Tag Archives: Turkey

Britain, Iraq, Islamic State, NATO, Syria, Turkey, United States

Turkey: why isn’t it doing anything to curb the advances of Islamic State?

THE LACK OF TURKISH ACTION

Almost 200,000 people have been forced to flee and abandon their homes, joining 1.5 million Syrian refugees already in Turkey.

Poorly equipped Kurdish fighters – men, women and children – have tried in vain with AK-47 assault rifles to hold back the maniacal hordes of Islamic State fighters. The terrorists are armed with modern, heavy-grade American weapons.

IS now has a clear grip on at least a third of the Syrian Kurdish stronghold of Kobani on the border with Turkey.

U.S. and Arab warplanes and drones have been targeting IS positions, but to little avail. U.S. General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accepts the town could fall, leaving its remaining citizens facing rape, murder and torture at the hands of the barbarians besieging it.

All the while, just a few hundred yards over the border, Turkish troops look on. As IS fighters stalk the deserted streets of the town, Turkish tanks in clear sight of the calamity stand idle.

Turkey’s inaction as Kobani falls has provoked worldwide fury. Kurdish expats have taken to the streets throughout the country, and at least 19 people are known to have died in violent clashes against the government’s troops and police.

Washington has ‘voiced concern’ about Turkey’s reluctance to engage IS, even though it has its own parliament’s approval to do so.

Less diplomatically, a U.S. State Department official reportedly told the New York Times: ‘This isn’t how a NATO ally acts while hell is unfolding a stone’s throw from its border.’

It does, indeed, seem outrageous that Turkey, the second-largest land power in NATO with 290,000 troops, and a candidate for EU membership, is doing nothing to prevent a massacre on its doorstep. Why does it view the prospect of IS’s dreaded black banner fluttering over a town near its border with such apparent equanimity?

The main reason – and it is a very simple one – is that Turkey abhors the 1.3million Syrian Kurds more than it hates IS.

Turkey is home to some 15million Kurds – about 20 per cent of its population – many of who are locked in a violent secessionist battle with the Turkish government.

What Turkey really fears is that the Syrian Kurds will establish their own state on the Turkey/Syria border, which could prove deeply destabilising in a country with such a large Kurdish population. Anything – even IS – that weakens the Syrian Kurds reduces that threat.

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Turkey has, for 30-years, fought a brutal war against the far-Left militant Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), until a fragile ceasefire was declared in 2013. In those blood-soaked decades, 40,000 people were killed in vicious fighting that involved suicide bombers on the terrorist PKK side, the flattening of Kurdish villages on the other – and widespread allegations of torture on both.

What makes Turkey particularly reluctant to defend the Syrian Kurds in Kobani is that they are allied to the PKK, and committed to Kurdish homeland. This explains why Turkish border guards have been stopping PKK militia and other Kurdish fighters from joining their Syrian kinsmen in Kobani to fight IS.

And why, in contrast, they turned a blind eye to foreign jihadis flying into Turkey to take the long bus journey over the border to Syria – not to mention the 3,000 Turks who have joined IS after being recruited in rundown provincial towns.

Turkey’s response to IS was certainly complicated by the terrorists’ seizure of 49 Turkish hostages in Syria. But rather than refuse to negotiate, the Turks exchanged them for 180 imprisoned IS sympathisers.

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has made it plain he sees no moral difference between the Kurds in Kobani and IS.

In a briefing, Mr Erdogan said: ‘It is wrong to view them differently; we need to deal with them jointly.’

One diplomat who is involved in attempting to build the anti-IS alliance says Erdogan hates the Syrian Kurds. What is more, the diplomat said, is that ‘he thinks they’re worse than IS.’

Elsewhere, the EU’s counter-terrorism co-ordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, said: ‘The Syrian Kurds are a big concern for Erdogan because he is not done with the PKK.’

Both the EU and the U.S. has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation. The irony is that the West is now implicitly relying on PKK fighters to relieve Kobani. And the fact is that, until IS came along, the Syrian Kurds were getting ever closer to their dreams of an autonomous state.

In the chaos of the Syrian civil war, they had declared their own statelet, calling it ‘Rojava’, which straddled Syria’s northern border with Turkey like a series of cantons.

