Tag Archives: Defence spending

Britain, Defence, Economic, European Union, Government, Military, National Security, NATO, Politics

Defence spending and the ‘peace dividend’…

DEFENCE SPENDING

Throughout history, defence spending has always gone up and down, and has responded largely to the perceived level of threat at the time.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War expectations were high for a so-called ‘peace dividend’. This led to the British military, along with its NATO partners, assuming they would no longer have to maintain a massive defence capability in central Europe as a bulwark against the Russians. Tank squadrons, for example, on the German plain were drastically reduced as the threat from the Russian bear showing its claws no longer existed.

This, it was generally agreed, was a good thing. There was never any shortage of other priorities on which politicians could spend otherwise huge sums of money that had previously been spent on defence.

However, the question now, according to General Sir Richard Shirreff, who recently stepped down as NATO deputy supreme commander, is whether a new and heightened level of threat should now require an increase in defence capability, and therefore defence spending.

General Shirreff is eminently qualified to make such a judgment, of that few will doubt. He has said that the dismantling of the West’s presence in mainland Europe has gone too far, leaving us vulnerable and exposed in the face of a renewed Russian threat.

The facts tend to support his case. A recent defence analyst’s report, for instance, revealed that Britain now had fewer tanks than Switzerland.

And there can be little doubt that the threat level facing mainland Europe is now significantly different to what it was a decade ago. Russia has annexed Crimea and the Kremlin is making less pretence about the fact that it is at war with Ukraine.

NATO’s primary role is to defend its members from military threat and attack. Shirreff questions whether NATO is able to perform that key function, at current strength.

Highlighting ‘the reality’, Shirreff says that NATO would be very hard-pressed and they would find it very difficult to put into the field the means required, particularly on land, to counter any form of ‘Russian adventurism’.

Undoubtedly, the signal General Shirreff gives amounts to a stark warning, and one that deserves to be the start of a serious debate.

At a time of continuing financial and economic austerity, this will be the last thing that many European political leaders will want to hear. The ‘peace dividend’ has been taken for granted for a quarter of a century. Even in Britain, following recent bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not led to a reversal in political thinking that says Britain needs fewer soldiers and fewer sophisticated weapons.

The focus of efforts in keeping the UK safe has moved away from hard power and more towards intelligence and security led measures in tackling jihadist terror groups – at home and abroad.

While this is bound to remain the key priority, the challenges being posed elsewhere by an expansionist President Putin can no longer be ignored. Putin’s threat to eastern Ukraine as well as to Western concerns over Russian interests in the Baltic States are proof enough that NATO requires and needs an adequate defence capability in dealing with challenges it could be called upon in dealing with. The security of the wider world surely depends on it.

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Britain, Defence, Government, Military, National Security, Politics, Society

New round of British Defence Cuts…

DEFENCE

Intro: Our severely reduced military capability amounts to a mere standing defence force, and one that is barely equipped enough at present to deal with the most basic of future threats

The announcement from Whitehall that there is to be further cuts to Britain’s already shrinking Army, albeit on grounds of economy rather than strategic priorities, is deeply alarming.

The new rounds of cuts are aimed, primarily, at Britain’s elite rapid reaction force – the most unwarranted target for making economies and savings through cost-cutting. A prime target earmarked is 16 Air Assault Brigade, a core component of which is Britain’s elite Parachute Regiment. It is to be stripped of half its regular infantry battalions, as well as reductions in some of its helicopters, artillery and armoured vehicles. The Royal Engineers, who support our elite forces through maintenance of equipment and servicing, are also to suffer wide ranging cuts to its budget. 16 Air Assault Brigade is to be reduced from the current level of 8,000 troops to 5,000 by the end of this year. Such a scaling-down is difficult to discern given Britain’s post-Afghanistan strategy. This was meant to be focused on our military capability deemed agile enough to respond and execute contingency operations as they arise in the future. A diminishing capability raises fresh concerns over the Government’s overall defence policy.

Alarmingly, these latest cost reductions are to be implemented alongside the already massive cuts inflicted on the Armed Forces. The last strategic defence review in 2010 proposed the reduction of the Army’s strength from 102,000 regular soldiers to just 82,000 by the end of the decade. Parallel reductions of 8,000 personnel in the RAF and 5,500 in the Navy were also part of the defence reconfiguration. Not since before the Napoleonic Wars has Britain had such a low level of manning to call upon in the event of defending sovereign interests.

