Tag Archives: Bashar al-Assad

Government, Politics, Russia, Syria, United States

The West should pursue punitive strikes in Syria…

‘RED LINE’ POLICY

Following Russia’s proposal on Syria aimed at monitoring and destroying Bashar al-Assad’s stockpile of chemical weapons, President Obama suspended a congressional vote to authorise the use of force against the Syrian regime.

But that proposal looks overly optimistic and unrealistic. Not only do the U.S. and Russia disagree over enforcement mechanisms if the Syrian regime fails to comply – the United States and her allies want a resolution provisioning the use of force in the event of non-compliance, the Russians do not – but the operational and technical challenges associated with destroying these weapons in a risky and volatile conflict zone should not be interpreted as something that will happen with unqualified ease.

Western military intervention has not, therefore, been averted and still remains a probable scenario. That has to remain an option that can still make an important contribution to the Syrian conflict, as well as beyond it.

Those desperate despots and tyrants around the world must be sent a message, namely that the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated or permitted. Where this horrific form of weaponry is used the international community must insist it has the right to act. America’s ‘red line’ policy is once again being called into question.

Critics point out it is the numbers killed, rather than the means through which they are killed, that should constitute the ‘red line’ for the international community and those who are in support of humanitarian intervention. That, however, misses the logic, purpose and the devastating impact of chemical weapons use.

Recently on this site an article was posted concerning how history is littered with examples of chemical weapons being used during warfare (see article). Chemical weapon attacks in modern times can be traced to World War I. More recently they were used in 1988 in the Iraqi Kurdistan town of Halabja. These lethal and macabre attacks not only kill quickly and with an immediate impact on the local population, but they also inflict terror and have long-term consequences. They have the capacity to dramatically reduce enemy morale and fix a permanent physical and psychological scar on the local population. Chemical weapons inflict long-term injuries to its victims and can affect future generations in the form of birth defects and other disabilities. In Halabja, Hussein’s forces killed at least 5,000 men, women and children almost instantly. Thousands more continue to suffer today.

Chemical weapon attacks are not simply about destruction but about inflicting long-term, immeasurable and sustained pain and horror on a population. By their very nature, the use’ of chemical weapons are indiscriminate with their targets and their reach goes beyond the boundaries of the battlefield.

On the battlefield, they have the capacity to alter the balance of a conflict and offer a strategic advantage, especially in localised conflicts. Whilst it is certainly questionable that the limited use of chemical weapons will change the direction of the conflict, there effectiveness in urbanised and local areas should not be underestimated. Syria is engaged in a localised conflict where battles are taking place between disparate rebel forces and regime loyalists in an array of towns and cities.

Yet, if chemical weapons were used in a more consistent and sustained fashion and throughout the towns and cities embroiled in the conflict, then the entire balance of power could be altered to favour the regime.

Hesitation over military action is also based on the premise that the West would be supporting and fighting alongside radical al-Qaeda factions that dominate and comprise the Syrian opposition. That, though, misses two important aspects: firstly, that it would be against Western interests to have a rebel victory at a point when the West has very limited influence on the ground and, secondly, victory would put these radically inspired al-Qaeda elements in a position where they would come to dominate the Syrian state. That would be catastrophic for regional and global security and for the interests of both the West and the broader international community.

It has been made clear by President Obama (along with a British declaration) that any military strikes will not be aimed at removing the Assad regime (which otherwise would amount to ‘regime change’) or afford the rebels any meaningful victory. Instead, they say, strikes would be ‘punitive’ in their nature, giving in-effect Assad a bloody nose. Hence, Western action that aims to deter further chemical weapons use would not be instigated to bolster or afford rebel forces any meaningful victory.

The use of punitive and symbolic military strikes does not have to mean that diplomatic efforts should be put aside. The form of military intervention proposed by the US/UK, despite both powers having temporarily drawn back, can realistically be combined with diplomacy. The U.S. and Britain have repeatedly stated that the only outcome to this conflict can and must be a negotiated political settlement.