An embattled President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, locked in a lethal war with IS, tolerated this arrangement, which put Kobani right in the centre of the statelet. Little wonder IS considers the town to be of such strategic significance.

The Syrian Kurds have taken their lead from Kurds in northern Iraq, who have established their own thriving and virtually autonomous regime in an oil-rich region now known as Iraqi Kurdistan.

The difference, however, is that Turkey does not see the Iraqi Kurds – who will have nothing to do with the PKK – as a threat. Ankara invested heavily in the region and has become increasingly dependent on Kurdistan’s oil and gas to fuel its own growth.

In contrast, Turkey fears that any concession to the Syrian Kurds will fuel demands from its own restive Kurdish population for autonomy.

On top of all of this, you have the autocratic and self-determined nature of Erdogan who, in a move reminiscent of Russia’s Vladimir Putin, appointed himself president this summer after serving 12-years as prime minister.

No Turkish leader since the death in 1938 of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, has invested himself with such power as Erdogan. But whereas Ataturk wanted to distance Turkey from its religious heritage, turning it into a power player in modern Europe, Erdogan has very different ideas.

As part of his general conservative push, Erdogan has been trying to re-orientate the country away from the decadent West and towards the Arab world, which the Ottoman Turks ruled for centuries.

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With his ambition to revive Turkey’s once-great power status, Erdogan has allied the country not only with the conservative Sunni Muslims of Saudi Arabia, but with the Muslim Brotherhood regime of former President Morsi in Egypt, and with the Sunni militant Palestinian group Hamas.

In doing so, he destroyed Turkey’s good relations with Israel, a staunch ally of the Kurds.

Relations with the newly-elected military regime in Egypt are grim, too. Erdogan’s emotional pull towards Sunni Arabs means he is implacably opposed to Syria’s President Assad, who is an ally of Shia Iran, and explains why he is so keen to back Assad’s enemies, even if it means backing IS.

That is why he is telling the U.S. that only if America extends its intervention in Syria to toppling Assad will he then move to help the Kurds in Kobani.

Erdogan will drive a very hard bargain before he contemplates any military action, not least because the Turks realise that while Western intervention comes and goes in the Middle East, Turkish intervention in Syria could involve the country in an intractable war that lasts decades.

Yet, this is a NATO country which the West hopes will put men on the ground to repulse IS. Some hope that is. For as well as supporting the terrorists, Turkey has been allowing British jihadis to cross its borders, while simultaneously claiming its desire to join the anti-IS coalition.

At this terrifying moment and juncture when IS appears to be unstoppable, it’s tragic for the West that Turkey is the country that holds most of the cards.

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Government, Middle East, Politics, Russia, Syria, United Nations, United States

Calming the violence in Syria…

Intro: The Geneva talks may help to calm the bloodshed in Syria, but there are other practical measures that can be taken

The Syrian peace talks which began this week in Switzerland began dramatically. The original invitation for Iran to join the talks was quickly reversed and the first significant and genuine attempt by the US and Russia to bring an end to the civil war that is tearing the country apart was made. If these efforts cannot be sustained, and many suspect they can’t, it will still be important for definitive steps to be taken into de-escalating the conflict. Such terrible losses and suffering on the Syrian people should not be understated.

The fact that the meeting in Geneva did take place really does matter. For the first time since the conflict began, the government and a faction of the opposition were brought together. This can only be an advance on what has happened between the two sides that have been driven by a need to kill each other. What is more, the energy which Washington and Moscow put into staging the talks is the clearest sign yet of a genuine desire to bring the conflict to an end. When the US and Europe saw such a meeting as a precursor to the inevitable demise of Bashar al-Assad some 18 months ago, the same supposition was not necessarily true. The military balance of power on the ground was such that government forces were never likely to suffer total defeat without a full-scale foreign intervention. That option disappeared when the US and Britain abandoned plans for a military strike last September, after a chemical gas attack was used on civilians in Damascus. Since then, a recipe for continuing the war has been the uncompromising demands for Assad’s surrender.

Practical measures could be taken to calm the violence. Local ceasefires do already exist and could be expanded, with UN observers monitoring on the ground ready and able to mediate on the need for a longer-term solution. Without that, hatred and distrust between the two sides will ensure that ceasefires have a short life-span. UN observers are also needed to help coordinate relief convoys to rebel-held enclaves, where people are starving and in dire need of humanitarian assistance and aid. The same applies to prisoner swaps.

