Britain, Government, Politics, Society

The UK Government needs a clearer policy on migration

IMMIGRATION

Theresa May follows her predecessor by setting a specifically vague target on net migration levels. But how will the targets on immigration be met?

As Theresa May seeks a mandate from the electorate on June 8 to proceed with Brexit negotiations under her own terms, there are certain and specific issues that should be central to her case. Immigration policy is clearly one of them.

But in keeping and in line with much of the Prime Minister’s campaigning so far, the political debate on such issues fall short on substance. Certainly, it’s apt to ask whether Conservatives can agree on what the detail of their immigration policy should be. Yet, when pressed on the matter, Home Secretary Amber Rudd, could only say that the party’s manifesto “will not be identical” to the last two election campaigns. Hardly enlightening given that one of the central tenets prior to the Brexit vote was people’s concerns over migration. Mrs May insists there will be no back-tracking, and the target will be to reduce net immigration to the “tens of thousands”, a policy enshrined previously by David Cameron. If that’s suitably vague to speak in such terms, we must question whether it is credible? In 2016, net migration stood at 273,000, and it is some 20 years since that figure was below 100,000. What interpretation are we to apply when the Prime Minister repeats the mantra of old by insisting that net migration be reduced to the “tens of thousands”? An issue of confidence might yet arise.

In all of this, however, we should be careful of assuming that the EU is to blame for the UK’s high net migration. That would be a mistake. Migration from the EU accounts for less than half of the total figure, at 44 per cent. The other 56 per cent, from the rest of the world, is already within the control of the British government.

A difficult dilemma arises. The suggestion being made is that immigrants who shore up our workforce will be permitted entry if they are important to the economy, such as filling the skills-gap in industries such as health and IT. But those who come here to work account for half of the annual influx. Reducing the immigration figure by enough to get anywhere near the target (whether notional or not) will be tough if an exception is to be made for the majority of migrants.

The government could halt the flow of students into the UK, but by doing so could harm our universities and cut off a supply of skilled workers who could help to drive economic growth if they stay on. Or, the number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants could also be tackled. The most recent figures, however, show that just over 12,000 people were granted asylum over a 12-month period. Even if all of them were to be removed at a stroke that would make minimal difference to the headline figures.

When published, the Conservative manifesto could yet contain a coherent strategy on immigration. But, on the evidence of recent years, when net migration targets have been repeatedly missed, we are entitled to doubt whatever the document says will be done or if the targets will ever be achieved.

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Britain, European Union, Government, Politics, Society

Britain will be entitled to walk away without a deal with the EU

BREXIT

brexit

When the 27 EU leaders met to review their Brexit talks guidelines last Friday, it took them less than a minute to approve the draft. They then burst into open applause – the grandstanding almost akin to a Soviet-era meeting of Warsaw Pact comrades. The guidelines are provocative and blatantly breach the UK’s own red lines. Britain, in turn, must spell out that it is prepared to walk away if it is unsatisfied with the deal that the talks produce.

The EU’s mask of collegiality and high ideals is slipping. As it does, so the decision of the British voters to walk away last year looks even wiser. Britons should be aware that walking away is a valid and legal option that the UK is entitled to exercise if talks with the EU irretrievably break down.

Extracts from Yanis Varoufakis’s memoir of the 2015 Greek crisis depict an EU where the Germans dominate and the Union, they insist, must be preserved at all costs. He claims that Emmanuel Macron, probably France’s next president, described the EU’s deal for Greece as a latter-day “Versailles Treaty”. Angela Merkel apparently overheard and barred Mr Macron from talks.

But Greece is not Britain: a great deal more for the Union is at stake this time around given the UK’s historic position of generating handsome contributions to EU coffers in Brussels.

Theresa May attracted shrill criticism for pointing out that continental security might be affected by the course of negotiations, yet the EU has shamelessly put absolutely everything on the table: the cost of the so-called divorce, from which they are determined to wring every penny, Gibraltar, UK bases in Cyprus and, in a concession to the French, an effort to stop any financial deregulatory drive by Britain.

The UK cannot accept a settlement that would, say, tie its hands on tax and regulation after it leaves the EU: the country voted to get out in part to liberate its economy. And there are matters on the table that have nothing to do with the EU – such as the future of Ireland. Britain therefore has to make it absolutely clear that it will not be drawn into diplomatic traps or be landed with bills and commitments that reduce its status and undermine the raison d’être behind Brexit.

The EU needs to be reminded that it relies so much on the UK’s markets, intelligence and military that it would be foolish to act so bullishly over the terms of settlement. It is in everyone’s interests to separate amicably and agree as soon as possible on a new trade arrangement. That is what Britain should aim for. If the Europeans will not play ball, however, they must be in no doubt that Britain has the strength and will to go it alone.

