Tag Archives: Ukraine war

Britain, Europe, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Kyiv’s allies should avoid Putin’s entrapment

PROPOSED UKRAINE CEASEFIRE

PUTTING a stop to the killing in Ukraine is a highly desirable aim. A permanent end to the war would be a truly great achievement. Who on this earth would not welcome an agreement that stopped Russia’s daily slaughter of civilians and its destruction of Ukraine’s cities, and which would allow millions of displaced people to return home? As history clearly shows, peace at any price is no peace at all. In his untutored haste, Donald Trump risks rushing into a bad deal with Vladimir Putin that could set the stage for renewed conflict in Ukraine and other vulnerable countries bordering Russia and for an overall weakening of Europe’s security.

The proposed 30-day truce under discussion between the US and Russia entails a complete halt to fighting and temporary freezing of the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. It makes provision for the exchange of prisoners of war, release of civilian detainees, and the return from Russia of abducted Ukrainian children. The truce could be extended beyond the initial period. But Putin is adamant that, before it even begins, many complex, longer-term issues must be addressed, including the most fundamental point of all: Ukraine’s future as an independent, sovereign state.

This attempt by the Russian president to set highly problematic conditions must be firmly resisted by Trump and western leaders. As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky says, it is a transparent bid to delay and manipulate the negotiations and win broader concessions, while allowing Moscow’s forces time to pursue battlefield gains, particularly in Russia’s contested Kursk region. It is not reasonable to insist on a halt to military aid to Kyiv during a truce. Putin’s demand that the historical “root causes” of the conflict be examined is a cynical ploy and trap, set to gain wider advantage.

Familiar tactics. Putin raises hopes of a breakthrough, then finds reasons why it must remain elusive. He tells untruths about the situation at the front, as in his fabricated claim that Ukrainian troops are encircled in Kursk. He flatters and plays Trump to his own tune, congratulating him for “doing everything” for peace and exploiting the US president’s ego-driven desire to keep his promise to end the war. Putin is brutally clear about his war aims: a neutral, disarmed Ukraine led by a Moscow-friendly government. His wider objective is an end to international ostracism, the lifting of punitive sanctions, and a remaking of Europe’s security architecture to suit his post-Soviet vision. All this to be achieved by a dramatic reset in US-Russia relations, as gaily and inexplicably offered, by his comrade in the White House.

Before making more unforced concessions, Trump should study very carefully this threatening agenda. He should remember this war would end today if Putin wished. He should understand the Russian bully does not want peace; he wants victory. He should stop at once regurgitating Russian propaganda. Most of all, he should stop his cruel persecution and intimidation of Zelensky and start applying substantial, painful pressure on Russia to halt its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. The fact that Trump is unlikely to do any of this goes to the heart of the problems surrounding the talks. For all his self-important bluster and insincere compassion, the “master dealmaker” does not have a plan extending beyond an immediate halt to the gunfire. Putin certainly does.

Trump’s optimistic prediction that a good agreement can be reached has little basis in fact. Britain, at least, is aware of this. Sir Keir Starmer says Putin is not serious about peace and should stop “playing games”. The PM’s latest attempt to rally European and other allies around a ceasefire deal backed by credible, in-theatre security guarantees is worthwhile. His “coalition of the willing” proposal, for example, is a key feature.

But Sir Keir surely knows that Trump’s mishandling of the negotiations so far, and his daily attempts to win personal credit for imaginary progress, as well as his persistent exclusion of the Ukrainians and his biased pressurising of Kyiv (but not Moscow), is unlikely to end well. No peacekeeping force, whether under a NATO, EU, or UN flag, can be deployed in Ukraine without viable security guarantees, principally from the US – which Trump withholds. Nor can it happen without Putin’s consent – and he is vehemently opposed.

The evident danger for Britain and Europe is that they may be strong-armed by Washington into endorsing and policing a flawed, short-term ceasefire cooked up by Trump and Putin that does not serve, and potentially undermines, their long-term objective: securing a free, sovereign Ukraine and putting a stop to Russian aggression. The dialogue between Putin and Trump is at an early stage, but who knows what Trump will give away next in his haste to claim the prestigious mantle of Nobel peacemaker, shaft his old foe Zelensky and appease his ex-KGB crony?

Trump has already told Ukraine it must accept the loss of occupied territory in the east and Crimea. He has already dashed its NATO membership hopes. He has already cut military aid and intelligence assistance once, refused to guarantee the peace, and publicly shamed and humiliated Zelensky in front of the world. And if a ceasefire fails to materialise, it’s a safe bet Trump will find a way to blame Kyiv.

