Britain, Europe, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Europe must awaken or face great insecurity in 2026

EUROPE

THE great Victorian jurist, Sir Henry Maine, wrote: “War appears to be as old as mankind… but peace is a modern invention”. Events in the early part of 2026 will doubtless prove his wisdom by showing the awful fragility of that particular invention.

Even if they had never heard of Maine, the most complacent Europeans should have learnt from Vladimir Putin’s relentless onslaught against Ukraine that peace is neither a natural state nor the default setting of advanced countries, but rather a historical aberration that can only be preserved through strength and vigilance.

Yet, in 2025, we discovered how Europe remains divided between nations that grasp this lesson – or never forgot it – and those that cling with obstinance to old delusions. Leading the former category are Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Having broken free of the Kremlin within living memory, these countries know exactly what it means to be invaded by Russia: they will do anything to prevent this from happening again.

And what of Britain? Despite Sir Keir Starmer’s grandiose rhetoric (“a battle-ready armour-clad nation”), Britain remains firmly imprisoned in the camp of the deluded. The PM revealed his priorities in the Budget when he preferred social policies over defence, such as appeasing Labour backbenchers by abolishing the two-child benefit cap. This Government will allocate another £17bn to welfare by 2030, the exact sum that would have allowed Britain to increase defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP. This looks as if Sir Keir has decided to place his own political survival – and the prejudices of his party – before the national security of his country, and for that there is bound to be a reckoning.

The outcome of those decisions is that Britain will enter 2026 at greater risk than was necessary. The perils ahead could scarcely be greater. The first and most immediate danger is that Donald Trump could collaborate with Putin to impose Russia’s peace terms on Ukraine. The guns along the frozen 800-mile front might then fall silent, but any respite would almost certainly be temporary while Russia rearms and regroups. If Putin achieves what he believes to be victory in Ukraine, he would be emboldened to come back for more. We should remember that today’s tragedy in Ukraine is Putin’s third war of attrition and conquest since the assault on Georgia in 2008. Like all aggressors, his appetite remains insatiable.

If there is a flawed peace in 2026, Putin’s next move could be a renewed attack on Ukraine, to achieve his original goal of subjugating the entire country. He might consider still more dangerous options. If he concludes that Mr Trump no longer cares about defending America’s allies, Putin could risk attacking a NATO member and the signs are ominous. If so, Britain would be obliged to stand with our allies and go to war with Russia, the world’s biggest nuclear power. Do we in Britain have any idea of what this would entail, or where such a crisis might lead?

There are still ways of ensuring that we never have to find out. We can rally our European allies to deliver more support to Ukraine, protecting Volodymyr Zelensky from being muscled into a false peace that rewards aggression. And we must do whatever is necessary to secure America’s commitment to NATO. Both imperatives require Britain and the rest of Europe to emulate Poland and its neighbours and spend far more on defence.

The second danger and the threat is rising is that China’s colossal military build-up might culminate in a confrontation with the United States and its allies in the Pacific. In 2025 alone, China commissioned 14 frigates and destroyers into its fleet; the Royal Navy, by contrast, has only 13 of these warships. 2026 has begun with China conducting intensive exercises in the waters around Taiwan, apparently simulating a blockade of that democratic island.

A full-scale invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely, this year, though Xi Jinping is believed to have ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready in 2027. But no possibility can be excluded and China’s lightning military expansion will heighten the danger. That threat is likely to reach its peak later in this decade.

Elsewhere, Mr Trump is going to have to decide whether to go to war in Venezuela to overthrow Nicolas Maduro’s autocracy. The biggest deployment of US forces in the Caribbean for nearly 40 years cannot be sustained indefinitely. If the president orders US forces into action, the first new conflict of 2026 would be a regime change operation in Caracas, probably combining air strikes with covert action on the ground.

Another authoritarian anti-Western leader who may be fearing for his regime’s future is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. The new year is opening with mass protests in Tehran and other cities.

The Ayatollah’s authority was severely weakened by the successful Israeli-US strike on Iran’s nuclear plants last June. As Khamenei approaches a point of maximum weakness, there must be a chance that 2026 could see the downfall of Iran’s regime, though no-one knows who will take over.

Above all, this has to be the year when Europe finally awakens to the threats and relearns the art of defending itself against aggression. If not, it may be too late to save the modern invention of peace.

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Britain, Economic, European Union, Government, Politics, Society, United States

EU reset: No time for UK passiveness

EUROPEAN REALIGNMENT

FANATICS of Britain’s departure from the European Union have struggled to quantify the Brexit dividend and what benefits it brought, but when Donald Trump unveiled his schedule of global tariffs they finally had a number to point towards. It was the difference between the 20% levy imposed on all continental exports and the 10% baseline figure payable on British goods.

A week later the gap closed leaving Brexiteers melancholic and dejected when Mr Trump reversed his plans. What the tariff schedules will look like at the end of the 90-day “pause” is no more predictable than any other feature of current US policy. There is no obvious concession from the UK government that might induce Washington to lower its 25% barrier against car exports, and the 10% rate on everything else looks non-negotiable.