Military strikes, it is argued, will induce Assad into negotiating. But this has to be coupled with an effort to force rebel forces to also sit down at the negotiating table. That seems unlikely to happen at this stage, given that Assad has immense regional support as well as important proxy support from Russia. Rebel forces themselves are divided on the issue and do not operate under one unified banner.

But military strikes will show a willingness by the West to act that goes beyond the current conflict in Syria. The West is not currently in a position to topple Assad through extensive use of its military capacity (such as deploying ground troops), but it can and should still send a message to the Assad regime that it will act in the face of chemical weapons usage. That message would also resonate to other existing and future despots of the world.

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Britain, France, Government, Middle East, Politics, Russia, Syria, United Nations, United States

The U.S. holds fire by giving a Russian-backed proposal a chance over Syria…

SYRIA

The diplomatic momentum over Syria in the last 24 hours has surpassed all expectations and has been quite breath-taking. Events may have unfolded through an inopportune comment made by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, during his visit to London at the beginning of this week.

A week in politics is a long time, or so it’s said. No more is this evident than in America where, one minute, President Obama was preparing to tour the US talk shows to appeal for Congressional and public support for air strikes; the next, he was actually on those talk shows, airing qualified support for a Russian proposal to place Syria’s chemical weapons stocks under international control and supervision. The Congressional vote, which was widely seen as a make-or-break for Mr Obama, has been shelved, and France has been working hard in delivering a draft UN Security Council resolution that aims to put the Russian proposal into effect.

Startling, because, in just 24 hours, we have gone from the tense threshold of unilateral U.S. military action and a Cold War-style US-Russia rift to a proposal on which almost everyone can agree – the exception being possibly Syria’s anti-Assad opposition.

The French draft resolution is said to provide not only for the weapons stocks to be controlled, but destroyed, and for any breach to be met with ‘extremely serious consequences’.

If those consequences are assumed to include military action, if non-compliance was forthcoming, there is a risk that the resolution will attract a new Russian veto. The West should be wary of Moscow’s proposal that may have been conjured up to head-off U.S. air strikes, by merely serving as a delaying tactic. An apt tactic some may say, presaging months of Iraq-style disputes about access and monitoring.

But from another perspective it hardly matters why the international appetite for a military response is so small – however limited in intent and however heinous the crime that inspired it.  That could be put down to the ‘war weariness’ of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of which still colours the political debate. But it may also be due to the difficult geopolitics surrounding Syria, a conflict recognised as being far too complex for punitive resolution.

If democratically leaders cannot convince their electorate on something as grave as peace and war, it will be time for them to pause and consider whether another answer might be found.

Any solution that deters outside military intervention, while removing the insidious threat of chemical weapons, would surely benefit everyone, no more so than the escalating numbers of Syrian civilians who find themselves in the middle of a war zone.

Any UN-sponsored agreement along the lines of a credible Russian proposal could help to open the way for wider talks. While this may be premature by jumping ahead to soon, the priority must be to ensure that the diplomatic process is not written off at a whim before it has been given a real chance to start.

The off-the-cuff remark by John Kerry in London does appear to have opened the door to a diplomatic resolution of the stand-off over Syria’s deployment of chemical weapons. In what was deemed a half-hearted suggestion by Mr Kerry that Bashar al-Assad’s arsenal be placed under international control and destroyed, the response was so swift that it is inconceivable not to see some choreography at work (or else just sheer relief).

Vladimir Putin picked up on the idea, and immediately pressed the Assad regime to agree. Washington said that if Syria did comply it would put on hold plans for a military strike in retaliation to the atrocity in Damascus last month. The United States, Britain and France have now tabled a resolution in the UN Security Council.

Nonetheless, sceptics are entitled to be suspicious. Why, for example, has Mr Putin, for so long the barrier to any action against Assad, turned peacemaker? Is this a delaying tactic to protect his Syrian ally, or one that is aimed in further undermining the already weak public support in the West for military strikes?