Trump is no honest broker. He is no friend to Ukraine or Europe. Like Putin, he cannot be trusted to build or honour a just and lasting peace. A truce, on fair and reasonable terms, that Kyiv can freely accept, and that can be adequately monitored and effectively enforced, would be the way to proceed. In its absence, Ukraine must fight on with the support of Britain and other coalition partners.

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Britain, Government, NATO, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Give President Zelensky what he needs to defeat Putin

UKRAINE WAR

EUROPEAN leaders gathered at Blenheim Palace recently in a symposium that was a conduit for European solidarity. They surrounded Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in an image of steadfast support.

For Zelensky, he must be wondering how stalwart those allies really are. Two and a half years into Putin’s bloody and violent war, it must increasingly seem to Zelensky that NATO is offering just enough to keep Ukraine limping on – but not enough, anywhere near enough, in smashing Russian forces completely. What else could explain the West’s ambiguity and indecisiveness over the use of long-range weapons to attack targets inside Russia?

The British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has rebuffed Zelensky’s plea that he ditch the UK’s veto on Storm Shadow “bunker-buster” weapons, which have a range of up to 190 miles, easily capable of striking targets in Russia.

As it currently stands, the UK and other allies allow Ukraine to fire long-range missiles defensively at targets on Russian soil near the border, but not offensively or deep into Russian territory.

Such a position is, of course, calculated to avoid provoking Putin into wider retaliation. At the heart of that fear is the ultimate and terrifying prospect that the dictator might reach for the nuclear button, but even less apocalyptic concerns help to dictate policy.

Success in armed conflict can only be achieved if all the elements of the battlefield are dominated. In the traditional doctrine of NATO, this means winning “deep, close, and rear” battles – that is long-range strikes and raids on infrastructure (deep), front-line combat (close), and the essential support mechanisms such as logistics and headquarters (rear).

Just as Russia is hitting Ukrainian cities, factories, and infrastructure, any military general knows it is perfectly reasonable for Ukraine to do the same in order to degrade its enemy’s military capability. But with the current restrictions on missile use in place, Ukraine’s fighting forces can’t execute the “deep” battle. Zelensky is being forced to fight with one arm tied behind his back.

That’s why many are now pressing decision-makers in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris to authorise the use of long-range weapons, such as the UK’s Storm Shadow, to strike targets inside Russia.

That would likely lead to some escalation. But as in the Cold War, many strategists are confident this war, at least, won’t go nuclear, despite the warnings of those concerned about the UK’s deepening involvement in the conflict.

For one thing, Russian tactics would probably use a tactical nuclear weapon only to stop an enemy breakthrough in Ukraine. Such a breakthrough could only occur in one of the four eastern provinces that Putin has decreed to be forever Russian. Where is the logic in irradiating many square miles of your own soil?

Then there is the relationship between China and Russia to consider. President Xi has so far offered only mild support to Putin and is unquestionably the dominant partner in the relationship. China has consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Of course, matters could seriously escalate long before it reached nuclear proportions.

A cyber attack on the scale of the IT outage chaos caused by CrowdStrike is well within Russia’s capability, as is severing underwater communications or energy pipelines in the North Sea. And if the Houthi rebels in Yemen were capable of striking Tel Aviv, we cannot rule out a long-range conventional missile strike on a target in Western Europe, even potentially one on the UK.

Nevertheless, military strategists and theoreticians often refer to the concept of “limited war” – that is, restricted in its aims and its geography. The war in Ukraine does indeed have limits, but history has demonstrated that Putin’s ambition is not restrained in the same way.

Before Ukraine there was Chechnya and Georgia. Why, after Ukraine, should we not think there might be Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, or even all three? Why not Poland? Anxiety levels are already high in the Baltic States, and one has to wonder why at this moment in their history, both Sweden and Finland recently chose to join NATO. The fear of Russian expansion is tangible on Russia’s borders – no wonder the Poles are spending more than 4 per cent of GDP on defence and building the largest army in Europe.

Any discussion of Ukraine’s prospect of achieving military success must also confront the issue of Donald Trump returning to the White House in November. He has made the claim that he could settle the war in a day with one telephone call. If that’s the case, Ukraine must be given every chance to achieve a position of advantage on the battlefield before that call is made.

If this war is to have a successfully negotiated end, Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position at the start of any talks. The reality is that Putin must be stopped, and Ukraine is the place to stop him. The best means of doing so is by giving Kyiv what it needs to finish the job.

The price of stopping Putin now is far better than paying the price of a wider devastating war – as the history of the last century shows.

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