Meanwhile, dialogue with the EU about closer cooperation continue apace. The UK hopes to have a framework agreement in place in time for a summit in London in May. The primary focus is security, but that is intended to be a forerunner to closer trade alignment.

As an indication of accelerating rapprochement, Rachel Reeves, the Chancellor, has just attended a meeting of EU finance ministers in Warsaw. Plans have been announced for a pan-European defence procurement fund with the UK expressing an interest to be included. There are hurdles still to be overcome but also strong will on both sides to make it happen. It is a measure of how much more constructive diplomacy has become under Labour. No Tory government would have sought such collaboration. Regime change in Westminster made a closer EU-UK relationship possible, then Mr Trump’s rampage of destruction through the norms of transatlantic security and global trade made it urgent.

The Brexit withdrawal treaty and subsequent trade and cooperation agreement were deliberately shaped by Boris Johnson’s government to impede reintegration on any level. Irreversible divergence was the whole point. But, while there is no great appetite in Brussels to revisit the terms of Brexit that damaged British businesses and interests more than the EU, recognition of a mutual strategic interest and a more constructive disposition are necessary. The long-term economic rational is being hampered as the UK continues to operate within red-lines drawn by domestic electoral imperatives.

European leaders fully understand that democratic politicians must defer to public opinion. But with Sir Keir Starmer having earned goodwill through his diplomatic advances, the prime minister’s reluctance to ever challenge the fallacious premises of Brexit, even after winning a landslide general election victory last year, raises doubts about the true scale of his ambition when it comes to the EU reset. That misgiving is magnified whenever British ministers talk enthusiastically about their dealings with Mr Trump, who doesn’t hide his hostility to the European project. Sir Keir insists it is not a binary choice, but it will become one as soon as concessions to the White House threaten to destroy trust in Brussels or further impede access to the single market.

The claim that the UK can be equidistant between Europe and the US may feel like keeping options open, but in Brussels it looks like a reversion to typical British Eurosceptic ambivalence. Sir Keir faces a stark strategic dilemma, and his options get worse the longer he defers the choice.

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Aid, Britain, Defence, Economic, Government, Politics

Labour’s foreign aid cuts: they will undermine security

BRITAIN

THE nature of politics is about choices. Some are forced on governments by circumstance. Others are self-imposed. The Labour Government’s decision to cut the aid budget to pay for an increase in defence spending is firmly in the latter category. It is also very wrong – forcing the world’s poor to pay for Britain’s safety and security. This is a false economy. Cutting overseas aid will make the world more unstable, not less. The very crises that fuels conflict – poverty, failed states, climate disasters, and mass displacement – will only worsen with less development funding. Labour’s logic is self-defeating: diverting financial resources from aid to defence does not buy security; it undermines it.

The numbers tell the story. Despite government attempts to inflate the amounts involved, in real terms the extra £6bn for defence is tiny relative to Britain’s GDP. The UK could easily absorb this through borrowing – especially in a global financial system where pound sterling is heavily traded – or, if the government prefers, through a modest wealth tax. Yet, Sir Keir Starmer has chosen to frame this as a zero-sum game, where aid must give way to security. But why? Because this is not about economic necessity – it’s about political positioning. Labour wants to prove that it can be fiscally disciplined even when the numbers don’t demand it. It wants to neutralise Tory attacks, even when the real battle is over priorities, not affordability.

It is also a move that aligns with Donald Trump’s worldview. The US President wants to close down the US government’s main overseas aid agency, treating it as an expensive indulgence rather than a pillar of foreign policy. A UK prime minister that echoes Mr Trump’s “America first” instincts on defence and aid will likely meet with congeniality. Starmer has been searching hard for common ground since President Trump was re-elected. On aid and defence spending he has found it.

Labour doesn’t just believe in fiscal discipline; it believes that it must adopt financial rectitude and has constructed a justification for that belief. The problem is that by accepting Conservative trade-offs, Labour locks itself into an orthodoxy that it may later need to break. In a volatile world, Britain – outside the EU – must boost high-value exports and cut reliance on fragile supply chains. Even under Joe Biden, the UK was kept out of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, which strengthened transatlantic industrial policy. Will Downing Street ever admit that Britain’s real limit is productive capacity and not budget deficits?

Britain’s fiscal constraint is artificial, but its resource constraints are real. Energy, food, and manufacturing are matters of national security, not just market functions. Without investment, dependence on key imports makes the UK vulnerable to supply-chain shocks and price inflation. If every pound spent requires a cut elsewhere, recent announcements by Labour’s Ed Miliband and Steve Reed wouldn’t have mattered.

Keir Starmer often presents himself as a pragmatist rather than an ideologue – claiming to be adapting to circumstances rather than adhering to dogma. Yet, such pragmatism is itself a belief system, one that treats capitalism’s rules as fixed and unchangeable, markets as being beyond politics, and history as a one-way street where past mistakes justify permanent and crippling caution. In doing so, Starmer isn’t just rejecting viable alternatives – he’s rewriting history to suggest they were never an option to begin with.

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