Tag Archives: Ukraine war

Britain, Europe, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, United States

Is Putin a drowning man?

PUTIN’S WAR IN UKRAINE

Intro: The paranoid dictator has built an impenetrable echo chamber around himself, within which he is told only what he wants to hear

Vladimir Putin’s war to subjugate Ukraine is going from bad to worse for the Russian tyrant.

Originally billed as a three-day “special military operation”, it is now in its fifth year, longer than Russia fought in World War One, and longer than the Soviet Union took to repel then defeat Nazi Germany in World War Two.

Nor is there any end in sight as Putin faces yet another summer of setbacks. The Russian military has long ceased to make any territorial gains in Ukraine and the human toil continues to mount.

British intelligence estimates Russian war deaths at half a million. At least another half a million have suffered horrible, life-changing injuries.

Putin is running out of manpower to replace casualties of over a million. His military is being forced to offer enlistment bonuses of up £60,000.

This sounds like a lot of money to most young Russians – until they discover that the average life expectancy of a new recruit once deployed – after training – on certain sections of the frontline is between just 20 and 35 minutes.

Putin is being forced to consider conscription. But that would make an unpopular war even more disliked.

Ukraine has fanned the war’s unpopularity by taking it to Russia’s home front. Increasingly sophisticated, long-range, lethal drone strikes have hit oil refineries, arms factories and other critical infrastructure deep inside Russian territory. They even managed to cripple an oil refinery in Siberia – 1,200 miles from the Ukrainian frontline.

Almost a third of Russia’s oil-refining capacity has been put out of service, some of it for a long time. Fuel depots have also been destroyed. As a result, there are now fuel shortages in more than a dozen regions across the country, even in Moscow (normally shielded from such inconveniences), where bad-tempered drivers are queuing ever longer for fuel.

There are now plans to import gasoline, quite an embarrassment for a country which pumps out 9 million barrels of crude oil a day.

It’s even worse in Crimea, which Putin annexed from Ukraine in 2014. The peninsula is home to a massive Russian military presence, a vital bridgehead supplying Russian forces on the frontline.

But a relentless series of Ukrainian strikes using new, more powerful, semi-autonomous drones on roads, bridges, railways and ferries has effectively isolated Crimea from Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine.

The drones stalk petrol tankers and military vehicles travelling on the main highways in and out of Crimea. Unsurprisingly, freight traffic has collapsed. The ferries have stopped. Fuel is scarce. And blackouts are common. Russia has even had to remove its powerful Black Sea fleet from Crimea to put it out of harm’s way. Quite the humiliation, since Ukraine doesn’t even have a navy.

It’s not clear how much Putin knows about any of this. The paranoid dictator has built an impenetrable echo chamber around himself, within which he is told only what he wants to hear.

It is populated by a mixture of senior military lackeys and old cronies from his KGB days. Bad news, they have easily worked out, isn’t a career-enhancing move. So they don’t give him any. They even produce a specially sanitised, bespoke version of the news for his delectation.

Stuck in this vortex of disinformation and downright lies, Putin often doesn’t have a clue what’s actually going on.

But even he couldn’t ignore the ominous dark clouds of burning oil over the Moscow sky some days ago, nor the black rain falling across the capital.

Ukrainian drones had struck the city’s main oil refinery again, this time putting it out of action for maybe 18 months and ensuring fuel shortages will remain a daily reality. Another humiliation, given Moscow has some of the best air defences in the world. Putin’s response was to retaliate.

He unleashed more than 70 missiles and almost 500 drones on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, killing at least 21 and wounding 85 in the capital alone.

The death toll will rise as rescuers rake through the rubble of some 20 residential blocks. It’s a gruesome business, but Putin is in no mood for peace.

His echo chamber is still telling him he can win – and nobody is within his earshot to gainsay or contradict that.

There are still more than 700,000 Russian troops massed in eastern Ukraine, maintaining deadly pressure on Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donbas which, if it were to fall, would put the whole country in peril.