Brexit | Some of The European Union’s draft negotiation principles

 . The EU wishes to have the United Kingdom as a close partner in the future

. Preserving the integrity of the Single Market means that the UK will not be able to participate on a sector by sector basis

. The EU “four freedoms” are indivisible and there can be no cherry-picking

. A non-member of the Union cannot have the same rights and benefits as a member

. The EU will negotiate as a bloc, rather than 27 individual countries, so as not to undercut the position of the Union

. Brexit negotiations will take place as a single package. They will only be considered settled when all individual items are agreed

. The United Kingdom and European Union must agree on their future relationship, but these discussions can only take place when there is sufficient clarity on the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the Union

. The Union is open to a transitional membership agreement, but this must be very clearly defined, time-limited and dependent on the UK maintaining EU membership obligations

. Negotiations must be completed by 29 March 2019

. No part of these negotiations can affect Gibraltar without an agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain

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Britain, Government, Politics

Britons will vote again on June 8 in a snap general election

UNITED KINGDOM

It is less than two years since the last UK general election, ten months since the Brexit referendum and some nine months since the present occupant of 10 Downing Street replaced David Cameron. They say a week is a long time in politics. Yesterday, the prime minister announced that the country would face yet more upheaval: a snap general election on June 8. Polls suggest that Theresa May’s Conservative Party will win comfortably. However, what shouldn’t be in doubt is that Britain’s negotiations with the European Union will make the election a far more complicated contest than Britain has seen in many years.

Under the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act of 2011, Mrs May needs the backing of two-thirds of the House of Commons to validate the calling of an election. Curiously, her own MPs will have to vote in favour of a motion-of-no-confidence in the government in order to bring the election about. But the sanctioning seems likely to be a formality: the leaders of the main opposition parties have already said they are in favour.

Whilst opposition parties could hardly be seen to turn down a chance to eject the government, the glaring truth is that for many in the Labour Party the election is uncomfortably timed. The official opposition trail the Tories in the polls by more than 20 percentage points, attributed mainly it is said to the unpopularity of Labour’s leader, Jeremy Corbyn, within the Parliamentary Labour Party. Mr Corbyn, a far-left socialist, was chosen with enthusiasm by the party’s members in 2015, and again in 2016, but who has failed uncharismatically to appeal to voters more widely.

What seems more probable is that Mrs May will easily extend her working majority, which currently stands at just 17. An electoral boost will give her a freer hand both in her EU negotiations and in setting an agenda at home (where she has so far proposed very little). A lack of obtaining a direct mandate is likely to be weighing heavily on the prime minister’s mind: she has never won a general election, having succeeded her predecessor at the helm of government only via a Tory Party leadership contest.

In Mrs May’s statement, she went further than announcing her intention to seek an election. She implied, too, that it was a chance to heal divisions over Brexit. “The country is coming together, but Westminster is not,” she said. In fact, something like the reverse is true: whereas polls and street marches show that a large minority remain bitterly against Brexit, in February MPs dutifully backed the legislation allowing her to trigger it by 492 votes to 122. Nonetheless, winning a general election would allow Mrs May to claim popular backing for her “hard” approach to Brexit—including taking Britain out of the EU’s single market—something that the referendum did not specify.

For the prime minister to go to the country as she has carries risks. One immediate penalty for doing so is giving up nearly two months of the government’s time and energy, when it has just two years to negotiate its exit terms with the EU. Notwithstanding a window that was already deemed narrow, the government’s agenda for agreeing Brexit terms looks even more hurried. Time is scarce and the clock is ticking. Mrs May might have calculated that not much really is going to happen until after the German elections in September, so there will be little to lose.

Another complicating factor is the unstable situation in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Only recently Mrs May turned down a request by Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s first minister, for an independence referendum in Scotland, on the basis that it would be irresponsible to hold such a vote when the terms of Brexit were not yet clear. It is hard to see why the same cannot be said of holding a general election now in Britain. In Northern Ireland, meanwhile, the power-sharing government is currently suspended, and there is the prospect of a fresh election to its devolved assembly.

The divisions over Brexit and the unpredictable consequences in how people will cast their vote is likely to be the biggest complication at home. The populist UK Independence Party was jubilant after achieving its defining ambition of Brexit last summer, and was billed by some as a future rival to Labour in many parts of England; it has, however, since flopped in by-elections. The left-leaning Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, have defined themselves as the opponents of Brexit, a strategy which has seen them picking up seats in council and parliamentary contests since the EU referendum. Some senior Conservatives worry that the Lib Dems will deprive them of victory in many parts of London and the south-west. These factors meant that the decision to go to the country was harder than it might have looked for a prime minister with a near-record lead in the polls.

Last year Mrs May ruled out an election before 2020. In performing a U-turn, she seems to have decided that the gamble is one worth taking.

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