliban hands.

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