Certainly, Russia has far more shells to fire than Ukraine and can deploy swathes of missiles and hundreds of guided bombs a day on a scale Ukraine cannot come near matching.

And frontline reports from battle-hardened Ukrainian soldiers who are aware of Russia’s suffering and setbacks, are reporting that there is still no sign of its forces collapsing.

Putin is being told all that – and more. But the home front continues to deteriorate. The initial war-driven stimulus is petering out: the economy grew by only one per cent last year, it will be less than that this year.

Unemployment remains very low. But that merely reflects the loss of so many lives on the battlefield and the fact so many other young folk have fled the country to escape military service.

Inflation and interest rates are cripplingly high. The national debt and the annual budget deficit were in fine fettle when the war started. But while the debt is still low, budget deficits are rising fast as defence devours almost 10 per cent of GDP (and half of all state spending). The national wealth fund, which has been pillaged to pay for the war, has run out of liquid assets to finance it.

More than 60 per cent of Russians now think economic conditions are worsening, and 56 per cent believe that the war is hitting their living standards.

Concerns about a deteriorating economy are adding to the growing anti-war mood. Public opinion is clearly souring on Putin’s “special military operation”.

Dictators, of course, don’t have to bother about public opinion – at least not for a while. But there’s always the risk they will do something stupid.  

You might think that a stalemate with no end in sight and an increasingly restless populace would encourage Putin to call for a ceasefire and sue for peace. Donald Trump, after all, has said he can keep all his ill-gotten gains in eastern Ukraine in any peace deal and can look forward to all manner of lucrative Trump-inspired business deals. 

Putin is just as likely, though, to double down and strike elsewhere to deflect attention from Ukraine and rouse Russian patriotism. The Kremlin is already waging extensive cyber and hybrid warfare against the Western democracies, including Britain.

That could be ramped up, creating various crises and confrontations on the way, keeping Ukraine out of the headlines.

More seriously, Putin could threaten Poland or the Baltic states or even Scandinavia, contriving a small-scale incursion to test NATO’s resolve.

The timing would be propitious for him: NATO has never looked more fragile, thanks to Trump’s hostility to the European democracies and his penchant for dictators like Putin.

The Trump administration has already cancelled the deployment of an armoured brigade to Poland and withdrawn an infantry brigade from Romania.

Pete Hegseth, the blowhard US defence secretary whose animosity to Europe knows no bounds, is reviewing what further US troop withdrawals should follow. He wants to move quickly.

Nothing is more likely to embolden Putin to seek a way out of his Ukrainian troubles than a show of weakness on NATO’s flank.

One expert has likened it to “drowning man” syndrome – the desperate measures a struggling swimmer will take to keep afloat, even pushing others under water to stay alive.

Thanks, then, to the resolve and bravery of the Ukrainian people, Putin is that drowning man.

The NATO allies have the resources and determination not to be pushed under by him.

If they stay resolute and united he will eventually sink to the bottom – if only President Trump didn’t keep indicating he’s minded to throw him a lifebelt.

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Britain, Europe, Government, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Kyiv’s allies should avoid Putin’s entrapment

PROPOSED UKRAINE CEASEFIRE

PUTTING a stop to the killing in Ukraine is a highly desirable aim. A permanent end to the war would be a truly great achievement. Who on this earth would not welcome an agreement that stopped Russia’s daily slaughter of civilians and its destruction of Ukraine’s cities, and which would allow millions of displaced people to return home? As history clearly shows, peace at any price is no peace at all. In his untutored haste, Donald Trump risks rushing into a bad deal with Vladimir Putin that could set the stage for renewed conflict in Ukraine and other vulnerable countries bordering Russia and for an overall weakening of Europe’s security.

The proposed 30-day truce under discussion between the US and Russia entails a complete halt to fighting and temporary freezing of the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. It makes provision for the exchange of prisoners of war, release of civilian detainees, and the return from Russia of abducted Ukrainian children. The truce could be extended beyond the initial period. But Putin is adamant that, before it even begins, many complex, longer-term issues must be addressed, including the most fundamental point of all: Ukraine’s future as an independent, sovereign state.