Some £10 billion has already been cut from the defence budget. Whilst understanding the need for austerity and for efficiency gains to be made where they can, of which the Ministry of Defence cannot expect to be excluded given its high wastage rate on incompetent procurement programmes, defence of the realm is a paramount obligation of every government. If that duty is neglected, a government runs the risk of all of its other priorities and government policies becoming compromised in the process. It is crucial, then, that Britain retains an effectively trained army with a full complement of experienced and professional troops. For many, though, our severely reduced military capability amounts to a mere defence force, and one that is barely equipped enough to deal with the most basic of future threats. Yet, the world is a far more dangerous place than it has ever been, and Britain should be punching above its weight: diminution of military resources reduces the UK’s global influence – military cuts which go against the Government’s aspiration of retaining a place at the top table around the world. To have a positive influence, it is crucial that Britain’s Armed Forces are sufficiently maintained if that ambition is to be met.

There is no doubt that Britain’s military Armed Forces have been pared to the bone. It has reached the stage where any further cuts may well imperil national security.

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Britain, Foreign Affairs, Government, Intelligence, Military, National Security, Politics, Society, United States

Reconfiguring Defence for reasons of a changed world…

DEFENCE & FUTURE OVERSEAS PARTNERSHIPS

Over the course of the last half-century defence spending has attracted and been a hot issue of contention. This has been brought to the fore in recent times, through government rounds of budget and expenditure reductions. Most notably, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the cuts to overall manning levels to the armed services have brought the issue into sharp focus. Critics argue this has seriously skewed our defence posture and capability towards mammoth (and massively expensive) commitments such as upgrading and maintaining Trident and the development of new aircraft carriers.

Last month, former US defence secretary, Robert Gates, asserted that defence cuts in Britain have left the UK unable to be a ‘full partner’ in future military operations with the United States. As a result of defence cuts, Mr Gates believes that the UK no longer has ‘full-spectrum capabilities’. This, he says, will affect the UK’s ability to be a full partner and will change the dynamics of how operations are conducted in the future. His comments came in the wake of remarks by General Sir Nicholas Houghton, the Chief of the Defence Staff, who said that manpower is increasingly being perceived as an ‘overhead’ and that Britain’s defence capabilities have been ‘hollowed out’.

It is right that these cuts have been questioned in the UK. The concerns over the knock-on direct and indirect effects on local economies, and the dangers of global military over-stretch, have been well aired. At the same time, however, many have long queried the need for such a large and over-bloated defence budget, particularly when our appetite for overseas engagements in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts has greatly diminished.

The world has changed, too. Britain is certainly not the global power she once was. There is perhaps room for debate on the reasons for this relative decline, but some truths are incontrovertible. The growing focus of global power and wealth from West to East, the profound change in the nature and structure of armed conflict and the threats that we face to our national security are all factors that must enter the equation if we are to explain and account for how the world has changed and how, as a consequence, our influence has declined. Our reduced military capabilities reflect in large part the need to bear down and address our massive budget deficit and public debt. Such considerations have, as Gates himself stated, also forced spending reductions in the US.

But what is also true is that Britain is less committed in performing the role of being an acquiescent subordinate to the United States in international affairs. Widespread disquiet has also stemmed from the ubiquitous relationship that US intelligence has with Britain’s intelligence services and the close links that have existed between America’s National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s communications and listening posts at GCHQ in Cheltenham. In light of these considerations, it is only right and proper that the UK’s military relationship with the US be subject to re-examination.

Public ambivalence is not likely to stop there, either. It should also lead in due course to a more searching examination of Britain’s future commitment to Trident and what justifications there are in keeping a nuclear deterrent. Particularly so, given the changing political landscape in the UK and the very real prospect of Scotland (where Trident and the nuclear deterrent is housed against its will) becoming an independent nation. The referendum for Scottish independence is to be held this year in September.

It may be tempting to compare our defence capacity with what the country was able to sustain in the past and no-doubt some will rue Britain’s reduced capabilities. But the fact remains that the world has changed and with it the shifting balance of global power. It is to the future, not the past, which we should now look in how our overseas partnerships are formed. Britain’s defence arrangements will become a reflection of these changed requirements.

 

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