And, how will it be possible to logistically verify the destruction of the chemical weapons while civil war rages on in Syria? Will Assad call a ceasefire to allow inspectors to do their work, and if so will the rebels agree to one? The highly complex process of confirming whether Syria has complied would be fraught with difficulty, and could take several years to complete.

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Foreign Affairs, Government, Middle East, Politics, Syria, United Nations, United States

Comparing Syria today with Iraq in 2003…

ANALYSIS

Many commentators use Iraq as a benchmark when judging American foreign policy in the Middle East. Whilst no one will want ‘another Iraq’, and placing rhetoric aside, how does Syria today actually compare to Iraq in 2003?

Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s President, and Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi despot, were both Ba’athist dictators presiding over countries that are an unstable balance of varying sectarian, political and ethnic groups. Long before any suggestion of U.S. military involvement, both regimes committed grave atrocities against their civilian populations. In 1988 Saddam Hussein dropped chemical bombs on citizens in the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing around 5,000 and injuring thousands more. Prior to that, and in 1982, Hafez al-Assad, Syria’s former leader, crushed an uprising in the Syrian city of Hama, killing more than 20,000 people.

Iraq was plagued with sectarian violence (which continues today) following the political vacuum created by the US-led invasion. The bloody civil war in Syria is already dividing along sectarian lines at a time when these divides are deepening across the entire Middle East region.

Making the case for war is the second comparative. The US-led invasion of Iraq primarily centred on Hussein’s failure to co-operate with U.N. weapons inspections and the since-discredited evidence and intelligence on the country’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. When it comes to Syria, President Obama has signalled that Assad’s use of chemical weapons on unarmed civilians is a ‘red line’ and that the U.S. will want to disrupt and degrade the regime’s military capabilities against civilians.

The United Nations have said that around 100,000 have been killed in Syria so far. If the U.S. doesn’t intervene, we know that many more will perish before a political solution is found. We won’t know, however, how many will be killed if the U.S. carries out military strikes, irrespective of how accurate the missiles are deemed to be. As many as 125,380 civilians were killed following the U.S. invasion of Iraq; it’s difficult to argue that this many would have died if Iraq had not been invaded in 2003.

The cost of intervention must also be considered. An estimate of the overall cost of the Iraq war is said to run as high as $2 trillion. Whilst Washington has said that military action in Syria will be far more limited, and there will be ‘no boots on the ground’, the Cato institute suggests that the cost of a Syrian intervention would need to include $500 million for training rebels, a further $500 million for establishing an initial Syrian no-fly zone, and then as much as a billion dollars a month in military operational costs. Expect costs to inflate beyond official figures, as they invariably do.

The issue of outside involvement is also important to note. Unlike Iraq pre-2003, there is already a high level of external involvement on the ground in Syria. The Gulf States, along with Turkey, as well as the U.S. and Europe, are offering varying degrees of financial and military support to a broad range of anti-Assad factions. Assad himself can still count on backing from Iran and Russia. The Arab Spring has meant that politics across the region is now far more volatile and unpredictable than it was ten years ago; there can be no doubt that Syria’s interventions will have far-reaching ramifications across the Middle East and post-Arab Spring.

Appetite for war is the final consideration. America’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have dampened public appetite for war. A ‘war weary’ nation will have reduced expectations that any U.S. military involvement in another Middle Eastern country will be neat or quick. If Mr Obama does win support in Congress, the U.S. will have a clear mandate to go to war in Syria with France as its chief European partner. The U.S. can also expect support from the Arab League, too. In an unusual intervention it has urged the international community to ‘take the deterrent and necessary measures against the culprits of this crime that the Syrian regime bears responsibility for’. Just as in Iraq, the U.S. cannot hope for UN backing for its actions because of veto wielding Russia and China. Arguably, though, this was seen as more important in 2003 because today we have lower expectations of the UN’s divided and indifferent Security Council.

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