This attempt by the Russian president to set highly problematic conditions must be firmly resisted by Trump and western leaders. As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky says, it is a transparent bid to delay and manipulate the negotiations and win broader concessions, while allowing Moscow’s forces time to pursue battlefield gains, particularly in Russia’s contested Kursk region. It is not reasonable to insist on a halt to military aid to Kyiv during a truce. Putin’s demand that the historical “root causes” of the conflict be examined is a cynical ploy and trap, set to gain wider advantage.

Familiar tactics. Putin raises hopes of a breakthrough, then finds reasons why it must remain elusive. He tells untruths about the situation at the front, as in his fabricated claim that Ukrainian troops are encircled in Kursk. He flatters and plays Trump to his own tune, congratulating him for “doing everything” for peace and exploiting the US president’s ego-driven desire to keep his promise to end the war. Putin is brutally clear about his war aims: a neutral, disarmed Ukraine led by a Moscow-friendly government. His wider objective is an end to international ostracism, the lifting of punitive sanctions, and a remaking of Europe’s security architecture to suit his post-Soviet vision. All this to be achieved by a dramatic reset in US-Russia relations, as gaily and inexplicably offered, by his comrade in the White House.

Before making more unforced concessions, Trump should study very carefully this threatening agenda. He should remember this war would end today if Putin wished. He should understand the Russian bully does not want peace; he wants victory. He should stop at once regurgitating Russian propaganda. Most of all, he should stop his cruel persecution and intimidation of Zelensky and start applying substantial, painful pressure on Russia to halt its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. The fact that Trump is unlikely to do any of this goes to the heart of the problems surrounding the talks. For all his self-important bluster and insincere compassion, the “master dealmaker” does not have a plan extending beyond an immediate halt to the gunfire. Putin certainly does.

Trump’s optimistic prediction that a good agreement can be reached has little basis in fact. Britain, at least, is aware of this. Sir Keir Starmer says Putin is not serious about peace and should stop “playing games”. The PM’s latest attempt to rally European and other allies around a ceasefire deal backed by credible, in-theatre security guarantees is worthwhile. His “coalition of the willing” proposal, for example, is a key feature.

But Sir Keir surely knows that Trump’s mishandling of the negotiations so far, and his daily attempts to win personal credit for imaginary progress, as well as his persistent exclusion of the Ukrainians and his biased pressurising of Kyiv (but not Moscow), is unlikely to end well. No peacekeeping force, whether under a NATO, EU, or UN flag, can be deployed in Ukraine without viable security guarantees, principally from the US – which Trump withholds. Nor can it happen without Putin’s consent – and he is vehemently opposed.

The evident danger for Britain and Europe is that they may be strong-armed by Washington into endorsing and policing a flawed, short-term ceasefire cooked up by Trump and Putin that does not serve, and potentially undermines, their long-term objective: securing a free, sovereign Ukraine and putting a stop to Russian aggression. The dialogue between Putin and Trump is at an early stage, but who knows what Trump will give away next in his haste to claim the prestigious mantle of Nobel peacemaker, shaft his old foe Zelensky and appease his ex-KGB crony?

Trump has already told Ukraine it must accept the loss of occupied territory in the east and Crimea. He has already dashed its NATO membership hopes. He has already cut military aid and intelligence assistance once, refused to guarantee the peace, and publicly shamed and humiliated Zelensky in front of the world. And if a ceasefire fails to materialise, it’s a safe bet Trump will find a way to blame Kyiv.

Trump is no honest broker. He is no friend to Ukraine or Europe. Like Putin, he cannot be trusted to build or honour a just and lasting peace. A truce, on fair and reasonable terms, that Kyiv can freely accept, and that can be adequately monitored and effectively enforced, would be the way to proceed. In its absence, Ukraine must fight on with the support of Britain and other coalition partners.

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Britain, Government, NATO, Politics, Russia, Society, Ukraine, United States

Give President Zelensky what he needs to defeat Putin

UKRAINE WAR

EUROPEAN leaders gathered at Blenheim Palace recently in a symposium that was a conduit for European solidarity. They surrounded Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in an image of steadfast support.