Given that the Iranian and Saudi governments are crucial players on opposing sides of the conflict, it is unfortunate that Iran has been absent from this week’s talks. To have one and not the other present has undermined the credibility of the negotiations. The open willingness of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to see an end to the fighting without victory for the rebels – of whom they are the main financial and military supporters – must be tested.

A reduction in violence might also be achieved by pressuring Turkey to clamp down on jihadi fighters crossing its 500-mile-long border with Syria. Turkey denies any acquiescence, but all the evidence suggests that it has backed rebels of every persuasion.

The gravest challenge in setting up the Geneva conference has underlined just how difficult it will be in the future to get a multitude of players with differing interests, inside and outside of Syria, to agree to anything. But a negotiated peace is the only option in bringing to an end the slaughter in a conflict that is now almost into its fourth year. However far away a solution may seem to be all parties concerned have a duty in bringing the bloodshed and suffering in Syria to an end.

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Britain, Government, History, Intelligence, Military, United States

RAF Cold War missions over the former Soviet Union…

COVERT FLIGHTS

The RAF flew covert spying missions over the former Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War.

After decades of secrecy, CIA documents show British pilots were involved in the U-2 flights in 1959 and 1960.

These missions gathered vital intelligence which was regarded by the American intelligence services as being worth ‘a million dollars’.

Until now the Ministry of Defence has neither confirmed nor denied the participation of the RAF in the controversial missions, a position it will no longer be able to maintain.

The first U-2 flights over the Soviet Union started in July 1956, but despite the valuable information gathered, President Dwight Eisenhower was concerned about the ramifications of such a flagrant breach of Russian air space if they were discovered.

Unfortunately for the Americans, even though the high-tech U-2s flew at more than 70,000ft, the Russians were still able to track the planes.

The Soviets sent a strongly worded protest to Eisenhower, who developed second thoughts about the missions and suspended such flights in December 1956.

But the CIA was extremely keen for the spying missions to continue and looked for ways, in the words of one CIA document, ‘to increase the possibility of plausible denial’.

The solution was to use British pilots for the sensitive missions. During the spring of 1957, negotiations took place between the CIA and the chief of MI6, Sir Dick White, who saw the immediate benefits for Britain.

By the summer of 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had given his authorisation, and four RAF officers, Squadron Leader Christopher Walker and Flight Lieutenants Michael Bradley, John MacArthur and David Dowling – all of whom were in their twenties and single – were sent to train on flying the U-2s in Texas.

Flying the U-2s, however, was not without risk, and on July 8, 1958, Walker was killed when his plane crashed. The cause was never definitively established, but it is believed the aircraft disintegrated at high altitude.

He was immediately replaced by Wing Commander Robert Robinson. By 1959 all four men had finished their operational conversion to the U-2 and were sent to a secret air base in Turkey. From there they launched their flights over the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

In order to emphasise American denials of the operation, the U-2 planes were formally transferred on paper to the British Government. Eisenhower wrote to Macmillan, stating: ‘British missions are carried out on your authority and are your responsibility.’

And the flights remained a secret in Britain, too. The pilots were no longer paid by the RAF, but by MI6, and the public was told the airmen were engaging in ‘high-altitude weather-sampling missions’.

The first mission was flown by Wing Commander Robinson on December 6, 1959, over the Kapustin Yar missile test range and a squadron of long-range bombers in the Ukraine.

The missions proved to be hugely successful and proved the Soviets did not have as many bombers as they claimed – a vital piece of intelligence at the height of the Cold War. The head of the CIA referred to photographs taken by Wing Commander Robinson as being worth ‘a million dollars’.

The second British U-2 mission over the Soviet Union was flow by Flight Lieutenant John MacArthur the following month. Although his brief was to look for missile sites around the Aral Sea, he ended up uncovering a new type of Soviet bomber called the Tupolev Tu-22 at Kazan.

The Americans later resumed their involvement in the U-2 missions, but this came to an abrupt end in the wake of the Soviets shooting down and imprisoning US pilot Gary Powers in May 1960. The British ordered the RAF officers to leave Turkey immediately.

The following year, all four British RAF pilots received the Air Force Cross, although their citations in the London Gazette did not mention exactly why. After more than half a century, the truth has now been revealed.

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