For Zelensky, he must be wondering how stalwart those allies really are. Two and a half years into Putin’s bloody and violent war, it must increasingly seem to Zelensky that NATO is offering just enough to keep Ukraine limping on – but not enough, anywhere near enough, in smashing Russian forces completely. What else could explain the West’s ambiguity and indecisiveness over the use of long-range weapons to attack targets inside Russia?

The British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has rebuffed Zelensky’s plea that he ditch the UK’s veto on Storm Shadow “bunker-buster” weapons, which have a range of up to 190 miles, easily capable of striking targets in Russia.

As it currently stands, the UK and other allies allow Ukraine to fire long-range missiles defensively at targets on Russian soil near the border, but not offensively or deep into Russian territory.

Such a position is, of course, calculated to avoid provoking Putin into wider retaliation. At the heart of that fear is the ultimate and terrifying prospect that the dictator might reach for the nuclear button, but even less apocalyptic concerns help to dictate policy.

Success in armed conflict can only be achieved if all the elements of the battlefield are dominated. In the traditional doctrine of NATO, this means winning “deep, close, and rear” battles – that is long-range strikes and raids on infrastructure (deep), front-line combat (close), and the essential support mechanisms such as logistics and headquarters (rear).

Just as Russia is hitting Ukrainian cities, factories, and infrastructure, any military general knows it is perfectly reasonable for Ukraine to do the same in order to degrade its enemy’s military capability. But with the current restrictions on missile use in place, Ukraine’s fighting forces can’t execute the “deep” battle. Zelensky is being forced to fight with one arm tied behind his back.

That’s why many are now pressing decision-makers in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris to authorise the use of long-range weapons, such as the UK’s Storm Shadow, to strike targets inside Russia.

That would likely lead to some escalation. But as in the Cold War, many strategists are confident this war, at least, won’t go nuclear, despite the warnings of those concerned about the UK’s deepening involvement in the conflict.

For one thing, Russian tactics would probably use a tactical nuclear weapon only to stop an enemy breakthrough in Ukraine. Such a breakthrough could only occur in one of the four eastern provinces that Putin has decreed to be forever Russian. Where is the logic in irradiating many square miles of your own soil?

Then there is the relationship between China and Russia to consider. President Xi has so far offered only mild support to Putin and is unquestionably the dominant partner in the relationship. China has consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Of course, matters could seriously escalate long before it reached nuclear proportions.

A cyber attack on the scale of the IT outage chaos caused by CrowdStrike is well within Russia’s capability, as is severing underwater communications or energy pipelines in the North Sea. And if the Houthi rebels in Yemen were capable of striking Tel Aviv, we cannot rule out a long-range conventional missile strike on a target in Western Europe, even potentially one on the UK.

Nevertheless, military strategists and theoreticians often refer to the concept of “limited war” – that is, restricted in its aims and its geography. The war in Ukraine does indeed have limits, but history has demonstrated that Putin’s ambition is not restrained in the same way.

Before Ukraine there was Chechnya and Georgia. Why, after Ukraine, should we not think there might be Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, or even all three? Why not Poland? Anxiety levels are already high in the Baltic States, and one has to wonder why at this moment in their history, both Sweden and Finland recently chose to join NATO. The fear of Russian expansion is tangible on Russia’s borders – no wonder the Poles are spending more than 4 per cent of GDP on defence and building the largest army in Europe.

Any discussion of Ukraine’s prospect of achieving military success must also confront the issue of Donald Trump returning to the White House in November. He has made the claim that he could settle the war in a day with one telephone call. If that’s the case, Ukraine must be given every chance to achieve a position of advantage on the battlefield before that call is made.

If this war is to have a successfully negotiated end, Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position at the start of any talks. The reality is that Putin must be stopped, and Ukraine is the place to stop him. The best means of doing so is by giving Kyiv what it needs to finish the job.

The price of stopping Putin now is far better than paying the price of a wider devastating war – as the history of the last century shows.

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